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UN-EU Cooperation in International Peace and Security:
The Driving Force Behind Peacekeeping Cooperation

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Abstract

In recent years, cooperation between the UN and the EU in the realm of international peacekeeping has gone through major changes, including the remarkable achievement of a ‘Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management’ through which both organisations promised their primary role and responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Although the EU has reiterated its commitment to play a decisive role as a reliable peacekeeping actor within the UN framework, the decision of the EU to not always engage in international peacekeeping operations alongside the UN is puzzling. The aim of this dissertation is to examine the major driving forces behind decision-making which may determine the likelihood of EU cooperation with the UN in international peacekeeping, by asking: *‘under what condition do EU Member States lead UN-related peacekeeping operations?’*

Using a revised two-level game approach, this thesis identifies the most important chief negotiators involved in negotiations, and analyses the dynamics of decision-making between the UN and the EU on the issue of international peacekeeping at two different levels: international UN level and domestic EU level. Variables and conditions under which chief negotiator(s) are more likely to provide active leadership to drive the EU to decide to engage in a peacekeeping operation are investigated with insights from two prominent IR theories; realist and social constructivist theories. Hypotheses drawn from each theory and the roles of chief negotiators are examined in each of three cases selected: Operation Artemis (2003), EUFOR RD Congo (2006), and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2007). With the key research outcomes from a comparative analysis of the three case studies, the thesis aims to contribute to comprehensive debates on the role of the EU as a promising partner of the UN in international peacekeeping.

Declaration

I hereby declare that, except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is entirely my own work, and that no part of it has been submitted for any other degree or qualification.

Yunmi Choi

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AMIS	AU Mission in Sudan
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CFADS	Franco-German Defence and Security Council
CFSP	Common Foreign Security Policy
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
COG	Chief of Government
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives (European Union)
CSG	Council General Secretariat of the European Union
DG	Directorate-General (European Commission)
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC	European Community
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUPM	EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
FARDC	Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FCdr	Force Commander
FHQ	Force Headquarters
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council (European Union)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HR (SG/HR)	Secretary General of the Council General Secretariat and High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
IDPs	Internally displaced persons
IEA	International Energy Agency

IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IEMF	Interim Emergency Multinational Force
IPC	Ituri Pacific Commission
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MS	Member States
MSO	Military Strategic Option
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAVFOR	Naval Force (European Union)
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
OPLAN	Operational Plan
PMG	Politico-Military Working Group
PSC	Political and Security Committee
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
RELEX	Directorate-General for the External Relations (European Union)
SG	Secretary-General (United Nations)
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
VICOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

Chapter 1

Introduction

The UN and the EU: Promising Partners in Peacekeeping?

“The UN and the EU are natural partners. We share the same values and objectives, [...] and we are engaged across the international agenda, from peace and security to democratization [sic], from humanitarian assistance to environmental protection. While the partnership adds value at the policy level, our overarching intent is to translate these norms into practical realities.”

Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, 2009¹

Introduction

Over the past half century, the issue of international peace and security has occupied a central position in the international political system. Unpredictable and unstable events in international relations (IR) have increasingly exposed the need to promote cooperation in international peacekeeping. In this respect, to deal with threats to international peace and security in both a consistent and effective manner, the United Nations (UN) has spent decades improving its capacity. The UN has conducted various peacekeeping missions in which the so-called ‘*Blue helmets*’ were, and are still currently deployed, in conflict areas. Such deployments are buttressed in the UN’s universal mandate and legitimacy at the legal, political and operational level. French President Jacques Chirac highlighted the role of the UN, *inter alia* the Security Council, which is to assume the right to utilise the use of military

¹ Forwarded by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to the UN-EU Partnership Report, “*Improving Lives: Result of the partnership between the United Nations and the European Union in 2009*”, Brussels: United Nations System in Brussels, 2009.

force, and stressed that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the UN.² The UN has thus been considered the uncontested central player in the realm of international peace and security in terms of its legitimacy. No other organisation was in a position to compete with the UN, and states barely considered the possibility of carrying out peacekeeping operations outside of the UN framework.³

However, as peace operations became more multifunctional and multidimensional, the UN encountered many difficulties and challenges in its peacekeeping activities. Since the 1990s, a growing demand for *blue helmets* has led the UN to enter into a number of highly complex and expensive operations. Some 80,000 peacekeepers have been deployed in over 30 different operations. Such deployments have brought the UN's capacity near the point of overstretching. The UN began to lose its centrality when its peace operations encountered considerable losses and fatal implementation failures in volatile regions such as Somalia (1993), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995) and Rwanda (1994). These difficulties and challenges led to an erosion of the UN's credibility, and this in turn led to the inevitable reappraisal of the UN's role.⁴

Given the significant challenges facing the UN and the growing global demand for peace operations, the UN Security Council decided to appeal to regional organisations to provide robust assistance in order to enhance UN capacities with well-trained, equipped, mission-ready and rapidly deployable forces.⁵ Moreover, as international voices against American unilateralism were amplified following the aftermath of the war against Iraq in 2003, the question of effective multilateralism to deal with security threats has been increasingly posed in hot international political disputes. Greater international and regional collaboration was required to fulfil the demand for multilateral crisis management. As a result, the UN is no longer the only universal security actor conducting peace operations. The increasing number of peace operations mounted by regional organisations has doubled in the past decade. Efforts by regional actors to develop their own ability to manage and sustain peace operations alongside the UN have created new opportunities for the development of more

² Speech of President Chirac to the General Assembly, New York, 23 September 2003.

³ For example, see E. Newman, *A Crisis of Global Institutions?: Multilateralism and International Security*, London: Routledge, 2007, pp.43-55. and T. Tardy, "UN Peace Operations in Light of the Events of 11 September 2001" in T. Tardy (ed.), *Peace Operations After 11 September 2001*, New York: Frank Class, 2004, p.14.

⁴ Thierry Tardy (2004), *Ibid.*, p.14.

⁵ Government document of Canada, International Consultative Group, "Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations", Ottawa, September 1995, p. 7.

flexible and enhanced cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in the field of international peace and security.

Meanwhile, since the 1990s, the European Union (EU) has staked out a growing role in peace and security by developing structures and capabilities for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sustained by European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).⁶ The EU has presented itself as a reliable regional security actor committed to strengthening UN peacekeeping capabilities. The EU and its member states have also emphasised the need for cooperation between the UN and the EU in carrying out effective global peace operations. By espousing these commitments and dedicating substantial efforts to their realisation, the EU has gradually come to be expected to play a decisive role in maintaining international peace and security. The UN welcomed the EU's willingness to share its heavy peacekeeping burden, and finally called upon the EU to play an important role in a wide range of international peacekeeping operations in close cooperation with the UN.⁷ Not surprisingly, the question of whether the smaller and regional EU can 'rescue' the larger and multilateral UN became one of the salient issues in the realm of international peace and security.⁸

Although the EU has reiterated its commitment to play a decisive role as a reliable peacekeeping actor within the UN framework, the decision of the EU to not always lead or engage in peacekeeping operations alongside the UN is mystifying. Besides, despite the fact that a consensus-based decision-making mechanism in the second pillar of the Union, *i.e.* CFSP, involves all EU member states, there exist considerable tensions between members and the levels of interests and active roles played by EU actors vary across different operations. Some EU member states exclusively tend to jostle or to be reluctant to influence on a peacekeeping agenda, which results in a different negotiation outcome over UN-EU peacekeeping initiatives. Empirical evidence suggests that UN-EU cooperation seems to not

⁶ With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been relabelled the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since December 2010. However, as most part of this research project has gone through pre-CSDP period, this thesis refers to the European common security and defence policy as ESDP.

⁷ For example, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which took over from the UN mission (UNMIBH), was deployed in January 2003. UN Security Council Resolution 1396 (2002) "welcomed" the EU's willingness to provide EU police mission in the country. Operation *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was authorised following UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003). The EU deployed its military forces to the north-east regions of the DRC on a temporal basis until the UN mission (MONUC) was reinforced. See also EU Presidency Statement, 'Review of Peacekeeping Operations', New York, 16 October 2003.

⁸ For example, see D. Hannay, *"Making Multilateralism Work"*, CER Bulletin, No. 40, London: Centre for European Reform, 2005; and K.V. Laatikainen and K.E. Smith, *The European Union at the United Nations*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p.3.

always happen as favourably as predicted in accordance with formal commitments and agreements. Given this puzzling paradox, this thesis seeks to examine the important conditions that may drive the EU to decide to take a responsibility in a peacekeeping operation.

1.1 Research Question

In 2008, there were many illegal armed groups triggering violence and conflicts in the Kivu, east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). A quarter of a million people were forced to flee their homes and hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded as a result of intense fighting between the rebel forces, and Congolese army soldiers and their allied militia.⁹ A question immediately arose regarding protecting civilians and handling peacekeeping in the region; should the EU send an additional force to back up the extraordinarily overstretched MONUC?¹⁰ The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged the EU to take immediate action to protect civilians who were at severe risk in eastern Congo. EU ambassadors met on 31 October in Brussels to consider the UN's request for the deployment of an EU force. Although Belgium, the former colonial power in the DRC, expressed a particular willingness to support the operation, France did not have much interest.¹¹ In addition, Germany also opposed the UN Secretary-General's request for the deployment of a military operation in eastern DRC.¹² As an excuse for rejecting the UN's request, EU diplomats said that they preferred to see "MONUC use its existing troops more efficiently before deciding whether an EU force was needed."¹³ In the end, the EU undertook no commitment or action.

Despite the urgent request of the UN Security Council followed by intensive EU-level discussions for a possible deployment of troops, the EU Member States decided not to deploy their forces to the DRC. This was an unanticipated outcome, because it seemed obvious that the EU and its member states should have been willing to cooperate with the UN in maintaining peace and security in the DRC. The EU and its member states have reiterated on several occasions their determined readiness to fulfil the responsibility to

⁹ For more information, see Human Rights Watch, "DR Congo: Civilians Under Attack Need Urgent Protection", 7 November 2008.

¹⁰ Interview with senior officer, EU Commission, Brussels, 28 April 2010.

¹¹ Interview with national officer, Council of the European Union, 29 April 2010.

¹² See Roy H. Ginsberg, "*Measuring and Evaluating CSDP Impact: The Case of EU-NATO Relations*", paper submitted for the Twelfth Biennial International Conference of the European Union Studies Association, Boston, Massachusetts, March 2011, p7.

¹³ Human Rights Watch, *op.cit.*

contribute to conflict prevention and peacekeeping in the DRC for humanitarian and normative reasons.¹⁴ In fact, the UN and the EU had already gone through successful tests and developments of close cooperation in peacekeeping, particularly in the DRC, through a number of operations including Operation *Artemis* (2003), EUSEC RD Congo (2005), EUFOR RD Congo (2006), and EUPOL in Kinshasa (2007). Hence there was a credible belief within the international community that the EU would play a most robust role in enhancing the peacekeeping operation in the DRC, especially when requested to do so by the UN. It is also noteworthy that whereas France demonstrated its pivotal role in receiving the EU's imprimatur for a military mission in the Ituri region of the DRC in 2003, France expressed loss of appetite to respond to the UN's request for further peacekeeping support in 2008. This empirical case allows us to critically address some theoretical puzzles; under what conditions is the EU, especially its major states, most likely to cooperate with the UN in peacekeeping? Who and/or what determines whether UN-EU peacekeeping occurs?

The study initially aimed to investigate the most significant motivations of the UN and the EU to cooperate respectively, giving an equal weight to both organisations. However, given the inter-governmental nature of the EU's decision-making in the specific area of foreign and security policy, it is the EU member states that are the most decisive and powerful actors insofar as the issue of UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation is concerned. According to Ginsberg, a unique status of the EU that is "neither a military alliance nor a single sovereign state" becomes "challenges that the EU faces in the field of international security and crisis management".¹⁵ Ginsberg notes that the role of the EU as an international actor in foreign and security affairs needs to be evaluated through a perspective that ranges in levels of national effect of member states "from nil to marginal political impact and from considerable to significant political impact".¹⁶ As Ginsberg points out, within this policy structure, each member state holds a different influence or impact on decision-making, and the likelihood of EU's agreement and collective action seems to be more possible when the initiative is taken by the great powers.

¹⁴ For example, see Anglo-French summit (2003), *Declaration on Franco-British cooperation in Africa*, Le Touquet, 4 February 2003; and *Council Conclusions on the Great Lakes Region*, 2879th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg, 16-17 June 2008.

¹⁵ R.H. Ginsberg (2011), *op. cit.*, p.3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.5. For a detailed examination of the ranges of foreign policy impact, see also Roy H. Ginsberg, *Demystifying the European Union: The Enduring Logic of Regional Integration*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010.

Upon an empirical investigation, the study discovers that there is one type of important variation across all UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation: leadership. To be more specific, in each case of UN-EU peacekeeping, the level of leadership or active role of the major states varied, and EU's approval for the UN's request for peacekeeping cooperation came about when considerable leadership was provided by the bigger states. This research posits that the variation on the role of the European major states is one of the most important factors which may determine the likelihood of EU's decision to engage with the UN in international peacekeeping operations.

Hence, the primary research question is clear: *under what conditions do EU Member States lead UN-related peacekeeping operations?* In order to answer the primary research question, there are two key steps in the analytical process. First, we must identify the most important EU actors who provided leadership during the dynamic interactions between the UN and the EU. Second, we must investigate the key motivational factors that contribute to the leadership role of the EU actors in decision-making. Theoretical perspectives are employed to elaborate on the plausible explanations. Combining the two sets of conclusions derived from the analysis, the study offers the best explanations for the driving force behind the EU's decision-making on a robust peacekeeping engagement with the UN.

1.2 Peacekeeping Operations

The Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945, is the foundation document for all of the UN's work. According to the UN Charter, the UN was established to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security.¹⁷ More specifically, the Charter gives the UN Security Council primary responsibility and power to take collective action for the maintenance of international peace and security, which led to the Security Council's adoption of a range of measures for peace operations, including the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation. However, the term 'peacekeeping' *per se* is not explicitly provided in the Charter, but has evolved into one of the main tools used by the UN to achieve this purpose.

¹⁷ See Preamble and Article 1 of the Charter I (Purposes and Principles) of the United Nations.

Chapter VIII of the Charter stipulates that the UN shall work with regional organisations acting within their geographical area. Collaboration between the UN and the EU has developed steadily since the first UN-EU Troika meeting in 2000. Both the UN and the EU are gradually asserting their promising roles and partnership as global players in the maintenance of international peace and security. Yet, even though UN-EU cooperation is founded on shared common values such as human rights, rule of law and democracy, the range of UN-EU cooperation activities or modalities in international peace and security has not been clearly defined or specified. In fact, UN-EU cooperation takes a range of forms and denotations depending on the tasks to be carried out. Moreover, cooperation between the UN and the EU often adopts different terms that have a favourable resonance, so that states or institutions are inclined to use them in their statements and rhetoric in circumstances where it will look appropriate. Examples include ‘UN-EU cooperation in peace operations’,¹⁸ ‘Joint declaration on UN-EU cooperation in crisis management’,¹⁹ ‘EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management’,²⁰ ‘EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management operations’,²¹ and ‘UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping operations’.²²

Given this situation, cooperation between the UN and the EU needs to be approached with a precise and specific definition and scope within the realm of international peace and security. This study does not focus on the utility of the concept of peace and security. While the research does not propose to engage with the various perspectives and debates on peace operations, it suggests using the term ‘peacekeeping’ to label issues which share a number of characteristics of civil-military operations and which, in recent years, have been at the centre of negotiations between the UN and the EU. As it is the focus of this study, it is important to define peacekeeping in order to understand how it relates to and differs from a range of other peace and security activities, as well as to limit the scope of the research. Therefore, it is pertinent to offer a short review of the various definitions of peace operations, which include peacekeeping.

¹⁸ For example, see T. Tardy, “*Limits and Opportunities of UN-EU Relations in Peace Operations: Implications for DPKO*”, UN DPKO, September 2003.

¹⁹ For example, European Council, “*Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management*”, 24 September 2003.

²⁰ For example, European Council conclusions, “*EU-UN Cooperation in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management*”, Brussels, 06 June 2001.

²¹ For example, European Council, “*EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations: Element of Implementation of EU-UN Joint Declaration*”, Brussels, 17-18 June 2004; and C. Major, “*EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006*”, EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Occasional Paper n° 72, 2008.

²² For example, T. Tardy, “*EU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping: A Promising Relationship in a Constrained Environment*”, in M. Ortega (ed.), *The European Union and the United Nations: Partners in Effective Multilateralism*, EUISS, Chaillot Paper n°78, 2005, pp. 49-68.

What is Peacekeeping?

Peace operations, broadly, are supposed to embrace the whole gamut of activities performed by states, international organisations and other actors when dealing collectively with a conflict. The spectrum of peace operations was carefully and precisely presented in the *Brahimi Report*.²³ According to this report, UN peace operations entail the following principal activities: conflict prevention; peacemaking; peace enforcement; peacekeeping; and peace-building.²⁴

Conflict prevention addresses the structural sources of prevention in order to build a solid foundation for peace and security. When those foundations crumble, conflict prevention generally involves the application of a diplomatic initiative or measure to reinforce them, thereby conflict prevention seeks to “keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict”.²⁵ Ideally, it should build on structured measures including early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict. Such preventive action or confidence-building measures are, by definition, low profile activities; “when successful, it may even go unnoticed altogether”.²⁶

Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them to a halt. In other words, peacemaking usually uses diplomatic action or mediation to facilitate the resolution of the conflict, which brings hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. For this reason, the role of peacemakers in diplomacy and mediation is deemed as particularly important. Peacemakers can be envoys of governments, groups of states, regional organisations or the United Nations. Peacemaking efforts may also be undertaken by unofficial and non-governmental groups, or by a prominent personality working independently.²⁷

²³ The report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations is commonly called the *Brahimi Report*, named after the chairman of the committee which produced it, Lakhdal Brahimi. This report addressed many of the dysfunctionalities of the United Nations, chiefly its inability to carry out its mission for lack of a proper global information collection, processing, and analysing capability.

²⁴ See Brahimi Report, “*Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*”, UN General Assembly(A/55/305) and/or Security Council(S/2000/809), New York, 21 August 2000. Meanwhile, NATO uses the term ‘Peace Support Operations’ or ‘Crisis Response Operations’, while the European Union prefers the broader expression ‘Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management’.

²⁵ “*United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guideline*”, published by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2008, p.17.

²⁶ Brahimi Report (2000), *op. cit.*, para. 10.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 11.

Peace enforcement involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force to separate combatants and to create a cease-fire that does not exist. It requires the explicit authorisation of the Security Council. However, peace enforcement operations are usually beyond the UN's ability to command, control, and plan. Instead, they are often carried out by a coalition of countries or by a regional organisation such as NATO. Peace enforcement operations are likely to disregard state sovereignty, particularly if the mission takes place on the soil of the combatant who opposes peace and has not invited the peace enforcers into their territory. For this reason, an international mandate is normally necessary for the operation to be considered legitimate.

Peacekeeping, as defined by the UN, is "a way to help countries torn by conflict create the conditions for sustainable peace and security".²⁸ Peacekeeping is a 60-year-old enterprise that started off primarily as a military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars. In the past decade it has rapidly evolved to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to build the foundations for sustainable peace.²⁹ Peacekeeping is designed to preserve peace and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by peacemakers. The nature of peacekeeping includes, but is not limited to, the monitoring of the withdrawal of combatants from a former conflict area, the supervision of elections, and the provision of reconstruction aid.

Peace-building is a complex, comprehensive, and long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. Peace-building is a term of more recent origin that defines broad "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for "building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war".³⁰ Thus, peace-building involves broader measures aimed at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels to effectively, as well as legitimately, carry out state core functions for conflict management.³¹ Peace-building includes, but is not limited to, reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law,³² providing technical support

²⁸ See "60 Years of United Nations Peacekeeping: Looking Back and Moving Forward", published by the United Nations, 2008; and "What is peacekeeping?", United Nations, 2008.

²⁹ See Brahimi Report (2000), *op. cit.*, para. 12; and "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guideline" (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 18.

³⁰ Brahimi Report (2000), *Ibid.*, para. 13.


³¹ "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guideline" (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 18.

³² For instance, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform.

for democratic development, and improving respect for human rights through education.³³ By addressing such a comprehensive range of measures, peace-building seeks to strengthen the foundation for sustainable peace and development.

Peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity, but the boundaries between different peace operations – conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-building, and peace enforcement – have become closely linked and even blurred, as seen in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1. 1 The linkages of Peace Operations



Hence, while UN peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed for the primary purpose of supporting the implementation of a peace agreement or a ceasefire, they are also likely to be involved in peacemaking and early peace-building activities to play a robust role in peace operations. In this context, MacQueen perceives a peacekeeping operation as an “activity with extremely flexible boundaries”, for which defining a dimension of peacekeeping is difficult and still complicated.³⁴ Although the line between peacekeeping and other peace operations may appear blurred at times, there are nevertheless important differences that distinguish peacekeeping from other peace operations. Peacekeeping operations usually involve a huge range of military and quasi-military activities with the authorisation of the Security Council. Particularly in situations where the states are unable to

³³ Brahimi Report (2000), *op. cit.*, para. 13.

³⁴ N. MacQueen, “*Peacekeeping and the International System*”, New York: Routledge, 2006, p.1.

provide security and maintain order, peacekeeping operations are allowed to use military forces at the tactical level with the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties in the conflict. On the contrary, other peace activities are normally prohibited from involving the use of force unless they are authorised under Article 2 (4) of the Charter by the Security Council.

UN's role in Peacekeeping

UN peacekeeping crystallised during the Cold War as a “technique to control violence by means other than enforcement or counter-violence”.³⁵ The early years of the post-Cold War decade were ones of remarkable achievement for the Security Council, and strategic context for UN peacekeeping was dramatically changed. Massive expansions of the UN's peacekeeping activities were underway, and were a shift away from the earlier classical peacekeeping operations to much more complex, multi-faceted, and multidimensional enterprises. Traditionally, peacekeeping operations fall into two main categories: observing ceasefire and peacekeeping. Observational tasks were generally performed by military personnel who monitor the implementation of ceasefire agreements following the cessation of hostilities between two state parties in dispute. After the Cold War ended, there was a rapid increase in the number of peacekeeping operations. With a new consensus and a common sense of purpose, the Security Council authorised a total of 20 new operations between 1989 and 1994, raising the number of peacekeepers from 11,000 to 75,000. The UN achieved significant successes among its peace operations, beginning with Namibia in the late 1980s, and including Mozambique, El Salvador, the Central African Republic, Guatemala, Eastern Slavonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and, at least partially, Cambodia.³⁶

The general successes of earlier missions raised expectations for UN peacekeeping beyond its capacity to deliver. Between 1992 and 1995, three major disasters struck UN peacekeeping operations and severely undermined the authority and credibility of the Security Council. Increasing numbers of demands upon peacekeepers without a requisite

³⁵ M. Berdal, “United Nations Peace Operations: The Brahimi Report in Context”, *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, 2001, pp.35-44 (p.38).

³⁶ For more details on each operation, see the history of UN peacekeeping (DPKO), available at <https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml> (accessed on 08 March 2012).

rethinking of the nature, role and scale of the peace operations, the gap between the tasks given to peacekeepers and the means supplied to them resulted in a number of high-profile failures in peacekeeping operations. The first of these occurred in Somalia where local insurgents inflicted heavy casualties on the peacekeeping forces, leading to the withdrawal of the large UN contingent and eventually to the collapse of the whole operation. The second case was in former Yugoslavia where, despite very large UN deployments and some tactical successes, the UN proved unable to prevent a massacre of thousands of civilian refugees by the Bosnian Serbs at Srebrenica “right under the noses of a battalion of UN peacekeepers”.³⁷ Thirdly, and perhaps most shamefully of all, was the small and under-resourced UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda which became a “helpless spectator” to acts of genocide of massive proportions.³⁸ The UN was particularly criticised because of its disintegrating force, as two out of the three main troop contributors withdrew and no member state volunteered to replace them.

These three high-profile peacekeeping operations came under criticism and the reputation of UN Peacekeeping suffered. On such less-favourable circumstances and fatal failures, Hannay refers to UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990s as a “roller-coaster of a decade”.³⁹ There was a widespread sense among the international community that the UN had become irreparably damaged by a succession of catastrophic peacekeeping failures. Not surprisingly, therefore, the very word ‘peacekeeping’, which was originally a neutral and uncontested term in the international relations lexicon, had acquired a wholly negative connotation.⁴⁰

At the turn of the century, the UN undertook a major exercise to examine the challenges to peacekeeping in the 1990s and introduce a series of reforms to strengthen its capacity to manage and sustain field operations. At the UN’s Millennium Summit in 2000, Kofi Annan called for a special panel of experts led by the former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi to consider the future direction of UN peacekeeping operations. The panel was given the task of identifying the principal weaknesses and shortcomings in UN peace operations and making specific and practical recommendations to overcome those

³⁷ D. Hannay, “Effectiveness and Ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council in the Last Twenty Years: A European Perspective”, *Istituto Affari Internazionali*, Documenti IAI 09-28, November 2009, p.4.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ M. Berdal, “Ten Years of International Peacekeeping”, *International Peacekeeping*, vol.10, no.4, 2003, pp.5-11.

weaknesses. As instructed, the *Brahimi Report* focused upon how the UN's peace operations might better manage planning, mission support, decision-making and personnel in the field to produce more effective results. The panel contained insights into how peacekeeping operations might be conducted in the future, which reinvigorated the ongoing dialogue with member states and other partners such as the EU on how to better adjust UN peacekeeping to meet current and future requirements.⁴¹

EU's role in Peacekeeping

From its creation, the European Union has engaged in crisis management and conflict prevention, and now continues to strive for peace, security, and prosperity across the European continent and often beyond. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been developing a credible foreign and security policy designed to contribute to peacekeeping through international crisis management operations. During the past decade, as a part of the EU's CFSP, ESDP has developed rapidly to become the Union's first coherent strategy to identify and respond to EU-wide security concerns. ESDP enables the EU to develop the international crisis management capacities required to achieve five key objectives: safeguarding the EU's common values and fundamental interests; strengthening the security of the EU; preserving peace and international security in accordance with the UN Charter; promoting international cooperation; and advancing democracy and the rule of law, including human rights.⁴² ESDP affords the member states a broad range of options for managing crises as well as an enhanced ability to act rapidly and collectively in the face of security threats.

Since 2003, the EU has carried out more than twenty ESDP operations, including military and policy missions, rule of law missions, border management operations, and civil-military support actions, in Europe, Africa, and Asia.⁴³ The EU has significantly increased its

⁴¹ See UN document, *New Partnership Agenda: Charting A New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, Department of Peacekeeping and Department of Field Support, New York, July 2009.

⁴² Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) defines the five objectives of the CFSP.

⁴³ For instance, military operations aimed at ensuring stability and security include EUFOR Concordia in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003), EUFOR *Artemis* in Democratic Republic of Congo (2003), EUFOR *Althea* in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004), EUFOR DR Congo (2006), and EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic (2008). Mixed civilian/military operations for security sector reform was operational in Darfur/Sudan (2005-2007), in DR Congo (2005-2009), and in

operational contribution to international crisis management. Through autonomous and UN Security Council-mandated ESDP operations, the EU helps lessen the burden on UN peacekeeping capacities that are stretched close to the limit.

However, as mentioned earlier it is important to note that the EU itself is “neither a state nor a traditional international organisation”.⁴⁴ Besides, EU foreign and security policy has remained largely intergovernmental in character, focusing on member states’ preferences in decision-making. In order to understand the role of the EU in line with the UN, a comprehensive approach needs to be adopted that elucidates the extent to which the EU is an important partner of the UN. The strength and impact of the EU before the UN is determined, first and foremost, by the mere presence of EU member states, especially in the Security Council.⁴⁵ As things stand today, the EU is assured at least two most influential seats in the Security Council. These two permanent member seats are reserved for the United Kingdom (UK) and France, which are able to veto any Council decisions and resolutions.

According to Johan Verbeke, the maximum number of seats which the EU could theoretically occupy in the Security Council is six⁴⁶; i.e., out of the total 15 members of the UNSC, on average and in practice, the EU can count on four to six member states in the Council, which will amount from around 27% to 40%, respectively. In 2006 and 2007, for instance, no less than one-third of the seats were in EU Member States’ hands, while the 27 EU Member States stand for only one-eighth of the total 192 UN Member States.⁴⁷ This numerical strength might be sufficient to guarantee the EU’s decisive influence in the UNSC,

Guinea-Bissau(2008). Besides, a number of civilian missions for police, rule of law, border management and monitoring was also conducted in Balkans, Africa, Middle East and Asia.

⁴⁴ C. Damro, "EU-UN Environmental Relations: Shared Competence and Effective Multilateralism" in K. V. Laatikainen and K E. Smith (eds.), 2006, *op. cit.*, pp.175-192.

⁴⁵ See J. Verbeke, "EU Coordination on UN Security Council Matters" in J. Wouters, F. Hoffmeister and T. Ruys (eds.), 2006, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-60.

⁴⁶ The EU is currently represented in three regional groups out of five, which can each deliver non-permanent members to the Security Council: the Western European Group delivers two non-permanent members; the Eastern European Group (with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria) delivers one non-permanent member; and the Asian Group (with Cyprus as only EU-member in it) delivers again two non-permanent members to the Security Council. The groups in which the EU is not represented are the African and Latin American Group.

⁴⁷ By way of illustration, these members were, for the last few years, and currently are, in addition to the two permanent members (source: UN Security Council <http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp>):
2004: Germany, Spain, (+ Romania as candidate member)
2005: Denmark, Greece (+ Romania as candidate member)
2006: Denmark, Greece, Slovakia
2007: Belgium, Italy, Slovakia
2008: Belgium, Italy


because EU Member States have an obligation to defend common EU positions at this venue (see Figure 1.2). Given this legal duty, EU states on the Security Council possess ‘EU-loyalties’ and are obliged to respect, pursue, and maintain common positions as well as interests of the Union on behalf of all EU Member States.⁴⁸

Figure 1. 2 Article 19, Treaty on European Union

- (1) Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations.... [and] uphold the common position in such forums.
- (2) Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), [...] Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provision of the United Nations Charter.

Beyond voting power there is a financial dimension to the EU’s potential power at the UN. This power derives from the EU’s major contributions to UN activities. As in Figure 1.3, EU Member States provided around 36.6% of the UN’s regular budget in 2006 and around 38.9% in 2007.

Figure 1. 3 Main Contributors to the UN Regular Budget (2006 - 2007)




Source: United Nations DPKO

⁴⁸ European Constitutional Law Review (2005), ‘Article 10 EC, Article 6 EU, Article I-5 Draft Convention’, 1:17-20.

The EU member states are likewise the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, to the tune of 38.6% in 2006 and 40.6% in 2007 (see Figure 1.4). In addition, the EU member states also provide around half of the budget of UN funds and programmes. Hence, there is no doubt that the EU Member States' current share of the overall budget for UN peacekeeping missions amounts around 40 percent, making the EU by far the largest financial contributor.

Figure 1. 4 Main Financial Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations



Source: United Nations DPKO

The EU's high level of commitment to the primary role of the UN in maintaining international peace and security and its core function of peacekeeping is also reflected in the number of troops, police and observers assigned to UN operations. In November 2006, a total of 11,140 men and women, or around 13.5% of UN peacekeeping personnel, came from the EU. This was a considerable increase compared to figures from previous years. In 2003, for instance, the EU's contribution to UN operations totalled 3,295 personnel, which accounted for 9.0% of the total. When the contribution of the ten new acceding countries was added in 2004, the figure rose to 4,801 which accounted for 13.2% of total UN deployment. With the largest financial contribution as well as the provision of troops and police for UN peacekeeping operations, the EU and its member states are seen as playing a decisive role in ensuring international peace and security in close cooperation with the UN.

UN-EU Cooperation in Peacekeeping

The issue of the EU as a global actor has attracted the attention of a rising number of IR studies. In recent years both the IR community and the European studies community have demonstrated an increased focus on European powers in the international system. Within this focus there has been a particular emphasis on the role of the EU at the UN in the context of foreign and security policy.⁴⁹ Tardy suggests that ten years of UN-EU cooperation in the crisis management field has led to substantial changes and developments in international peacekeeping. Central to this change has been a fundamental evolution of the UN as the main peacekeeper and the emergence of a regional actor (the EU) offering considerable promise for cooperation at both military and civilian levels.⁵⁰ Hannay explains that the EU and the UN have shared many common objectives and approaches to the solution of international problems, and this feeling of shared objectives has been strengthened over the past decades as a result of the ever larger contribution of the EU to the UN's operations. According to Hannay, the EU and its member states became the UN Secretary-General's strongest supporters in pushing for an ambitious programme of change, and thereby the EU and the UN are "natural allies".⁵¹ He stresses that "without them [the EU and its members] nothing at all would have been achieved".⁵² Gowan remarks that it is hard to imagine the EU having developed an important role as a security actor without the UN as a partner. Gowan compares the UN and the EU, in the field of peacekeeping operations, to '*Obélix* and *Astérix*' respectively; one handling big and slow missions (the UN, *Obélix*), and the other concentrating on smaller and flexible operations (the EU, *Astérix*).⁵³

The initial idea that UN-EU cooperation should perhaps be institutionalised was voiced in 2000, at a time when the UN was examining the reform of its operations through the 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations', commonly known as the *Brahimi Report* (2000). In the *Brahimi Report*, the UN acknowledged the need for cooperation with regional organisations, and called upon the EU to take on a share of the responsibility for international peacekeeping and to provide assets that are needed for complex and robust

⁴⁹ For example, see K. V. Laatikainen and K E. Smith (2006), *op. cit.*; M. B. Rasch, *The European Union at the United Nations: The Functioning and Coherence of EU External Representation in a State-centric Environment*, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008; J. Wouters, F. Hoffmeister and T. Ruys (eds), *The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership*, The Hague: T.M.C Asser Press, 2006.

⁵⁰ See T. Tardy (2008), "UN-EU Relations in Crisis Management, Taking Stock and Looking Ahead", *International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations*, October 2008.

⁵¹ David Hannay (2009), *op. cit.*, p.10.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Interview with R. Gowan, Centre on International Cooperation, New York, 6 April 2009.

peacekeeping operations.⁵⁴ In response to the UN's request for cooperation, the EU underlined the special and unique value of cooperation between the two bodies. The EU addressed that "efforts made will enable Europeans in particular to respond more effectively and more coherently to requests from leading organisations such as the UN".⁵⁵

The expectations for UN-EU partnership were stoked by the adoption, in 2001, of *EU-UN Cooperation in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management*, which identified three areas of priority for cooperation: conflict prevention, civilian and military aspects of crisis management, and particular regional issues.⁵⁶ The document also established modalities for meetings at different levels between these two organisations. Both organisations have made further remarkable achievements when the UN Secretary-General and the Presidency of the Council of the EU signed the *Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management* on 24 September 2003.⁵⁷ In this landmark agreement, the UN and the EU declared that they are united by the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The EU's commitments were echoed in Javier Solana's report in 2003, the *European Security Strategy* (ESS), through which the EU reaffirmed its primary responsibility to support the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security and the core function of peacekeeping.⁵⁸

Despite the two organisations sometimes holding contradictory and competing visions, both the UN and the EU have acknowledged that they are the most ideal partners for cooperation in crisis management.⁵⁹ Some arguments are also made that in both the scholarly literature and official documents the special and unique value of UN-EU cooperation has gradually become an object of attention.⁶⁰ Moreover, according to a European national official, as UN-

⁵⁴ UN General Assembly / Security Council (A/55/305-S/2000/809), *op. cit.*

⁵⁵ Presidency Report on ESDP, Nice European Council, 7-9 December 2000.

⁵⁶ For details, see "EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management", Annex to the Presidency Conclusions, Göteborg European Council, June 2001.

⁵⁷ Council of the European Union, "*Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management*", New York, 24 September 2003.

⁵⁸ J. Solana, *A Secure Europe in a better World: European Security Strategy*, Paris: The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2003.

⁵⁹ For example, see "Civilian Police and Police Training in Post-Conflict OSCE Areas", *Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, U.S Government Printing Office, September 2001, p.13; W. Hansen, "EU-UN Cooperation in Peace Operation: Change, Concepts and Constrains" in Hans-Georg Ehrhart et al (eds.), *Die Europäische Union im 21. Jahrhundert: Theorie und Praxis Europäischer Außen-, Sicherheits-, und Friedenspolitik*, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007, p.238.

⁶⁰ For example, see B. Charbonneau (2009), "What is so special about the European Union? EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management in Africa", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.16, No.4, August 2009, pp.546-561 (p.548).

EU cooperation became a source of greater legitimacy for both organisations, the UN and the EU have mutually benefited from such cooperation.⁶¹ From the UN's side, the benefits derive from the credibility and operational resources provided by the EU in complex and multidimensional operations in difficult situations. The UN has tried to involve the EU as much as possible in peacekeeping activities. From the EU's side, the benefits derive from the political legitimacy conferred by UN mandates. In addition, UN-EU cooperation allows the EU to fulfil the initial aims of the ESDP. The EU seeks to equip itself with capacities for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces and appropriate decision-making bodies and to strengthen stability and security both in Europe and beyond by conducting military and civilian peace operations.⁶² In short, given the benefits derived by both sides of this equation, UN-EU cooperation in the realm of peacekeeping operations seems to be a phenomenon that will continue to develop and deepen in future years.

1.3 Theoretical Debates

On the issue of relations between the UN and regional organisations, such as UN-EU cooperation or UN-NATO coordination, Jamie Shea offers an interesting analogy of a 'married couple'.⁶³ The relationship between the UN and the EU in peace operations is more or less like a married couple who have children. One day the children leave and the married couple discover that they have nothing in common. They face a stark choice: either to develop some new and common interests, or to divorce as quickly and painlessly as possible. Likewise, where cooperation has been established and has evolved between the UN and the EU, some common interests that strongly unite the two organisations must exist. In order to elucidate important conditions under which UN-EU cooperation seems most likely to happen, the two key concepts of foreign policy analysis need to be focused: who makes decisions (actors) and why they behave and make such choices (motivations).

The theoretical and empirical literature on EU foreign policy in general, and EU's role as a global security actor in particular, is growing. However, little systematic and empirically-based theoretical work has been conducted, for which theoretical approaches encompassing

⁶¹ Interview with official, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Paris, 04 March 2010.

⁶² For example, see European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, Cologne European Council, Annex III, 3- 4 June 1999.

⁶³ Interview with Jamie Shea, Private Office of the Secretary-General, NATO, Brussels, 26 April 2010.

both input and output of decision-making are essential. Ginsberg points out that no one theoretical perspective explains the complexity of phenomena surrounding the start-up of an EU operation.⁶⁴ As the number, range and complexity of peace operations have grown, so too have the number of theories and concepts used by analysts and practitioners alike to explain and understand the regional arrangement and the UN.⁶⁵ Christopher Hill asks, in this regard, that “what you see (theoretically) may well depend on where you sit, but what seats give you the best view in the house?”⁶⁶ Ginsberg’s logic of explanation suggests particularly three of the best seats that are occupied by political scientists: EU foreign policy, the starring actors, or the preferences of the actors.⁶⁷

This section explores different ways of defining cooperation in peacekeeping and contending theories. Since the origins of peace operation lie in attempts by the great powers to manage conflicts and impose their collective will in other powers,⁶⁸ theoretical debate must be able to draw together different threads of great-powers-centric approach and institutional approach by seeking to answer how collective actions become functional. According to Gibbs, it has been idealists and realists who have been dominant on the basic issues and discussion of peacekeeping.⁶⁹ Having considered various theoretical assumptions surrounding cooperation in peace and security, the study narrows down possible interpretations into three systemic theories which entail the key ideas of actors, motivations and behaviour: realism, liberal institutionalism, and social constructivism. In addition, as it has become prevalent that European cooperation is a product of its own internal dynamic, this thesis also takes Ginsberg’s self-styled logic into account to see if its explanation best fits into this research subject. In what follows, different theories of peace operations are examined to determine the best theoretical framework.

⁶⁴ See R. H. Ginsberg (2011), *op. cit.*

⁶⁵ See Alex J. Bellamy (et al.), *Understanding Peacekeeping*, Cambridge: Polity, 2010, pp.13-42.

⁶⁶ C. Hill, “A Theoretical Introduction”, in W. Wallace and W. Patterson (eds.), *Foreign Policy Making in Western Europe*, Harborough: Saxon House, 1978, p.8.

⁶⁷ R. Ginsberg (2011), *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁶⁸ For example, see S. Chesterman, *Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 and M. Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.

⁶⁹ D. N. Gibbs, “Is Peacekeeping a New Form of Imperialism?”, *International Peacekeeping*, vol.4, no.1, Spring 1997, pp.122-128.

Realist theories

Realist scholars recognise the primary importance of states in pursuit of national interests on the world stage where they seek to advance gains and minimise losses. The realist perspective begins with the structure and distribution of power in world politics and its impact on the commercial, political, and other interests of the member states. For realists, power primarily functions as the determinant of states' choices and behaviour.⁷⁰ Realists argue that states are unitary rational actors in international relations, and multilateral cooperation is a result of inter-state or inter-governmental bargaining.⁷¹ Realists possess a notorious pessimism about the autonomy and impact of international organisations. In their view international organisations are often seen as merely effective means to protect national interests and to promote the economic and military power of the state. Where international organisations are acknowledged, they tend to be depicted as the tools of their members and thus are premised upon, and protective of, state sovereignty. Thus, states remain the key actors, states control decision-making, and the international organisation itself is merely a new stage on which the drama of power politics can be performed.

Realists acknowledge that international cooperation is hard to achieve, difficult to maintain, and dependent on state power and interest.⁷² However, they insist that international cooperation is nevertheless possible when states make it happen and more likely to succeed when states' interests and preferences are aligned. That is, EU foreign policy action is likely to occur only when it is the rational and national interests of member states to cooperate at the EU level. The realist perspective seems useful in explaining and anticipating the preference and choice of EU members' behaviour as well as limits to EU foreign policy and ESDP operations.

⁷⁰ For example, see Z. Selden, "Power is Always in Fashion: State-Centric Realism and the European Security and Defence Policy", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.48, no.2, 2010, pp.397-416; C. Gegout, "The West, Realism and Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo", *International Peacekeeping*, vol.16, no.2, 2009, pp.231-244; A. Jahier, "ESDP Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Realist Analysis", *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, vol.4, Issue 2, 2010, pp.81-92.

⁷¹ See S. Hoffmann, "Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy?", *Journal of International Affairs*, vol.38, no.2, 2000, pp.189-199; and S. Hoffmann, "World governance beyond utopia", *Dædalus*, vol.1, 2003, pp.27-35.

⁷² For example, K. L. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", *Journal of International Affairs*, vol.44, no.1, 1990, pp.21-38; J. M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", *International Organization*, vol.42, no.3, 1988, pp.485-507; J. J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001.

Neo-liberal Institutionalism

Since neo-liberalist institutionalism is the progeny of liberalism which is an intellectual sibling with realism, neo-liberal institutionalism has shared some ideas and assumptions with realism. However, in contrast with realism, whose core research question is how to survive and maximise a state's interests in the international system, neo-liberal institutionalists focus on the idea of cooperation after hegemony, where there were no hegemonic superpowers, and the international environment consisted of many regimes and institutions.⁷³ Advocates for neo-liberal institutionalism, such as Keohane, Krasner and Ruggie, are attracted to rational-egoist logic or what some might call rational choice institutionalism. This scholarship would argue that states pursue cooperation because it is usually in the best interest of all involved to do so. According to Keohane, "states adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination".⁷⁴ In the case of the EU, member governments delegate authority to the union's agents such as the Council and the Commission to implement their decisions. Institutionalists find that in collective action the transactional costs are lower and the potential for more efficient and effective action is greater than in a case where the individual member states had pursued their interests separately. Moreover, as EU bodies help shape and implement EU foreign policy and ESDP decisions, they increase the scope of their influence.

From a neo-liberal institutionalist view, although cooperation is hard and can easily lead to situations of discord, regimes and institutions could benefit states by incorporating cooperative strategies. Ruggie defines regimes as "a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational [*sic*] energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states".⁷⁵ Hence, cooperation is possible in areas where states have mutual interests, and within the institution states want to maximise total amount of gains for all parties involved. Neo-liberal institutionalists provide insightful ideas to explain why states cooperate and to what extent regimes and institutions are important in promoting cooperation. However, neo-liberal institutionalist views have less relevance in areas in which states have no mutual interests. Not every member of the EU shares mutual interests when it comes to the particular issue of a peacekeeping engagement. In addition, the level of interests and participation of, as well as benefits for, states significantly vary in this policy

⁷³ See R. O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p.49.

⁷⁴ *Idid.*, p.51.

⁷⁵ J. G. Ruggie (1975), "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends", *International Organization*, vol. 29, no.3, 1975, p.570.

area. Cooperation in military or national security areas, where someone's gain is perceived as someone else's loss, a zero-sum perspective, seems to be more difficult to achieve. It may be more ideal for cooperation in political economy, human rights and environmental issues where states seek mutual interests and common goods rather than in peacekeeping involvement.

Self-styled logic of EU foreign policy

Having a careful consideration of various theoretical and analytical frameworks which possibly explain how EU states make collective decisions and achieve cooperation, Smith suggests that more attention needs to be paid to the internal decision-making process within the EU foreign policy system. Given the limits of general explanations of cooperation, Smith argues that Ginsberg's "self-styled" logic of EU foreign policy action has become more prevalent since the 1970s, which involved European Political Cooperation (EPC).⁷⁶ The self-styled logic posits that EPC actions reflect a unique European brand of diplomacy and foreign policy moulded by an internal dynamic of cooperation among members and common institutions. According to Ginsberg, "EPC enables members to reach into all areas of international politics and has served to create an atmosphere conducive to fashioning a foreign policy style that reflects the members' convergent interests in foreign affairs."⁷⁷ EU foreign policy actions are thus the products of habits of working together, its own mission and initiatives in the world independent of the phenomena that trigger other actions, and a sense of what Europeans want in foreign policy questions.⁷⁸ In this respect, when the EU initiates policy actions based not on external stimuli but on its own internal dynamic, interests, and instincts, a European interest of "self-styled" logic is at work.⁷⁹

Ginsberg argues that the self-styled logic is neutral in the liberal-realist debate because "it represents a symbiosis between the EU and the member governments who together produce uniquely European action".⁸⁰ Ginsberg's self-styled logic explains that cooperation is driven

⁷⁶ See M. E. Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

⁷⁷ R. H. Ginsberg, *Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989, p.59.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* See also R. H. Ginsberg, *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire*, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001.

⁷⁹ R. H. Ginsberg (1989), *Ibid.*, p.31.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

by an internal decision-making dynamic and increasingly bound by institutionalisation. Yet with its general arguments Ginsberg's self-styled logic has some limits. It fails to account for comprehensive conditions, such as external forces impinging on the EU or individual member states, which may also generate cooperation. Furthermore, it falls short of elucidating more fundamental questions; does the internal dynamic of the EPC always lead to successful agreements between members and institutions? but, what if it is not the case?; and how can different interests of each member state simply converge into a single European interest given the complex process of negotiations? The self-styled logic assumes that European identity and common interests are naturally produced as a result of the customs of working together within the EU. However, it underestimates the reality in which the level of states' power, willingness or interests can significantly vary during the internal dynamic and decision-making process especially when it is concerned with ESDP. It fails to explain empirical outcomes in which states' different interests prevent a European common foreign policy from being achieved. The self-styled logic seems, therefore, to have less explanatory power in explication of the different levels of leadership and interests between members during the internal decision-making process.

Constructivist theories

Mark Eyeskens, a former Belgian foreign minister, famously stated in 1991 that the EU was 'an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm'. While the EU was represented as a 'civilian power' in the 1990s,⁸¹ the increasingly vital role of the EU as both a civilian and a military power in international relations has led a new generation of European studies scholars to revisit the EU as 'normative power Europe'.⁸² Rosecrance and Manners argue that Europe's attainment is more normative than empirical. Put differently, the EU's power stems more from what it is than from what it does. It has the power to change conceptions of what is 'normal' in international politics and thus exerts an ideational impact.⁸³ Smith echoes this argument, positing that the normative dimension is important because the debate on the

⁸¹ See H. Bull, "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 21, no.2, 1982, pp.149-64.

⁸² For example, see I. Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 40, no.2, 2002, pp.235-58.

⁸³ R. Rosecrance, "The European Union: A New Type of International Actor" in Zielonka, J. (ed.), *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 15-23; I. Manners (2002), *Ibid.*

role of the EU as a global security actor involves “fundamental choices about the EU’s international identity”.⁸⁴

The concept of normative power Europe places a heavy focus on the role of ideational factors such as constitutional norms, ideas, principles and identity. It is thus associated with the social constructivist approach to IR, an approach that stresses the value of social, cultural and historical factors, and their ability to “shape or even determine political actors’ behaviour”.⁸⁵ Peterson argues that constructivism is now the ‘increasingly popular’ theory of European foreign policy,⁸⁶ which is perhaps unsurprising given that the EU remains ‘in [the] course of construction’ as a global actor.⁸⁷ According to Giegerich, the EU is in the process of establishing its twin goals of autonomous capacity in crisis management and enhancing its profile as a security actor.⁸⁸ This combination of a normative identity and the EU’s establishment as an actor managing global security has generated a demand for EU operations.⁸⁹ The language used by Giegerich expresses explicit normative claims. Giegerich argues that the EU, as an established civil-military actor, has the potential to dominate integrated crisis management in the future with its neutrality.⁹⁰ As a result, the EU becomes conceived and construed as a unit-state-like entity of which institutional arrangements and characteristics authorise its uncontroversial engagement in crisis management.⁹¹ To what extent the normative values and identity of the EU lead to the likelihood of member states’ decision to engage in peacekeeping seems worthy of attention.

In sum, two theories are perceived as particularly useful to explain important conditions for UN-EU cooperation: realist and constructivist theories. The two theoretical approaches are further examined in chapter 4 seeking to formulate plausible and testable hypotheses.

⁸⁴ K. Smith, “The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?”, *International Spectator*, vol.23, No.2, 2000, pp.11-28 (p.27).

⁸⁵ J. Peterson, “The EU as a Global Actor”, in E. Bomberg, J. Peterson and A. Stubb (eds.), *The European Union: How does it work?*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.13.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, Routledge: London, 1999.

⁸⁸ B. Giegerich, *European Military Crisis Management: Connecting Ambition and Reality*, London: International Institute for Security Studies, 2008, p.24.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ B. Charbonneau (2009), *op.cit.*

1.4 Thesis Outline

The following chapter introduces the research design and methodological framework utilised in this thesis. In order to transform the research question into a testable and ascertainable form of statement, the chapter formulates a hypothetical relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables. The chapter then justifies the case selection and the use of the case study. It also discusses data collection and methods used to analyse and answer the research question.

The third chapter provides analytical tools in order to 1) identify the most important EU actors involved and 2) delineate a dynamic interaction and decision-making process between the UN and the EU. Drawing upon Putnam's two-level game metaphor, a new revised two-level game model in which a complex web of actors interacts simultaneously at two different levels is discussed: International UN level (Level I) and domestic EU level (Level II). The analysis shows how UNSC resolutions are internationally achieved and how the EU member states domestically come to agree on a Council Joint Action. By investigating simultaneous negotiations and decision-making between the two levels, the chapter identifies the most influential EU actors in terms of chief negotiators. The role of the Big-four (UK, France, Germany and Italy) and the High Representative (HR) are examined at both levels.

Chapter four discusses the theoretical framework. First, the important concept of leadership is elaborated in order to provide a conceptual framework. Then hypotheses are investigated with insights from two prominent IR theories: realist theories vs. constructivist theories. From a realist perspective, this thesis hypothesises that as political and strategic interests increase, the likelihood of EU actors to actively provide leadership will also increase. In contrast, constructivist theories hypothesise that if there are normative pressures derived from norms and responsibilities, the likelihood of EU actors deciding to provide active leadership for a peacekeeping operation will increase.

Chapters five, six, and seven analyse the case studies selected: Operation *Artemis* (2003); EUFOR RD Congo (2006); and EUFOR Tchad/CAR (2007). Each of the case studies begins with retrospection on the outbreak of conflict in the regions. The case studies examine decision-making dynamics between the UN and the EU by using a revised two-level game framework. The roles of major European powers and the HR are investigated respectively. In

each of the case studies, hypotheses are tested to determine whether they are accepted or rejected.

Using the scales, the eighth chapter provides a comparative explanatory analysis across the three cases. It identifies the most important chief negotiator insofar as the issue of UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation is concerned. The chapter revisits the overall outcomes of hypotheses testing and concludes with the best answers to the research question. The comparative explanatory analysis identifies that France is the most decisive chief negotiator among the EU actors in decision-making at both UNSC and EU levels. The study confirms that the political and strategic interests are the most important factors under which EU actors are most likely to provide an active leadership role in decision-making.

The final chapter puts forward some thoughts on the effective role of the EU as a reliable global security actor. Taking a look at the EU framework from the inside and the outside, the chapter presents challenges which the EU is now confronting. The idea of how the EU will skilfully cope with upcoming challenges and uncover ways to reduce the gap between the credibility and capacity of ESDP are discussed. The chapter assesses the prospects for future research by considering the potential contributions of this thesis to the study of international peace and security.

Chapter 2

Research Design and Methods

Introduction

The primary function of a research design is to ensure that the evidence emerging from the project answers the research question as unambiguously as possible.⁹² A research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data.⁹³ Well-designed research enables the project to obtain relevant evidence that presents important data to accurately describe certain phenomena, evaluate hypotheses, test a theory, and identify which of the competing explanations is most compelling empirically and theoretically as a way to decisively answer the research question. De Vaus stresses that the way in which researchers develop research designs is fundamentally affected by whether the research question is descriptive or explanatory, which determines what information needs to be collected.⁹⁴

The primary research question of this thesis is ‘*under what conditions do EU Member States lead UN-related peacekeeping operations?*’ As it involves developing causal explanations, it employs the explanatory and deductive approach. In order to transform the research question into a testable and ascertainable form of statement, this chapter introduces variables and formulates a hypothetical relationship between dependent and independent variables. The chapter then justifies the case selection and the use of the case studies on the basis of the research question. It also discusses the data collection and research methods utilised to evaluate and analyse resources.

⁹² D. A. De Vaus, *Research Design in Social Research*, London: Sage, 2001, p.9.

⁹³ A. Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, 3rd edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.31.

⁹⁴ D. A. De Vaus (2001), *op. cit.* p.2.

2.1 Explanatory and Deductive Approach

Answering the question ‘*under what conditions*’ involves explanatory analysis and to some extent causal explanations. According to King, Keohane and Verba, if we posit that an explanatory variable causes a dependent variable, a causal mechanism approach would require us to identify a list of causal links between the two variables.⁹⁵ Put simply, causal explanations seek to identify factors that may have a causal impact on a certain phenomenon; for instance, ‘Factor X causes (or affects) phenomenon Y’. However, it is difficult to recognise a clear causation in social science research. Defining causality often brings a critical confusion with correlation, which also misleads prediction with causation and prediction with explanation. Addressing this problem, De Vaus advises that simply because one event follows another, or two factors co-vary, does not mean that one causes the other.⁹⁶ The link between two events may be coincidental rather than causal. Instead, most causal relations in the social sciences are probabilistic.

Probabilistic explanations can be achieved by specifying conditions under which X is less or more likely to affect Y. More specifically, probabilistic explanations can simply deduce cause and effect as follows: when/if a given factor increases (or decreases), the probability of a particular outcome is affected. Then, how can causal relations be accurately defined to meet the explanatory research question? According to Bryman, formulating a relationship between ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ variables is the best way to account for causes and effects.⁹⁷ The factor that has a causal impact is the independent variable (X) and the effect is the dependent variable (Y). Although one will never achieve complete or deterministic explanations in assessing an inference of how an independent variable is responsible for the variation that has been identified in the dependent variable, the research can minimise incorrect chances and avoid invalid inferences.⁹⁸

This thesis seeks to draw on theoretical grounds from which hypotheses are derived. A deductive approach is theory testing that begins with a theory to guide which observations to make. The deductive approach represents the commonest view of the nature of the relationship between theoretical considerations and empirical social phenomena. Deductive reasoning enables hypothetical concepts to be translated into researchable, predictable, and

⁹⁵ G. King, R. O. Keohane, and S. Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p.86.

⁹⁶ D. A. De Vaus (2001), *op. cit.*, p.3.

⁹⁷ A. Bryman (2008), *op. cit.*, p.32 and p.156.

⁹⁸ D. A. De Vaus (2001), *op. cit.* p.4.

operational entities.⁹⁹ In contrast with a theory building approach, theory testing is a process that moves from the general to the particular.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, by using a deductive reasoning approach to derive a set of propositions from the theory, hypotheses are tested to see whether these predictions are correct. If the theory has explanatory power, then certain things should be valid. But if they do not, then the hypotheses need to be either rejected or modified.¹⁰¹ In this thesis, the plausible hypotheses deduced from theoretical ideas come first and then drive the process of gathering data.

Variables

Variables refer to a logical set of attributes of the research subject, classified as independent and dependent variables. Defining variables which are conceptually precise, free from bias and well-substantiated on the basis of available evidence is a vital aspect of hypothesis-testing, as variables reveal hypothetical relationships which accommodate the most likely explanations.

An *independent variable* is typically the variable representing the value being manipulated or changed. The *dependent variable* (sometimes called the outcome variable, endogenous variable, or explanandum) is the observed result of the independent variable being manipulated.¹⁰² In research or an experiment, the values of independent variables can be controlled and selected by the researcher to determine their relationship to an observed phenomenon, *i.e.* the dependent variable. On the contrary, the dependent variable is the event that usually cannot be directly controlled, but is expected to change whenever the independent variable is altered.¹⁰³ According to King *et al.*, choosing variables, especially dependent variables, is a particularly important decision.¹⁰⁴ The authors offer the following three suggestions in selecting on the dependent variables. First, dependent variables should be dependent. In other words, explanatory variables are clearly exogenous and dependent variables are endogenous. Second, we should not select observations based on the dependent

⁹⁹ A. Bryman (2008), *op. cit.*, p.9; and R. K. Merton, *On Theoretical Sociology*, New York: Free Press, 1967, p.39.

¹⁰⁰ A. Bryman (2008), *Ibid.*, p.6.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp.6-8.

¹⁰² See Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, Random House, 2001, p.534 and 971; J.

Pearl, *Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

¹⁰³ Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (2001), *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ See King et al. (1994), *op.cit.*, pp.107-109.

variable so that the dependent variable is constant. Finally we should choose a dependent variable that represents the variation we wish to explain.

In this thesis, the dependent variable is the ‘*likelihood of the EU Member States’ leadership*’. It is important to note that the study does not aim to examine the likelihood of leadership of every member state. Rather, as it is the focus of this study to identify the most decisive and important states that may lead a EU’s decision, the study limits the scope of 27 EU Member States only to the four major powers, namely Big-4 (UK, France, Germany and Italy). The dependent variable of leadership will be measured on a scale that ranges from *low*, *medium* to *high*. Based on theoretical assumptions, the study examines possible variables that may significantly influence the level of EU member states’ active leadership. Two broad independent variables are accordingly identified:

1. *Political and strategic interests*, including the political and economic interests of the EU member states in areas of operation; and
2. *Normative pressures* that may be largely triggered by normative ideas, values and historical memories of the EU member states.

As summarised in Figure 2.1, by examining these variables, the study proposes testable hypotheses that consider the relationship between the important factors and the decisional outcome. Each hypothetical relationship between dependent and independent variables is tested to see whether these conditions appropriately explain the likelihood of the EU member states’ leadership which may affect the EU’s decision to lead UN-related international peacekeeping operations.

Figure 2. 1 Dependent and Independent Variables

▪ Dependent Variable	EU Member States’ leadership
▪ Independent Variables	1) Political and Strategic Interests
	2) Normative Pressures

Hypotheses

Fearon argues that scholars in comparative politics and IR often use hypotheses, particularly in small-N research settings, in order to evaluate the causes of the phenomena they study.¹⁰⁵ By definition, a hypothesis refers to an untested assertion about the relationship between two or more variables.¹⁰⁶ Hypothesis formation and testing are considered important in political and social research which should proceed by seeking to establish and test evidence of relationships between variables.¹⁰⁷ Given the value of variables, this study tests deductively interrelated propositions using a ‘hypothetico-deductive model’.¹⁰⁸ It is designed around the assumption of ‘multiple causation’, meaning that there will likely be more than one cause for one particular effect.¹⁰⁹ The following hypotheses are derived according to the correlation between the dependent variable and each of the independent variables.

The likelihood of the EU Member States’ leadership to lead EU’s engagement in UN-related peacekeeping operations will increase *if*:¹¹⁰

- Hypothesis 1: *there are* Political and Strategic Interests in the peacekeeping areas.
- Hypothesis 2: *there are* Normative Pressures of the EU member states.

Hypotheses 1 is derived from a realist assumption, while Hypotheses 2 is derived from a social constructivist assumption. The precise relationships between the dependent variable and each independent variable will be elaborated in Chapter 4.

¹⁰⁵ J. D. Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science”, *World Politics*, vol. 43, no. 2, January 1991, pp.169-195.

¹⁰⁶ D. Jary, “Hypothesis” in V. Jupp (ed.), *The SAGE Dictionary of Social Research Methods*, London: Sage Publications, 2006, p.137.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ See K. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, London: Hutchinson, 1959; K. Popper, *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1979; and C.G. Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*, New York: The Free Press. 1965.

¹⁰⁹ K. F. Punch, *Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*, Sage Publications: London, 1998, p.55

¹¹⁰ And *vice versa*, the likelihood of EU engagement in a peacekeeping operation will decrease if the opposite variable is true.

2.2 Case Studies

Employing case studies has been widely recognised as an essential research strategy, especially when contemporary sets of events are explored and in-depth explanations are sought.¹¹¹ Zainal argues that the case study method enables a researcher to closely examine data within a specific context.¹¹² Yin defines the case study ‘as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used’.¹¹³ The use of case studies will primarily depend on the types of research questions asked. If research questions focus mainly on ‘what’ or ‘who/where’, two possibilities arise; empirical/descriptive research or survey/archival research strategies.¹¹⁴ In contrast, ‘why’ and ‘under what conditions’ questions are more explanatory and likely to lead to the use of case studies, histories and experiments as the preferred research strategies. This is because such questions deal with operational links that must be traced carefully over time, rather than over mere frequencies or incidents.¹¹⁵ Thus, the case study as a research strategy is often used to investigate a contemporary phenomenon or events over which the investigator has little or no control.¹¹⁶ Also the case study provides a useful tool to identify specific factors that may expose a causal relationship and thereby serve to evaluate a fundamental driving force behind the phenomenon studied.

Stake suggests that case selection offers the opportunity to maximise what can be learned through the research process, given the limited time available for carrying out the study.¹¹⁷ In the same manner, Yin stresses that a well-developed theory can be tested by carefully selecting a series of cases in the same way as theories are tested experimentally.¹¹⁸ Indeed, selecting cases is a difficult process, but Yin holds that the literature provides proper guidance for such selections.¹¹⁹ In this thesis, a multiple-case study on the basis of a comparative perspective is used. Using such an approach mandates that cases be selected carefully because they should *either* produce similar results *or* bring contrasting results.

¹¹¹ Z. Zainal, “Case study as a research method”, *Jurnal Kemanusiaan*, June 2007; and W. Tellis, “Application of a Case Study Methodology”, the *Quantitative Report*, vol.3, no.3, September 1997.

¹¹² Z. Zainal, *Ibid.*, pp.1-2.

¹¹³ R. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, California: Sage Publications, 1984, p.23.

¹¹⁴ R. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 3rd ed., CA: Sage Publications, 2003, pp.1-9.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.6.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.8-9.

¹¹⁷ R. Stake, *The art of case research*, CA: Sage Publications, 1995.

¹¹⁸ R. Yin, *Applications of Case Study Research*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993.

¹¹⁹ R. Yin, *Case study research: Design and methods* (Rev. ed.), CA: Sage Publications, 1989.

Case Selection

In this thesis, three cases of UN-EU peacekeeping operations were selected:

1. Operation *Artemis* (2003) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC);
2. EUFOR RD Congo (2006); and
3. EUFOR Tchad/CAR (2007) in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR).

Having careful awareness of the possible problems and bias of case-selection, the research carried out case selection driven by the research question as well as the dependent variable. In the process of the case-population approach, the assessment revealed that there is one type of variations across every case in UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation. It is always member states that provided the decisive leadership to drive the EU to cooperate with the UN in peacekeeping. The leadership usually came from one or more member states. However, the level of leadership among the members significantly varied across cases. Hence, identifying the most important actor who possesses influential leadership to determine the EU's decision is considered crucial. The essential interest of this study lies in examining to what extent *leadership* of major powers is important in deciding the EU's engagement in a peacekeeping operation and *under what conditions* the leadership is more likely to increase. From this standpoint, only cases in which UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation has successfully gone through on account of an effective leadership role played by the major powers are valid. There were four basic steps through which the study delineated important criteria for selecting cases.

First, cases were selected from 46 peacekeeping operations which have been deployed either jointly or separately by the UN and the EU since 2003.¹²⁰ Second, as this thesis seeks to examine the likelihood of leadership of the major powers in deciding EU's engagement in the realm of international peacekeeping on a UN's request, cases were selected among autonomous EU-led peacekeeping operations. By definition, peacekeeping operations are allowed to use military force in maintaining peace and security, while other peace operations are normally prohibited from involving the use of force. Thirdly, military operations were considered as appropriate cases to investigate, whereas civilian operations were excluded from the case selection. Fourth, the research focuses on peacekeeping operations deployed

¹²⁰ As of 2010, the UN has authorized 21 peacekeeping operations under UNSC resolutions, while the EU has conducted 25 crisis management operations mandated by Council Joint Actions since 2003.

beyond Europe reflecting the growing role of the EU as a ‘global’ peacekeeping actor alongside the UN. As Figure 2.2 displays, three cases were selected accordingly. Justification of case-selections should be linked to variations identified by the hypotheses to explain and predict the most important factors which led to EU member states’ leadership for UN-related peacekeeping operations. Further details about justification of case selection are expounded below.

Figure 2. 2 Case Selection

Operation area	UN Mission (Resolution)	EU Missions (Council Joint Action)	Categories	Deployment
Congo (DRC)	MONUC S/RES/1484 30 May 2003	Operation ARTEMIS Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP , of 5 June 2003	<i>Bridging model</i> EU-led military operation before UN take over	12 June 2003 – 01 Sep. 2003
	MONUC S/RES/1671 25 April 2006	EUFOR RD Congo Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP , of 27 April 2006	<i>Stand-by/ Over-the-horizon</i> EU-led military operation in support of an existing UN operation	30 July 2006 – 30 Nov. 2006
Chad and the CAR	MINURCAT S/RES/1778 25 Sep. 2007	EUFOR TCHAD/RCA Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP , of 15 October 2007	<i>Bridging model</i> EU-led military operation before UN take over	28 Jan. 2008 – 15 Mar. 2009

a. Time frame: Cooperation since 2003

The EU launched its first ESDP operation in 2003. Since then an increasing number of peacekeeping operations have been conducted under the auspices of the UN and the EU either individually or jointly. The EU became labelled as a possible security actor equipped with both civilian and military capacities, and the UN has authorised the EU to undertake peacekeeping operations alongside it since 2003. Given the landmark year for the UN-EU cooperation at both a political and an operational level, only peacekeeping operations since 2003 were considered as possible cases for this research.

b. The nature of mandate: EU-led operation

There are three variations in UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping according to the different leadership types: UN-led operations, EU-led operations, and UN-EU coordinated operations.

In general, when an operation is authorised, the type of cooperation is clearly identified in official mandate such as UNSC resolutions and EU Council Joint Actions. In the DRC case, for instance, the UN Security Council, by its resolution 1279 of 30 November 1999, decided to constitute MONUC and authorised the expansion of the UN-led military mission. However, this peacekeeping operation has been constantly extended by resolutions authorising the expansion of MONUC as the conflicts in this area continued and required more UN military forces. In 2003, the Secretary-General reported that the peace process had moved beyond the initial conflict area and opened a new chapter that would require the comprehensive engagement and assistance of the UN and the international community.¹²¹ The main focus of MONUC has shifted to facilitating and assisting the transitional process, and by resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003, the Security Council authorised the EU to take over that mission. Peacekeeping operations in the DRC, consequently, shifted from being UN-led in the first instance, to UN-EU coordinated in the second instance, and finally became an EU-led operation in the third instance. In this thesis, EU-led peacekeeping operations are perceived as suitable cases to investigate a dynamic leadership role of the EU actors concerning the EU's responsibility to lead an operation.

c. The modality of peacekeeping: Autonomous & Military operation

On the civilian front, the EU has been actively involved in a number of crisis management operations since the 1990s. These have taken various forms, including police, rule of law, civil protection, and civilian administration missions.¹²² There has been little dispute over the role of the EU as a civilian actor, and it is more likely to meet EU openness towards engagement than military aspects. For military activities, however, there is reluctance on the part of the EU to be involved, particularly when the UN leads operations. Even though the EU has stressed the need to build its autonomous military capacities (EU-led) without recourse to NATO assets, in reality military intervention without NATO has often exposed a high-level cleavage within the EU. Besides, conducting an EU-led autonomous military operation involves high costs that would require personnel, financial and material resources. This research selects the most challenging cases – autonomous military operations without recourse to NATO assets - to investigate the most crucial motivation of EU member states to provide active leadership to encourage the EU to lead peacekeeping operations nonetheless.

¹²¹ Secretary-General report, “Le Deuxième rapport spécial du Secrétaire général sur la Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo”, UNSC, 27 May 2003.

¹²² EU Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference at ministerial level, Brussels, 19 November 2002.

d. Peacekeeping beyond Europe

Since 2003, the EU has declared its operational capability and reaffirmed its strong willingness to play an important role in maintaining international peace and security alongside the UN. Accordingly, the pressure has been relatively high on the EU to live up to its promises, and it became an impetus for the UN to press the EU to play a more robust and effective role in crisis management beyond Europe.¹²³ As the purpose of this thesis is to investigate the conditions under which the EU member states are likely to provide leadership concerning international peacekeeping, the cases are selected beyond European boundaries on the basis of a 'global' dimension, rather than limited to Europe or its neighbours, the Balkans.

2.3 Data Collection and Methods

Documentary Analysis

Documents are a rich source of data for social and political research. Documentary analysis covers a wide variety of sources, including official statistics, photographs, texts and visual data.¹²⁴ The use of documents as a data source can corroborate information and evidence from other sources.¹²⁵ In addition, documentary analysis can also be used differently in conjunction with either quantitative or qualitative methods.¹²⁶ Although this research project did not depend entirely on documentary data, primary and secondary documents were largely collected and analysed in conjunction with other data sources.

In order to scrutinise the research topic, primary data analysis was deemed the most appropriate. Often primary sources consist of direct evidence that emerged at the time when the events or conditions were occurring. Primary data sourced from official documents is important for the analysis of UN-EU cooperation, because it helps to reveal the dynamic interactions during the negotiation process. For the analysis of UN-level negotiations, Security Council resolutions, session documents, progress reports, decisions, letters from the

¹²³ For example see T. Tardy (2003), *op.cit.*, p.14.

¹²⁴ K. F Punch (1998), *op. cit.*, p.190.

¹²⁵ R. Yin (2003), *op. cit.*, p.81.

¹²⁶ N. Blaikie, *Designing Social Research*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p.235.

Secretary-General, and national statements presented by requesting countries and contributing countries were examined. Documents produced by the EU include, but are not limited to, common positions and common strategies announced by the European Commission, Council Joint Actions, declarations or conclusions from the Council, statements of the Presidency and Commissioners, and letters and reports from the High Representative. Documents and statements produced by various individual EU Member States were also examined.

Despite a wide range of official and administrative documents, primary sources are of course subject to restricted access in many cases.¹²⁷ In order to overcome the limited access to primary archives, this research project used secondary data to supplement the primary documents. The main source of the secondary documents was collected from a range of publications, including newspapers, released speeches, scholarly journal articles, and reports from non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Interviews

The interview was one of the main research methods employed to collect data for this research project. Conducting in-depth elite interviews provided an effective way of assessing the substantial information which has not been fully disclosed to the public. Official documents released to the public often only entail the final results without full details of the negotiations. The documents may indicate whether or not the participants or decision-makers agreed on certain issues, but they are limited and fail to reveal the whole story of what exactly happened both inside and outside the room. Particularly in the case of decision-making processes at UNSC level, most essential negotiations and lobby activities often take place through informal discussion behind closed doors. Thus, acquiring the whole story from document data seems less likely unless the negotiation was directly observed and recorded.

Semi-structured [in-depth] elite interviews were a valuable tool to obtain a more comprehensive account of the negotiations to corroborate the research question. Interviewing elites is appropriate when interviewees are considered to be experts or have direct and profound knowledge of the issues studied. Officials who took part in or witnessed the events being examined in the research are also considered to be an appropriate source of

¹²⁷ P. Burnham, K. Gilland, W. Grant, and Z. Layton-Henry, *Research Methods in Politics*, Houndmills Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.165.

preliminary data. This research project carried out thirty-five elite interviews in five different venues: New York (Feb-April 2009), Paris (March 2010), Brussels (April 2010), Edinburgh (November 2010) and Seoul (May 2012).¹²⁸ All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity, and assurances were given regarding confidentiality. Where the interviewees did not demand anonymity, this thesis cites their name.

In order to collect qualitative data about decision-making at UN level, interviews were conducted at the UN Headquarters in New York. Officials and professionals from the UN secretariat, *inter alia*, Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) were interviewed. Interviews with delegates from various EU Member States' Permanent Representation/ Mission to the UN were also carried out. National delegates from EU countries, particularly the Big-3 (UK, France and Germany), shared the most valuable information and diplomatic experience, including their domestic preferences and positions on the issue of peace operations. Furthermore, in-depth interviews were conducted with British and French high level diplomats who were in charge of the Security Council's matters. Officers representing other EU member states, such as the Czech Republic that was holding the EU Presidency at the time of interviewing (March 2009), also agreed to be interviewed. Interview data and primary sources gathered from the United Nations were very fruitful and are used as important sources of evidence in this thesis.

Elite interviews were also carried out in Brussels to collect primary data on the nature of EU-level decision-making. Officials from the European Commission and the Council of the European Union who were specifically in charge of CFSP/ESDP were interviewed. Data collected in Brussels provided a wide range of useful information for this thesis and filled the gaps left by insufficient public documents. Moreover, considering the most decisive role of France in peacekeeping operations at both UN and EU levels, in-depth interviews were also carried out in France, with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. For the important role of Italy, diplomats who had been previously in charge of foreign and security affairs welcomed sharing their knowledge and experience in regard to this research subject. In-depth interviews at the Embassy of Italy in Seoul were an essential part of data collection. Several interviews with officials from other prominent security organisations, such as NATO, were also carried out to collect data important for examining inter-organisational cooperation in international peacekeeping.

¹²⁸ See Appendix I: Research Notes and Appendix II: Lists of Interviews.

Despite the fact that interview data could provide crucial evidence, the author was well aware of the possible weakness of interviews as source material. Interviewees could be tempted to highlight their own institutional role or to not give the exact account of specific events. In order to avoid the potential biases generated by the interview data, interviewees were asked almost the same questions in general. The same semi-structured interview questions were asked to different people, for instance, interviewing French officials in NY, Brussels and Paris. Likewise, delegates from Britain and other member states were also cross-examined with the same interview questions both in NY and Brussels. This was believed as the best way to ensure reliability and validity of interview data on the specific issues and events which demanded special knowledge and experience. In cases where confidentiality was required, secondary questions were predominantly used. In this way, the research was able to corroborate statements provided by different interviewees, and thereby the risks were mitigated.

The research was critical in assessment and acceptance of interview data. When there is need to support important claims with statements made by interviewees and other data source, the interview data was used as source material. The research tried to reduce the tendency to use statements by individuals uncritically and to balance conflicting information and opinions gained from diverse sources.

Non-participant Observation

In addition to elite interviewing, the research also relied on non-participant observation. Non-participant observation allows the researcher to have a first-hand experience with the informant, as information and details can be noticed at the time that the observation occurs.¹²⁹ Observation without participation was particularly useful when identifying the most important actors and decision-makers involved in dynamic negotiations and group discussions at the United Nations. This data collection method does not require any particular skill or experience. This research carried out non-participant observation during the substantive session of the ‘UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group (C-34)’ at the UN Headquarters in New York from 23 February to 20 March

¹²⁹ J.W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, London: Sage publications, 1994, p. 150.

2009.¹³⁰ The author attended almost all of the High-level plenary meetings as a delegate and special advisor on UN peacekeeping operations, being formally authorised by the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN.¹³¹

Access to the conference, the High-level plenary sessions and daily working group meetings allowed for the careful observation of the role of the EU and its member states at the UN with regards to the issue of peacekeeping operations. In addition to observing the special committee on peacekeeping operations at the UN General Assembly, exclusive meetings at the Security Council concerning peacekeeping operations were also monitored. Conducting non-participant observation enabled this research to obtain robust and practical evidence about the role of the EU in general and the important position and leadership of some EU member states at the UN Security Council in particular.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the research design utilised to answer the research question. It argued that, in order to answer the primary research question that entails a causal ‘under what conditions’ subject, an explanatory and deductive approach provides the best framework to identify the most important conditions. In explanatory and deductive research, developing plausible propositions that have been derived from theory is deemed essential. This chapter offered two testable hypotheses drawing on the most prominent IR theories, realist theory vs. social constructivist theory. Each hypothesis considered the relationship between the dependent variable and independent variable. This chapter hypothesised that the likelihood of the EU Member States’ leadership in supporting UN-related peacekeeping operations will increase *if* there are political and strategic interests of the EU member states in peacekeeping areas and the normative pressures concerning peacekeeping operations. In each case chapter, the study will examine the relationship between the dependent and independent variables and test the hypotheses.

This chapter also introduced the research strategy and methods used to collect and analyse data. It suggested that a multiple case study is the preferred research strategy to investigate

¹³⁰ See Official UN Report (A/63/19) of the “Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group”, General Assembly, New York, 23 Feb-20 March 2009.

¹³¹ See Appendix I – Research Notes.

the important conditions under which the EU states are more likely to provide their leadership to approve UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping operations. Three cases were carefully selected on the basis of the research question and analytical framework: Operation *Artemis* (2003); EUFOR DR Congo (2006); and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2007). In the next chapter, some possible analytical frameworks will be discussed to investigate the dynamic negotiations and decision-making between the UN and the EU on the issue of international peacekeeping operations (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 will further examine the key theoretical debates to clarify the formulation of two hypotheses deduced from theoretical ideas. By using a new revised two-level game analysis, each case study (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) will examine the most important actors involved in decision-making and test the hypotheses to determine to what extent important conditions are likely to influence the decision of EU member states to play an active role in peacekeeping. Chapter 8 will revisit the findings of each of the case studies and provide a comparative explanatory analysis of the three cases. The hypotheses derived from theories will either be accepted or rejected.

Chapter 3

Two-level Game Analysis: *Dynamic Decision-making between the UN and the EU*

Introduction

This chapter proposes an analytical framework to examine the dynamic interactions between the UN and the EU in the realm of international peace and security. Building upon Putnam's traditional 'Two-Level Game' metaphor, this chapter seeks to develop an analytical framework to answer the following two questions: (1) *how* the UNSC and the EU simultaneously interact in dealing with issues of international peacekeeping; and (2) *who* plays the most important role in decision-making insofar as the issue of UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation is concerned. The two-level game approach is deemed worthy of attention; it addresses a structural analysis for international negotiations, and it also accounts for actors' behaviour driven by domestic preferences which may significantly influence international bargaining outcomes.

This chapter begins by examining Putnam's traditional two-level game metaphor to elucidate how international diplomacy enables domestic interests and preferences to be compatible with international politics in general (section 3.1). The chapter also investigates the suitability of a multi-level game approach to the study of UN-EU cooperation. Focusing on various important actors involved in a complex web of interactions, a multi-level game approach is examined by delving into three different levels (section 3.2). Finally, this chapter suggests a new revised two-level game model which best fits into this specific case (section 3.3). In order to construct a new analytical framework, this study first defines two different levels: the '*international UN level*' as level I and the '*domestic EU level*' as level II. Then the two-level game analysis identifies the most important actors involved in negotiations and decision-making in terms of *chief negotiator* and *facilitator* (section 3.4).

3.1 Putnam's Two-Level Games

Several authors argue that in international contexts negotiations take place on different levels or in different fora, but a central feature of political diplomacy is the interaction between domestic level and international level.¹³² Amongst many attempts to theorise the correlation between domestic and international politics, Robert D. Putnam's two-level game provides a useful analytical tool for assessing this interaction. Putnam's metaphor helps to flesh out the dynamic interaction between the domestic level and international level, where every international negotiation goes through. In addition, it identifies the most important actors involved in negotiations in terms of chief negotiators. The two-level game analysis helps this study to explain how interactions between different levels can be formulated and to what extent the role of chief negotiators can lead to a simultaneous bargaining outcome in the end.¹³³

Putnam developed what he calls 'Two-Level Games' as a metaphor for analysing the domestic-international interaction which happens as a part of international negotiations. By observing the complex negotiations on macroeconomic, trade and energy policies linked to the Bonn G7 summit of 1978, Putnam sought to make the argument that an economical bargaining mechanism became possible politically. He argues that key governments adopted policies "different from those that they would have pursued in the absence of international negotiation", and that agreement would be possible only when "a powerful minority within each government actually favoured on domestic grounds the policy being demanded internationally"¹³⁴

In Putnam's two-level games, as Figure 3.1 illustrates, international negotiations should be broken down into two different stages. The first stage consists of negotiations aiming to


¹³² See P. J. Katzenstein, *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978, p.4.; P. J. Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States", *International Organization*, vol. 30, Winter 1976.; S. D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978.; P. Evans, K. K. Jacobsen, and R. D. Putman (eds.), *Double-Edges Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993.; and S. Woolcock, "Multi-level Economic Diplomacy: The Case of Investment" in N. Bayne and S. Woolcock (eds.), *The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations*, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007, p.141.

¹³³ See N. Bayne and S. Woolcock (2007), *Ibid*.

¹³⁴ R.D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games", *International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 3, 1988, pp.427-460 (p.428).

achieve a provisional agreement at the international level (Level I), while the second stage entails negotiations at the domestic level (Level II), within which each group discusses whether or not to accept and ratify the initial agreement of Level I.¹³⁵ Putnam's metaphor implies that the games are played simultaneously when two level processes are interactive in many negotiations. According to Putnam, there are likely to be prior consultations at Level II in order to impose a domestic initial position for the negotiations at international Level I. Putnam highlights the importance of a Level II ratification that would affect Level I negotiations directly or indirectly.

Figure 3. 1 Negotiation and Ratification Process



Putnam explains that Level II ratification usually entails a formal voting procedure, which leads to the endorsement or implementation of a Level I agreement, either formally or informally.¹³⁶ Accordingly, the Level I agreement is considerably constrained, because it must bring a Level II ratification in the end. Furthermore, expectations of being rejected by constituents at Level II may abort negotiations at Level I. During Level I negotiations, therefore, there is a considerable amount of pressure exerted by the national government or constituents who seek to maximise their own preferences and interests on the international arena.

¹³⁵ See R. D. Putnam (1988), *Ibid.*; and P. Evans (1993), *op. cit.*, p. 438.

¹³⁶ R. D. Putnam (1988), *Ibid.* p. 437.

The logic of the two-level games is, therefore, that strategies and decisions taken at one level can have a direct effect on negotiations at the other level.¹³⁷ In this context, attention must be paid to the concept of ‘win-set’ that defines a range of outcomes that each party will accept. Given the Level II constituency, Putnam’s win-set implies the set of all possible Level I agreements that would gain the necessary majority among the constituents when simply ‘voted up or down’.¹³⁸ From Putnam’s point of view, during international negotiations all negotiators - Putnam considers them national leaders - aim to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic preferences and interests, so that they can bring around the domestic ratification without any amendment or rejection. Putnam argues that the contours delineating Level II win-sets are very important for understanding a Level I agreement for two reasons.

First, larger win-sets make a Level I agreement more likely, *ceteris paribus*.¹³⁹ By definition, any successful agreement at Level I must fall within the Level II win-sets of each of the parties to the accord. Thus, an agreement is possible only if those win-sets overlap; and the larger each win-set, the more likely they are to overlap. Conversely, the smaller the win-sets, the greater the risk that negotiations will break down. In other words, when it becomes clear that the initial win-sets do not overlap at all, no successful Level I agreement can be achieved.¹⁴⁰

Second, Putnam argues that the relative size of the respective Level II win-sets will affect the distribution of joint gains from the international bargain. The larger the perceived win-set of a negotiator, the more the negotiator can be “pushed around” by the other Level I negotiators. Conversely, a smaller domestic win-set can somehow be a bargaining advantage; because it sometimes turns out to be a good excuse for a negotiator to politely refuse counterparts’ proposal by saying “I’d like to accept your proposal, but I could never get it accepted at

¹³⁷ Putnam argues that the only formal constraint on the interacting process is, nevertheless, that since the identical agreement must be ratified by both sides, a preliminary Level I agreement cannot be amended at Level II without reopening the Level I negotiations. In other words, final ratification must be simply “voted up or down.” Any modification to the Level I agreement counts as a rejection, unless that modification is approved by all other parties to the agreement (Putnam 1988:439). Putnam also addresses that this stipulation is, in fact, characteristic of most ‘real-world ratification procedures’, although it is somewhat violated by the occasional practice of appending “reservations” to the ratification of treaties.

¹³⁸ R. D. Putnam (1988), *Ibid.*, p. 439.; S. Woolcock (2007), *op. cit.*, p.35.

¹³⁹ Under some circumstances, an expanded win-set might actually make practicable some outcome that could trigger a dilemma of collective action. See V. P. Grawford, “A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining”, *Econometrica*, vol. 50, May 1982, pp. 607-637.

¹⁴⁰ This discussion implicitly assumes uncertainty about the contours of the win-sets on the part of the Level I negotiators – for if the win-sets were known with certainty, the negotiators would never propose for ratification an agreement that would be rejected.

home.”¹⁴¹ To sum up, the size of Level II win-sets directly and indirectly affects the outcomes of international negotiations and bargaining.

In assessing the interactions between domestic and international politics, Putnam presents each side as represented by a negotiator who acts as the only formal link between Levels I and II. He views national leaders as negotiating players in a two-level game.¹⁴² In Putnam’s traditional two-level games, the negotiator is often introduced as a ‘*Chief Negotiator*’ or ‘*Chief of Government (COG)*’.¹⁴³ In Putnam’s two-level games, the chief negotiator is an individual single actor rather than a group or multiple actors, who have no independent policy view, but act merely as an ‘honest broker’ or rather as an ‘agent’ on behalf of his government or constituents.¹⁴⁴ Given the role of the COG, it appears that the credibility of the COG is especially essential at both level negotiations, and neither of two games can be neglected by the central decision-maker, the COG.¹⁴⁵

In sum, the two-level game approach depicts international diplomacy as a “process of strategic interactions”.¹⁴⁶ Although Putnam’s metaphor basically implies a state-to-state interaction, it can also incorporate a state-centred approach within an institutional structure. This may provide a good reason why many scholars gradually shift their attention to Putnam’s metaphor for the analysis of EU’s external relations, which entails complex interactions among multiple actors across interdisciplinary policy areas. Putnam himself suggests that further efforts have to be made to extend and develop upon the two-level game. Indeed, various authors fascinated by the value of Putnam’s two-level game metaphor seek to extend and identify more possible levels in the analysis of EU diplomacy.¹⁴⁷ Drawing on

¹⁴¹ R. D. Putnam (1988), *op. cit.*, p. 443.

¹⁴² For more account of the role of negotiators, see Putnam (1988); and Evans (1993), *op. cit.*, p.399.

¹⁴³ There are various terms referring to a negotiator; *e.g.* statesman, chief executive or leader vis-à-vis domestic constituencies (see P. B. Evans, 1993:399). Nevertheless, scholars seem most likely to use the term of ‘chief negotiator’ or ‘chief of government (COG)’ to refer a negotiator within a two-level game framework.

¹⁴⁴ See Putnam (1988), *op. cit.*, p.451.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

¹⁴⁶ A. Moravcsik, “Introduction: Integrating international and domestic theories of international bargaining” in P. B. Evans *et al.* (eds), *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 15.

¹⁴⁷ See D. Bonvicini, “Playing Three-Level Games in the Global Economy – Case Studies from the EU”, *EU Policy Paper*, College of Europe, 2008.; H. Hubel, “The EU’s Three-Level Game in Dealing with Neighbours”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 9, 2004, pp.347-362.; S. Meunier, “What Single Voice? The European Institutions and EU-US Trade Negotiations”, *International Organization*, vol.54, no.1, 2000, pp.103-135.; S. Collinson, ““Issue-system”, “multilevel games” and the analysis of the EU’s external commercial and associated policies: a research agenda”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.6, no.2, 1999, pp.206-224.; L.A. Patterson, “Agricultural policy reform in the European Community: a three-level game analysis”,

this traditional two-level game metaphor, the following section examines a multi-level game approach to determine whether the analysis offers the appropriate explanations on UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation.

3.2 Multi-Level Game

Recently, an increasing number of scholars have applied a multi-level game approach to the study of the EU's external relations; more specifically, to the study of the EU as a global actor.¹⁴⁸ Authors who advocate a multi-level game analysis seek to take every possible unit into account as a separate level, so that they can define different levels whereby various EU actors interact simultaneously. Hence, this chapter also seeks to investigate a multi-level game analysis to determine to what extent multi-levels of analysis can explain the dynamic interactions between the two organisations both in a precise and simple way.

The argument is best laid out by Andrew Moravcsik, in his book '*Choice for Europe*' (1998). According to Moravcsik, decisions are ultimately made through a series of intergovernmental bargains at European-level, which therefore enables us to consider the value of multi-level negotiations based on the number of levels established. Collinson notes that the use of multi-level frameworks in the analysis of the EU's external policy provides a "basis for tackling some of the broader questions concerning the nature and significance of the EU as an international actor in the world's economic and political arena".¹⁴⁹ In the course of analysing international negotiations where the EU is a party,¹⁵⁰ Young argues that there must be an extension of the two-level game model by emphasising the important role of the European Community (EC) that plays in two parallel games; "in one game the EU is the international level at which the member governments representing their domestic interests seek to find a common position, while in the second game the EU is the domestic level and

International Organization, vol. 51, no.1, 1997, pp.135-165.; and J. S. Odell, "International Threats and Internal Politics: Brazil, the European Community and the United States, 1985-1987" in P. B. Evans *et al.* (eds.), *op. cit.*, 1993, pp.233-264.

¹⁴⁸ For example, see S. Meunier (2000), *Ibid.*; S. Collinson (1999), *Ibid.*; and L.A. Patterson (1997), *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ S. Collinson (1999), *Ibid.*, p.206.

¹⁵⁰ For example, M. L. Frennhoff, "Principal-Agent Analysis with One Agent and Two Principals: European Union Trade Negotiations with South Africa", *Politics & Policy*, vol. 35, no. 3, 2007, pp. 857-881.

the Commission (or the Council presidency) negotiates at the international level”.¹⁵¹ Consequently, three levels - domestic government level, EU level, and International level - are defined to examine the EU’s external negotiations.

The interpretation as well as application of a multi-level game approach may significantly vary according to the different actors and institutions involved in negotiations. Most often, however, when Putnam’s metaphor has been used for the study of the EU in international negotiations, the two-level game metaphor was converted into a three-level game metaphor.¹⁵² In adaptations of Putnam’s two-level game framework, for instance, Patterson and Moyer insist that it is useful to envisage three rather than two levels in the EU’s negotiation and decision making processes.¹⁵³ Glaser also emphasises the need for the extension of the two-level game, by proposing a three-level model for his case on EU trade policy; Level I is a level in which the Commission negotiates based on a mandate at the international level; while Level II refers to the Community level, where the common position is forged by the EU institutions; and Level III involves decision-making in the domestic politics of member states.¹⁵⁴ Moreover, Meunier argues that, in the case of the EU, the complex web of rules through which diverse preferences are aggregated into a common position is amplified by the existence of three levels that interact in international bargaining: ‘domestic, supranational (European), and international’.¹⁵⁵ Considering the value of a three-level game analysis, the next section examines the applicability of a three-level analogy to the analysis of UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping.

¹⁵¹ A. Young, “What Game? By Which Rules? Adaptation and Flexibility in the EC’s Foreign Economic Policy” in M. Knodt & S. Princen (eds.), *Understanding the European Union’s External Relations*, London: Routledge, 2003, p.55.

¹⁵² For example see Meunier (2000), *op. cit.*, and Collinson, *op. cit.*

¹⁵³ H. W. Moyer, “The European Community and the GATT Uruguay Round: preserving the common agricultural policy at all costs” in W. P. Avery (ed.), *World Agriculture and the GATT*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993.; and L. A. Patterson (1997), *op. cit.*

¹⁵⁴ M. Glaser, “The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: European Leadership Emerging from a Multi-level Game” in D. Bonvicini (ed.), *op. cit.*, 2008, p.21.

¹⁵⁵ S. Meunier (2000), *op. cit.*

Three-level Game


Level I, as in Putnam's two-level framework, would depict the international UN level, at which the key actors involved negotiate simultaneously to reach an agreement on international peacekeeping operations. Level II, on the other hand, becomes the European Union level, in which the negotiations take place among the member states. The Commission plays an important role in steering the policy process within the framework of the CFSP and ESDP. Level III remains the national or domestic level, at which individual member states' preferences are particularly considered. In sum, according to a three-level analysis, the negotiations between the UN and the EU on the issue of international peacekeeping are simultaneously carried out in three different venues: the UN (Level I), the EU (Level II), and domestic sectors of individual EU member states (Level III).

In Putnam's two-level game, the same individual negotiators simultaneously interact encompassing direct concerns and responsibilities at both Level I and II. However, particularly in Collinson's three-level formulation, negotiators in the various levels may differ. Collinson argues that the key EU negotiators linking Level I and Level II are not always the same individuals who are playing at Level II and Level III. In addition, Level I may involve more than one key actor and each may represent different interests and 'issue-systems'.¹⁵⁶ In this three-level model, as Figure 3.2 displays, UNSC member states are present at Level I negotiations; while the Commission representatives and other key EU actors within the EU system such as COREPER¹⁵⁷ and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each member state are entangled within the EU level negotiations; and domestic constituencies constitute Level III negotiations. The role of the Commission is rather highlighted in accessing the negotiations between Level I and Level II as well as Level II and Level III, because it is deemed to be negotiating on behalf of all member states as well as the Union at international level. Ministers and officials representing each domestic member state, on the other hand, constitute the interface of negotiations between Level II and Level III.

¹⁵⁶ For a comprehensive account of the multi-level negotiators, see S. Collinson (1999), *op. cit.*, p.219.

¹⁵⁷ Committee of Permanent Representatives (*Comité des Représentants Permanents*).

Figure 3. 2 Three-level Game Model



The multi-level game analysis seems to be useful to formulate a byzantine network of interactions between different levels and investigate the range of possible analyses of the role of EU actors in international relations. Despite the value of a multi-level game approach, however, it appears that a multi-level or three-level game analysis is less appropriate to examine negotiations between the UN and the EU.

First, the direction of interactions between different levels needs to be redefined. As Collinson acknowledges, Putnam's framework is concerned principally with the 'vertical interaction' between different levels within a whole system.¹⁵⁸ To put it differently, as far as the direction of the negotiations and decision-making process goes either vertically top-down or bottom-up, the role of the EU (Level II) which is placed in the middle position comes to be the most highlighted, as it represents the only formal link between Level I and Level III (see Figure 3.2). However, in fact, the role of the EU is limited at both levels, especially insofar as the peacekeeping resolutions are concerned.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ S. Collinson, *op. cit.*, p.220.

¹⁵⁹ Although the Treaty of Lisbon has intended to achieve the EU legal personality by creating a 'High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy' for the consistency of the Union in external relations, the ratification process is still undergoing. And even if the Treaty would be ratified by all Member States, it will take more time to come into force. Therefore, the issue of

Furthermore, despite the fact that the external agreement can be somehow reached by the efforts of the Commission and the Commission is often directly engaged in the policy process, the negotiation outcomes nevertheless can only be determined by the Council of Ministers in which individual member states have the right to vote and ratify in the end. Considering the nature of foreign and security policy by which the decision-making process remains fundamentally inter-governmental, domestic Level III is the level that should directly interact with international Level I. Therefore, the set of vertical arrangements of a three-level model where the EU is placed in the middle as the formal link between different levels would less fit into this specific case of UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation.

Second, in terms of the chief negotiator, the key actors who are formally involved in the negotiations across the three levels are not explicitly identified. According to Collinson's three-level game analysis, individual EU member states at domestic Level III are more likely to facilitate the European level (Level II) to play an effective role as an agent or negotiator that aims to achieve the Community's common interest and position in international negotiations. However, on the specific case of international peacekeeping, only a few EU members in the Security Council can participate and act in the negotiations on behalf of the EU (Level II) as well as their own nation (Level III) at the UNSC negotiations (Level I). Therefore, international bargaining outcomes are largely determined by a few powerful member states which can directly reflect their preferences and interests on UNSC resolutions, rather than be driven by the EU as an institution. The three-level game analysis lacks an explicit identification of who would simultaneously act across different levels as a chief negotiator. As a result, a complex web of interactions among different actors at different levels only brings more intricate analysis.

Third, in terms of the ratification phase, a three-level game analysis still remains a critical question regarding at which level the final agreement is to be accepted and ratified by voters. According to Putnam's metaphor, the agreement taken at an international level must be ratified at a domestic/national level in the end. However, in a three-level game analysis, the external agreements on peacekeeping operations shall only be concluded by the Council of Ministers at the European Level II. In this regard, Collinson notes that the Council's conclusion of agreements may be equated with Putnam's notion of 'ratification'.¹⁶⁰ Yet, in principle, the form of ratification usually comes to encounter national/domestic approval at

the EU's legal personality still remains at negotiation level, and thus this study does not consider the EU as a legal personality so far.


¹⁶⁰ S. Collinson, *op. cit.*

last. If Level III is not significantly considered in the context of the ratification phase, it seems unlikely to constitute a separate third level.

Three-level Game and Its Deficit

Given the critical weaknesses of a three-level game analysis, this study attempts to evaluate an alternative three-level game approach. This alternative three-level game analysis differs by and large from the one discussed above in two aspects. First, the concept of ‘vertical reverberation’ is redefined by the potential for horizontal interaction between different levels.¹⁶¹ To be more specific, as Figure 3.3 illustrates, instead of adopting a vertical interaction, the alternative three-level model accounts for a triangular interaction by combining horizontal and vertical interactions, within which every actor or negotiator can play simultaneously across different levels.

Figure 3. 3 Alternative Three-level Game Model



¹⁶¹ Collinson argues that only negotiation issues can make a horizontal interaction across different levels, whilst negotiation structures remain vertical. However, this study assumes that not only the issues concerned, but also the structure of interactions between different levels can be horizontal within this analytical framework.

Second, for the analysis of domestic Level III, it narrows down the scope of possible EU member states involved. Alternatively, as Collision notes, since Level III should encompass the domestic politics of every member states and those areas of interest-group politics across national boundaries, the picture of the dynamics would potentially become very complicated.¹⁶² So in order not to overload the analysis, it must identify the most important member states and focus only on those states' positions in a way that may demonstrate a significant impact on the negotiations at both EU and UN levels. Gross argues that the positions of Britain, France and Germany, namely the 'Big-three', are of particular relevance in explaining policy outcomes in European crisis management due to "their substantial political and military involvement, their size and influence in the EU setting, and their contrasting preferences and approaches towards the EU foreign and security institutional framework".¹⁶³ Apart from those traditional 'Big-three', Italy in particular has increased its involvement in peacekeeping and provided important role in ESDP missions over the last decade, trying to ensure its prominent position at both the UNSC and the EU. Italy notably insists on a 'Big-four' rather than three, especially when it comes to the issues of EU-related peace operations.¹⁶⁴ In this perspective, among all 27 EU members that potentially constitute the domestic Level III, the positions and preferences of the UK, France, Germany, and Italy are viewed as considerably important. The Big-four countries are deemed to possess a super power to promote European consistency in security and defence policy at the community EU level (Level II) and international UN level (Level I).¹⁶⁵

Nevertheless, despite further efforts to make up for these deficiencies in a three-level game analysis, there remain crucial questions about chief negotiators and the ratification phase. First, in light of a separate domestic level for the UK, France, Germany, and Italy, this study raises a critical question about the chief negotiator who has to act as a formal link between different levels. It seems unfeasible to formulate the Big-four countries as a separate level (Level III), because they rather act as the most important negotiators interacting between the Security Council (Level I) and the EU (Level II) simultaneously. According to the logic of the multi-level game analysis, there must be different chief negotiators who interface and negotiate across three different game boards; between the Security Council (Level I) and the European Union (Level II); between the European Union (Level II) and domestic UK,

¹⁶² See S. Collinson (1999), *op. cit.*, pp.206-224.

¹⁶³ E. Gross, *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in European Crisis Management*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.4.

¹⁶⁴ Interview with national officer, Embassy of Italy in Seoul, 8 June 2012.

¹⁶⁵ See J. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp.178-206.

France, Germany and Italy (Level III); and between domestic UK/FR/DE/IT (Level III) and the Security Council (Level I) respectively.

As in Figure 3.3, negotiations between Level II and Level III would be led by British, French, German and Italian Foreign Affairs Ministers or officials who would play a role as chief negotiators representing their domestic constituents. Meanwhile, the permanent representatives of the UK and France and to a lesser extent Germany and Italy to the UNSC would become the chief negotiators between Level I and Level III respectively. However, the chief negotiator who directly interacts between the UNSC (Level I) and the EU (Level II) is not clear here. If the UK, France, Germany and Italy are defined as a separate domestic national level (Level III), there must be another chief negotiator who would simultaneously connect the UNSC level and the EU level, other than those Big-four countries. However, besides the UK, France, Germany and Italy, there are countries that are unlikely to be involved in decision-making at either Level I or Level II. In sum, even in this alternative three-level game model, chief negotiators who must formally link negotiations between the UNSC (Level I) and the EU (Level II) are still absent.

The second reason that the UK, France, Germany and Italy are less likely to be considered as a separate third level is primarily associated with the negotiation outcomes on peacekeeping mandates. Given the increasing credibility of multilateral cooperation among regional and international organisations for the maintenance of international peace and security, the UNSC is more likely to mandate the EU to collaborate alongside the UN, rather than to call upon individual countries, such as the UK, France, Germany and Italy, to provide peacekeeping support separately. Therefore, it is the EU not individual member states that the UN Security Council resolution authorises to carry out EU-related peacekeeping operations.

Hence, it is unlikely that a UNSC resolution would directly mandate the UK, France, Germany or Italy to perform peacekeeping operations by being entitled 'UK mission', 'French mission', 'German mission', or 'Italian mission' for instance. In light of the EU mission, decision-making on peacekeeping operations at the EU level implies the unanimous agreement of all EU member states. Negotiation outcomes are thus expected to be ratified and implemented within the framework of the ESDP, not by the individual French, British, German or Italian domestic structures. As a result of the intensive negotiations between the UN and the EU, the final agreement is normally achieved and officially announced in two

different forms: UNSC Resolution at the international UN level and Council of Joint Action at the European level. After all, neither individual nor separate domestic peacekeeping mandates are precisely authorised during the process of UN-EU decision-making. The argument for a third level therefore seems less likely to be plausible.

Finally, if the European Big-four countries are to be placed as a separate level, the third level should bring the analysis to examining the British, French, German and Italian domestic politics respectively, including each national decision-making procedure and ratification phase. Because, theoretically, a domestic national level represents a stage where negotiation outcomes should be either ratified or rejected by constituents. However, this study does not aim to explore individual domestic politics in which each distinctive national culture of decision-making, as well as the win-sets, is intricately linked. Rather, this study seeks to examine the institutional interactions between the UN and the EU. By doing so, it aims to identify the most important actors involved in the process of the simultaneous negotiations and decision-making.

The advocate for a multi-level or three-level game approach would argue that establishing a separate third level for the Big-four countries is essential in the analysis of UN-EU relations because of their vital role and decisive position which may largely affect negotiation outcomes. It is true that the role of the UK, France, Germany and Italy is undeniably important in relations between the UN and the EU. Nevertheless, this study confirms that it is only possible to consider the Big-four as a separate level if evidence suggests that they negotiate and make a decision as independent actors representing their own domestic interests at international level. Furthermore, considering legal obligations and responsibilities of the EU member states stipulated in Article 19 of the EU Treaty, the European Big-four are strongly expected to act on behalf of all EU member states in international negotiations. Therefore, the UK, France, Germany and Italy are neither separate actors nor independent units in UN-EU relations. On the contrary, they are part of a core between two levels by being engaged in the negotiations between these levels.

Overall, this study confirms that a three-level game framework which considers France, the UK, Germany and Italy as a separate third level would not fully depict a comprehensive contour of the dynamic interactions between the UN and the EU. In what follows, consequently, this thesis suggests a new analytical framework. By drawing on, but revising, Putnam's traditional two-level game metaphor, a new analytical framework would explicitly

account for the simultaneous interactions between different actors and levels involved on the issue of UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping.

3.3 Revised Two-Level Game

The most noticeable difference between a two-level and a three-level game analysis lies in the existence of Level III. The question of whether or not the UK, France, Germany and Italy constitute a separate level is a key concern in determining to what extent different levels can most simply, but explicitly, account for the UN-EU decision-making on peacekeeping cooperation. This thesis argues that negotiations between the UN and the EU on the issue of international peacekeeping are simultaneously carried out at two different levels: *International UNSC level* (Level I) and *domestic EU level* (Level II). This study determines that the Big-four states are chief negotiators, rather than a separate level. It posits that during the dynamic interactions between the UNSC and the EU on the issues of international peacekeeping cooperation, the UK, France, Germany and Italy would play a decisive role as chief negotiators by leading and being engaged in bargaining, negotiations, and decision-making at both levels simultaneously.

Putnam argues that international relations are entangled with domestic politics where the “domestic causes and international effects” or the “international causes and domestic effects”.¹⁶⁶ Similarly, one UK national delegate to the UN highlighted that European common preferences and interests can affect the negotiation outcomes of the United Nations, either directly or indirectly, and *vice versa*, through the activeness of the EU major powers.¹⁶⁷ The UK, France, Germany and Italy play an important role across two levels, leading to the achievement of peacekeeping mandates and eventually an operational action in the field.

Although this study adopts a two-level game approach as an analytical tool, it will not duplicate or simply repeat what Putnam has already done with his traditional two-level game. This study instead proposes a new revised model based on Putnam’s traditional metaphor, which may best fit into the analytical and theoretical perspectives as well as empirical cases.

¹⁶⁶ R. D. Putnam (1988), *op. cit.*

¹⁶⁷ Interview with the British delegate to the United Nations, New York, 14 April 2009.

This chapter further discusses the most notable features of a new revised model *vis-à-vis* Putnam's traditional metaphor. It also clarifies why the two-level game needs to be revised for the analysis of this specific research subject. Table 3.1 summarises some key elements of a revised two-level game differing from Putnam's traditional metaphor.

Table 3. 1 Comparison of Two-level Game: Putnam's Metaphor vs. Revised Model

	Putnam's model	Revised model
Level I	International Level	International UN level (NY)
Interrelation	State-to-State (Inter-governmental)	UN-EU (Inter-organisational)
Policy area	Economic / Trade diplomacy	Foreign and Security Policy
Outcomes	Agreement	UNSC Resolution
Level II	Domestic Level	Domestic EU level (Brussels)
Parties	Government / Constituents	27 EU member states
Ratification	Vote	Council Joint Action
Negotiator(s)	Chief of Government (COG) (national leader / individual actor)	Chief Negotiators (FR / UK / DE / IT) + Facilitator (HR)

First of all, the analysis of this thesis argues that the UN-EU interaction is clearly divided into two levels: '*international UN level*' as Level I and '*domestic EU level*' as Level II. Whilst Putnam addresses that international negotiations are shaped by individual governments that seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures,¹⁶⁸ a revised two-level game delineates international negotiations as a process of inter-organisational interactions, *inter alia* between the UN and the EU. That is, a revised two-level game posits that the interactions between levels are not inter-governmental or state-centric interactions as Putnam's metaphor suggests.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ See R. D. Putnam (1988), *op. cit.*, p.436.

¹⁶⁹ See also N. Bayne and S. Woolcock (2007), "What is Economic Diplomacy" in *The New Economic Diplomacy*, pp.1-19. Bayne and Woolcock focus more on state-centred theories in the course of analysing the link between shaping domestic policy preference and defining international negotiation win-sets.

Second, in light of the negotiator, the revised model identifies the UK, France, Germany and Italy as four possible *chief negotiators*. According to Putnam, each national leader or head of government appears at both game boards as the so-called chief of government (COG), and neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, COG.¹⁷⁰ In the new revised model, however, the Big-four countries are viewed as important chief negotiators representing their domestic EU level position at the international negotiations. The UK and France are particularly seen as important chief negotiators, because they are not only powerful EU member states at domestic level, but they are also permanent members of the UN Security Council, which allows them to possess a prerogative legal status and power to influence the decision-making outcome. Germany and Italy, on the other hand, are also considered as important actors alongside the UK and France at the domestic EU level, *albeit* less influentially, particularly at the international UNSC level, due to their limited non-permanent position at the Security Council. The revised two-level game analysis examines to what extent the UK, France, Germany and Italy play an important role as chief negotiators dealing with the issue of international peacekeeping operations.

Third, besides those four chief negotiators, the new revised model identifies a *facilitator*. As the Treaty of Lisbon came into force on 1 December 2009, the EU's representation in the international arena became the centre of attention. The EU has increasingly endeavoured to demonstrate the ambitious role of EU representatives by strengthening the role of the High Representative (HR) for Common Foreign and Security Policy or the President of the European Council. Nevertheless, in practice, there remains a critical restriction on the role of EU representatives to act as decisive chief negotiators, because neither the HR nor the President of the European Council have a legal status at the UNSC where only sovereign states are allowed to sit. The position of the EU representative is, therefore, inevitably more limited than that of chief negotiators. The study examines the role of the HR in peacekeeping cooperation between the UN and the EU. Yet, this study considers the HR an important facilitator who has no direct impact on decision *per se*, but prompts and facilitates the UN-EU negotiations on peacekeeping.


Finally, in the context of negotiation outcomes and ratification, a revised two-level game analysis investigates a UNSC Resolution as a negotiation outcome at international level, while a European Council Joint Action is perceived as a negotiation outcome at domestic level. According to Woolcock, negotiators seek to find an outcome that will satisfy both their

¹⁷⁰ Putnam (1988), *op. cit.*, pp. 436-438.

international partners at Level I and their domestic principals at Level II.¹⁷¹ In a new revised two-level game analysis, negotiation outcomes at international level and domestic level should differ respectively. An international peacekeeping mandate and resolution can be adopted by the fifteen Council members' vote at the UN Security Council, while 27 EU member states have to reach a unanimous consent on peacekeeping mandate by adopting Council of Joint Action.

In sum, as Figure 3.4 illustrates, in a revised two-level game framework, the dynamic interactions between the UN and the EU on the issue of international peacekeeping are simultaneously carried out across two levels in which the European Big-four countries play an important role as chief negotiators. When decisions are achieved at each level, *i.e.* UNSC resolution at the international level and Council Joint Action at the domestic level, UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping finally takes place on the ground.

Figure 3. 4 Revised Two-level Game (on UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation)



¹⁷¹ See S. Woolcock (2007), *op. cit.*, pp.21-42.

International UNSC level

International peacekeeping operations have been universally perceived as being controlled and authorised by the UN Security Council. In the aftermath of the First World War, the first formal statement of what would become known as ‘collective security’ was introduced, in parallel with the establishment of a new international organisation, the League of Nations, which was replaced later by the United Nations after the Second World War.¹⁷² Collective security was a concept closely related to ‘peacekeeping’, *albeit* not necessarily synonymous with it.¹⁷³ The important fact to be underlined here is that both the League of Nations and the United Nations were intended to be the institutional vehicle for international peacekeeping through the collective security.¹⁷⁴ To be more specific, the purposes and principles of the UN are laid out in Chapter I of the UN Charter. According to Article 1(1), the first purpose of the UN is:¹⁷⁵

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

The primary responsibility of the UN was reaffirmed by the Brahimi Report in 2000 which spells out that the UN should maintain international peace and security by facilitating collective cooperation among nations in a wide range of peace operations, such as peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-building.¹⁷⁶ As the very first and original legitimate international organisation for international peace and security, the UN has authorised and deployed a total of 63 peacekeeping operations around the world as of December 2009 since its foundation in 1945.¹⁷⁷ According to the speech given by the former President of France

¹⁷² For a comprehensive account of the League of Nations and the United Nations, see *Basic Facts About the United Nations 2000*, New York: United Nations Publications, 2001.

¹⁷³ N. MacQueen (2006), *op. cit.*, p.26.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ See Charter of the United Nations.

¹⁷⁶ According to the *Brahimi Report*, the UN peace operations are divided into mainly three categories: (1) conflict prevention and peacemaking; (2) peacekeeping; and (3) peace-building.

¹⁷⁷ The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, when the Security Council authorised the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

Jacques Chirac on the issue of the war against Iraq in 2003, no one had been entitled universally to assume the right to utilise force to prevent and intervene in any occasions of threat to international peace and security except the United Nations.¹⁷⁸ Issues related to international peacekeeping operations have thus been the sheer weight of the UN.

Among the plethora of specialised bodies, programmes and funds within the UN system, none has carried out greater peacekeeping work than the Security Council.¹⁷⁹ As Article 24(1) spells out, in order to ensure that prompt and effective peacekeeping action is taken by the UN, its “members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf”.¹⁸⁰ Accordingly, the UN’s 193 sovereign member states are obliged under its Charter to agree to accept and respect the decisions of the Council’s fifteen members, in particular on the issue of international military peacekeeping mandates.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, unlike decisions made in the General Assembly, decisions of the Security Council are to be binding.

Luck also notes that the Security Council is a special and unique place where the enforcement authority for international peace operations comes to be decided and formed.¹⁸² For more than sixty years of its existence, UN peacekeeping has evolved significantly to meet the “demands of different conflicts and a changing political landscape” as a tool of international crisis response.¹⁸³ The Security Council has been confronted and grappled with its major task of effectively managing international peacekeeping operations both at the political and operational level. At the political level, the Security Council appears to bring substantial issues to the negotiation table and decides legitimately and legally on whether civil-military peace operations ought to be deployed to conflict areas. When the Council deals with peacekeeping issues at political level, it elicits substantial and sustainable commitments from member states to support its decisions. Then moving on to the operational level, the Council carries out its operational activities and missions competently by organising collective actions to enforce institutional decisions.

¹⁷⁸ Speech of President Chirac to the UN General Assembly, 23 September 2003.

¹⁷⁹ See Appendix III-1 Organisational Chart of the United Nations.

¹⁸⁰ Article 24 (1), Charter of the United Nations: Chapter V – The Security Council.

¹⁸¹ Regarding functions and powers of the Security Council, Article 25 addresses that “the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”.

¹⁸² See E. C. Luck, *UN Security Council: Practice and Promise*, New York: Routledge, 2006.

¹⁸³ See internal document of the UN, *New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS), New York, July 2009.

The UN Security Council is a supreme commander as well as being “central to the life of international diplomacy”.¹⁸⁴ Despite the fact that most peacekeeping operations are deemed to be approved and implemented by Security Council Resolutions, the Security Council itself can neither mandate peacekeeping operations nor provide any peacekeeping support without agreement or consensus of the fifteen member states of the Council. In light of the legal basis of decision-making and its procedures within the Security Council, resolutions whereby the Security Council organises peacekeeping operations must be adopted under Article 27 of the UN Charter. According to Article 27, Security Council decisions on all substantive matters require the ‘affirmative votes of nine members’ including the concurring votes of the permanent members. Even if it has received the required number of affirmative votes (9), a negative vote, or *veto*, also known as the rule of ‘great power unanimity’ by a permanent member prevents adoption of a proposal.¹⁸⁵

Meanwhile, procedural matters are not subject to a veto, so the veto cannot be used to avoid discussion of an issue. For example, abstention is not regarded as a veto despite the wording of the Charter.¹⁸⁶ Therefore, the fact that one or several permanent members of the Council do not participate in or abstain from voting on any particular resolution does not mean an objection to the approval of what is being proposed. In order to prevent the adoption of a resolution requiring unanimity of the permanent members, a permanent member has only to cast a negative vote. If the dissenting member has a permanent seat in the Security Council, its negative vote would certainly prevent the adoption of the resolution concerned, and the same result may equally be achieved by the collective opposition of ten non-permanent members of the Council. The Charter does not expressly provide any legal means or procedure for the settlement of this kind of constitutional dispute.¹⁸⁷ One could conclude that, in light of the legal possibility, there seems more likelihood of defeating resolutions on peacekeeping operations by individual permanent members than by strongly objected collective action of non-permanent members.

¹⁸⁴ E. C. Luck (2006), *op. cit.*, p.4.

¹⁸⁵ See H. Köchler, *The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council: Studies in International Relations*, XVII. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1991.; and H. Köchler, "The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council" in *Democracy and the International Rule of Law: Propositions for an Alternative World Order*, Selected Papers Published on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, Vienna and New York: Springer, 1995, pp. 85-116.

¹⁸⁶ D. Ciobanu, “The power of the Security Council to Organize Peace-keeping Operations” in A. Cassese (ed.), *United Nations peace-keeping; Legal Essays*, Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff, 1978, p.15-53 (p.30).

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p.31.

The dispute over the Iraq war in 2002-03 is a good example to illustrate how the Security Council can be easily and critically exposed to the fragile and intricate political environment. The Council appeared to be caught in a state of limbo by being split between divergent voices, *inter alia* the permanent members of the UNSC, particularly between Britain and France. The event critically demonstrated that compliance, cooperation, and participation in international peacekeeping are not always 'automatic',¹⁸⁸ as individual permanent members of the Security Council retain the power to vote on any resolutions in compliance with their national position or interests. Hill argues, in this regard, that the 'power' of a permanent seat remains as a vital factor that may account for a considerable variation in the degree of adaptation and consensus of national diplomacy toward the international agreement on peacekeeping mandates at the Security Council.¹⁸⁹

In sum, the question regarding negotiation outcomes and decision-making at international UN level seems unlikely to be a merely procedural matter within the Security Council. Rather, it is essential to recognise a significant influence of veto-power and prestigious position of permanent members of the Security Council, particularly when issues concern peacekeeping mandates. The principle of unanimity of permanent members in such matters can be a critical hurdle that the Security Council has to surmount in order to undertake international responsibilities and provide the necessary resources for peacekeeping in a timely and effective manner.¹⁹⁰

Domestic EU level

The EU's foreign and security policy is a purely intergovernmental matter involving all 27 Member States. However, Smith argues that EU foreign policy must be supplemented with, and fully explained by, insights from institutional functioning and coordination between the institution and the member states.¹⁹¹ From Smith's point of view, the EU's intergovernmental decision-making structure became increasingly institutionalised and

¹⁸⁸ E. C. Luck (2006), *op. cit.*, p.6.


¹⁸⁹ C. Hill, "The European Powers The European Powers in the Security Council: Differing Interests, Differing Arenas", in K. V. Laatikainen and K. E. Smith (eds.), *op. cit.*, 2006, pp.49-69.

¹⁹⁰ See K. E. Laatikainen and K. Smith (2006), *op. cit.*, p.8.

¹⁹¹ M. E. Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.63-89.

linked to ‘Community’ procedures.¹⁹² Hence, CFSP/ESDP is considered a policy-making competence which is shared by member states and supranational institutions.¹⁹³ Björkdahl and Strömvik argue that the process of agenda-shaping, decision-making and implementation for an EU-led operation is carried out by the simultaneous interactions between the three main institutional structures of the EU: the intergovernmental Council structure, the support structure of the Council General Secretariat, and the supranational Commission structure (see Figure 3.5).¹⁹⁴

Figure 3. 5 Organisation of main ESDP bodies¹⁹⁵



¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p.64.

¹⁹³ See D. C. Tomas, “Explaining the negotiation of EU foreign policy: Normative institutionalism and alternative approach”, *International Politics*, vol. 46, no.4, 2009, pp.339-357 (p.340).

¹⁹⁴ A. Björkdahl and M. Strömvik, *EU Crisis Management Operations: ESDP Bodies and Decision-making Procedures*, DIIS Report, 2008.

¹⁹⁵ Building upon Björkdahl and Strömvik (2008), p.14.

The Commission makes two broad contributions to CFSP and ESDP. First, the EU Treaty invites the Commission to be ‘fully associated’ with CFSP work including matters relating to ESDP.¹⁹⁶ The Treaty allows the Commission to enjoy a right of policy initiative along with the member states. The Commission also manages the CFSP budget line, which gives it certain influence on the establishment, duration and mandate of civilian peace support operations.¹⁹⁷ The Commission’s role in military dimensions of the ESDP, however, is limited. Second, the Commission plays a role as external representative in all the European Community areas, which includes policy formation in Brussels and representing of European common interests throughout the world.

Despite the various efforts of EU actors that seek to fulfil their respective responsibilities in pursuing foreign and security policy, CFSP/ESDP issues are conducted jointly by the member states within the Council of Ministers. The European Council (or the Council of Ministers) comprises the Heads of state and government and the Commission President, and it is formally the highest decision-making institution within the EU structure. The primary task of the Council is to define the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP as well as common strategies to be implemented in areas where the member states have important interests in common. Every peacekeeping-related issue and decision on ESDP civil-military operations is taken by the Council. To be more specific, the issue of peacekeeping operations normally comes to the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) where 27 Ministers for Foreign Affairs are from each member state gather to deal with CFSP/ESDP matters together.

Before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in December 2009, the Council had been one single body irrespective of the ministers meeting, and other configurations of the Council could go ahead with decisions on CFSP/ESDP if time was of essence and a swift decision-making procedure was required.¹⁹⁸ For instance, the Joint Action on the operation *Artemis* was adopted by the ministers for justice and home affairs, and the operation was formally launched by the ministers for agriculture. However, when the Lisbon Treaty came into force on the 1st December 2009, a new specified configuration of the Council, named the Foreign

¹⁹⁶ See Article 18 of the Treaty on European Union.

¹⁹⁷ For further information about the external role of the Commission for foreign affairs and security policy, see European Union External Action, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/index_en.htm (accessed on 21 October 2008).

¹⁹⁸ A. Björkdahl and M. Strömvik (2008), *op. cit.*, p.18.

Affairs Council (FAC), was created and replaced the GAERC format.¹⁹⁹ Moreover, the FAC is no longer chaired by the representative of the member state holding the Presidency, but by the person holding the newly created post of High Representative.²⁰⁰

In contrast to other EU policy areas where member states are likely to accept and even somehow empower a prominent role for the European Commission, ESDP operations are heavily dependent on the inter-governmental decision-making process which involves all member states at all times and allows them to veto at any time.²⁰¹ Every formal decision is taken in bodies where all members are represented, and every decision is taken unanimously. The supranational institutions are far less involved in the process, and the Council - and its support structures - is the main 'locus of power' in this specific policy area.²⁰² In addition, as Reynolds cites the British government's blunt assertion that "when we don't agree, there is no common policy",²⁰³ the degree of consensus among the members on a particular policy issue remains the key question for the possible launch of an EU peacekeeping operation.

In order to get an ESDP operation on the agenda, not only member states but also the Commission can formally propose any new policy initiative. Those who initiate or wish to see the EU carry out an EU-led operation have far more influence over agenda-setting and sometimes spend laborious efforts and time lobbying in the Council.²⁰⁴ Björkdahl *et al.* point out that some states become more active than others when it comes to proposing new operations "with France and the UK being among the more active and enthusiastic ones".²⁰⁵ The initiative can also come from the HR and the Council Secretariat. On some occasions, the initiatives originate from external demands outside of the EU framework; from a UN request, for instance.²⁰⁶ The external demand for an ESDP operation seems often far greater than the EU's actual present capacity to undertake the operation. Such ambitious initiatives are at least likely to be successful when any members 'who wish to affect the ESDP agenda'

¹⁹⁹ And the EU's Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) started having meetings as a separate Council configuration on Tuesday 8 December 2009, for the first time, with questions to be discussed; "Western Balkans, Middle East, Iran, Other issues".

²⁰⁰ See "The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009: A brief summary of the main changes", The Council of the European Union.

²⁰¹ See D. Tomas (2009), *op. cit.*; and M. Koenig-Archibugi, "Explaining government preferences for institutional change in EU foreign and security policy", *International Organization*, vol.58, no.1, 2004, pp. 137-174.

²⁰² A. Björkdahl and M. Strömvik (2008), *op. cit.*, p 23.

²⁰³ P. Reynolds, *Analysis: Quest for EU identity*, BBC News Online, 27 October 2004, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/fr/-/2/hi/europe/3945001.stm> (accessed on 22 April 2010).

²⁰⁴ Interview with a Principal Administrator official, Council Secretariat of the European Union, Brussels, 30 April 2010.


²⁰⁵ A. Björkdahl and M. Strömvik (2008), *op.cit.*, p.24.

²⁰⁶ The case Operation *Artemis* (2003) and EUFOR RD Congo (2006) were suggested by the UN.

have relatively influential power to bring other members to agree on the proposed operation.²⁰⁷ The precise decision-making process on the launch of an ESDP operation is displayed in Figure 3.6.

²⁰⁷ For example, see A. Björkdahl and M. Strömvik (2008), *op. cit.*, p.26.

Figure 3. 6 Overview of the ESDP decision-making process²⁰⁸



²⁰⁸ Building upon Björkdahl and Strömvik (2008:25).

Once an initiative or idea for a new operation starts to circulate at EU level, a number of considerations and intensive negotiations take place among the member states. In coordination with the Council Secretariat and the Commission, the member states deliberately seek to measure the political feasibility and tune the gaps between the real capacities and political willingness. In order to examine the conditions in more detail, the Political Security Committee (PSC) and other relevant bodies in the Council Secretariat undertake some initial contacts with the UN and gather information.²⁰⁹ Meanwhile, the member states discuss operational and strategic feasibility. Given the absence of a supranational authority during negotiations, any members who have strong interests and willingness to support the operation seem likely to lead the Union's strategic and operational choice. Concerning operational feasibility, the member states seek to figure out whether they have the capacity and willingness to provide adequately-sized and equipped contributions. If it turns out that an operation would not be feasible enough for the EU to deploy such an operation, then a proposed initiative will not be carried out further this stage.

When the member states reach an agreement within the PSC to go ahead with further discussions on an operation, the issue takes on the planning and preparatory phase. The first formal document being discussed is the crisis management concept (CMC). This document describes the general political assessment of "the situation, the overall objectives of the operation, and one or more proposed courses of action".²¹⁰ In the process of elaborating the CMC, the document establishes several strategic options, such as the line of command and the roles and responsibilities of the PSC and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) if the operation includes military components.²¹¹ To be more specific, the PSC is appointed to exercise political control and strategic direction of the operation and explicitly given powers to change the operational plan (OPLAN), the chain of command and the rules of engagement.²¹² The EUMC provides military direction of all military activities within the EU framework and is responsible for offering the PSC military advice and recommendations on all military matters.²¹³ The potential operation headquarters (OHQ) that may grant advice

²⁰⁹ Interview with an EU official at the Council Secretariat, Brussels, 27 April 2010.

²¹⁰ A. Björkdahl and M. Strömvik (2008), *op. cit.*, p.28.

²¹¹ See S. Ulriksen, C. Gourlay and C. Mace, "Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?", *International Peacekeeping*, vol.11, no. 3, 2004, pp. 508-525 (p.514).

²¹² See Article 25 of the Treaty of the European Union.

²¹³ Council Decision of 22 January 2001(2001/79/CFSP): "Setting up the Military Committee of the European Union".

and support is identified at this stage.²¹⁴ Following the recommendation given by the EUMC, the military crisis management concept is negotiated in the PSC. Once an agreement has been reached in the PSC, the Council approves the CMC, which leads to the formal decision on the launching of an EU military operation.

Finally, the dynamics of negotiations at EU level come to an end by formally adopting the EU decision, so-called Council Joint Action, which is the legal decision-making format available to the Council. The Joint Action requires the approval, or at least consent, of all member states and must be adopted unanimously by the Council.²¹⁵ The Joint Action generally contains an outline of the political and legal context and the reasons for undertaking the operation. It also indicates operational details, such as the role and chain of command of a number of actors, including the SG/HR, as well as financing details. Furthermore, the Joint Action specifies a date for the launch of the operation in which an end date for the operation is normally presented. Under a mandate provided by the UN Security Council, the Council Joint Action is officially announced at the Security Council as a formal decision on the EU operation.

3.4 Chief Negotiators

When it comes to the analysis of UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping, a place to start is the ubiquitously pivotal chief negotiator. The so-called 'Big-four' refers to France, Germany, the UK and Italy which are the four biggest and most powerful European countries. Given the important role of the European Big-four countries, this thesis seeks to investigate the role of the UK, France, Germany and Italy respectively to determine to what extent each plays a decisive role in decision-making on the launch of an EU operation in cooperation with the UN.

²¹⁴ For military operations, the identification of an OHQ normally takes place at an early stage, because the location of military planning and mission support during the operation is a question in need of early discussion.

²¹⁵ For more comprehensive accounts of the decision-making rule on CFSP, see Article 23 of the Treaty on European Union.

France

France is unquestionably one of the major driving forces behind UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation. France is a major contributor to EU operations both politically and operationally. Overall, at least four out of six EU operations have been conducted by French command and leadership. Apart from EUFOR Althea and EU NAVFOR Somalia, France has been the framework nation for all other missions. It provided the force commanders on the ground each time.²¹⁶ In 2010, France ranked first in total number of military personnel in EU operations. As of February 2011, in the field of UN peacekeeping operations, France has been participating in seven of fourteen UN peacekeeping operations, with 1,473 total personnel deployed under UN mandates.²¹⁷ France ranks so far as the nineteenth contributor of UN peacekeeping personnel,²¹⁸ while being the first European contributor and the second largest contributor among the permanent members of the Security Council after China. In European military expenditure, France has been the second largest contributor to UN missions since 2002 to 2008, by being the biggest military power besides the UK and Germany.

At the political level, France also appears to be the strongest supporter for ESDP missions as well as UN peacekeeping operations. In the eyes of France, according to a French national official, cooperation between the UN and the EU is “a vital instrument through which France expresses its leadership role, responsibility and its ambitious priority.”²¹⁹ France has presented itself as embodying responsibilities for international peace and security and viewed its role as “an issue of humanitarian duty and great power status.”²²⁰ France has reaffirmed its duty as a permanent member of the UN Security Council “to be at the forefront of it [international peacekeeping]” and “[to] bear a special responsibility for

²¹⁶ Interview with an official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 05 March 2010.

²¹⁷ The personnel deployed include 95 civilian police officers, 20 military observers and 1,358 troops. For further figures or information about French contributions to UN peacekeeping, see French report on Peacekeeping Operations, Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, New York, available at <http://franceonu.org/spip.php?article3645> (accessed on 13 May 2011).

²¹⁸ As of 31 December 2010, the top 20 contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping Operations are: Pakistan (10,652), Bangladesh (10,402), India (8,691), Nigeria (5,841), Egypt (5,409), Nepal (4,431), Jordan (3,977), Rwanda (3,810), Ghana (2,966), Uruguay (2,453), Senegal (2,358), Ethiopia (2,301), Brazil (2,267), South Africa (2,187), China (2,039), Indonesia (1,795), Italy (1,741), Morocco (1,557), *France* (1,540) and Sri Lanka (1,215).

²¹⁹ Interview with national official, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 05 March 2010; see also The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 17 June 2008.

²²⁰ B. Giegerich, *European security and strategic culture: National responses to the EU's security and defence policy*, Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos and Meyer, 2006, p.120.

maintaining peace and international security”.²²¹ France also reiterated that “making the European Union a major player in crisis management and international security is one of the central tenets of our [French] security policy.”²²²

France has actively promoted the ESDP “as a cooperative framework that would enable France to fulfil her national ambitions”.²²³ Those ambitions are primarily reflected in, but not limited to, military engagement with both the UN and the EU in peacekeeping operations. Regarding African peacekeeping operations, for instance, France alone contributed approximately 52 percent of all EU military personnel deployed to Africa ESDP operations.²²⁴ Overall, France is an important actor which may influence the likelihood of UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping.

UK

In the course of identifying the nature of the interaction between the UN and the EU, Hill focuses especially on the role of the two permanent European members of the UNSC, *i.e.* France and the UK.²²⁵ As a founding member of the UNSC in 1945, Britain alongside France has carried the ‘greatest weight’ in the UNSC over the past decades.²²⁶ Britain has sought to pursue its vital role and assumed responsibilities in shaping a new ‘international order’ as one of the most powerful and influential countries of the European Union.²²⁷ As a permanent member of the UNSC, Britain is obliged to uphold the UN Charter. At the same time, the UK aims to protect its own national interests while promoting the interests it holds in common within the EU framework. Hence, on the issues of UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping, the role of Britain in close coordination with France is essential in order to ensure politically consistent positions and the common interests of the EU in the Security Council. In military terms, the UK has been a major contributor to UN

²²¹ The French White Paper on Defence and National Security (2008), *op.cit.*, p.7.

²²² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²²³ B. Giegerich (2006), *op. cit.*, p.127.

²²⁴ See K. Soder, “*EU military crisis management: an assessment of member states’ contributions and positions*”, paper presented at the COST Action meeting, 10 June 2010, p.10.


²²⁵ See C. Hill (2006), *op.cit.*, pp.49-69.

²²⁶ For further account of the UK position at the UNSC, see British National Archives, “*The UK’s contribution to the United Nations*”, 05 February 2008, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

²²⁷ For example, see C. Hill (2006), *op.cit.*, pp.50-51.

peacekeeping.²²⁸ Financially, as displayed in Figure 3.7, Britain is the third largest contributor to the UN's peacekeeping budget, providing 8.16 percent, following the USA (27.17%) and Japan (12.53%).

Figure 3. 7 Top 20 Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Budget (2010)



Source: *UN Department of Peacekeeping*

The decisive role and position of the UK alongside France is closely linked to the nature of a chief negotiator delineated in Putnam's two-level game. At the international UN level, the UK and France are expected to maximise their capabilities in order to uphold the European common positions and interests deliberately. However, at the domestic EU level, these two major powers would strive to achieve unanimous consent of other members with respect to the peacekeeping initiative discussed at the UNSC. In so doing, France and the UK make moves on a UNSC game board designed to achieve certain objectives - not only to uphold the principles of the UN Charter, but to also protect European interests and common

²²⁸ For more details, see UK report on the Peacekeeping, UN Mission to the United Nations, available at: <http://ukun.fco.gov.uk/en/uk-at-un/thematic-issues/resolving-conflict/peacekeeping/> (accessed on 06 Feb. 2011)

positions - when they are bargaining with their foreign counterparts.²²⁹ Simultaneously, in response to UNSC decisions, they manoeuvre on an EU board to obtain domestic agreements on the provisional decisions made at the UNSC and to establish a Joint Action throughout the ESDP decision-making process.

Germany

Hampton explains that Germany has replaced its long-standing reluctance to participate in any military activities that might appear threatening with a willingness to project power or 'power lite' capabilities.²³⁰ Following a favourable and drastic shift in German attitudes and willingness to eschew past reticence, Germany is beginning to assume a "role of nuanced leadership in the EU's security governance approach to conflict prevention and resolution".²³¹ The German role in international peacekeeping has continuously grown as it has sought a permanent seat at the Security Council as part of the recent UN Security Council reform agenda.²³² Germany has contributed a considerable amount of financial resources as well as personnel support to UN peacekeeping missions. With a share of 8.6% of the total amount of the regular UN budget, which accounts approximately USD 417 million net for the years 2007-'08, Germany is the third largest contributor worldwide followed by other EU partners, *e.g.* the UK (6.6%) and France (6.3%) (see Figure 3.8). In addition, Germany has increased its participation and support to the objectives and values of UN peacekeeping operations. German troops have participated in various PKOs, including in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan among other countries, which reflects the current German tendency to pursue leadership in peacekeeping operations. Germany is also willing to be in charge of "important, but difficult, tasks on behalf of the EU at the United Nations."²³³

²²⁹ For example, see C. Hill (2006), *op. cit.*


²³⁰ M. N. Hampton, "Germany", in D. S. Sorenson and P. C. Wood, *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, New York: Frank Cass, 2005, pp.29-51.

²³¹ *Ibid.* pp. 29-30.

²³² For a detail account of the German role at the UNSC, see David Wroe, "Berlin's Ambitious UN Security Council Agenda", *The Local* (Germany's local newspaper), 5 January 2011.

²³³ Interview with German delegate to the United Nations, New York, 16 March 2009.

Figure 3. 8 Ten Largest Regular Budget Contributors to the UN mission in 2008



Source: Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN

Germany is indeed an important partner of Britain and France for ESDP operations within the EU system. Despite the fact that Germany has a limited status in the Security Council due to its non-permanent membership, Germany is nevertheless relevant because “concerning any salient EU matters, France and Britain always involve Germany and have consultations with Germany.”²³⁴ In addition, under the *Elisée Treaty*, France and Germany are obliged to concert on every topic before taking any actions or decisions. France acknowledges that Germany often seems to be more important than Britain in specific areas of ESDP operations.²³⁵ Given the empirical evidence and claims on the important role of Germany, this thesis seeks to explore the German role as a possible chief negotiator on the issue of UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation.

Italy

Over the decades Italy has gone through significant development in crisis management by assuming increasing responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Since

²³⁴ Interview with French official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 05 March 2010.

²³⁵ Interview with French official, Ministry of Defence, Paris, 08 March 2010.

the 1960s, it has deployed to numerous UN peacekeeping missions throughout the world, which has long been ‘part of the country’s foreign policy’.²³⁶ Examples include Italy’s engagement in 1963 in Congo where it made a significant contribution in terms of human life. Italian involvement in the international scene increased with the Libyan mission in the 1980s, and continued to grow through the 1990s with participation in many multinational missions authorised by the United Nations, especially in the Balkans regions whose stabilisation and development was a great concern to Italy for geopolitical reasons. Italy’s participation in humanitarian missions has also been considerable especially in countries like Somalia and Mozambique, where it had also been necessary to evacuate Italian citizens in peril. Most recently, Italy has carried out various counter-terrorism operations, such as that in Afghanistan.²³⁷ Currently Italy participates in international peacekeeping operations in various ways with more than 9,000 Italian troops deployed in multilateral peacekeeping to make an important contribution to reconstruction, stability and peacekeeping.

Consequently, from Africa to the Balkans and from the Middle East to Asia, Italy is actively engaged in making significant political, military and financial contributions through the various peacekeeping operations being conducted or authorised either collectively or individually by the United Nations and the European Union in all the principal crisis areas across the world.²³⁸ Italy gave strong impetus during its 2003 EU Presidency to the fruitful collaboration existing between the UN and the EU in the sector of crisis management. The signing of the *joint UN-EU declaration on crisis management* on 24 September 2003 in New York by Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi and Secretary-General became an important step forward, which gave Italy “the chance to participate in strategic decisions regarding the world’s main crisis regions”.²³⁹ It was also “one of the most significant manifestations of overall Italian involvement in the UN”.²⁴⁰ In addition to a highly visible role in political and operational context, Italy ranks sixth among UN peacekeeping budget contributors (with approximately 5% of total expenditures) as shown in Figure 3.7.

Given the important role of Italy in peacekeeping operations organised by the international institution, Under-Secretary De Mistura addresses that “Italy’s participation in peacekeeping

²³⁶ Interview with diplomat, Embassy of Italy in Seoul, 31 May 2012.

²³⁷ See “Italian peacekeeping 50 years of history”. The data supplied by the Ministry of Defence is available at www.difesa.it (accessed on 28 May 2012).

²³⁸ Interview with diplomat, Embassy of Italy in Seoul, 31 May 2012.

²³⁹ Interview with national official, Embassy of Italy in Seoul, 8 June 2012.

²⁴⁰ Interview with national official, Embassy of Italy in Seoul, 8 June 2012.

operations remains fundamental. The alternative would be highly serious.”²⁴¹ The Under-Secretary recalled changes over past decades in strategy and approach involving the roles of the UN and NATO, elaborating that “the Italian military has made a truly excellent contribution, and whose professional skill has improved enormously along with an ability to communicate linguistically that equals or surpasses that of many other nations. They are amply equipped for today’s multifaceted and asymmetrical wars and to maintain contact with the local populations”.²⁴² As De Mistura pointed out, Italy has been consistent for decades to manage international peacekeeping operations. In this regard, Italian leadership and its important role as a chief negotiator is worthy of attention to investigate across cases selected.

Facilitator (High Representative)

The HR is formally titled the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Secretary-General (SG) of the EU.²⁴³ The post was introduced under the Treaty of Amsterdam.²⁴⁴ The HR’s role was articulated and expanded upon further at the Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999. According to the European Constitution, the HR is the main coordinator and representative of the CFSP. As the first Council Secretary-General and High Representative (SG/HR), Javier Solana was appointed in July 1999 and had occupied the position for ten years.²⁴⁵ Following the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the HR position is currently held by Catherine Ashton.²⁴⁶

HR Solana has demonstrated his important role in numerous negotiations on issues related to international peace and security.²⁴⁷ The HR position allowed Solana to continue to be an

²⁴¹ Press Archives on “In Detail: Peacekeeping contribution fundamental, says De Mistura”, Office of Relations with the Public, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 September 2012.

²⁴² *Ibid.*

²⁴³ See Article 18 of the Treaty on European Union.

²⁴⁴ The tasks of the HR are not confined to this representative role, but are more widely defined in Article J.16 [26] as relating to the “formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions”. See P. Keatinge, ‘Strengthening the Foreign Policy Process’, in Ben Tonra (ed.), *Amsterdam: What the Treaty Means, Institute of European Affairs*, 1997, p.102.

²⁴⁵ Javier Solana, NATO’s former secretary general (1995-1999), has served as the EU’s High Representative for CFSP since 1999 until December 2009.

²⁴⁶ As the core part of this study was conducted through the period when Javier Solana held the HR position, the HR will be used to refer to Javier Solana. Whenever there seems likely to be confusion with the new HR, Catherine Ashton, each name will be indicated.

²⁴⁷ See curriculum vitae of Mr. Javier Solana, <http://www.nato.int/cv/secgen/solana.htm> (accessed on 15 April 2008).

active promoter of Europe's role in global security.²⁴⁸ For example, at the European Council in Thessaloniki on June 2003, the heads of state and government of the Union endorsed a paper presented by Javier Solana that was to serve as the basis for a new European Security Strategy (ESS).²⁴⁹ The ESS, also entitled '*A Secure Europe in a Better World*', was adopted by the European Council in December 2003. This strategy paper calls for directly countering new threats and strengthening multilateral cooperation in maintaining international peace and security. To meet these objectives, Solana urged the member states to be 'more active, more coherent, more capable and working with partners'.²⁵⁰

According to Solana, Europe loses influence 'when it does not speak with one voice'.²⁵¹ Solana advised all permanent and non-permanent members of the UNSC to be aware that they are not just representing their own country but should be representing 'the spirit of the EU'.²⁵² The HR particularly urged the permanent members of the EU to cooperate coherently by pointing out that if they do not reach an internal common position, there would be no external EU position at international level. Solana sought to increase the bargaining power of the EU in the UNSC by achieving uniform EU representation. Biscop, in this respect, notes that the role of Solana is illustrative of the ongoing debate about how to increase the EU's presence and power at international level.²⁵³

The role of the HR is essential at both the UN and EU levels. Solana played an important role in getting any EU-related UNSC resolutions approved and ratified within the EU framework. Alexander Vershbow, US ambassador to NATO, expressed the view that Solana is an "extraordinary consensus-builder who works behind the scenes on both sides".²⁵⁴ Also, Solana's leadership and diplomatic experience in political negotiations was expected to have influence on international relations.²⁵⁵

²⁴⁸ For example, see R. C. Hendrickson, J. R. Strand and K. L. Raney, "Operation Artemis and Javier Solana: EU Prospects for a Stronger Common Foreign and Security Policy", *Canadian Military Journal*, Spring 2007, pp.35-42.

²⁴⁹ See J. Solana (2003), *op. cit.*

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁵¹ "Solana: Einheit Iraks muss erhalten bleiben", *Die Welt*, 24 March 2003.

²⁵² "Die EU ist ein wichtiger Mitspieler", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 May 2004, translated by S. Biscop; see S. Biscop and E. Drieskens, "Effective Multilateralism and Collective Security: Empowering the UN", in Katie V.Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (eds.), *op. cit.*, 2006, p.119.

²⁵³ S. Biscop and E. Drieskens (2006), *Ibid.*

²⁵⁴ The News and Views of Southeast Europe; *International Herald Tribune*, 13 December, 2003, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/infoCountryPage/setimes/resource_centre/bios/solana_javier?country=EU (accessed on 15 April 2008).

²⁵⁵ R.C. Hendrickson, J.R. Strand and K.L. Raney (2007), *op. cit.*

This study argues that, despite the important role of the HR, Javier Solana was a facilitator rather than a chief negotiator for the following reasons. First, he had no legal status as a sovereign state. According to Putnam's assumption, the chief negotiator is not only a domestic representative to international negotiations, but also a part of domestic constituents who have the right to vote or make a decision. Javier Solana, however, did not have any right to vote or authority to act as a decision-maker. Farrell stresses that the EU is not a legal member of the UN Security Council and there is no single standing for the EU to vote on UNSC decisions or even to represent its common position at the UNSC.²⁵⁶ For the same reason, the HR cannot be a member of the UN Security Council, which only allowed Javier Solana to participate in formal meetings as an observer not as a negotiator. Second, Solana contributed to neither the EU budget nor the UN budget. Moreover, the HR does not have any authority to make his own decisions on the UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping as he does not contribute to peacekeeping troops. The role of the HR is limited to budgetary, military and institutional terms. Consequently, the HR is rather a facilitator who has no "legal competence or authority" to make decisions on ESDP missions or UN peacekeeping operations, whilst other chief negotiators can do so at both levels.²⁵⁷

Conclusion

This chapter explored the dynamic decision-making process between the UN and the EU in the realm of international peacekeeping. In order to provide an analytical tool to identify the most important actors involved in decision-making, this chapter examined both two-level game and multi-level game analyses drawing on Putnam's metaphor.

In the process of investigating analytical frameworks, this study revealed some critical shortcomings of traditional two-level as well as multi-level game approaches to apply to this specific research subject. Consequently, the study proposed a new revised two-level game model, in which complex webs of interactions between the UN and the EU are decomposed into two different levels: *International UN level* (Level I) and *domestic EU level* (Level II). Regarding decision-making on UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation, the analysis of a revised

²⁵⁶ See M. Farrell, "EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations" in K. V.Laatikainen and K. E. Smith (eds.), *op. cit.*, 2006, pp.33-36.

²⁵⁷ See S. Biscop and E. Drieskens (2006), *op.cit.*, p.119.

two-level game showed how UNSC resolutions are internationally achieved and how the EU member states domestically come to agree on a Council Joint Action. Moreover, the analytical framework identifies the most important actors who may influence the likelihood of a decision on UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping. The European Big-four countries, *i.e.* France, the UK, Germany and Italy, appeared as chief negotiators, while the HR was presented as a facilitator.

Despite the value of a two-level game analysis that describes a useful analytical tool for assessing the simultaneous interactions between different levels, the two-level game attracts one main criticism: it is not a fully developed explanatory theory. In order to determine the best answer to the primary research question, '*under what conditions do EU Member States lead UN-related peacekeeping operations?*', the next chapter unfolds the theoretical debates to clarify the key motivational factors that may influence chief negotiator(s)'s decisions to provide active leadership, which is likely to increase the likelihood of UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping operations. The role of the chief negotiators and the HR is further examined in each case study chapter.

Chapter 4

Theoretical Debates: *Neoclassical Realism vs. Social Constructivism*

*[A] theory of international politics... can describe the range of likely outcomes of the actions and interactions of states within a given system and show how the range of expectations varies as system changes.... [but in general] a theory of international politics bears on the foreign policies of nations while claiming to explain only certain aspects of them.*²⁵⁸

Kenneth N. Waltz

Introduction

A military peacekeeping intervention is a high politics decision among foreign and security policies. Due to the complexity of intergovernmental decision-making, member states' active roles and preferences fundamentally determine the outcome of UN-EU cooperation. It is therefore essential to investigate the key motivational factors under which states are more likely to trigger EU's engagement in peacekeeping cooperation. In order to identify the important components, this chapter aims to examine the hypothetical variables derived from the insights of two prominent IR theories: realist theories vs. social constructivist theories.

Realists would argue that states cooperate and engage in crisis management in order to exert their power and influence in the international arena. Bellamy *et al.*, in this context, argue that the idea of cooperation in peace operations is based on the notion that "the great powers have a vested interest in preserving the international order in which they occupy a privileged position".²⁵⁹ From a realist perspective, this thesis hypothesises that as political and strategic interests increase, the likelihood of the EU member states' leadership in a peacekeeping

²⁵⁸ K. N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp.71-72.

²⁵⁹ Bellamy *et al.* (2010), *op. cit.* p.91.

operation will also increase. A social constructivist theory of EU foreign policy, on the other hand, emphasises the effect of pre-existing EU norms which are normally constructed by ideological factors including ideas, values, identities and traditions. Social constructivists would argue that a state's behaviour is largely determined by normative pressures which gradually consist of normative conditions. From a constructivist perspective, this thesis hypothesises that normative pressures would increase the likelihood of EU member states' leadership in determining whether to engage in a peacekeeping operation alongside the UN. This chapter expounds on explicit hypotheses for each theory, which integrate empirical and theoretical aspects.

4.1. Realism and Foreign Policy

After the Second World War, realism became the dominant theory of international relations in which primary concerns are issues of survival and the structure of the international system.²⁶⁰ The core assumption of realism is that the structure of the international anarchy system and humankind's lust for power determine states' choice of behaviour, which appeared particularly persuasive as an explanation for international relations.²⁶¹ In the 1970s, however, classical realism was challenged by liberalists who emphasised interdependence between states, transnational relations and non-state actors.²⁶² Critical questions were raised against the key concepts of realism such as egoism, self-interest and balance of power, which had been considered as the important factors determining states' behaviour within the international anarchy system.

Critics suggested the need to enrich analyses with other variables.²⁶³ Are the interests of nations served only through competition with one another and never through cooperation? Or how do we explain the growth of collaborative multinational institutions such as the EU and states' willingness to abide by institutional rules and principles? Realism failed to

²⁶⁰ See S. L. Lamy, "Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism" in J Baylis and S Smith (eds), *The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.182-199.

²⁶¹ For example, see C. W. Jr. Kegley and E. R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 5th edn., New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, p.23.

²⁶² C. Reus-Smit, "Constructivism" in S. Burchill *et al.* (eds.), *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd edn., New York: Palgrave, 2005, pp. 188-212 (p.189).

²⁶³ For example see O. R. Holsti, "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy", *Diplomatic History*, vol. 13, 1989, pp.15-43 (p.19); and Jr. Kegley and Wittkopf (1995), *op.cit.*, pp.10-41.

respond to such empirical questions. A growing number of critics pointed out that the “new” realism should be able to account for the ‘international-political system as a whole’ and to show “how the structure of the international system and variations in it affect the interacting units and the outcomes they produce”.²⁶⁴

Such a challenge to classical realism was replaced by Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* (1979), in which Waltz advanced a radically revised realist theory, subsequently labelled ‘neo-realism’ or ‘structural realism’.²⁶⁵ Waltz emphasises the importance of the structure of the international system and its role as the primary determinant of states’ behaviour. According to a neo-realist assumption, states’ behaviour and all foreign policy choices are shaped by the international system and its structure, where the anarchic and competitive international system provokes states to interact and cooperate with one another for their self-interest as well as survival.²⁶⁶

Waltz’s neo-realism is distinct from traditional or classical realism in a number of ways. As in classical realism, anarchy and the absence of central power in the international system’s structure remain a key element in neo-realism. Classical realism primarily adopts an inductive explanation.²⁶⁷ Looking at states’ behaviour and interaction in the system, classical realists explain international politics by arguing that states’ behaviour is a product of the international structure, in which there is no higher authority to prevent threats and counter the use of force, and accordingly states can only ensure their security by self-help.²⁶⁸ In this regard, classical realists highlight the constraints on international cooperation imposed by the nature of states – *egoism*, and the absence of international government – *anarchic structure*.²⁶⁹

On the contrary, Waltz and neo-realists employ a deductive approach to explain international politics. Neo-realists argue that such international structure emerges from “the interaction of

²⁶⁴ K. N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory” in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal challenge*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, pp.67-83 (p.74).

²⁶⁵ S. Burchill *et al.* (eds.), *Theories of International Relations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 29-54; and Reus-Smit (2005), *op. cit.*, p.189.

²⁶⁶ For example, see K. L. Waltz (1979), *op.cit.*; K. L. Waltz, “International politics is not foreign policy”, *Security Studies*, vol. 6, no.1, 1996, pp.54-57; C. Elman, “Horses for courses: Why not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?”, *Security Studies*, vol.6, no.1, 1996, pp.7-53; and J. D. Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol.1, 1998, pp.289-313.

²⁶⁷ S. L. Lamy (2001), *op. cit.*, p.185.

²⁶⁸ T. Dunne and B. C. Schmidt, “Realism” in J Baylis and S. Smith (eds), *op. cit.*, 2001, p.153.

²⁶⁹ See J. Donnelly, “Realism” in S. Burchill and A. Linklater (ed.) (2005), *op. cit.*, 2005, p.30.

states and then constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them toward others”.²⁷⁰ Furthermore, in contrast to classical realism, neo-realist analysis suggests that states would decide to follow norms and cooperation because they calculate that it is to their advantage, or because norms and cooperation become ‘internalised’.²⁷¹ This neo-realist view helps to explain why the prospects for international cooperation often appear possible in anarchy international system.

Neo-realists posit that international cooperation is hard to achieve, difficult to maintain, and dependent on states’ power. Nevertheless, neo-realists recognise that international cooperation is possible when states make it happen and more likely to succeed in relations with powerful states. Whilst classical realists argue that states respond to the conditions of the international system according to their size, location, domestic politics and leadership qualities, neo-realists further develop the argument that all states are functionally similar units as they all experience the same constraints presented by anarchy.²⁷² Rather, in a neo-realist world, states do not differ in the tasks they face, but only in their capabilities or power. The relative capabilities and power of states are particularly important, because the capabilities distributed either “define the structures of the system” or “stimulate changes in the structure of the system”.²⁷³ Neo-realists suggest that the effectiveness of international institutions or cooperation depends on the “leadership and support of a major power”.²⁷⁴

The difference between classical realism and neo-realism can also be found in their different view of power. Hans Morgenthau, the most renowned US realist scholar of the mid-twentieth century, describes a realist view where “[...] international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. [...] We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interests defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out.”²⁷⁵ For classical realists, military power is considered the most essential element of a state’s power among different elements of power.²⁷⁶ Power also remains a central concept in neo-realism. However, the quest for power is no longer considered as an end in itself as in classical realism. Instead, neo-realists see power as the combined capabilities of a state. That is, from

²⁷⁰ K. L. Waltz (1990), *op. cit.*, p.29.

²⁷¹ P. D. Williams, *Security Studies: An Introduction*, New York: Routledge, 2008, p.18.

²⁷² S. L. Lamy (2001), *op. cit.*, p.186.

²⁷³ Kegley Jr. and Wittkopf (1995), *op. cit.*, p.29.

²⁷⁴ C. Elman, “Realism” in P. D. Williams (ed.), *op. cit.*, 2008, pp.15-29.

²⁷⁵ H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, New York: A. Knopf, 1962, p.5.

²⁷⁶ S. L. Lamy (2001), *op. cit.*, p.185.

a neo-realist point of view, states pursue power as an ‘instrument of survival’ and states seek to use this power to ‘coerce and control’ other states in the system.²⁷⁷

Kegley and Wittkopf suggest two categories of how states can use the power as a means to achieve survival: ‘internal efforts’ and ‘external efforts’.²⁷⁸ States internally seek to increase economic capability, to strengthen military capability and to develop robust strategies; while they invest efforts externally to strengthen and enlarge their own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one.²⁷⁹ Neo-realists would lead us to believe that power gives a state a place or position in the international system and shapes that state’s behaviour. The emergence of a balance of power accounts for a comprehensive relation between power and a state’s behaviour in international structure. Neo-realists argue that states consciously aim to establish and maintain a balance, because the distribution of power and any dramatic changes in that distribution of power can bring a change to the structure of the international system.²⁸⁰ The neo-realist view on power and the balance of power is important to understand the ultimate desire of states, not only to maximise their military and physical capabilities, but also to strengthen their economic predominance and secure energy resources, which become more crucial for contemporary survival and security in the international system.

Neo-realist assumptions draw the attention of this study to some essential points. First, neo-realists tend to dominate issues of international security or what was once called high politics issues. Neo-realists account for the condition of anarchy and the behaviour of states that seek to enhance their security and power. Second, neo-realists emphasise the capabilities (power) of states over the intentions and interests of states. According to a neo-realist assumption, capabilities are essential for security. And uncertainty about the intentions of other states forces states to focus on the capabilities that they are able to accumulate in various ways, and which include political and economic power. Third, neo-realists accept the existence of institutions or regimes whose roles are deemed as “tools or instruments of statecraft”.²⁸¹ From a neo-realist point of view, states remain the core and determinant unit that establishes and controls these regimes and institutions if they serve states’ own interests. Therefore, states tend to continue to support these institutions or regimes if the cooperation activities

²⁷⁷ See C. W. Kegley Jr. and E. R. Wittkopf (1995), *op. cit.*, p.29; and Lamy (2001), *Ibid.*, p.185.

²⁷⁸ Kegley Jr. and Wittkopf (1995), *Ibid.*, p.29.

²⁷⁹ K. N. Waltz (1979), *op. cit.*

²⁸⁰ For example, see Waltz (1979), *Ibid.*; and J. G. Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis”, *World Politics*, vol. 35, 1983, pp. 261-285.

²⁸¹ S. L. Lamy (2001), *op. cit.*, p.192.

promoted by the institution would advance their gains and interests. Finally, neo-realists agree that institutions can shape the content and direction of foreign policy of states in certain issue areas. All things considered, the study determines that neo-realism is particularly useful to examine the most important conditions that may influence the likelihood of an EU member state's leadership in dealing with issues of UN-related international peacekeeping operations.

Variants of Realisms

Kenneth Waltz's theory of structural realism is only one version of (neo-) realism. The end of the Cold War raised an important question about the future of realist theories that were developed during what could be regarded as an "exceptional period of modern international history".²⁸² The advent of neo-realism and its critics provided an impetus for realist scholars to think further about the underlying forces that drive international cooperation. As a result, realists discovered that neo-realism could lead to various predictions, depending on "how they thought about the core assumptions" and "what they view as the most reasonable expectations about real-world conditions".²⁸³ Recently, in the area of security studies, some scholars, including John Mearsheimer, Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, suggest new versions of neo-realism using the terms *offensive* and *defensive* realism. Also, Wohlforth revisits the diversity of theoretical sub-schools of neo-realism which are more foreign policy relevant realist theories than Waltz and Grieco's version of neo-realism, namely *offensive* realism, *defensive* realism, and *neoclassical* realism.²⁸⁴ On the question of what causes states to adopt certain kinds of foreign policy on the issue of cooperation in international peace and security, the following section examines four distinct theories of realism, including *innenpolitik* theory in addition to those three types of neo-realist theories, to gauge which theory has most explanatory power to apply to the research subject.²⁸⁵

G. Rose argues that the first and most common school of realism is composed of *Innenpolitik* theories. The main assumption of *Innenpolitik* theory is that foreign policy is best understood

²⁸² R. Jackson and G. Sørensen, *International Relations: Theories and approaches*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, p.89.

²⁸³ W. C. Wohlforth, "Realism and Foreign Policy" in S. Smith, A. Hadfield and T. Dunne (eds.), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.34.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.31-48.

²⁸⁵ Rose defines four distinct neo-realist debates related to European foreign policy. See G. Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics*, vol. 51, no.1, 1998, pp.144-172.

as the “product of a country’s internal dynamics”.²⁸⁶ More specifically, *Innenpolitik* theorists would argue that internal domestic factors such as political and economic preference and national character determine how countries behave toward the world beyond their borders. Therefore, according to *Innenpolitik* theorists, one should peer inside the ‘black box’ where the preferences and configuration of key states are formed in order to understand why a particular country is behaving in a certain way in international relations.²⁸⁷ However, these theories present difficulties in accounting for why states with similar domestic conditions often yield different outcomes in the foreign policy sphere; and why dissimilar states in similar systems often act alike. In order to avoid this problem, scholars grounded in realist theories have generated theories of foreign policy, namely offensive and defensive realism, which both highlight the influence of the international system on state behaviour.²⁸⁸ Although both offensive and defensive realisms start from the common assumption that the international system is unitary and anarchy in which rational states are forced to choose security strategy options to survive and prosper in the system, each has a different take on the nature of the international anarchic system.

Offensive realists assume that as the nature of international anarchy is generally Hobbesian, security is scarce and states try to achieve it by maximising their relative power and advantage.²⁸⁹ In the offensive realists’ world, states develop military power and the capability to influence international affairs by balancing the power of other states regardless of whether or not they pose a threat.²⁹⁰ Offensive realists argue that states begin with a defensive motive, but are forced to think and sometimes act offensively because of the structure of the international system.²⁹¹ Therefore, as Mearsheimer points out, leaders of states would seek to pursue security policies that weaken their potential enemies and increase their power relative to all others.²⁹² In this view, states should ensure their security by expanding their power and influence whenever they can.²⁹³ In order to understand a state’s behaviour in a particular way, offensive realism suggests that one should examine a state’s

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p.148.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁸ The distinction between offensive and defensive realism was first made by J. Snyder in *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991, p.11-12; and J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War”, *International Security*, vol. 15, no. 1, 1990, pp. 5-56.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁰ J. Mearshimer (2001), *op.cit.*

²⁹¹ J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 3, Winter 1994/95, pp.5-49.

²⁹² See J. Mearsheimer (1990), *op.cit.*; and J. Mearsheimer (1994/95), *Ibid.*

²⁹³ K. N. Waltz (1979), *op.cit.*; R. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

relative capabilities, power and external environment; because those factors will lead to foreign policy of a particular state and shape how the state chooses to advance its interests.²⁹⁴ Offensive realism does offer a useful insight to examine the desire of EU actors to develop their security power to influence international events, in particular in the civil-military sphere. Nevertheless, this study suggests that offensive realism cannot comprehend the current European efforts to work collectively alongside the UN in global peacekeeping operations beyond European borders.

Defensive realists take a softer line, arguing that in international anarchy security is often plentiful rather than scarce, because most leaders of rational states understand that the costs of war clearly ‘outweigh’ the benefits.²⁹⁵ According to a defensive realist assumption, states only respond to external threats.²⁹⁶ In other words, states only engage in expensive military operations to counter specific threats, and states often formulate cooperation or ally with neighbouring states in order to ensure their collective security in addition to reducing their military expenses. When states perceive or detect a threat to their security, they seek to expand their capability to influence events, but only ‘when necessary’ rather than whenever they can. According to defensive realism, states would seek to respond to any threats in a timely manner by balancing against them to obviate the need for actual conflict. However, the defensive realist argument underestimates the fact that states’ responses to threats can vary according to their perceptions of threats, which are generally shaped by their relative material power.

Neoclassical realism challenges key elements of all three realist perspectives. For neoclassical realists, as Wohlforth argues, theoretical structures like offensive and defensive realism are “not always and everywhere true or false”.²⁹⁷ Rather, neoclassical realists seek to rectify this imbalance between the general and the particular. Instead of assuming that states seek security *per se*, neoclassical realists believe that states seek to control and shape the external environment and respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy. In this respect, Rose points out that neoclassical realism occupies a “middle ground between pure

²⁹⁴ See G. Rose, *op. cit.*, p.149; and M. P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.

²⁹⁵ R. Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate”, *International Security*, vol. 24, 1999, pp.42-46; J. Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991.

²⁹⁶ G. Rose (1998), *op. cit.*

²⁹⁷ W. C. Wohlforth (2008), *op. cit.*, p.35.

structural theories and constructivism”.²⁹⁸ Neoclassical realists view the relative power of states as a key independent variable, stressing that power refers to the “capabilities or resources” with which states can influence each other in international relations.²⁹⁹ According to a neoclassical realist argument, the relative power shapes a country’s particular interests, goals or foreign policy preferences, which in turn primarily guide the country’s external choices and behaviour. In this regard, Wohlforth suggests that the neoclassical realist approach is most likely to exploit the benefits of realism for the analysis of foreign policy while avoiding the potential pitfalls.³⁰⁰

Zakaria suggests that a good theory of foreign policy should account for to what extent the international system has an effect on national behaviour, because “the most powerful generalisable characteristic of a state in international relations is its relative position in the international system”.³⁰¹ On the specific research subject of this study, neoclassical realism is deemed the best form of realist theories to evaluate the foreign policy of EU member states. Among various different sub-theoretical schools of realism, this thesis adopts neoclassical realism as a main theory to test whether it provides the best explanation for important conditions that may influence the likelihood of EU member states’ leadership which would lead to UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping.³⁰²

Realist Propositions

What would realists say about the key reasons of the European major powers leading and actively engaging in decision-making on an EU-led peacekeeping operation? Realists argue that states’ foreign policy and behaviour is considerably driven by rational calculations of gain or loss of national power and interests. On the basis of this realist assumption, Gegout attempts to explain the primary reasons why European powers are likely to engage in conflict resolution and international peacekeeping operations. According to Gegout’s

²⁹⁸ G. Rose (1998), *op. cit.*, p.152.

²⁹⁹ W. C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993, p.4.

³⁰⁰ W. C. Wohlforth (2008), *op. cit.*, p.36.

³⁰¹ F. Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics” in M. E. Brown, S. M. Lynn-Jones and S. E. Miller (eds.), *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995, pp. 462-483 (p. 482).

³⁰² In this thesis, the specific realist hypothesis is deduced from neoclassical realist assumptions. Therefore, whenever ‘realism’ is found in this thesis, it specifically refers to ‘neoclassical realism’. When necessary, the thesis uses ‘neoclassical realism’.

argument, the primary motives of European intervention, particularly in the military sphere, are related to political interests in power projection on the international stage, such as the defence of zones of influence, the promotion of national prestige, and enhancing their reputation as a major world power.³⁰³ One of the best examples to support this realist claim can be found in the US-led UN peacekeeping operation deployed in South Korea during the Korean War in 1950. The US utilised the UN to legitimise its intervention in Korea, which brought a significant triumph of US political and strategic interests afterwards.³⁰⁴ The political, economic and foreign policy directions of South Korean government were considerably influenced and guided by the US foreign policy, and the American power and influence over Korean peninsula along with north-east Asia, which are all geo-strategically important, became dominant.

This realist view is particularly enhanced by Wohlforth's argument. Wohlforth reflects the importance of the promotion of the relative power of states, arguing that declining power can unquestionably be a major driving force to trigger states to legitimately use military force to rescue their power and position if they are at stake.³⁰⁵ Put differently, when a state which had previously occupied an influential power in certain areas went through a decline in its power and position, the state would be likely to view a crisis management operation as an important opportunity to recover its place and further extend its power in the areas. This argument seems to be persuasive when it comes to the case in which there exists any colonial legacy between a host country and a troop contributing country. Bellamy and Williams posit that peace operation is intimately connected to the *status quo*, arguing that "international organization [*sic*] depends on each of the world's most powerful states having vested interest in preserving the status quo".³⁰⁶ Europe's peace operations accordingly can be "ultimately concerned with managing and protecting the colonial status quo".³⁰⁷

In addition to the internal and state-centric political interests of individual states, European engagement in international peacekeeping can also be explained by the external motivations of EU member states, in terms of the balance of power. As discussed earlier, power is deemed by realists as the most essential element of a state's survival and security, and it therefore remains a central concept in realist theories. States continuously seek to promote

³⁰³ C. Gegout, "Causes and Consequences of the EU's Military Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Rational Explanation", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 10, 2005, p.12.

³⁰⁴ See E. C. Luck (2006), *op. cit.*, pp.49-50.

³⁰⁵ W. C. Wohlforth (2008), *op. cit.*, p.41.

³⁰⁶ A. J. Bellamy and P. D. Williams (2010), *op. cit.*, p.91.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.75.

their power and position in the international system, while they also consciously aim to maintain a balance of power. International systems have considerably changed since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s from a bilateral to a multilateral international system. Furthermore, as China has recently emerged as a great power in the international system, the European super powers have relatively lost their uncontested prestigious power and position. For realists, new emerging powers such as China are seen as a threat. Realists would argue that due to a fear of dramatic changes in the distribution of power in the international system, which may cause a change to the structure of this system, the European major powers would tend to provide their active leadership to support institutional activities and promote cooperation conducive to maintaining their power within the international structure.

Along with ensuring political power, enhancing economic power becomes an increasingly salient concern to the major states. When the world summit on sustainable development was held in Johannesburg in 2002, experts and scholars emphasised the importance of natural resources, particularly oil and gas, as a key catalyst for the various forms of engagement of super powers in Africa.³⁰⁸ One UN official remarks that permanent members of the Security Council seem most likely to get involved in crisis management in Africa if the region involved is particularly rich in various natural resources.³⁰⁹ Interestingly, according to interview evidence from a UN official for African peacekeeping missions, “some permanent members of the UNSC have launched investments and taken advantage of the engagement in most conflict areas in Africa where UN peacekeeping missions were authorised, such as in the Congo, Sudan, Chad and Somalia”.³¹⁰ In light of the new security challenge facing the EU’s increasing dependency for energy imports, particularly fossil fuels (natural gas, solid fuels and oil) from non-EU countries, the EU has stated that a new energy strategy gives African countries an important geo-strategic position as well as a vital role in assuring the EU’s secure and reliable energy security.³¹¹

From a realist perspective, oil and natural resources would play an important role in managing the dynamics of international relations and generate a new economic imperialism.

³⁰⁸ See World Summit on Sustainable Development, “Oil and War: The Artifices of 20th Century History”, Johannesburg, 2002.

³⁰⁹ Interview with UN official, UN DPKO, New York, 02 April 2009.

³¹⁰ Interview with UN official, UN DPKO, New York, 02 April 2009.

³¹¹ For example, see B. Kavalov, H. Petric and E. Tzimas, “Evolution of the Indigenous European oil and gas sources: Recent trends and issues for Consideration”, *Energy Policy*, vol. 31, issue 1, 2011, pp.487-491; Report of the European Environmental Agency on “Net Energy Import Dependency (ENER 012)”, European Union, September 2010; Document of the European Commission, “The Energy Challenges: Access and Security for Africa and for Europe”, Africa-EU Partnership, 2010; and the European Commission, “The Africa-EU Energy Partnership”.

In effect, states often hold the perception that “economic power can be far more promising than military power when it comes to influencing the international agenda.”³¹² According to Drezner, the global distribution of power is rapidly shifting to oil producers.³¹³ Drezner argues that energy exporters will thus have been in front and centre in the minds of national security and foreign policy strategies.³¹⁴ In the same respect, Vialls also suggests that oil and natural resources have always been the major reason for many internal conflicts that in many cases have turned into civil wars such as in the Gulf (1991), Angola, Algeria and Congo.³¹⁵ More importantly, Vialls argues that superpowers seek ‘global dominance through control of the world’s oil resources’ for their own survival and protection of their national security.³¹⁶

As it has emerged that securing energy resources in a both effective and safe way became an important aspect of national and regional security, “the [EU] states are more willing to support the stability of countries of which abundant natural resources are produced”.³¹⁷ For a realist view, states tend to behave and pursue foreign policies in order to maximise their self-interests for survival’s sake. This argument may overlap with what Putnam presents as ‘win-sets’. The chief negotiators - the UK, France, Germany and Italy in this study- may seek to augment their own ability in negotiations at the international level in order to satisfy domestic preferences - securing reliable natural resources and strengthen their own economic power - and to clinch an international agreement in their favour. Hence, in a realist context, Elman argues that due to the geo-strategically important conditions of a particular region, the tendency of major powers’ engagement in crisis management would increase.³¹⁸

³¹² F. Algieri, T. Bauer, and K. Brummer, “Germany and ESDP” in K. Brummer (ed.), *The Big 3 and ESDP: France, Germany and the United Kingdom*, discussion paper on European Foreign and Security Policy, no.5, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh, November 2006, p.27.

³¹³ See D. W. Drezner, “Oil Dependence as Virtue”, *The National Interest*, Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 2006.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*

³¹⁵ J. Vialls, “The Global Oil Conspiracy: An Inside Look at the CIA’s Involvement in Protecting the Super Rich American, British and European Oil Families over the Last Decade”, *Nexus*, vol. 12, no. 17, December 1993; also see paper of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Oil Watch, *op.cit.*

³¹⁶ J. Vialls (1993), *Ibid.*

³¹⁷ Interview with British official, New York, 14 April 2009.

³¹⁸ For a comprehensive account of realist geo-strategic assumption, see C. Elman (2008), *op. cit.*

4.2 Realist Hypothesis

Drawing on what neoclassical realists primarily assume, this thesis establishes a realist hypothesis. The single hypothesis encompasses the most important conditions of neoclassical realism that may constrain the behaviour and decisions of the member states (independent variable). By examining the independent variable, it seeks to answer under what conditions the EU member states, *inter alia* the European Big-four major powers, are likely to provide their decisive leadership roles in dealing with issues of peacekeeping cooperation with the UN (dependent variable). As discussed earlier, the core assumptions of neoclassical realism are as follows: 1) states are the most important actors who determine and control the direction of institutions and cooperation in the international system; 2) due to the relative power and capabilities of states, powerful states primarily lead and stimulate cooperation when they consider it necessary; and 3) to states, institutions and cooperation are viewed as an effective means to reflect and maximise states' interests and power in international relations.

Such neoclassical realist assumptions are transformed into one single hypothesis that is linked to the dependent variable of this research study. As Figure 4.1 summarises, this thesis proposes a hypothetical relationship that *if* political and strategic interests in a peacekeeping operation increase, the likelihood of chief negotiator(s)' leadership will also increase.

Figure 4. 1 Hypothesis 1: Political and Strategic Interests (PSI)

↑ PSI ⇔ ↑ Likelihood of Chief Negotiator(s)' Leadership

The political and strategic interests are generally informed and measured by, including but are not limited to, the following three important conditions: *extension of political power*, *existence of colonial legacy*, and *enhancement of economic power*. First, states are interested in building their political power in the international system; and when there is a political interest on the part of chief negotiator in a peacekeeping operation, the likelihood of its leadership to influence the EU decision to engage with the UN in peacekeeping will increase.

Second, states that have previously enjoyed colonial powers would not want to abandon their exclusive influence over former colonies; and when there exists a colonial legacy of a chief negotiator particularly in a peacekeeping area, the likelihood of its leadership will increase. Third, states perceive that reinforcing economic power and securing energy resources are becoming more important for states' power and security; so if the chief negotiator has an economic interest in a peacekeeping operation, the likelihood of its leadership in dealing with issues of engagement with the UN in peacekeeping will also increase. Yet, it must not be overlooked that this realist proposition could fall into a logical fallacy, i.e. the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* error. Put differently, it would be difficult to assert that since peacekeeping engagements are followed by economic benefits, peacekeeping must have been caused by economic interests. The study thus seeks evidence to show clear correlations, rather than causality, between economic interests of the chief negotiator and economic benefits following the operation. Overall, the aim of theory testing is to clarify whether political and strategic interests appropriately explain and predict the likelihood of the EU member states' leadership in deciding to engage in a peacekeeping operation.

4.3 Constructivism and Foreign Policy

Beginning in the 1980s following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, criticisms emerged that realist theories were not clear about the future development of the balance of the power in a multi-polar system. A new IR debate and theoretical discussion thus began to emerge among IR scholars to help rectify current weakness in IR theories. Realism was particularly challenged by idealist scholarship, so called social constructivists. The term of Social Constructivism (in shorthand, constructivism) in IR was first elaborated by Nicholas Onuf in his book *World of Our Making* in 1989.³¹⁹

Constructivist theory is often called social constructivism, as its core assumption was inspired by theoretical developments in other social science disciplines, particularly philosophy and sociology. According to social constructivist assumptions, the world is constituted socially through "inter-subjective interaction" where actors and structures are

³¹⁹ N. G. Onuf, *World of our making: Rules and rule in social theory and international relations*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.

mutually constituted.³²⁰ Unlike realism which focuses on the distribution of power as an important reason for states' behaviour and foreign policy in the international system, constructivists reject such a one-side materialistic account. Instead, constructivists give greater weight to the social, as opposed to the material, in world politics, which leads to a less rigid and more dynamic view of the relationship between structures and agents (individuals, states, non-state actors). Giddens argues that structures and actors are not two separate concepts or constructs.³²¹ Rather, in the process of interactions between states, the identities and interests of states are created, and states know who they are and what they want in the structure. Hence, "structure has no existence or causal powers" apart from these processes of interactions.³²² Instead of just assuming that a particular foreign policy is determined by certain pre-existing interests of a state, constructivists explore how those interests are constructed through a process of interaction with the broader environment.³²³

Constructivist theory has been applied to a range of IR subjects, including 'political economy',³²⁴ 'international organization [sic]',³²⁵ and 'security studies.'³²⁶ Realists would argue that constructivism has generally eschewed the focus on the power politics of security studies and developed instead 'benign norms' for managing inter-states interactions and institutionalising broader forms of 'political community.'³²⁷ Constructivists rather insist that their approach actually enables more sophisticated issues to be elucidated, including issues traditionally associated with realist approaches to security studies, from the 'nature of

³²⁰ A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p.25.

³²¹ A. Giddens (1984), *Ibid.*; See also E. Adler, "Constructivism and International Relations", in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage, 2002, pp. 95-118 (p.95).

³²² A. Wendt, "Anarchy Is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization*, vol. 46, no. 2, 1992, pp. 391-425 (p.394).

³²³ For example, see J. T. Checkel, "Constructivism and Foreign Policy" in S. Smith *et al.* (eds.), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.72-82

³²⁴ For example, see M. Blyth, *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; and M. Blyth, "Structures do not Come with an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas and Progress in Political Science", *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 1, no. 4, December 2003, pp. 695-703.

³²⁵ See J. G. Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, London: Routledge, 1998; J. G. Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge" in *Constructing the World Polity*, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, pp. 12-13; M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.

³²⁶ P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996; and J. Weldes, M. Laffey, H. Gusterson and R. Duvall, "Introduction" in J. Weldes *et al.* (eds), *Cultures of Insecurity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, pp.1-33.

³²⁷ See M. McDonald, "Constructivism" in Paul D. Williams (ed.), *Security Studies*, New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 60; and J. J. Mearsheimer (1994/95), *op.cit.*

power’³²⁸ in general to the ‘security dilemma and the balance of power’³²⁹ in particular. Constructivists believe that one can rarely understand the security dilemma or a state’s perception of threat without some attention to the role of standards of legitimacy or the politics of identity which are both the core concepts of constructivist theories. For constructivists, interests are interpreted as socially constructed rather than pre-given, which means that regularities or constraints of structures of the international system are the consequence of collective or inter-subjective interactions of states.³³⁰

The logic of constructivism is particularly useful when it aims to account for the four decades covering Europe’s desire to maintain its peace and security by promoting effective multilateral cooperation within the EU framework.³³¹ For constructivists, the most important dimension of European foreign and security policy is the role of the European norms and identity, which constrain and influence states’ behaviour. In the constructivists’ vocabularies, norms are interpreted as “shared expectations about appropriate or legitimate behaviour by actors with a particular identity”.³³² Similarly, Katzenstein depicts the definition of norms as “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity”.³³³ Constructivists suggest that identity is especially constructed through the use of language, the deployment of ideas, and the establishment of norms. Through the internationalisation of norms, states usually acquire their identities and establish what their interests are, which is what constructivists mean when they talk about the ‘constructive effects of norms’.³³⁴ In order to address the value of constructivism and determine to what extent constructivist theory is applicable to the specific research project of this thesis, the next section investigates the nature and variants of constructivism.

³²⁸ For more accounts of constructivist approach to the concept of power and security, see M. Barnett and R. Duvall (eds), *Power in Global Governance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

³²⁹ For example, T. Hopf (1998), “The promise of constructivism in International Relations theory”, *International Security*, vol. 23, no. 1, 1998, pp.171-200.

³³⁰ B. Rosamond, “New theories of European integration” in Cini, M. (ed.), *European Union Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp.110-127.

³³¹ See A. Wendt (1992), *op.cit.*, p.418.

³³² M. McDonald (2008), *op.cit.*, p. 63.

³³³ P. J. Katzenstein (1996), *op. cit.*, p.5.

³³⁴ B. Rosamond (2003), *op.cit.*

Variants of Constructivism

Most commonly, constructivists explore how international norms evolve and provide limits to acceptable state behaviour in general.³³⁵ Checkel suggests that constructivism comes in two main varieties: North American and European constructivism. The North American variant of constructivism, which is heavily dominated by US scholars, is often referred to as '*conventional constructivism*'. It examines the role of 'social norms' and to a lesser extent 'identity' in shaping international and foreign policy outcomes.³³⁶ These scholars adopt a top-down or deductive approach to account for causal relationships between variables such as actors, norms, interests, and identity. Conventional constructivism is especially useful to access the role of international organisations, because the theory is particularly interested in their ability to promote certain understandings of norms or identities, determining whether these associations have any influence on the behaviour of particular states in terms of their foreign policy.³³⁷

The European variant of constructivism, on the other hand, is often labelled '*interpretative constructivism*' as its main focus relies on the role of language in mediating and constructing states' identity and behaviour. The interpretative constructivists choose an inductive or bottom up research strategy that seeks to examine a fundamental change or a new construct of state identity which has emerged from a range of linguistic conditions, such as textual, narrative and normative discourses.³³⁸ Instead of examining what factors cause aspects of a state's identity to change, interpretative constructivists have a different approach to explore the 'background conditions' which link to social discourse that may change a state's foreign policy or position in international relations.³³⁹ A wide range of linguistic forms including public documents, statements, declarations and reports are viewed as important factors to determine states' choices and behaviour.

Another school of IR theories which is also broadly inspired by the work of social constructivism is '*normative institutionalism*',³⁴⁰ which is often referred to as '*constructivist*

³³⁵ See M. Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.

³³⁶ J. T. Checkel (2008), *op. cit.*

³³⁷ For example, see Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. (2004), *op. cit.*

³³⁸ For further understanding of European/interpretative constructivism, see T. Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1995 and 1999*, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.

³³⁹ J. T. Checkel (2008), *op. cit.*, p.73.

³⁴⁰ B. G. Peters (1999), *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism*, New York: Continuum, pp. 25-42

institutionalism’ as well.³⁴¹ Normative institutionalism particularly focuses on the ‘central role assigned to norms and values within institutions’ in explaining states’ behaviour and choices of foreign policy.³⁴² For normative institutionalists, an institution is not necessarily a formal or physical structure, but rather understood as a “collection of norms, rules, and understandings”.³⁴³ Peters notes that an institution would cover a comprehensive range of meanings from formal structural elements to amorphous normative entities, and has been conceptualised to explain the behaviour of individual member states.³⁴⁴ A collection of values and identities of institutions is largely normative rather than cognitive, which provides a means of linking individual states’ behaviour and institutions.³⁴⁵ In this respect, March and Olsen suggest that institutions possess an ‘inherent legitimacy’ that guides their members to behave in accordance with a sense of the collective, as opposed to their own self-interests.³⁴⁶

According to Duke, decision outcomes on the issue of UN-EU relations can be shaped by institutions that are “collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate action in terms of relations between roles and situations”.³⁴⁷ For example, when the EU is undergoing international bargaining at the UN, institutional values such as European norms and identity encourage individual negotiators “to remember some identities and common ties, and to forget individual national identities that tend to create cleavages and conflicts”.³⁴⁸ Thomas argues that a collection of institutional norms and values significantly constrains policy-makers to consult each other before publicising their preferences and to seek consensus, now deeply embedded in member states’ practice and expectations.³⁴⁹

³⁴¹ The proliferation of new institutionalist scholarship, including James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1989), Peter A. Hall and Rosemary Taylor (1996), and B. Guy Peters (1998; 2004), has led to a number of new institutionalist theories, yet none of these authors made any distinction between the nature of institutionalism and that of constructivism. For further understanding of constructivist institutionalism, see C. Hay, “*Constructivist Institutionalism: Or, Why Ideas into Interests Don’t G*”, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political science Association, Pennsylvania Convention Center, PA in 2006. In this thesis, ‘normative institutionalism’ will be used.

³⁴² B. G. Peters (1999), *op.cit.*, p.25.

³⁴³ March and Olsen provide a stipulative definition of political institution as: “collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations. [...] The process involves determining what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what obligation of that role in that situation is.” See J. G. March and J. P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*, New York: Free Press, 1989, pp. 21-6.

³⁴⁴ B. G. Peters (1999), *op.cit.*, pp.26-28.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid*, pp.29.

³⁴⁶ March and Olsen (1989), *op. cit.*, pp.22-3.

³⁴⁷ S. Duke, “Consensus Building in ESDP: The Lessons of Operation Artemis”, *International Politics*, vol. 46, no.4, 2009, pp.395-412; see also B. G. Peters (1999), *op cit.*, p.28.

³⁴⁸ March and Olsen (1989), *op.cit.*, p.961.

³⁴⁹ D. C. Thomas (2009), *op. cit.*, p.347.

In sum, constructivist theories share the key assumptions that norms and collective ideas are constructed in the process of social interactions between actors and structures, which leads to states' normative behaviour and foreign policy in international relations. The thesis suggests that normative institutionalism is worth incorporating into social constructivism to examine to what extent normative factors are decisive to determine UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping operations.

Constructivist Propositions

To the extent that structures can be said to shape the behaviour of states, constructivists hold that normative or ideational structures are just as important as material structures.³⁵⁰ Constructivists believe that institutionalised norms and ideas “define the meaning and identity of the individual actor and the patterns of appropriate economic, political, and cultural activity engaged in by those individuals”,³⁵¹ and they “condition what actors consider necessary and possible in both practical and ethical terms”.³⁵² Therefore, normative ideas such as “how states think they should act, what the perceived limitations on their actions are and what strategies they can imagine to achieve their objectives” can be institutionalised through reciprocal interaction between normative structure and individual actors.³⁵³

From a constructivist point of view, the propensity of states to lead a cooperation to achieve joint gains is more likely to be found within an institutionalised and normative framework than outside of one. Smith seeks to explain cooperation in related areas of security and defence through mechanisms or processes by which institutional norms occurs and affects EU foreign policymaking. According to Smith, a state's behaviour is institutionalised through the various processes by which “an informal, extra-legal, ad hoc, improvised system gradually fostered the achievement of cooperative outcomes and progressively enhanced its own procedures to improve the prospects for those outcomes”.³⁵⁴

³⁵⁰ For example, see C. Reus-Smit (2005), *op. cit.*, pp.188-212.

³⁵¹ J. Boli, J. Meyer and G.Thomas, “Ontology and Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account”, in G. Thomas *et al.* (eds) *Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual*, Beverley Hills, CA: Sage, 1989, pp. 10–25 (p.12).

³⁵² C. Reus-Smit (2005), *op. cit.*, p.198.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁴ M. E. Smith (2004), *op. cit.*, p.17.

Reus-Smit defines the normative and institutional process as three mechanisms: imagination, communication and constraint.³⁵⁵ With regard to the first aspect, it is argued that normative and ideational structures affect an actor's behaviour by framing its imagination. For example, a democratic state will only imagine and seriously entertain certain strategies within the liberal democratic polity, and such norms will condition its expectations and behaviour. Second, normative structures also work their influence through communication. When a state seeks to justify its behaviour, it usually provides a linguistic or moral court of appeal. In the case of intervention in the affairs of another state, a state may justify its behaviour with reference to international human rights norms. Finally, constructivists argue that "institutionalised norms and ideas work as rationalisations only because they already have a moral force in a given social context".³⁵⁶ In sum, besides appealing to norms and ideas to justify behaviour by using the very language and imagination, normative structure itself can place significant constraints on the actor's conduct.

The idea of the institutionalised normative process has been further developed by some constructivist scholars, including Daniel Thomas, Frank Schimmelfennig, Richard Youngs, Jeffrey Lewis, and Simon Duke. They have collaborated on a theory of EU decision-making on foreign and external relations, aimed at illuminating 'why and when member states succeed or fail in negotiating common policies on the international stage'.³⁵⁷ By examining the bargaining dynamics and policy-making process of the EU's CFSP, the authors conclude that EU decision-making is certainly determined by normative values, which are normally presented by three main normative pressures: normative commitment, normative entrapment, and normative suasion.

As Figure 4.2 displays, once member states have committed themselves to a particular set of norms or policy course, they are likely to find themselves entrapped to take further actions


³⁵⁵ C. Reus-Smit (2005), *op. cit.*

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.198.

³⁵⁷ See special Issue on 'The Negotiation of EU Foreign Policy' of *International Politics* (2009), Volume 46 (4), pp. 335-504. This special issue contains articles as follows: D. C. Thomas, "The challenge of EU policy-making: Moving from divergent preferences to common policies", pp.335-338; D. C. Thomas, *op. cit.*, pp.339-357; R. Youngs, "A door neither closed nor open: EU policy towards Ukraine during and since the Orange Revolution", pp.358-375; D. C. Thomas, "Rejecting the US challenge to the International Criminal Court: Normative entrapment and compromise in EU policy-making", pp. 376-394; S. Duke, *op.cit.*, pp.398-412; F. Schimmelfennig, "Entrapped again: The way to EU membership negotiations with Turkey", pp.413-431; J. Lewis, "EU Policy on Iraq: The collapse and reconstruction of consensus-based foreign policy", pp. 432-450; O. Elgström, "Trade and aid? The negotiated construction of EU policy on economic partnership agreements", pp.451-468; J. Vogler, "Climate change and EU foreign policy: The negation of burden sharing", pp.469-490; and F. Schimmelfennig and D. C Thomas, 'Normative Institutionalism and EU foreign policy in comparative perspective', pp.491-504.

that do not reflect their original intentions or current preferences (*normative commitment*).³⁵⁸ The states are expected to fulfil their commitment; otherwise their reputation will be somehow damaged in the international community (*normative entrapment*). In parallel, others may seek to behave in accordance with the normative ideas and policy commitments in order not to find themselves isolated from the collective actions of the Union in support of EU common policies. The concept of '*normative suasion*'³⁵⁹ remains the last, but the most important and difficult, step to strengthen the normative arguments. Normative suasion is pursued through communication among actors involved in negotiations. They discuss normative reasons why particular common policies are more desirable or more appropriate than what particular member states preconceive their identities and fundamental interests to be. Successful normative suasion produces a convergence of member states' preferences that facilitates consensus on EU common policies. For constructivists, normative pressures are presented as important variables that may significantly influence the likelihood of cooperation.

Figure 4. 2 Development of Normative Pressures



³⁵⁸ For example, see F. Schimmelfenning, "The community trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the eastern enlargement of the European Union", *International Organization*, vol. 55, no.1, 2001, pp.47-80; F. Schimmelfenning, "Strategic action in a community environment: The decision to enlarge the European Union to the East", *Comparative Political Studies*, vol.36, no.1, 2003, pp.156-183; and F. Schimmelfenning, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

³⁵⁹ The concept of 'Normative Suasion' was introduced by Daniel C. Thomas (2009). According to Thomas, this hypothesis derives from Constructivist theories of international relations and European governance that posit an *interactive* relationship between the interactions of states and the understandings of common interests that drive their behaviour.

Historical memory also plays a considerable role in affecting actors' identities and behaviour in a normative way. Belgium's fatal failures in the decolonisation process in the DR Congo, for instance, remain a significant reason for Belgium to baulk at the initiative of military deployment. The collective international failure to prevent or stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 also resulted in a bone of contention between troop contributing countries. On the contrary, successful historical memory can become catalysts for active leadership just as in Kosovo case in 1999 which helped the growing emergence of the EU doctrine of a responsibility to protect and maintain peace even without UN endorsement. In light of European history, colonial legacy is inextricably entangled with the foreign policy of the major powers. Although colonial legacy is often seen as entailing ruthless neo-colonialism, the empirical study posits that colonial legacy also seems to be linked to the historical memory which helps to generate normative identity and responsibility of EU member states to intervene in peacekeeping.

According to the document on '*The European Union and peacekeeping in Africa*', the EU emphasised the importance of peacekeeping support in Africa, stressing the importance of "historical, cultural and economic ties between the states of Africa and many European nations".³⁶⁰ The EU urged its member states to consider that 'the institutions responsible for the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) should have a subsidiary role in coordinating bilateral and multilateral initiatives to support African military crisis-management capabilities (iv)'.³⁶¹ In fact, a wide range of EU-led peacekeeping operations in Africa is closely linked to the former colonial ties of some EU member states. As Table 4.1 shows, the EU has taken over a number of African peacekeeping missions that were initially mandated as UN missions. Interestingly, most of the African countries to which the EU deployed ESDP operations in cooperation with the UN were former colonies of Europe. Both the Central African Republic and Chad, for instance, where the strong EU-led military troops have been deployed alongside UN operations, were colonies of France. Sudan, where the EU has coordinated UN-AU mission by supporting military and civilian capabilities, was a colony of Britain. The DR Congo, in which a number of recent peacekeeping operations have been deployed, was colonised by Belgium in the nineteenth century. The EU has a robust military presence in the country.

³⁶⁰ See Document A/1880, Recommendation 756 on '*The European Union and peacekeeping in Africa*' submitted by Mr Goris Rapporteur on behalf of the Defence Committee, 1 December 2004, http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2004/1880.html#P72_2082, (accessed on 3 July 2009)

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*

Table 4. 1 Peacekeeping Operations in Africa (2003-2010)

Country	UN Mission	EU Operation	Colonial History
CAR and Chad	MINURCAT Resolution 1778 25 September 2007	EUFOR TCHAD/RCA Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP , of 15 October 2007	France (1960)
Sudan	UNAMID (Darfur) Resolution 1547 Resolution 1556 11 June 2004	EU Support to AMIS (Sudan/Darfur) Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP , OJ L 188, 20.07.2005	Britain (1965)
	UNMIS (Sudan) Resolution 1590 24 March 2005		
Côte d'Ivoire	UNOCI Resolution 1528 27 Feb 2004	French mission Operation Licorne (in 2002)	France (1960)
Liberia	UNMIL Resolution 1509 19 Sep. 2003	-	-
Congo (DRC)	MONUC Resolution 1484 30 May 2003 and S/ RES/1671 25 April 2006 was renamed MONUSCO S/RES/1925 28 May 2010	DRC/ARTEMIS Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP , of 5 June 2003	Belgium (1960)
		EUPOL KINSHASA Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004	
		EUFOR RD Congo Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP , of 27 April 2006	
		EUSEC RD Congo Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP , of 02 May 2005	
Somalia	UNPOS Resolution 1814 15 May 2008	EU NAVFOR Somalia Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP of 19 September 2008	Britain, Italy (1960)
Guinea-Bissau	(On-going Peace-building) UNOGBIS Resolution 1223 06 April 1999	EU SSR Guinea-Bissau Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP , Of 12 February 2008	Portugal (1974)

In the case of the Liberia War Crisis, however, which displaced scores of people, both internally and beyond the borders resulting in some 850,000 refugees in the neighbouring countries and led to a complete breakdown of law and order,³⁶² none of the EU countries deployed peacekeeping support. Liberia, a nation on the west coast of Africa, was colonised by freed American slaves with the help of the American Colonization Society and is the only country without roots in the “European Scramble for Africa”. Such empirical evidence provides an important basis for the constructivist proposition that states tend to behave, interact and cooperate in accordance with socially constructed normative identity and responsibility based upon their historical memory. Nevertheless, it is important to note that it would be also possible that the existence of historical memory will decrease the likelihood of active leadership of EU member states on the issue of peacekeeping engagement. If they have not established a peaceful relationship with countries requesting a peacekeeping support, there might be reluctance by host countries to invite their former colonial powers back into their territories.

4.4 Constructivist Hypothesis

The constructivist hypothesis seeks to evaluate to what extent normative values are important when EU actors provide their leadership in negotiating and making decisions on the possibility of an EU-led peacekeeping deployment. It is hypothesised that *if* there are normative pressures of chief negotiator(s), the likelihood of their leadership to lead peacekeeping cooperation with the UN will increase. Within this constructivist hypothesis, it is perceived that historical memory and normative institutional processes are particularly important conditions.

First, in the context of historical memory, constructivists would argue that European countries that have ever experienced special historical ties or relationship with a country requesting peacekeeping may have a normative feeling of responsibility, and such a normative responsibility and identity would give an important impetus for, or at least spill over into, European collective action through social interactions. In this regard, if a country which was previously constrained by the colonial legacy of a certain European country requests a peace operation, the likelihood of the leadership of the EU states will increase.

³⁶² For further details about the mission, see UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia), available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/> (accessed on 21 April 2008).

Second, once states commit themselves to a particular set of norms and/or policy course, they are likely to find themselves obliged to act coherently. In this respect, it would be argued by constructivists that when there is a normative commitment of EU countries, the likelihood of EU engagement in a peacekeeping operation with the UN will also increase.

Hence, as Figure 4.3 shows, this thesis hypothesises that *if* normative pressures of EU actors on a peacekeeping issue are presented, the likelihood of chief negotiator(s)' leadership will also increase. The hypothesis is examined to determine whether the constructivist approach explicitly explains the real motives of EU actors' leadership in deciding a peacekeeping engagement alongside the UN.

Figure 4.3 Hypothesis 4 : Normative Pressures

Normative Pressures => ↑ Likelihood of Chief Negotiator(s)' Leadership

Conclusion

This chapter discussed theoretical debates. In order to identify the important variables and conditions under which chief negotiators are likely to maximise their leadership in the determination of an EU-led peacekeeping deployment in support of a UN mission, this chapter suggested two hypotheses derived from each of the two theories: realism *vs.* social constructivism. The realist hypothesis is deduced from neoclassical realism and generally labelled *realist hypothesis*. The constructivist hypothesis is broadly inspired by social constructivist theories incorporating normative institutionalism. This thesis refers to it as the *constructivist hypothesis*.

From a realist perspective, this thesis hypothesises that as political and strategic interests increase, so does the likelihood of leadership of EU major powers that may lead to an EU

decision on peacekeeping operations. Additionally, the social constructivist theory hypothesises that the presence of normative pressures would increase the likelihood of leadership of the major powers to lead the EU to decide a EU-led peacekeeping engagement alongside the UN.

In the following case study chapters (Chapter 5, 6 and 7), each of the hypotheses is tested across three cases to determine to what extent theories are likely to provide the best answer to the research question: *under what conditions do the EU Member States lead peacekeeping operations?*

Chapter 5

UN-EU Cooperation in Peacekeeping I : Operation *Artemis* in the DR Congo (2003)

Introduction

On 12 June 2003, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision to launch a fully autonomous military operation, codenamed *Artemis*, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).³⁶³ It took place in accordance with the mandate set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003 and the Council Joint Action of 2003/423/CFSP adopted on 5 June 2003. Operation *Artemis* became an important test case for the credibility of the EU as a global civil-military actor because it was the first EU attempt to cooperate with the UN with a full range of military instruments outside Europe. The aim of the operation was to contribute to the stabilisation of security conditions and improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, the north-eastern Ituri province of the DRC.³⁶⁴ The operation was deployed on a strictly temporary basis and officially ended on 1 September 2003.

Artemis is considered a special EU military intervention for the following reasons. First, it was the first autonomous EU-led military mission. Without recourse to the “Berlin Plus” arrangements and hence to NATO assets, Operation *Artemis* was the first to be implemented entirely autonomously. Second, it was the first ESDP military operation where UN-EU cooperation was applied. Operation *Artemis* was initiated by the EU and conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It was carried out at the request and mandate of the UN

³⁶³ In this chapter, the acronym ‘DRC’ or ‘DR Congo’ will be used to refer to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Also note that EU military operation in the DRC can be labeled in various forms, such as ‘Operation *Artemis*’, ‘Operation *Mamba*’ and ‘Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF)’.

³⁶⁴ See Security Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003.

Security Council to work in close cooperation with the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). Third, it was the first EU military operation which took place outside Europe. The EU certainly expected to acquire greater credibility on the international stage and affirm its role as a promising security actor in the settlement of international crisis and conflicts.

Despite such high expectations and largely being considered a success, Operation Artemis still suffers from lingering criticism that it had very limited aims in time and geographical location; the EU intervention was limited to the town of Bunia and only lasted three months. The EU was not willing to engage in crises and conflicts outside of this zone. In addition, there have been tangible debates on the nature of the EU military operation in the DRC. Initially, the military operation in the DRC was given to France by the request of the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. However, France seemed to transform the French national military mission into a European operation by getting other member states involved. It is thus important to investigate the negotiating process and elucidate key conditions under which the EU achieved a consensus.

In order to examine the causes and consequences of the first EU military cooperation in Africa, this chapter sheds light on both the negotiating context through which the operation became implemented, and important factors that may have influenced the leadership role of the chief negotiators to formulate the operation. The first section offers a brief background on the emergence of conflicts in the DRC, including an overview of the MONUC operation, which may facilitate a general understanding of why the UN came to request support from the EU (5.1). Then the chapter explores the dynamic negotiations between the UN and the EU in order to identify the most important actor(s) involved in decision-making at both the UN and the EU, namely the chief negotiator(s) (5.2). In the remaining two sections, various motives that may have influenced the decision of chief negotiator(s) regarding the military intervention in the DRC are analysed by testing theoretical propositions drawn from neo-realism (5.3) *and* social constructivism (5.4). The aim of this chapter is to explicate the most important conditions under which the European major powers are more likely to provide their leadership in deciding the EU's engagement in peacekeeping operations alongside the UN.

5.1 Background

The Democratic Republic of Congo is the third largest country in Africa by area after Sudan and Algeria, and is as large as Western Europe.³⁶⁵ The country is situated at the heart of the west-central portion of sub-Saharan Africa and is bounded by nine neighbours: the Central African Republic and Sudan in the north; Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania in the east; Zambia and Angola to the South; and the South Atlantic Ocean and the Republic of Congo to the west (see figure 5.1). In spite of a slight increase in its Human Development Index (HDI) between 2000 and 2007 (it rose by 1.41% annually from 0.353 to 0.389) the DRC remains one of the least developed countries, ranking 167th out of 182 countries in 2007.³⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the DRC seems to possess great economic potential.³⁶⁷ It owns more than 50 percent of the forests in Africa.³⁶⁸ The Congo River is the second longest river in Africa after the Nile, and is also the second most concentrated in the world after the Amazon in terms of hydro-electric potential.³⁶⁹ More importantly, the country is rich in natural resources, particularly various and abundant minerals such as diamonds, cobalt, copper, gold, silver, rubber, zinc, uranium, iron, tin, natural gas, petroleum and a range of rare minerals.

³⁶⁵ More specifically, the size of Congo, 2,345,408 square kilometres (905,567 sq mi), is slightly greater than the combined areas of Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Norway.

³⁶⁶ See Human Development Reports 2009, UNDP available at : http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_COD.html (accessed on 12 November 2009).

³⁶⁷ For example, Manuela Scheuermann notes that the DRC is potentially the ‘economic glasshouse’ for the whole continent. Kadima and Booysen also comment that the DRC is one of the most richly endowed countries in the world, with a gigantic potential of natural resources and mineral wealth. See M. Scheuermann, “*The EU and Multilateral Crisis Management: The Case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*”, EU-Grasp Working Papers, no.14, 2010.; and D. Kadima and D. Tshiyoyo, “Chapter 4: Democratic Republic of Congo”, in D.Kadima and S. Booysen (eds.), *Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa 1989-2009: 20 Years of Multiparty Democracy*, EISA, Johannesburg, 2009, pp.101-103.

³⁶⁸ T. Hart and R.t Mwinyihali, “*Armed Conflict and Biodiversity in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*”, Washington, D.C.: Biodiversity Support Program, 2001.

³⁶⁹ MONUC Resources, ‘Why the DRC Matters’, United Nations, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/documents/drc.pdf> (accessed on 03 August 2009).

Figure 5. 1 Map of Democratic Republic of Congo³⁷⁰



The richness and variety of Congolese natural resources could have certainly been a Central-African blessing. However, it turned into a Congolese bane. Besides its politically unstable and insecure situation, the vast amount of mining resources of the DRC has drawn the attention of its neighbours, particularly Angola, Rwanda and Burundi, who are very much interested in Congolese natural resources. As a result, its geographically important position has augmented tensions not only between inter-ethnic groups, which are estimated to be over

³⁷⁰ Map No. 4007 Rev.8, United Nations Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section, 2004.

250, but also in conflicts with numerous armed militia rebel groups supported by the DRC's neighbouring states. The main conflict factions involved Congolese government and rebel forces supported by Rwanda and Uganda. Having their own interests in sharing trade benefits and reaping from diamond mining, Rwanda and Uganda occupied and controlled the North-Eastern regions of the DRC, namely the Kivus and Ituri, where Operation *Artemis* aimed to deploy forces. Also, Rwandan ethnic rebel groups, Hutus and Tutsis which had been historical rivals, were fighting on Congolese territory in the Kivus.³⁷¹ Tensions remained high in the DRC, particularly in the north-eastern area where numerous armed militia groups were in control of the country and inter-ethnic massacres had been taking place.

Political instability and crisis in the DRC spiralled rapidly, and the second DRC civil war broke out in 1998, coinciding with international and internal wars where a number of countries became involved and fought simultaneously.³⁷² Ulriksen *et al.* described this Congolese civil war as a 'central web of wars' in Africa.³⁷³ In July 1999, there was an attempt to end the war through a ceasefire, and inter-Congolese dialogues were established under the auspices of the United Nations. The heads of state gathered together in Lusaka (Zambia) and signed the Lusaka Agreements.³⁷⁴ After the first peacekeeping operation of the UN in the DRC during the Congolese wars of the 1960s,³⁷⁵ the UN started its largest and most expensive peace operation in 1999. Following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement between the DRC and five regional states, the MONUC was established in November 1999 to monitor the implementation of the Agreement and observe the ceasefire and disengagement of forces.³⁷⁶ Under the UNSC mandate, 90 peacekeepers were deployed.

³⁷¹ See Manuela Scheuermann (2010), *op. cit.*, p.7; Human Right Reports (2000), '1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, U.S. Department of State; S. Dickey, "Sierra Leone: Diamonds for Arms", *Human Rights Brief - A Legal Resource for the International Human Rights Community*, vol. 7, issue 3, 2000.

³⁷² The recent history of the DRC has been defined by continuous political instability with two wars: 1996-1997 and 1998-2003. The first Congolese war (1996-1997) drove out President Mobutu, and Laurent-Désiré Kabila came to power.

³⁷³ S. Ulriksen *et al.*, "Operation Artemis: the shape of things to come?", *International Peacekeeping*, vol.11, no.3, 2004, pp.508-525. See also M. Scheuermann (2010), *op. cit.*

³⁷⁴ Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe were signed the Agreement on 10 July 1999. See the Lusaka Agreements, available at the ISS (Institute d'Etudes de Sécurité) : <http://www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/drcongo/cdreader/bin/2lusaka.pdf> (accessed on 2 Aug. 2009).

³⁷⁵ The first United Nations Operation in the DRC (ONUC) was established in July 1960 and lasted until June 1964. The mandate of ONUC was to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. For more information, see <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onuc.htm> (accessed on 02 August 2009)

³⁷⁶ S/RES/1279 (1999), 30 November 1999, para.5.

In spite of its previous crisis management experience in the 1960s, the constraints and deficits of the UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC were evident. Morsut points out that due to the weak commitment of states and particularly the reluctance of Europeans to get involved in the operation, the deployment of blue helmets was delayed.³⁷⁷ Moreover, the lack of financial and human resources to cover a territory as big as Western Europe made the gap between the expectations and the capabilities of the UN even wider. It was impossible for the UN to fulfil its mission under limited resources and conditions. The situation of the DRC seemed not to improve greatly up to the year 2000, despite constantly renewed resolutions calling for respect of the ceasefire agreement.³⁷⁸ Accordingly, as the violence continued, the UN Security Council mandated to expand the mission with the addition of approximately 6,000 military personnel and observers on 24 February 2000.

The ‘fundamental turning point’ of the conflict came in January 2001 when Joseph Kabila assumed the presidency after his father, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, was assassinated during a conflict on the sixteenth of that month. On 2 February 2001, Joseph Kabila attended a UN Security Council meeting and spoke in a far more peaceful language than that of his bellicose father.³⁷⁹ Kabila appealed to the international community, expressing his strong willingness to cooperate with the UN, so that the UN could discharge its mandate effectively and help restore the Congolese peace. In his statement, Kabila called on the Council to support disengagement, deployment of UN troops, the unconditional withdrawal of the uninvited forces, and finally a full withdrawal of all foreign forces within a precise time frame.³⁸⁰ As a result, a vital breakthrough was reached in the Congolese peace process at both the national and regional level.³⁸¹ Kabila’s commitment to the ceasefire allowed the UN to take control of the territory and begin the operations of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in October. Moreover, an agreement was signed between the government of Uganda and the DRC in Luanda (Angola) on 6 September 2002. Under the Luanda Agreement, the withdrawal of the Ugandan army from the Ituri province in the northeast of the country was scheduled to occur.

³⁷⁷ C. Morsut, ‘Effective Multilateralism? EU-UN Cooperation in the DRC, 2003-2006’, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 16, no.2, 2009, p.262.

³⁷⁸ For example, see Security Council Resolutions 1291 (24 Feb. 2000), 1304 (16 June 2000), 1316 (23 Aug. 2000), 1323 (13 Oct. 2000), and 1332 (14 Dec. 2000).

³⁷⁹ Press Release SC/7006, Security Council 4271st Meeting, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo President Assures Council of His Commitment to Lusaka Agreement’, 02 February 2001. For further details, see also ICG Africa Report N° 27, ‘From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo’, Nairobi/Brussels, 16 March 2001.

³⁸⁰ See Press Release SC/7006, *Ibid.*

³⁸¹ See H. Hoebeke, S. Carette and K. Vlassentoer, ‘EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Centre d’analyse stratégique, IRRI-KIIB, Brussels, 2006.

In April 2003, under the guidance of the MONUC, the Ituri Pacific Commission (IPC) was created to supervise a separate peace process in Ituri. In contrast to the remarkable expectation of the peace and stabilisation progress in the Congolese area, however, the crisis in Ituri, especially around the capital Bunia, escalated following the withdrawal of the Ugandan troops. This was provoked by a security vacuum left after Ugandan troops pulled out in the beginning of 2003 in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement. The militia fought for control of the town, committing large-scale atrocities against the civilian population. The absence of a deterrent force led to renewed clashes between the militias of rival ethnic groups, especially the Lendu and the Hema, and the fighting between different armed factions in Bunia resulted in a great humanitarian disaster. The two weeks of total chaos that unfolded in Bunia led to an international outcry over the UN's incapacity to deal with the catastrophe promptly.³⁸² According to some authoritative reports, more than 3.5 million people were estimated to have died as a result of the factional fighting between 1998 and 2003, and a further estimated 500,000 to 600,000 people were displaced throughout the region in Ituri.³⁸³

5.2 Decision-making in Practice

Level I: International UN level

Following the withdrawal of the Ugandan army in May 2003, the humanitarian insecurity and political instability in Ituri continued to deteriorate. The MONUC's headquarters in Bunia got attacked and blue helmets also became victims of aggression.³⁸⁴ The UN quickly

³⁸² For example, see K. Homan (2007), "Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo", in *European Commission: Faster and more united? The debate about Europe's crisis response capacity*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, May 2007, pp.151-155; M. Scheuermann (2010), *op. cit.*; CNN news report, "UN backs Congo emergency force", 30 May 2003; and BBC news report, "UN agree on DR Congo force", 30 May 2003.

³⁸³ For example, see Second Special report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 27 May 2003, (S2003/566), para 10 and 63; "Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: results from a nationwide survey", International Rescue Committee, 2003; HPG Briefing Note: 'Humanitarian Issues in Ituri, Eastern DRC', Humanitarian Policy Group, June 2003.

³⁸⁴ C. Morsut (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 263; S/2003/566; International Crisis Group, "Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri", *ICG Africa Report*, no.64, 13 June 2003; S. Ulriksen *et al.* (2004), *op. cit.*, pp. 510-511.

mandated the MONUC to deploy 700 UN peacekeepers, mostly from the Uruguayan blue helmets, in Bunia.³⁸⁵ Yet, the small contingent of the MONUC troops had neither the resources nor the military skills necessary to stabilise the situation and was overwhelmed by the increase in violence due to the Uruguayan troops only possessing observer capabilities.³⁸⁶ The MONUC had a mere 2,800 troops, and in face of the humanitarian massacre, a 700-strong force in Bunia was too ridiculously small to even maintain its own safety, against 28,000 rebels.

These events eventually prompted a UN Security Council decision to mandate an additional deployment in the DRC. With the catastrophic situation in Bunia, the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operation, Jean-Marie Guehenno, raised the first call for international intervention on 9 May 2003.³⁸⁷ The UN Secretary-General (SG), Kofi Annan, reflected this appeal and expressed his grave concern over the situation. The Secretary-General called upon the Security Council and its member states to consider sending a peacekeeping force to eastern Congo, where inter-tribal fighting in and around the town of Bunia had left many dead and caused most of its 300,000 people to flee.

More specifically, on 15 May 2003, in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General called for the rapid deployment to Bunia of “a highly trained and well-equipped multinational force, under the lead of a Member State, to provide security to the airport as well as to other vital installations in the town and to protect the civilian population”.³⁸⁸ The SG also wrote letters to all 15 Security Council members asking them to form a ‘coalition of the willing’ to end the humanitarian disaster in Ituri. In addition, in his special report on the MONUC (S/2003/566), the UN Secretary-General highlighted a need to immediately extend MONUC’s troops to a brigade-size formation, namely ‘Ituri Brigade Force’.³⁸⁹ Annan also called for the deployment of an additional multinational rapid reaction force on a temporary basis until the possible deployment of MONUC was reinforced.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁵ S/2003/566, para 14; Peacekeeping Best Practices Section-Military Division (PBPS/MD), “*Operation Artemis: The Lesson of the Interim Emergency Multinational force*”, New York: UN Logistics Base, 2004.

³⁸⁶ H. Hoebeke, S. Carette and K. Vlassentoor (2006), *op. cit.*, p.8.

³⁸⁷ UN Press Release (SC/7755), ‘Press Statement on DRC by Security Council President’, 9 May 2003.

³⁸⁸ UN Document (S/2003/574), 28 May 2003.

³⁸⁹ UN Document (S/2003/566).

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

The negotiation efforts of the Secretary-General became more successful when the SG developed a bilateral dialogue with France. During the weekend of 10 and 11 May 2003, Kofi Annan spoke with French President Jacques Chirac and requested help.³⁹¹ France had indicated its readiness to accept a call for assistance very quickly. On 13 May, only a few days after Annan's call, France officially acceded to the Secretary-General's request by declaring that France was ready to send peacekeeping troops to the DRC.³⁹² Foreign ministry spokesman, Francois Rivasseau, announced that "we [France] are willing to contribute to the stabilization [*sic*] of Ituri and right now we are studying ways of taking part in an international force."³⁹³

France agreed to intervene, but subject to three conditions. Firstly, France should be granted a UN chapter VII mandate. Secondly, countries involved in the conflict, particularly DRC, Uganda and Rwanda, would have to officially support the French intervention. Finally, the operation would have to be limited in time and scope.³⁹⁴ When all these conditions had been met, France would officially announce its intention to act as the lead country in such an operation, labelled '*Mamba*', which later became operation '*Artemis*' when France brought the idea of an EU-operation into discussions at the EU level. France confirmed it would contribute not only troops but also essential equipment, such as a headquarters in Paris with personnel and facilities. Also, as a framework nation, France affirmed that it would acquire "support from a number of EU states".³⁹⁵

On 30 May, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1484 authorising the deployment of a French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in Bunia in close cooperation with the MONUC.³⁹⁶ Pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter which authorises the use of force when necessary to fulfil the mandate, the main objectives of the IEMF were as follows:³⁹⁷

³⁹¹ K. Homan (2007), *op. cit.*; C. Morsut (2009), *op. cit.*, p.263; M. Scheuermann (2010), *op. cit.*, p.11.

³⁹² And Kofi Annan confirmed that France had agreed to participate in a force to stabilise the situation. For further details, see also "Violence Continues in Northeast DR of Congo as Rebels Vie for Bunia – UN", UN New Service, 13 May 2003.

³⁹³ BBC, "New Clashes in DR Congo Town", 13 May 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3024441.stm> (accessed on 30 October 2010).

³⁹⁴ For example, see Fernanda Faria (2004), 'Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: The role of the European Union', *ISS Occasional Papers*, p.40.

³⁹⁵ Hans, Stéphanie and Koen (2006), *op.cit.*, p.8.

³⁹⁶ S/RES/1484, 30 May 2003.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

- to contribute to the stabilisation of security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia,
- to ensure the protection of the airport, internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia, and if the situation requires it,
- to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town.

The first UN-EU ‘bridging’ military operation was considered successful, as both organisations were able to manage to set up the operation in Bunia rapidly. When the Council of the EU, particularly the Political and Security Committee (PSC), requested HR Solana to study the feasibility of an EU military operation in the DRC, Solana anticipated that the decision would take “months, not days”.³⁹⁸ Yet, in practice, the decision-making process, from initiation to the launch of the operation, took less than a month. Nevertheless, critics claimed that the decision was possible because Operation *Artemis* aimed to demilitarise Bunia only by driving the militia elsewhere and not by disarming them or disbanding their units.³⁹⁹ It was also criticised that the operation was too limited in time and space. The IEMF was authorised to be deployed on a strictly temporary basis, until 1 September 2003, so as to allow the Secretary-General to reinforce the MONUC’s presence in Bunia by mid-August. In terms of the area the operation was to cover, the IEMF was to contribute to the stabilisation of security conditions and improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, the capital of the north-eastern Ituri province of the DRC, only.

Although the UN Secretary-General made the first public call for a peacekeeping force in Bunia, France was the first country that agreed on the mission and spurred a military action in the DR Congo. Shaping a prompt response to the Security Council’s request, none was more important than France in the Security Council in determining the nature and scope of the operation. At the operational level, France also played a central role. Prior to the passage of Resolution 1484, France deployed its troops on 20 May to Bunia to assess conditions on the ground. In sum, France played a central role as a chief negotiator in decision-making on Operation *Artemis*, especially through its permanent position in the UN Security Council.

³⁹⁸ A. Lobjakas, “EU: *Official Declares Rapid Reaction Force Operational, It Not Rapid*”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 20 May 2003.

³⁹⁹ See J. Ladzik, “EU military and civilian crisis management operations: the first six years”, *European Policy Brief*, April 2009, p.7.

Previously, Prime Minister of Britain Tony Blair had described the current state of Africa as “a scar on our conscience of the world”, speaking of a moral duty to provide international military and humanitarian action in countries anywhere.⁴⁰⁰ More specifically, on the issue of conflict in the DRC, Blair highlighted that “If the world continues to ignore the sufferings of African nations, like in the war-ravaged Democratic Republic of Congo, it would breed anger and frustration which would threaten global stability.”⁴⁰¹ When the Secretary-General’s letter which called upon the UK to contribute to the French-led EU operation arrived, Blair expressed the view that “It is going to be very important to make sure that force is properly led and properly supported, because otherwise we will revisit the terrors of the Congo of a decade or so ago. We are doing everything we can to avoid that situation.”⁴⁰² Moreover, Blair stated that “there is a UN force being put together now. I understand France is going to make a considerable contribution to that. We are seeing, given all our other engagements, what support we can give.”⁴⁰³ Baroness Amos, the former Secretary of State for Overseas Aid and International Development, said that “The UK has made its priorities absolutely clear, which is to work on conflict resolution in Africa, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo [...]”⁴⁰⁴

However, in practice, it seemed less likely that Britain would fulfil such a commitment in line with the French-led proactive role in peacekeeping and conflict prevention in the DRC. Tony Blair wanted to be careful to avoid committing British troops to the DRC. Despite his public announcement that Britain was willing to contribute to the operation and the deployment of soldiers had not been ruled out, Britain was in fact more likely to offer logistic or medical support rather than military troops. In addition, during the political negotiations in the Security Council, the UK rarely demonstrated its willingness to formulate a European military action in the DRC. Instead, the UK rather focused on the intervention in Iraq. In April and May 2003 when the war in Iraq dominated international headlines, concerns related exclusively to Iraq were on the radar screen of British political and military

⁴⁰⁰ T. Blair, ‘Healing the scar of Africa: *Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world*’, Speech to the Annual Labour Party Conference, October 2001. See also BBC news, ‘Blair promises to stand by Africa’, 2 October 2001.

⁴⁰¹ T. Blair, *Ibid.*

⁴⁰² T. Blair, speech of 21 May 2003, in the House of Commons. See N. Morris and R. Whitaker, ‘British troops may go to Congo after UN uncovers massacre’, *The Independent* (News article), 22 May 2003.

⁴⁰³ N. Morris and R. Whitaker (2003), *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁴ Television interview with Baroness Amos, BBC Breakfast with Frost, 18 May 2003, available at http://cdnedge.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/breakfast_with_frost/3152852.stm (accessed on 26 Sep. 2010).

affairs in the Security Council.⁴⁰⁵ The UK made few or no references in the Security Council to providing forces to contribute to African security either on its behalf or on behalf of the EU. Although the UK did not play an important role in decision-making at the Security Council, Britain did endorse the French initiatives in the end.

In terms of the role of Germany, Duke notes that Germany's contribution remained limited.⁴⁰⁶ Whilst France initiated and Britain endorsed the EU's military intervention in the DRC, Germany had been reluctant to give the EU responsibility for the operation. The German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, frankly admitted that Germany would have preferred to support a 'coalition of the willing' rather than provide substantial military force to the DRC.⁴⁰⁷ Although Franco-British pressure secured German approval in the end, Germany had constantly stayed reserved, hardly making any official statement, by the UN's request, during the decision-making process at the UN level.

The Italian government had no say on *Artemis* at the international level. Although the Italian government agreed to Operation *Artemis* and took part in the operation by sending one military observer at the Operation Headquarters placed in Paris, it did not put the issues on its national agenda for discussion.⁴⁰⁸ According to an Italian diplomat, "Italy was not involved in the UN level decision-making, because our contribution to the operation was only one person. Hence, the Italian participation has been merely symbolic."⁴⁰⁹ The results of the investigation into the Italian leadership demonstrate that the Italian roles and performance in the operation were not significant.

The role of the High Representative came after France had committed itself to lead the operation.⁴¹⁰ Kofi Annan appealed to Solana to build more specific support among the EU

⁴⁰⁵ Interview with an expert and author, ISS, New York, 06 April 2009.

⁴⁰⁶ S. Duke (2009), *op. cit.*

⁴⁰⁷ S. Ukriksen *et al.* (2004), *op.cit.*; see also C. Gegout (2005), *op. cit.*, p.13.

⁴⁰⁸ See G. Bono, "National Parliaments and EU External Military Operations: Is there any Parliamentary Control?", *European Security*, June 2005, vol. 14, no. 2, pp.203-229.

⁴⁰⁹ Interview with Italian national official, 31 May 2012.

⁴¹⁰ This case study suggests that most of the evidence, such as press releases and official statements of the High Representative, are found after the French commitment. For example, 'Remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, to the press on the preparations to deploy a EU military mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)', S0123/03, Brussels, 4 June 2003; 'Excerpt of address to the European Parliament by Javier SOLANA, EU High Representative for the CFSP', 16 June 2003; Press Release announcing 'Javier SOLANA's visit to African Great Lakes Region and the UN', 11 July 2003; Press Release announcing 'Javier SOLANA's report to the UN's Security Council on Artemis operation in DRC', New York, 16 July 2003; and 'Text of Javier SOLANA's intervention on DRC during the Public Meeting of the UN's Security Council', S/PV.4790, New York, 18 July 2003.

defence ministers. Moreover, once the operation was launched, Solana communicated with the leaders of the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, and travelled to the Great Lakes Region for meetings with the presidents in their capitals during mid-July.⁴¹¹ The HR also went to Bunia where the EU-led *Artemis* operation was deployed, which was followed by a trip to the UN Security Council in New York for a briefing on the mission on 18 July 2003. A series of Solana's activities in New York, Brussels and the region of the Great Lakes, implied that the HR constituted the primary point of contact with the UN, the authorities of the DRC and neighbouring countries. Although most contacts were less visible and unreported, Solana certainly played an important facilitating role in coaxing cooperation among the actors involved.⁴¹² Nevertheless, as Ryan *et al.* argue, Solana's diplomatic role and his influence at the political level *per se* appear to have been marginalised.⁴¹³ Moreover, contrary to a number of assessments of his previous function, particularly in the Balkans, in the case of *Artemis* the role of Solana received little credit from media pundits. There have been attempts to analyse the role of the HR on the EU-led operation *Artemis*, but they are mostly descriptive and none of them presented the role of the HR as being a central negotiator.

Level II: Domestic EU level

When the Secretary-General urged a reinforcement of the military presence in the DRC, Annan's request was also directly presented to the EU, via the High Representative. In parallel, the EU expressed its great concern with the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the peace process in the DRC. By adopting a Common Position on 8 May, the Council of the EU reaffirmed its willingness to fully support the action taken by the UN and underlined the importance of MONUC implementing its mandate.⁴¹⁴ Yet, such a statement by no means guaranteed that the EU would unconditionally commit itself to a military crisis management operation in response to the UNSC's appeal. In fact, as Jones criticises, there was a clear division within the EU on the issue of possible deployment of a

⁴¹¹ During Solana's travelling, the HR met with the Congolese President Joseph Kabila, Rwandan President Paul Kagamé and the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni. Press release, 'EUHR Javier Solana to Visit Africa Great Lakes Region and the UN (15-18/7/2003)', Brussels, 11 July 2003; and 'EUHR Javier Solana to report to the UNSC (16/7/2003)', Brussels, 18 July 2003.

⁴¹² Interview with an official, EU Commission, Brussels, 28 April 2010.

⁴¹³ R. C. Hendrickson *et al.* (2007), *op. cit.*, p.40.

⁴¹⁴ Council Common Position (2003/319/CFSP) of 8 May 2003 concerning 'European Union support for the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the peace process in the DRC'. See also Official Journal of the European Union, L115, 9 May 2003, pp. 87-89.

European autonomous military force without NATO assets; France and Germany emphasised the development of an independent military capability, whereas Britain and others stressed the importance of closer cooperation with NATO.⁴¹⁵

The EU's lukewarm and divergent positions had to change when Kofi Annan confirmed that France had agreed to participate in a force to stabilise the situation. France stated that it would act as the framework nation, yet emphasising the condition that it would not intervene alone without "a clear and robust mandate as well as the support from the EU".⁴¹⁶ France started to persuade European colleagues, particularly in the PSC, to formulate an EU military operation. Consequently, in line with the French proposal, the PSC requested Solana to study the feasibility of an EU military operation in the DRC on 19 May. Meanwhile, France carried on several bilateral dialogues with the UK and Germany respectively in order to receive a clear endorsement of the operation from the two most powerful EU states.

The first French call went to Britain. As mentioned earlier, the UK appeared reluctant to intervene with a military contribution in the DRC. Besides, it seemed less likely that Britain would support such a demonstration of a European capability to conduct an autonomous military operation without recourse to NATO assets. Nonetheless, France convinced Britain that the EU would accomplish its first autonomous military mission without NATO assets, which is vital for the development of the ESDP both symbolically and practically. In the same context, President Jacques Chirac suggested to Tony Blair that France and the UK ought to carry out Anglo-French commitments to fulfil the responsibility to "contribute to conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa, in close cooperation with the United Nations".⁴¹⁷ France also underlined that Operation *Artemis* would improve the otherwise shameful image of the EU engraved during the Security Council debates on the Iraq crisis.⁴¹⁸ The UK finally agreed to approve the first European autonomous military intervention in the DRC, albeit sending engineers rather than troops. Gegout argues, in this regard, that the

⁴¹⁵ E. Jones, "The Politics of Europe 2003: differences and disagreements", *Industrial Relations Journal*, vol. 35, no. 6, 2004, pp.483-499 (p.490).

⁴¹⁶ Interview with an official, Ministry of National Defence, Paris, 05 March 2010.

⁴¹⁷ Anglo-French summit (2003), *Declaration on Franco-British cooperation in Africa*, Le Touquet, 4 February 2003, para 1.

⁴¹⁸ See S. Duke (2009), *op. cit.*; and C. Griffin, "France, the United Kingdom, and the European Capacities for Military Action in Africa", paper presented at the Annual Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Italy, 2007.

UK's intervention was merely tokenistic or symbolic; because "in case the EU mission was successful, it would have been a shame not to have taken part in it".⁴¹⁹

The French lobby then moved on to Germany which had originally questioned the EU endorsement of *Artemis*. Like the UK, Germany had been extremely reluctant to participate in the military intervention in the DRC. In addition, Germany had been less conscious of the DRC. Whereas French interests in the region could easily be identified, Germany had none.⁴²⁰ However, the Congo intervention came to be one of the main topics of German foreign and defence policy discussions when President Chirac visited Berlin in mid-June.⁴²¹ Jacques Chirac stressed that the operation was entrusted to the EU by the UN's mandate and hence the operation was "European solidarity in an UN-instigated international mission".⁴²² President Chirac also emphasised that the operation was "[...] a far more than important operation and the first EU-led operation outside Europe, the first", and appealed that the German decision would help strengthen European Common Foreign and Security Policy which had been damaged by the dispute over the invasion of Iraq.⁴²³

German Chancellor Schröder finally changed his view on account of diplomatic pressure from France and the UK. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer expressed the view that the decision of Germany was primarily in response to the insistence of the two most important partners in Europe: France and Britain.⁴²⁴ However, even after its endorsement of *Artemis* within the EU, Germany remained reluctant to identify precisely how it would contribute militarily to the mission.⁴²⁵ The planned German contribution turned out to be only 'modest'.⁴²⁶

⁴¹⁹ C. Gegout (2005), *op. cit.*, p.12.

⁴²⁰ See K. D. Martinsen (2005), "The End of the Affair? Germany's Relationship with France", *German Politics*, vol.14, no.4, December 2005, pp.401-416 (p.410).

⁴²¹ Interview with official, French Defence Minister, Paris, 05 March 2010

⁴²² Statements made by President Jacques Chirac during his joint press briefing with Mr Gerhard Schröder, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, following their meeting (excerpts), Berlin, 10 June 2003.

⁴²³ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁴ See S. Ulriksen *et al.* (2004), *op. cit.*, p.513; and "Rede von Bundesausenminister Fischer vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zur Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo, 18.06.2003", accessed via *Auswärtiges Amt* (Federal Foreign Office) www.auswaertiges-amt.de (accessed on 06 November 2010).

⁴²⁵ See S. Ulriksen (2004), *Ibid.*; and Deutsche Press-Agentur, "Misgivings in Germany over Potential Congo Mission", 3 June 2003, in Lexis-nexis, world news, Europe.

⁴²⁶ A. Reiss, "European Union sends troops to Congo: First independent EU military mission", *World Socialist Web Site*, 27 June 2003, available at <http://wsws.org/en/articles/2003/06/cong-j27.html> (accessed on 26 October 2010).

Following the UN Security Council's decision to authorise the deployment of an IEMF in Bunia, the dynamic negotiations at the Council of the EU resumed to formulate a logistical map of the EU-led military operation, and to formally approve the implementation of the Security Council's mandate. The initial EU approval for the mission came on 5 June 2003 through a Joint Action by the European Council, which was then formally approved on 12 June. In accordance with Article 25 of the TEU, the PSC set up a Committee of contributors and established the political control and strategic direction of the EU-led operation, including the chain of command and the rules of engagement.⁴²⁷ On 5 June, the Council of the EU adopted a joint action on the EU military operation in the DRC (2003/423/CFSP). This document described the command structure of the operation in detail. France took up its position as the Framework nation of the operation. The UK, Belgium, Sweden, Germany, Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal were committed to contribute to the operation. Non-European nations South Africa, Canada and Brazil joined forces with the EU in providing troops for the operation. On 16 June 2003, under Article 14 of the TEU, Operation '*Mamba*' was finally renamed peacekeeping mission '*Artemis*'.⁴²⁸

The Operation Headquarters were assigned at the Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Operations (CPCO) in Paris, where the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) supervised the operation by liaising with the operation commander. France also provided both Operation Commander and Force Commander.⁴²⁹ Other European states - Austria, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain - provided assistance at the Headquarters in Paris, although the national numbers were quite small.⁴³⁰ On 12 June the Council approved the Operational Plan (OPLAN) and the Rules of Engagement, and authorised the Operational Commander to start deployment. This was the formal launch of Operation *Artemis*.

As table 5.1 illustrates, Operation *Artemis* was largely shaped by a major contribution from a single member state, France (90%). France admitted to providing 1,679 out of its 2,060

⁴²⁷ Article 25, The Treaty on European Union; Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP (of 5 June 2003).

⁴²⁸ EU Document A/1880, Fiftieth Session, 'The European Union and peacekeeping in Africa', Report, 1 December 2004, pp.16.

⁴²⁹ General Bruno Neveux was appointed to the Operation Commander (Général de division), and Jean-Paul Thonier was appointed to the Force Commander (Général de brigade).

⁴³⁰ See Review of European Union Field Operations (Henry L. Stimson Center, March 2004); See also Felicity Barringer, '*French Proposal for U.N. Force to Halt Congo Strife Gets Support*', in New York Times (29 May 2003), p. A3; and European Security Review, '*Operation Artemis; Mission Impossible?*' (July 2003).

personnel,⁴³¹ in addition to main air strike capabilities and utilities. Sweden contributed approximately 80 troops, who cooperated with the French force. The Belgians sent approximately 48 medical and logistical personnel to help with transportation, who were stationed primarily in Uganda.⁴³² The United Kingdom sent military personnel that amounted to 85, but they consisted primarily of engineers, medics, and staff officers. 70 of the UK troops, for example, were Royal Engineers who provided airfield services in Bunia.⁴³³ Germany provided only medical and logistical assistance.⁴³⁴ Although Germany had 350-strong troops stationed in Uganda, these troops were not deployed to Bunia.⁴³⁵ Italy's contribution also remained minor by sending only one military observer.

Table 5. 1 Contribution of the EU Member States to Operation Artemis (size)⁴³⁶

Country	Troops contributing	Represented at the Force Headquarters	Represented at OHQ (Paris)
Austria			x
Belgium		x	x
Denmark			
Finland			
France	x (1679)	x	x
Germany		x	x
Greece			x
Ireland			x
Italy			x
Luxembourg			
Netherlands			x
Portugal			x

⁴³¹ Out of the total troops provided by the EU and non-EU countries, 1,800 troops were raised by the EU countries. See Eufocus, 'The EU and Peacekeeping', EU newsletters, November 2008, p.4.

⁴³² See B. Giegerich and W. Wallace, "Not Such a Soft Power: the external deployment of European forces", *Survival*, vol. 46, issue 2, 2004, p.170.

⁴³³ See Press Release, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "Latest News: Royal Engineers to Deploy on Op Artemis", 23 June 2003.

⁴³⁴ According to Helly's report, up to 35 German personnel were deployed to Operation *Artemis*. See D. Helly, "Operation Artemis (RD Congo)" in G. Grevi, D. Helly and D. Keohane (eds.), *European Security and Defence Policy – The First 10 years*, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009, p. 184.

⁴³⁵ F. Nyakairu, "French Troops to Leave Bunia in September", in the Monitor-Uganda (4 July 2003). in Lexis-nexis, World News, Europe, 2003.

⁴³⁶ The table presents the EU members' troop contributions to Operation *Artemis* deployed in the DRC in 2003.

Spain			x
Sweden	x (80)	x	x
United Kingdom	x (85)	x	x
EU-15 Total	3 (1844)	5	12

With the exception of Sweden, the UK and to a lesser extent Belgium, most other EU nations were reluctant to take military risks in the DRC, and they were only willing to place their troops at a distance from the conflict area.⁴³⁷ In contrary, France played the most vital role “from the beginning to the end”.⁴³⁸ As such, Operation *Artemis* was largely viewed as a French-led operation, even though it was later transformed into the “EU category operations”.⁴³⁹

Regarding the HR, Solana’s role should not be neglected, because the HR was central in facilitating the EU-level decision-making process.⁴⁴⁰ Following the request of the UN Secretary-General, Solana immediately served as the diplomatic surrogate for Annan to the EU, by presenting Annan’s request at the meeting of EU defence ministers on 19 May 2003. Solana also appeared to be a *rapporteur* for the EU, when the defence ministers in the PSC tasked him to investigate the feasibility of deployment. Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that Solana’s role at the EU level remained minor and limited to facilitating and promoting the rapid reaction of the EU to the UN’s request. One EU diplomat evaluated the role of Solana in this regard by saying: “Solana acts as a key diplomatic conduit for the EU [member states], but that’s it; he cannot play further role beyond a facilitator or mediator, as the HR is nominated by the MS, and so his role is restricted by the MS.”⁴⁴¹

To sum up, the European Union’s decision to launch the Operation *Artemis* was primarily shaped by the dominant role of France, which acted as a chief negotiator at both the UNSC and the EU. Operation *Artemis* is a good test case for scholars who seek a key explanatory framework to illuminate the primary factors that may have significantly conditioned the EU’s engagement in peacekeeping cooperation with the UN. Operation *Artemis* has been

⁴³⁷ R. C. Hendrickson *et al.* (2007), *op. cit.*, p.39.

⁴³⁸ Interview with a national official, Ministry of Defence, Paris, 05 March 2010.

⁴³⁹ Interview with an official, Council of the EU, Brussels, 28 April 2010.

⁴⁴⁰ For example, see R. C. Hendrickson *et al.* (2007), *op. cit.*, pp.40-41.

⁴⁴¹ Interview with an official, Council of the EU, Brussels, 27 April 2010.

often examined by two main IR theories: realism vs. constructivism.⁴⁴² In the following sections, two hypotheses drawn from each of these theoretical insights are tested in order to determine the most important conditions under which the leadership and the active role of the chief negotiator, *i.e.* France, were most likely to have been influenced.

5.3 Realist hypothesis

Considering the nature of the realist politics of major European powers and the evolution of European military interventions in Africa, Gegout argues that EU military intervention in Africa was possible not because European great powers felt obliged to act on a humanitarian basis, but because they have not renounced their 'self-proclaimed right' to influence African politics.⁴⁴³ In light of the fundamental desire of a nation state to promote its own prestige and reputation as a major power in international affairs and, more specifically, to create and defend its zones of influence in Africa, French foreign policy toward the DRC can be understood within a realist framework. A realist approach is useful to investigate the important motivation of France to launch the first European military intervention in Africa alongside the UN's mandate.

France had recently increased its presence in the Great Lakes region, particularly from 1998 to 2004. During this period, the DRC went through political instability caused by atrocities and conflicts involving various ethnic and rebel groups. France, which presented itself as the 'African advocate' in the Security Council, demonstrated its fervent eagerness to get involved in military crisis management in the DRC under the UN structure, and committed itself to providing its full support to set up a transitional power-sharing government. Unlike many other francophone African countries which had been mostly former French colonies, the DRC had no direct relationship with France in terms of colonial legacy. The DRC had been under the rule of the Belgian government until its independence (1908-1960). Hence, France had not established a bilateral defence agreement with the DRC, which means that

⁴⁴² For example, rationalist scholars, including C. Gegout (2005; 2009a; 2009b), G. R. Olsen (2009) and B. Charbonneau (2010), examine the French foreign policy from a neorealist point of view; while authors inspired by constructivism and normative institutionalism, such as S. Duke (2008; 2009), S. Ulriksen *et al* (2004), C. Morsut (2009) and H. Hoebeker *et al.* (2006), analyse the role of norms, identity and normative conditions as the most important factors to shape the French-EU decision.

⁴⁴³ C. Gegout (2005), *op. cit.*, p.13.

France was not bound to any military responsibility or duty for the maintenance of Congolese peace and security.⁴⁴⁴ It may thus seem that the role of France to lead European military engagement in the DRC was somehow neutral and impartial with its own national interests aside. However, the American Ambassador to the DRC, Daniel Simpson, criticised France for supporting ‘decadent regimes’, asserting that France could no longer impose itself on Africa.⁴⁴⁵ In fact, from a realist perspective, the French readiness to support and lead the military intervention is closely linked to its political and geo-strategic interests; particularly the desire to re-extend its sphere of influence in the DRC.

First of all, in order to reveal details of French political and strategic interests, the historical relationship between France and the DRC must be scrutinised. After World War II, the US became more interested in the safety and security of the DRC and took a leadership role in the country’s stability for the sake of the US’s political strategy, *i.e.* the balance of power.⁴⁴⁶ When the DRC was given its independence by Belgium in 1960, Patrice Lumumba was elected as the first Congolese Prime Minister. But Lumumba displeased the western powers, particularly the US and France, as he appeared sympathetic to the Soviet Union.⁴⁴⁷ The CIA, supported by the Belgian force present in the Congo, deposed Lumumba and murdered him, and then displaced Mobutu Sésé Seko who was leader of the army and a dictator.⁴⁴⁸ Mobutu performed as a bulwark against Russian influence in southern Africa and served as a useful surrogate for the US and its partners - France and Belgium - for over three decades. However, after the collapse of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the Mobutu regime was of no further use to the US. When the US found no more necessity to prevent the Mobutu regime from being drawn into the Soviet sphere of influence, the US determined not to support the Congolese regime and withdrew its troops as early as 1991.⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁴ France has had a special foreign policy towards Africa and established bilateral relations with African countries by signing defence agreements, for instance with Angola, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Libya, Mauritania, Niger and Rwanda.

⁴⁴⁵ ‘Rude critique américaine contre Paris et Kinshasa’, *Le Monde* (Paris), 3 Dec 1996. Author’s translation: Mr. Simpson notes that France continues to support regimes ‘decadent’ and ‘France is no longer able to win in Africa.’ Neo-colonialism is no longer bearable; the French attitude no longer reflects the true facts.

⁴⁴⁶ See A. Hall, “*Why U.S. Leadership is Critical to Reforming the Mineral Trade in Eastern Congo*”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 29 December 2009.

⁴⁴⁷ For further details, see document “*Patrice Lumumba and the Congolese for Struggle for Independence*”, RBG Blakademics, August 2001.

⁴⁴⁸ S. W. Meditz and T. Merrill (eds.), “Chapter 4 – Foreign Policy : Relations with France”, in *Zaire: A Country Study*, Library of congress Country Studies : Washington, D.C., 1994.

⁴⁴⁹ M. Berdal, “Peacekeeping in Africa, 1990-1996: the role of the United States, France and Britain”, in O. Furley and R. May (eds), *Peacekeeping in Africa*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, p.64.

France, on the other hand, regarded Mobutu as underpinning its interests in Central Africa and continued to support his regime. French policymakers acknowledged that the DRC was potentially important for their foreign policies outside of Europe and predictably claimed that Francophone Africa, including Belgium's former colonies, would be placed within France's sphere of influence.⁴⁵⁰ President de Gaulle gradually developed a stronger bilateral relationship with the DRC. As a result, France occupied a place as one of the closest foreign allies of the DRC during the presidencies of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (1974-1981), François Mitterrand (1981-1995), and Jacques Chirac (1995-until Mobutu's downfall in 1997). The Mobutu regimes, under the constant auspices of France, enhanced their armament and attacked Rwanda, which led to the first Congo War in 1996-1997. Nevertheless, France seemed unwilling to impose sanctions on the Mobutu regime, believing that any strong sanctions against Mobutu could harm French interest in Zaire [DRC].⁴⁵¹

This resulted, needless to say, in a vehement protest from Rwanda and opposition to French interests. Rwanda and Uganda supported the armed rebel group against Mobutu, *inter alia*, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFLC), led by Laurent Kabila. After an eight-month-long clash led by Laurent Kabila against Africa's longest-ruling dictator, the rebel movement, under Rwandan support, overthrew President Mobutu in 1997. When the Mobutu regime was destroyed and displaced by Kabila, the French position and its predominant influence and power over the Congolese regime began to decline considerably as well. The stronger Kabila's opposition to western intervention in the DRC, the more difficulties France faced in regaining its influence in the country. During the period of Kabila's government from 1997 until 2001, France became almost excluded from the various benefits it had previously enjoyed in its relationship with the DRC politically, diplomatically and economically.⁴⁵²

⁴⁵⁰ See P. J. Schraeder, "Belgium, France, and the United States", in G. M. Khadiagala (ed.), *Security Dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006, pp.163-184 (pp.165-166); and C. Wauthier, *Quatre presidents et l'Afrique: De Gaulle, Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974.

⁴⁵¹ S. W. Meditz and T. Merrill (eds.), *Zaire: a country study*, Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1994.

⁴⁵² This research study examined every official documents and evidences relevant to the political, economic, diplomatic and cultural relationship between France and the DRC during the period of Laurent Kabila's regime (1997-2001). Official documents, statements and reports produced by the French Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Mission of France to the UN, and news media including BBC, CNN, and Le Monde were systematically investigated. Research outcomes confirm that the bilateral relationship of the DRC with France was suspended during Kabila's rule. Cooperation between the DRC and France has progressively improved since 2001. Evidence suggests that the DRC, under the Laurent Kabila's regime, had developed extensive

Secondly, parallel to the decline of the French position in the DRC, China began to evolve as a main power in the DRC. When the Mobutu regime was toppled and Laurent-Désiré Kabila assumed the position of head of the state, the relationship between the DRC and China was further consolidated. During his first year in power, in December 1997, President Kabila first made a visit to China and ministerial talks between the two countries increased.⁴⁵³ In the same year, China and the DRC signed an ‘Agreement on reciprocal protection and promotion of investments’, which gave China privileges to invest in Congolese industry and exploit abundant resources.⁴⁵⁴ Given the significant loss of its prestige, France felt threatened by the emergence of China as a new power in the DRC.⁴⁵⁵ In such circumstances, Operation *Artemis* was deemed as an important *raison d’être* for France to regain access to expand its influence in the DRC by intervening in military crisis management and supporting the establishment of the transitional government.

Thirdly, it is important to note that the French commitment to deploy peacekeeping troops came only two months after the Iraq invasion which had significantly revealed the divergent attitudes and values among the European major powers. France and Germany had vehemently opposed the UK’s position on the Iraq War within the Security Council. It critically damaged the EU, remaining an infamous reference for the divergence of the EU’s common foreign and security policy. Also, such a dispute over the Iraq crisis clearly exposed that the EU had only a limited political will when it comes to any major political or military agreement that is essential for collective European military action in international peace and security.⁴⁵⁶ Furthermore, the disruption of European solidarity led to pessimism regarding the incompetent diplomatic as well as political ability of France. According to Jahier, the event seriously tarnished the image of the French political leadership both in the European and

relations with China only. In barely a year under the new Kabila rule, Kabila even quarreled with his Ugandan and Rwandan backers and demanded that they withdraw their forces from the DRC.

⁴⁵³ For example, in January 2000, Machako Mamba, Congolese Minister of Health, visited China; and in October the same year, Leonard She Okitundu, Minister of Foreign affairs, headed a delegation to attend the Beijing Ministerial Meeting 2000 of the Sino-African Cooperation Forum; since the assassination of Laurent Kabila and the succession of his son Joseph Kabila as a president, the cooperation between the DRC and China continued to be developed. In April 2001, Yang Wenchang, Vice-minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited the DRC, followed by the visit of Leonard She Okitundu, Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs, to China in December. In March 2002 President Joseph Kabila made a visit to China. See for further details, FOCAC Beijing Summit: Congo (DRC), Chinese Foreign Ministry, 10 Oct. 2006, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/focac/183553.htm> (accessed on 26 Oct. 2010).

⁴⁵⁴ J. Jansson, “Patterns of Chinese Investment, Aid and Trade in Central Africa (Cameroon, the DRC and Gabon)”, Centre for Chinese Studies, August 2009.

⁴⁵⁵ See “The War in DR Congo: behind the slaughter and looting stand imperialist interests”, *Internationalist Communist Tendency*, Revolutionary Perspectives, no. 48, 2008.

⁴⁵⁶ For example, see D. P. Calleo, “The Broken West”, *Survival*, vol. 46, no.3, 2004, pp.29-38.

international arenas.⁴⁵⁷ In addition to the significant loss of image and power of France over the EU's external role, France also sought to repair its infamous image of "biased intervention in Rwanda".⁴⁵⁸ Hence, Operation *Artemis* was viewed as an important opportunity for France in a bid to reinforce a particularly 'European' approach to international crises and to recover the power of French leadership. France wanted to be able to lead the EU to agree on its first military intervention beyond Europe, enabling an enhanced 'self- and international perception'.⁴⁵⁹

Finally, France considered the EU as an intermediary to balance NATO and the US.⁴⁶⁰ According to a realist argument, the distribution of capabilities and power is essential to understanding the functioning of international politics. In light of the balance of power, the fundamental changes in international politics, notably the attempt by one state unit to dominate a region or the world, will lead to counter-balancing actions. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been understood that the world order and the concept of international peace and security would only be ensured by a preponderance of US power.⁴⁶¹ Jahier argues that Operation *Artemis* was a first step for France to challenge and counterbalance the US hegemony.⁴⁶² As a leading advocate of European power, France has intended to create checks and balances of power against the US hegemony, and to demonstrate to the US the EU's capacity in leading an autonomous military operation without recourse to NATO assets.

In the same context of the balance of power, Javier Solana hinted his assertive view of Europe's balance against the US. Solana claimed that the EU wanted to show how far European military capability had advanced, and for the first time the EU could demonstrate Europe's own ability to deploy troops rapidly and separately from NATO. In regard to Operation *Artemis*, Solana also insisted that the EU should do the operation, because "neither the Americans nor NATO had any interest".⁴⁶³ In this respect, Jahier argues that what

⁴⁵⁷ A. Jahier (2010), *op. cit.*

⁴⁵⁸ Interview with a national delegate, UN Headquarters, New York, 07 April 2009

⁴⁵⁹ Interview with an analyst and expert, ISS, New York, 06 April 2009. See also A. Jahier, *op. cit.*

⁴⁶⁰ C. Gegout (2005), *op.cit.*, p.13.

⁴⁶¹ C. Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why Great Powers Will Rise", *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 4, 1993, pp. 5-51. See also R. Gilpin (1981), *op. cit.*

⁴⁶² A. Jahier (2010), *op. cit.*, p.88.

⁴⁶³ Andreas Reiss, "European Union sends troops to Congo: First independent EU military mission", 27 June 2003, World Socialist Web Site, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jun2003/cong-j27.shtml> (accessed on 11 Sep. 2010).

motivated the EU, particularly France, to launch the military operation in Africa was nothing else than a “classical struggle for power in order to counterbalance the US”.⁴⁶⁴

Based on the realist proposition which underlines strategic and economic interests of major powers, not only have the Congolese rich natural resources triggered massacres, fatal violence and conflicts in the region, but at the same time they played a magnetic role to attract Western foreign powers to become directly involved in military intervention in the DRC. According to interview evidence, states are extremely reluctant to have military adventures which often entail expensive costs in military personnel, materials and financial resources.⁴⁶⁵ Thus, from a realist point of view, whenever a state would strongly commit itself to providing military support, in return there is likely to be a considerable expectation of reward for such a contribution. However, it is difficult to unveil the real motivation for states’ behaviour in peacekeeping operations, particularly when it comes to strategic and economic interests. European states ostensibly defend their EDSP missions as a ‘normative project’ aiming to promote the humanitarian and peaceful norms of the European Union.⁴⁶⁶ Nonetheless, Mehler argues that European foreign and security policy towards Africa was strongly aligned with strategic interests; and France sought hard to expand its influence in Africa not only to generate political support in the global arena, but also to secure privileged access to “natural resources and key markets”.⁴⁶⁷ In fact, French policy towards Africa, particularly during the Jacques Chirac’s government (1995-2007), became too militarised and humanitarily retrograde.⁴⁶⁸

It must be underlined that when the French agreed to provide the bulk of military forces in the DRC, France emphasised that the operation should be strictly limited to Bunia. Interestingly Bunia, where French-led EU military forces were deployed, is the core rich repository of vast natural resources of the DRC.⁴⁶⁹ It is endowed with abundant and valuable natural resources such as cobalt, copper, rubber, zinc, silver, tin, uranium, iron, diamond, gold and oil. Copper is an important mineral, which makes the country rank among the world’s leading copper-producing nations. But what is most important in the mining sector

⁴⁶⁴ A. Jahier (2010), *op. cit.*, p.88.

⁴⁶⁵ Interview with a (former) Minister of National Defence for ROK, 55th Annual NATO Assembly Meeting, Edinburgh, 16 November 2009.

⁴⁶⁶ For example, see A. Jahier (2010), *op. cit.*


⁴⁶⁷ A. Mehler, “France in Search of a New Africa Policy”, *The Journal of the German Council of Foreign Relations*, Spring 2008, pp.28-38 (p.28).

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁹ See Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3, and Figure 5.4 for areas of abundant and various natural resources exploited in the DRC.

in the DRC is gold and diamonds. The DRC leads the world in production of diamonds; approximately 10% of the world's diamonds. According to the information provided by the U.S. Department of State, the diamond sector currently accounts for about 10% of the DRC's export revenue.⁴⁷⁰ As shown in Figure 5.2, vast diamond mines are distributed in the north east of the DRC. Moreover, there is also the biggest goldfield in the world near Bunia (see Figure 5.3). In the Ituri area, as Figure 5.4 illustrates, across the border into Uganda, there has been also an increasing amount of exploitation of Congolese oil and gas.

Figure 5. 2 Map of diamond mining areas in the DRC⁴⁷¹



⁴⁷⁰ State profile, 'Background Note: Democratic Republic of Congo', the U.S. Department of State, 8 October 2010, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm> (accessed on 26 Oct. 2010).

⁴⁷¹ The Figure is made upon a hard copy map provided by the CAMI (Cadastre Minier de la DRC).

Figure 5. 3 Map of gold mining areas in the DRC⁴⁷²





Figure 5. 4 Oil and Gas Exploration in the DRC⁴⁷³



⁴⁷² The Figure is made upon a hard copy map provided by the CAMI.

⁴⁷³ The Figure is made upon a hard copy map provided by the CAMI.

European countries have been one of the greatest beneficiaries of the DRC's mining industries. In 1999, Belgium remained the main destination of the DRC's exports, accounting for 59.7%, principally owing to its diamond imports, followed by the USA (18.5%), Finland (4.2%), and Italy (4%). During that year South Africa strengthened its position as the DRC's main supplier, providing 28.4% of all imports, followed by Belgium (13.5%), Nigeria (8.9%) and Kenya (6.6%). In 2000, Belgium was the main destination for the DRC's exports, accounting for 61.1% of the total, followed by the USA (17.4%) and Finland (6.1%). In the same year, South Africa maintained the leading position among the DRC's suppliers, with 21.2% of total imports, followed by Belgium (15.7%), Nigeria (10.4%) and Zambia (5.2%). In 2001, Belgium was the first destination for DRC exports (59.7%), ahead of the USA (12.9%), Zimbabwe (7.4%) and France (6.9%). During that year, South Africa retained its leadership among the DRC's suppliers accounting for 18.2% of the value of total imports, followed by Belgium (16.4%), Nigeria (11.4%) and France (5.9%).⁴⁷⁴

The data above on the main destination of the DRC's exports and imports demonstrates that France hardly appeared on the list of main trade partners of the DRC until 2001. This was primarily due to Kabila's regime with which France came into disfavour. Under Laurent-Désiré Kabila's rule (1997-2001), France became left off in beneficiaries of Congolese natural resources and even excluded from trade. However, France faced a major breakthrough when Joseph Kabila assumed the new presidency after the death of his father in 2001. Joseph Kabila opened trade avenues to France, and the trade partnership and cooperation between the two countries recommenced in 2001. France wanted to more actively engage than had previously been the case in the DRC, aiming to become a key partner and main donor of development aid, which is essential for economic involvement.⁴⁷⁵ Yet, compared to the market share of some other European countries that continued to maintain the major part of trade with the DRC, particularly Belgium, the French position in Congolese trade and economy remained relatively minor and weak.⁴⁷⁶

In addition, the DRC significantly lacked the transparency in its trade arrangements. Almost 90% of the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC was undeclared. In other words, thousands of individual and illegal miners have allegedly exploited the DRC's mineral

⁴⁷⁴ K. Murison, *Africa South of the Sahara 2004 (Europa Regional Surveys of the World 2004 Series)*, London: Routledge, 2004, p.288.

⁴⁷⁵ Interview with a national official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 4 March 2010.

⁴⁷⁶ For further details or data analysis, see Appendix 4.1 Direction of Trade of the DRC (1998-2005).

resources informally and illegally.⁴⁷⁷ What is even worse, since the Ugandan army's withdrawal in May 2003, the conflict in Ituri was fuelled further by the country's vast mineral wealth, which allowed all sides to take advantage of the power vacuum to plunder and control wealthy natural resources in the region.⁴⁷⁸ Under these circumstances, France sought to strengthen its influential role in controlling the Congolese mining industry and dealing with the DRC's conflict resolution. France supported the constant consolidation of MONUC to take part in stabilising security, particularly in the eastern regions of the DRC.⁴⁷⁹

Parallel to the breakout of the violence in 2003, France extended its military presence and power by initiating and leading the EDSP mission in the Ituri province. The analysis of this case study uncovered an interesting finding: following Operation *Artemis*, which was accomplished in September 2003, there has been a considerable change in the trade flows of the DRC.⁴⁸⁰ Since 2003-2004, the DRC's major export items, including diamonds, gold, cobalt, copper, and oil, began to significantly shift to France. In contrast, as Figure 5.5 shows, little change happened in the direction of trade between the DRC and the UK, Germany and Italy. Regarding the flow of natural resources and the direction of trade of the DRC, Robert and Mwinyihali claim that historically political changes and foreign influence in the control of natural resources have been accompanied by major directional changes in the export of natural resources.⁴⁸¹

As the evidence of this research clearly illustrates, Germany, Italy and the UK, which remained reluctant to get involved in the military intervention in the DRC, have not seen any dramatic changes in their trade or economic relations with the DRC. However, France achieved outstanding results in terms of establishing trade and economic partnerships with

⁴⁷⁷ Global Witness, *Reforming the DRC Diamond Sector*, A briefing document by Global Witness, Washington DC: Global Witness Publishing Inc, June 2006.

⁴⁷⁸ C. Talbot, "France leads clamour for Congo intervention", *International Committee of the Fourth International* (ICFI), 24 May 2003, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/may2003/cong-m24.shtml> (accessed on 12 November 2010).

⁴⁷⁹ France has urged the UN Security Council to send a peacekeeping force to the DRC, and played an important role in increasing peacekeepers up to 18,000, under chapter VII. The forces were concentrated in the eastern regions. (French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 'France Diplomatie: Great Lakes region', 20 February 2008).


⁴⁸⁰ Nevertheless, it is important to note that the changes might not have been so significant, given the large percentage increases in volume from a low base. The study initially intended to provide a detailed breakdown of the resources to ensure the reliability and validity of the research argument and outcome. However, given the lack of access to a nation's high profile on economic and trade data, it was difficult to show that the chief negotiator's economy depends on particular minerals. This issue and fundamental flaws in dealing with data will be revisited in the Conclusions.

⁴⁸¹ See T. Hart and R. Mwinyihali (2001), *op. cit.*

the DRC, and it gained access to Congolese natural resources by becoming one of the major security, economic and trade partners of (as well as investors in) the country.

In sum, evidence from this case analysis confirms that the French motivation to launch Operation *Artemis* was clearly conditioned by the political and strategic interests of France; 1) to project its own national power and interests in the DRC; 2) to counterbalance the US and NATO by enhancing autonomous European military capabilities; and 3) to ensure securing access to natural resources. The realist hypothetical relationship between the political and strategic interests of the chief negotiator and the likelihood of its active leadership which led to the EU's decision to undertake peacekeeping is accordingly accepted.

Figure 5. 5 Trade of DRC with France, the UK , Germany and Italy (1999 - 2005) ⁴⁸²



⁴⁸² Source: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) database; see Appendix 4.1 for further data.

5.4 Constructivist hypothesis

It is an obvious fact that France, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has played a key role in peacekeeping operations at both political and operational levels, especially for countries with which France once had colonial ties. However, considering the UNSC mandate for a 'French-led' EU military operation in the DRC as well as France's overwhelming efforts to launch the operation, the following two questions arise: why did the Secretary-General call first upon France to reinforce military force in the DRC?; and in response to Annan's request, why did France agree to undertake the role of 'framework nation' and lead the ESDP operation in the DRC? The DRC had been ruled by Belgium from 1884 until it was granted independence in 1960. France had no particular colonial ties with the DRC. There seemed to be no reason, therefore, to oblige or expect France to undertake such a heavy military burden for the DRC's peace operations. In order to examine the high level policymaking profile of France in Operation *Artemis* from a constructivist angle, this study suggests that a historical approach is useful to scrutinise whether, and if so to what extent, the French decision and its decisive leadership role as chief negotiator were influenced by a sense of common responsibility for the European colonial legacy.

During the decolonisation process, Belgium "did virtually nothing" to promote political or social conditions for its former colonies, which ushered a series of mutinies and civil war in no less than five days following Congo's independence from Belgium.⁴⁸³ The Belgian empire had no intention to train or educate indigenous elites who could conduct an orderly transfer of power. The decolonisation process followed by a gradual withdrawal of Belgian troops bred a significant void of power in the country. As a result, foreign intervention exacerbated the crises in the Great Lakes region.

Moreover, as the generation of insular-minded policymakers of the colonial era has changed after the Cold War, the Belgian African polity lost its appetite and had a tendency to view its colonial era as a 'shameful period' in Belgian history.⁴⁸⁴ Whereas Belgium admitted to the steady erosion of its ambition in the African arena, France began to evolve its foreign policy interests in the Great Lakes region. The French government, from de Gaulle to Mitterrand, acknowledged that Francophone Africa was important to their foreign policies outside Europe. France sought to strengthen and promote the further *gloire* of the French language,

⁴⁸³ C. Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.38.

⁴⁸⁴ P. J. Schraeder (2006), *op. cit.*

culture and prestigious traditions, particularly in Francophone Africa.⁴⁸⁵ The French policy towards *l'Afrique Francophone* is best represented by the Franco-African Summits where French policymakers claimed that historical links and geographical proximity justified placing Francophone Africa within France's sphere of influence, including Belgian former colonies, counting the DRC.⁴⁸⁶

Belgium had initially committed itself to provide peacekeeping troops to African crisis management, particularly in the Great Lakes region. However, the idea of 'African solutions for African problems' became a central guideline for Belgian foreign policy toward the Great Lakes region in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide, where Belgian soldiers were assassinated along with Rwandan Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana in 1994.⁴⁸⁷ The Belgian government immediately withdrew its peacekeeping forces from the region, and expressed its great reluctance to commit further troops to peacekeeping missions. In contrast to Belgium's backing out in the region, France took an active role in undertaking military interventions and has dedicated its military forces to peacekeeping operations in the Great Lakes region since the 1990s. The combination of Belgium's inability to maintain stability in the DRC amid African participants in the Congolese crisis and the passive role of Belgium being one of 'absolute neutrality' *vis-à-vis* various foreign interveners provoked a French desire to more closely bind Belgium's former colonies to France's sphere of influence.⁴⁸⁸

In sum, despite its colonial ties with the DRC, Belgium played a very limited and rarely visible role in the negotiations on the launch of the military operation. Instead, France demonstrated its considerable concerns about the Congolese crises and played an important role as a chief negotiator. From a constructivist perspective, France was constrained by its foreign policy that aimed to pave the way to integrate Francophone Africa into the French, and to a lesser extent European, sphere of influence.⁴⁸⁹ This case study found little evidence that France, Belgium, or other EU actors directly expressed 'colonial legacy' *per se* or European responsibility driven by colonial history as an important motive for Operation *Artemis*. Nevertheless, as Hoffmann argues that the moral, ideational and ethical awareness

⁴⁸⁵ E. A. Kolodziej, *French Foreign Policy Under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974.

⁴⁸⁶ C. Wauthier (1995), *op. cit.*

⁴⁸⁷ In the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide, the idea of 'reciprocal responsibility' later translated to mean 'African solutions for African problems' to Belgian policymakers. See E. Kennes and others, *The Congo Crisis: Background and International Dimension*, Uppsala: NAI, 2001, p.147.

⁴⁸⁸ J. Willame, "Le processus de paix en RDC après Lusaka" in F. Reyntjens and S. Marysse (eds.), *L'Afrique des grands lacs. Annuaire 2002-2003*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2003, pp.157-170.

⁴⁸⁹ Interview with a national delegate, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 29 April 2010.

of ‘actors’⁴⁹⁰ would restrain their behaviour and determine states’ foreign policy,⁴⁹¹ this study suggests that French foreign policy’s viewing of the DRC as a part of ‘Francophone Africa’ can be explained by a constructivist approach, in the context of collective identity based on colonial responsibility within the EU. In this regard, the study suggests that it is important to maintain continuous peaceful and sound post-colonial relations between the European super powers and former European colonies, as it would also influence the likelihood of leadership to actively undertake responsibility for operations. As the case study manifested, Belgium’s abandonment of its colonial responsibility for the DRC’s crises and less interest in its former colonies could have decreased the likelihood of EU-led peacekeeping operation.

In order to determine to what extent the normative framework is likely to influence the French leadership which led to the EU’s decision to engage in a military peacekeeping operation, the study also seeks to identify the role of each of the normative conditions - normative commitment, normative entrapment, and normative suasion. According to a constructivist argument, states tend to associate more closely with a number of pre-existing norms and values that they embody rather than with individual interests based upon rational choice approaches.⁴⁹² Constructivists would lead us to believe that despite various degrees of interests in, and physical ability to contribute to, the operation, the EU member states were constantly shaping commitments that would formulate the common rules of the EU and fundamentally steer the member states into undertaking responsibility for an EU military operation.⁴⁹³ Put differently, once states have committed themselves to a particular set of norms or policy course, they are likely to find themselves too entrapped to take any further action that does not reflect their original intentions or current preferences. Simon Duke argues that the very first independent EU military operation, Operation *Artemis*, fits into the scheme of this normative framework. According to Duke’s argument, France created the

⁴⁹⁰ According to Martin Ortega, international society is made up of states, whereas the international community includes all the states, international organisations and other actors that participate in the complex life of the post-cold world. Hence, in a broad sense, ‘actors’ include states, international or regional organisations, trans-national actors, etc. See M. Ortega (2001), *op. cit.*, pp.3-4.

⁴⁹¹ S. Hoffmann, “The Political Ethics of International Relations”, *Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs*, 1988, pp.3-20.

⁴⁹² See B. G. Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism*, London: Continuum, 2005, pp.29-30.

⁴⁹³ See D.C. Thomas (2009), *op. cit.*, and S. Duke (2009), *op. cit.*

normative environment that would operate normative entrapment and normative suasion during the policy formation process among member states in the EU.⁴⁹⁴

In the context of *normative commitment*, there are four substantial commitments by which France seemed to be constrained to undertake the military operation in the DRC. The normative basis of the French role in Africa entered a new transition in 1994 when an Anglo-French summit sought to reach agreement to converge two seemingly separate European perspectives towards Africa; *Anglophone* versus *Francophone* camps.⁴⁹⁵ Ulriksen *et al.* remark that the EU had a low profile on the issue of military engagement in Africa until 1994, because France used to act alone in Africa, “when, where and how it wished to do so”.⁴⁹⁶ However, since 1994 French foreign and military policy in Africa had changed from being an exclusive domain to encompassing a wider range of actors, including the EU in general and Great Britain in particular. In November 1994, France and the UK formally established the Anglo-French defence agreement for two main purposes. The first aim was to establish an initiative to strengthen European military capabilities, which resulted in the creation of the European Air Group (1995).⁴⁹⁷ The second was to boost African peacekeeping capabilities through a bilateral strategy in which Britain would maintain forces for Anglophone African states, while France would do the same for Francophone states.⁴⁹⁸ Despite the first attempt to establish Franco-British cooperation for African peacekeeping, however, little progress was made in achieving broader defence cooperation, as this agreement only confirmed a separate territory of responsibility for the military forces of France and the UK respectively.

In 1998, the British-French summit was held in St. Malo, which paved the way for a common security and defence policy. For the first time, Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac both agreed, in the form of a declaration, to harmonise their policies towards Africa and to create a new European defence policy by establishing joint forces. Furthermore, France and the UK also decided to strengthen practical cooperation on security issues in Africa.⁴⁹⁹ Coinciding with crisis unfolding in the DRC, France and Britain were concerned about the crisis in the Great Lakes region and demonstrated close Franco-British cooperation to promote

⁴⁹⁴ S. Duke (2009), *Ibid.* pp.403-406.

⁴⁹⁵ W. Shawcross, *Deliver Us From Evil: Warlords & Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict*, London: Bloomsbury, 2000, pp.119-120.

⁴⁹⁶ S. Ulriksen *et al.* (2004), *op. cit.*, p.509.

⁴⁹⁷ C. Taylor, “Franco-British Defence Co-operation”, UK Parliament Library, 08 Nov. 2010, p.4

⁴⁹⁸ Interview with a national official, Ministry of Defence, Paris, 4 March 2010.

⁴⁹⁹ See “Déclaration conjointe sur le renforcement de la coopération en Afrique”, Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998.

“democracy, human rights, good governance and reform of Africa”, which was highly symbolic for European policy towards Africa.⁵⁰⁰ More specific visions of European military actions were emphasised in this statement that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”.⁵⁰¹ The Franco-British bilateral agreement was consequently presented as a milestone which enabled the EU to become competent in military and defence issues.

After the St. Malo summit in 1998, France and Britain together mounted the first joint Foreign Ministers’ mission to Africa and constantly demonstrated their desire to work collectively to address political crises there. Then at the Cahors summit in 2001, the United Kingdom and France reaffirmed their strong commitment to Franco-British cooperation in Africa, and expressed their determination to cooperate as closely as possible in the region.⁵⁰² Also, President Chirac addressed that Franco-British cooperation in the countries of Africa could particularly be a driving force for the European Union, by “promoting peace and development and respect for human rights and the rule of law”.⁵⁰³

In terms of humanitarian intervention in Africa, France and the UK achieved further pivotal development on cooperation in 2003. At the Anglo-French summit at Le Touquet, these two most powerful European states acknowledged their responsibility for promoting peace and security in Africa, and reaffirmed the principle of solidarity and mutual assistance in the face of threats. France and the UK urged that the EU ought to “contribute to conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa, including through EU autonomous operations, in close cooperation with the United Nations.”⁵⁰⁴ The Touquet Summit raised the African issue as one of the primary concerns to be discussed, emphasising the need for cooperation between France and the UK on African crises. The agreement delineated more specific dimensions of practical cooperation between France and the UK. For example, both countries stressed that strengthening air-naval capabilities is a key element in carrying out effective crisis

⁵⁰⁰ Interview with official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 05 May 2010; see also National archives, ‘Africa: St. Malo, Britain and France working together in Africa’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office of Great Britain.

⁵⁰¹ Franco-British Summit, ‘Joint Declaration on European Defence’, St. Malo, 4 December 1998.

⁵⁰² Franco-British Summit, Cahors, 9 February 2001.

⁵⁰³ Franco-British Summit Conclusions, French Embassy in the UK, 9 February 2001; ‘Franco-British Summit: Statement by M. Jacques Chirac and M. Lionel Jospin’, newsroom of the French Embassy in the UK Cahors, 9 February 2001.

⁵⁰⁴ Franco-British Summit, ‘Declaration on strengthening European cooperation in security and defence’, Le Touquet, 4 February 2003.

management; and the solidarity between France and the UK should develop the capacity for rapid reaction by the EU in the face of threats which affect international security.⁵⁰⁵

Social constructivists would argue that such a series of Franco-British commitments and substantial initiatives formulated normative pressures under which France, and to a lesser extent the UK, were entrapped to fulfil their pledges and take collective action for African peacekeeping. In fact, during the negotiation process, it emerged that consensus on the operation was heavily influenced by French leadership in accordance with its normative commitments.⁵⁰⁶ Operation *Artemis* is unique, because it was 1) the first EU military autonomous operation; 2) outside Europe; and 3) alongside the UN. All of these three special aspects of the first UN-EU peacekeeping operation were key elements that had been discussed at consecutive Franco-British summits as well. More precisely, at the Franco-British summit in 1994, France and Britain agreed to strengthen European military capabilities. Both countries demonstrated their desire to cooperate closely in African crisis management at St. Malo, in 1998. At Cahors in 2001, Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair reaffirmed their commitment to promote humanitarian intervention for African stability. Finally, in 2003, the Le Touquet summit explicitly expressed a strong willingness to establish the EU's autonomous military capability particularly without recourse to NATO assets in line with close cooperation with the UN. To sum up, Franco-British commitments provided a significant impetus to France to carry out its normative commitments by launching the first EU military operation in the DRC. In this respect, France was normatively entrapped by its commitments (*normative entrapment*).

The UK, however, which remained a constant 'pro-Atlanticist',⁵⁰⁷ seemed less likely to support such a French-backed demonstration of the EU's independence from NATO in crisis management. Nevertheless, due to the British agreements to promote European autonomous capability and to strengthen the EU's role in Africa alongside France, Britain could by no means reject French initiatives. In this regard, Gegout argues that the UK position on Operation *Artemis* is quite 'surprising',⁵⁰⁸ because the UK was also entrapped by its normative commitment outlined alongside France.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁶ See S. Duke (2009), *op. cit.*; C. Gegout (2005) *op. cit.*; and S. Ulriksen *et al* (2004), *op. cit.*

⁵⁰⁷ C. Taylor (2010), *op. cit.*, p.5.

⁵⁰⁸ C. Gegout (2005), *op.cit.*, p.12.

In terms of *normative suasion*, France was challenged by normative pressures when it had to persuade other EU members to endorse Operation *Artemis*. Germany was initially cautious about *Artemis*, but its reluctance to contribute to the combat operation turned into approval for the French initiatives in the end. According to Ukriksen, German foreign minister Joschka Fischer came under intense pressure to support the operation from combined Franco-British cooperation.⁵⁰⁹ Although Germany's actual contribution remained limited, German approval for Operation *Artemis* reflects a significant role for Franco-British cooperation facilitated by the normative framework. Belgium, on the other hand, remained discreet about military involvement in its former colonies. As a consequence of a Senate debate on the parliamentary inquiry regarding Belgium's participation in the peacekeeping operation, Belgian authorities officially announced in a legislative document that Belgium ought not to deploy combat troops to countries with which it has colonial ties.⁵¹⁰ Belgium provided only logistic support, such as transport, medical support, and financial contributions.⁵¹¹ Thus, the normative framework was not successful in persuading Belgium to change its own national foreign policy and to provide a military contribution to Operation *Artemis*.

Duke criticises that the realist approach failed to explain 'why *Artemis* resulted in far more cooperation at the EU level' and stresses that a normative framework offers the key explanation for shaping consensus in the EU.⁵¹² It may be less controversial, in this regard, that Franco-British cooperation and normative commitments established from 1994 to 2003 paved the way for strengthening the ESDP, which accordingly led to an EU-led military operation in the DRC. In sum, the analysis of the case study suggests that pre-existing norms or normative commitments of the chief negotiator were an important condition in the decision-making of the EU to cooperate with the UN in international peacekeeping. Hence, the constructivist hypothesis on the normative pressures is accepted in the case of Operation *Artemis*; normative pressures would increase the likelihood of French leadership to lead an EU decision to engage in a military peacekeeping operation with the UN.

⁵⁰⁹ S. Ukriksen *et al* (2004), *op. cit.*, p.513.

⁵¹⁰ Sénat et Chambre des représentants de Belgique (1998), 'Opération en Afrique' in 'Note de politique générale du Gouvernement sur la participation belge aux opérations de maintien de la paix', Bruxelles, 28 January 1998, <http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/49/1394/49K1394001.pdf> (accessed on 12 November 2010).

⁵¹¹ Interview with official, Council of the EU, Brussels, 28 April 2010.

⁵¹² S. Duke (2009), *op. cit.*, pp.403-406.

Conclusion

Although *Artemis* is often perceived as a ‘French operation with an EU cover’,⁵¹³ operation *Artemis* has been normally labelled as a successful test of the first EU military autonomous operation carried out beyond Europe without recourse to NATO assets. It also showed consolidation of the EU by responding promptly to the request of the UN. In this context, Scheuermann notes that Operation *Artemis* became a litmus test of the ambitious role of the EU as a multilateral security governor.⁵¹⁴ This chapter primarily focused on the most important factors that may have significantly influenced the likelihood of the EU’s decision to deploy its first military operation for DRC crisis management in support of the UN.

France was identified as a chief negotiator. During the negotiations at both the UNSC and the EU, France played an outstanding role in initiating a possible military operation in response to the request of the UN Secretary-General. At EU-level negotiations, the UK endorsed the French initiative and supported the French position. However, the UK remained sceptical about EU military intervention in the DRC, particularly without NATO, and was reluctant to provide military forces. The UK’s position was therefore not substantive, but rather symbolic. Like the UK, Germany and Italy were also likely to be distant from the core task of the operation, and contributed very limited resources. The German approval of the EU military operation was due primarily to Franco-British pressure. The Italian position was utterly indifferent to Operation *Artemis*. The Italian vice president of the Defence Committee, Mr Roberto Lavagnini, confirmed that “no discussions took place in their committees or on the floor of the house concerning the Framework Nation concept and its significance for future EU-led external military operations”.⁵¹⁵ The High Representative served his role as an important surrogate for the UN SG, which was strictly limited only to facilitating. Overall, the case study confirms that none was more important than France in the negotiations and decision-making at both the UN and the EU levels.

Various conditions under which France seemed most likely to influence the likelihood of EU decision were examined by testing theoretical propositions. The evidence from the case study suggested that France had both political and strategic interests in the peacekeeping operation. France viewed Operation *Artemis* as an important opportunity 1) to re-establish

⁵¹³ F. Grignon, “The Artemis Operation in the DRC: Lessons-learned for the future of the EU peacekeeping in Africa”, IEEI International Conference on ‘*The Challenge of Europe-Africa Relations: and agenda of priorities*’, Lisbon, 23-24 October 2003.

⁵¹⁴ M. Scheuermann (2010), *op. cit.*

⁵¹⁵ G. Bono (2005), *op. cit.*, p.219.

and project French national powers in the DRC and 2) to counterbalance the US hegemony and strengthen the EU as a global power. The evidence also showed that the military operation brought further considerable economic benefits to France in trade relations with the DRC, while Germany, Italy and the UK did not achieve any dramatic changes in their trade and economic relations with the DRC in the aftermath of the operation. Hence, the case study accepted the realist hypothesis that the increase in *political* and *strategic interests* of the chief negotiator would also increase the likelihood of its leadership to lead the EU's decision to engage in a peacekeeping operation.

In contrast, the constructivist hypothesis highlighted the importance of historical memory and normative conditions in decision-making. The evidence from the case study suggested that Operation *Artemis* was to a certain extent shaped by the normative and collective responsibility of France driven by European colonial legacies. The analysis also revealed that France was constrained by the normative framework – normative commitment, entrapment and suasion. In sum, the case study accepted the constructivist hypothesis that *normative pressures* triggered by colonial legacies and the normative framework would increase the likelihood of chief negotiator's leadership to drive the EU's decision to engage in a peacekeeping operation. Both two hypotheses are thus accepted in the first case study.

Chapter 6

UN-EU Cooperation in Peacekeeping II: Operation EUFOR RD Congo (2006)

Introduction

In summer 2006, the European Union launched an autonomous EU-led military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, code-named EUFOR RD Congo.⁵¹⁶ Following Operation *Artemis* in 2003, EUFOR RD Congo was the EU's fourth military ESDP operation and second military intervention which took place in the DRC from June to November 2006. In accordance with the mandate set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1671 of 25 April 2006, EUFOR RD Congo was assigned to support the UN mission in the DRC (MONUC). Its mandate was to stabilise the situation during the Congolese election process, protect civilians and secure the airport in Kinshasa. The Council of the EU adopted a Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP on 27 April 2006, and EUFOR RD Congo was launched on 12 June 2006, one month before the general elections. The operation comprised of 2,000 troops with a total of 21 member states participating. EUFOR RD Congo became another significant milestone of cooperation between the UN and the EU in the field of international peacekeeping.

Although EUFOR RD Congo is the EU's second military intervention conducted in the same country within the context of UN-EU cooperation, EUFOR RD Congo is clearly distinguishable from Operation *Artemis*. First, whilst Operation *Artemis* was mandated to take over military responsibility from the UN mission on a temporary basis as a 'bridging model', EUFOR RD Congo was authorised to support MONUC in close cooperation in terms of 'stand-by' or 'over the horizon' model.⁵¹⁷ Second, for the first time, the Secretary

⁵¹⁶ In this chapter, the shortened 'EUFOR' will be used to refer to EUFOR DR Congo. Whenever there is likely to be confusion with other EU operations, the full name will be used.

⁵¹⁷ The UN secretariat defined the two broad categories of UN-EU cooperation in military crises management operations, namely the 'bridging' model and the 'stand-by' model. For further

General called upon the EU to support MONUC without national detours.⁵¹⁸ Third, during the dynamic interactions between the UN and the EU, more than one EU actor was identified as chief negotiator. Furthermore, due to a significant lack of willingness of EU member states to participate in the military operation in the DRC, a decision could not be reached for almost half a year. Undoubtedly, there is considerable variation between EUFOR RD Congo and Operation *Artemis*.

Considering previous EU operations conducted in the DRC, Gross argued that the motives of the EU to launch EUFOR RD Congo seemed indisputable. According to her argument, EUFOR has been considered a “logical prolongation of EU commitments” by both the EU and the UN.⁵¹⁹ Unlike the case of Operation *Artemis*, however, the inner-European decision-making process on the launch of EUFOR was revealed as extremely complex and difficult. There existed some initial uncertainty and internal debates on the main question over which country should lead the military operation in the DRC. Given the significant reluctance among member states to take on the leadership role in the operation, EUFOR RD Congo was regarded as an important test of the EU’s capacity to support a UN peacekeeping mission beyond Europe.

This chapter seeks to explore the simultaneous negotiations between the UN and the EU on the issue of peacekeeping cooperation in the DRC. This chapter sketches out a brief backdrop of the situation in the DRC under which the UN and the EU came to cooperate in both the political and military realms (6.1). Then it analyses negotiations and decision-making at both the UNSC and the EU levels. The analysis of this case study aims to identify the most important chief negotiator(s) (6.2). Various conditions that may have influenced the EU’s decision to engage with the UN in a military operation in the DRC are investigated by testing hypotheses. The hypotheses drawn from realist theories (6.3) and constructivist theories (6.4) are tested respectively. This chapter aims to determine to what extent each of the theoretical assumptions provides plausible explanations for the likelihood of the leadership of chief negotiator(s) which led to the EU’s decision to cooperate with the UN in the realm of a military peacekeeping operation in the DRC.

accounts of each model, see ‘*EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management Operations: Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration*’, European Council, 17-18 June 2004, pp.4-5.

⁵¹⁸ M. Scheuermann (2010), *op. cit.*, p.18.

⁵¹⁹ E. Gross (2009), *op. cit.*, p.58.

6.1 Background

A transitional government of the DRC was set up in July 2003.⁵²⁰ Joseph Kabila remained president to lead the country until the general elections and the leaders of the main former rebel groups were sworn in as vice presidents.⁵²¹ The aim of the transitional process was to successfully achieve general elections scheduled for mid-2005.⁵²² The democratic elections were a crucial foundation for the longer term restoration of peace and stability, national reconciliation and establishment of the rule of law.⁵²³ In this context, Martin presents the Congolese general elections as a crucial step towards ‘cementing sustainable peace’ in the Great Lakes region.⁵²⁴

The transitional government was tasked with paving the way for the country to finally eradicate decades of dictatorship and civil wars and to establish a new constitutional government. The transitional government has thus taken a number of important steps, including the demobilisation processes in accordance with one of the provisions in the ‘Global and All-Inclusive Agreement’.⁵²⁵ The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was established under the Draft Constitution of the Transition under which the main role of the IEC was defined to guarantee the “neutrality and impartiality of the process for holding free and transparent democratic elections”.⁵²⁶ The IEC carried out practical functions to prepare the country for the electoral process, in particular establishing mechanisms and rules for elections, including voter registration, the maintenance of voters’ roles, voting operations

⁵²⁰ See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report, ‘*The World Fact Book – The Democratic Republic of Congo*’, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html> (accessed on 8 Dec 2010).

⁵²¹ BBC News, ‘*A Chronology of Key Events: Democratic Republic of Congo*’, updated on 11 December 2010, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1072684.stm (accessed on 15 December 2010).

⁵²² T. Dagne, ‘*Democratic Republic of Congo: Transitional Process and UN Mission*’, CRS Report for Congress, March 22 2005, p.1.

⁵²³ UNSC Resolution, S/RES/1671, 25 April 2006.

⁵²⁴ M. Martin, ‘Human Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The European Union as a Force for Good?’, *African Security Review*, vol.16, no. 2, 2007, pp.89-99 (p.89).

⁵²⁵ The All-Inclusive Agreement calls for a two-year transition period headed by President Kabila and four Vice Presidents. The Agreement aims to integrate the former Congolese belligerents into a unified Congolese army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). For further details on the transitional process of the DRC and the All-Inclusive Agreement, see United Nations DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) Resource Centre, available at <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=25> (accessed on 8 Dec 2010).

⁵²⁶ Draft Constitution of the Transition 2002, ‘*Democratic Republic of Congo: Inter-Congolese Dialogue*’, Article 154-160, available at <http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/DRCongo/cdreader/bin/7draft.pdf> (accessed on 8 Dec 2010).

and vote counting.⁵²⁷ In November 2004, the transitional government promulgated laws on Nationality and Defence Forces reform programs, and the Commission prepared a budget for expenses related to the elections with the support of the MONUC.⁵²⁸ The transitional government held a successful constitutional referendum in December 2005, which paved the way for the first presidential, parliamentary and senatorial elections in 45 years since its independence. The elections also allowed the Congolese to choose their provincial and local councils.

In parallel with a number of crucial achievements and efforts provided by the Congolese transitional government, the EU became more actively engaged in dealing with post-conflict settlement and peace-building in the DRC. For example, after its first military operation, *Artemis*, the EU launched two civilian ESDP missions at the request of the Congolese government in close cooperation with the UN to facilitate the smooth running of electoral operations. EUPOL Kinshasa, which was followed by EUPOL RD Congo in 2007, conducted its police mission in the capital Kinshasa from April 2005 to June 2007. This police mission was mandated to provide a framework and advice in helping the Congolese national police keep order during the DRC's transition to democracy, particularly during the electoral period in 2006.⁵²⁹ In June 2005, the EU launched an advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the DRC in support of the armed forces, named EUSEC RD Congo, which mandate runs until 2012.⁵³⁰

Despite considerable efforts to achieve the objectives of peace, development and stability in the DRC, the transitional process faced serious challenges. Massive logistics difficulties and strong disagreements in adopting essential legislation inevitably caused a postponing of the election. Furthermore, insecurity and factional fighting in the east of the country continued to pose a serious threat to Congolese political stability. Given the precarious political situation, sustainable transitional progress was frustrated and remained a serious concern for local and national elections. In order to enable the elections to take place as scheduled for July -

⁵²⁷ Electoral Institute for the Sustainable of Democracy in Africa (EISA), '*DRC: Independent Electoral Commission*', July 2007, available at <http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/drcec.htm> (accessed on 8 Dec 2010).

⁵²⁸ UN Security Council (S/2004/1034), '*Sixteenth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization [sic] Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo*', 31 December 2004.

⁵²⁹ EUPOL Kinshasa has been followed by EUPOL RD Congo after the Congolese elections, whose main tasks consist of supporting and assisting the Congolese authorities in reforming the security sector with regard to the police and its interaction with the justice sector. For further information, see Council of the European Union, EU Common Security and Defence Policy operations, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en> (accessed on 12 Dec 2010).

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*

October 2006,⁵³¹ maintenance of order and stability in the capital Kinshasa was considered by the UN as a key objective of the peacekeeping operation. Although MONUC had conducted the UN's largest peacekeeping mission in the country since 1999 with the dispatch of a peacekeeping force comprising 18,000 plus civilian personnel, the UN faced difficulties due to the lack of peacekeeping troops to cover the vastness of the country during the election period. From the beginning of the elections until the end of the transitional phase, MONUC had to be re-deployed to organise the complicated election processes in the whole country. Besides, as the bulk of MONUC troops were concentrated in the unstable East of the country,⁵³² additional forces were urgently appealed for by the UN to back up a latent security vacuum in Kinshasa during this crucial time.

6.2 Decision-making in Practice

Level I: International UN level

The Congolese referendum on a draft constitution took place on 18 and 19 December with minimal security problems, resulting in a 'yes' vote. Nonetheless, the UN's concerns greatly increased about the possibility of violence occurring before, during or immediately after the elections, which neither MONUC nor the Congolese Force (FARDC, Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo) would be able to manage robustly. In order to deal with a potential escalation of violence during the transition phase, additional military support for MONUC was required to enhance its capacity. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, requested the Security Council to extend MONUC on a temporary basis during the election period. However, Annan's request was rejected for financial reasons.⁵³³

⁵³¹ The first round of the elections was scheduled for 30 July and the second round for 29 October 2006.

⁵³² Only 2,000 troops from Tunisia, South Africa and Uruguay stayed in the capital Kinshasa while the other 15,000 peacekeepers were deployed in the eastern area. See interview with French Commander Christian Damay, 'DRC: EUFOR troops will open fire if needed', FomekaNews, 26 June 2006; and UNSC document (S/2006/759), 'Twenty-second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization [*sic*] Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', 21 September 2006.

⁵³³ M. Scheuermann (2010), *op.cit.*, p.18.

Against this backdrop, it is interesting to note that the UN's request was directly channelled to the EU without national detours. On 27 December 2005, in his letter to the EU Presidency,⁵³⁴ Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for UN Peacekeeping Operations, requested the EU to consider the possibility of making available a deterrent force to be deployed to the DRC in support of MONUC during the electoral process.⁵³⁵ Given the relatively limited time available for the necessary planning and consultation to organise such a force, the SG urgently requested the EU to consider the suggestion. It was highly exceptional that the UN's request was directly sent to the EU via both the outgoing British and incoming Austrian presidency without having a prior informal consultation. Considering the direct dialogue between the two organisations, one EU official notes that "although it provided a very good example for a politically and bureaucratically pragmatic communication between the UN and the EU for the first time, the UN's straight request was quite surprising and unusual for the European countries."⁵³⁶

In this respect, it may be noteworthy that Jean-Marie Guéhenno played to a great extent a visible and important role in facilitating and liaising the bilateral communication between the two organisations.⁵³⁷ Jean-Marie Guéhenno, a former French diplomat and a foreign policy intellectual, served as the catalyst for the Western countries', more specifically the EU's, engagement in UN's peacekeeping mandates. He suggested that Western personnel contributions to UN peace operations are "inadequate. We need a lot more. If UN Blue Helmets only come from a certain part in the world, our position weakens because it does not give a strong political signal."⁵³⁸ In regard to the EU's role in peacekeeping operations in Africa, Mr. Guéhenno stressed that "the UN Blue Helmets are the answer of the international community to Africa. And Africa really matters. That is why we are increasing our cooperation with the EU. We want a presence of the EU in Africa now, with Blue Helmets."⁵³⁹ Similarly, he also reiterated to the Council "the important role played in the DRC by the European Union, particularly the assistance given during last year's polls by the

⁵³⁴ The British EU presidency, Jack Straw, received this letter from the SG.

⁵³⁵ UNSC document (S/2006/219), 'Letter dated 27 December 2005 from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland', Annex I of a 'Letter dated 12 April 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council', 13 April 2006.

⁵³⁶ Interview with an official, EU Commission, Brussels, 28 April 2010.

⁵³⁷ See A. J. Bellamy and P. D. Williams, "The West and Contemporary Peace Operations", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol.46, no.1, 2009, pp. 39-57.

⁵³⁸ *NRC Handelsblad*, 'Explosion of UN Missions, Western Countries Absent', 2 October 2004, available at www.runic-europe.org/english/events/guehennointerview.html (accessed on 12 Sep. 2012).

⁵³⁹ *Ibid.*

European Union Force (EUFOR RD Congo) and its help to the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC).⁵⁴⁰ His role as a normative entrepreneur thus seems to be crucial during the UN level negotiations, as he encouraged “the members of the Council and other partners such as the EU to continue to provide the generous assistance rendered during the 2006 electoral process”,⁵⁴¹ which led the largest expansion of peacekeeping in the history of the UN, overseeing approximately 130,000 staff on eighteen missions.⁵⁴²

The UK, France, Germany and Italy ostensibly welcomed the UN’s request and reiterated the important role of the EU in enhancing MONUC’s capacity during the Congolese electoral period. However, in practice, none of the Big-four was likely to provide a vital leadership role in terms of both providing troops and offering a planning framework. Unlike the case of *Artemis* (2003), there was by no means strong willingness among the Big-four countries to become a framework nation for operation EUFOR DR Congo. The UK, France, Germany and Italy were ‘constantly cautious’ about committing themselves to undertaking a leading role as chief negotiator.⁵⁴³ Such uncertainty about the chief negotiator, in addition to the absence of a clear political guidance at the UNSC, resulted in a considerably prolonged reconciliation and negotiation process.

When the Secretary-General called for European military support, it was the UK which received the letter on behalf of the EU. Despite its EU presidency as well as an important permanent position in the Security Council, the UK showed strong reluctance to be involved in a military operation in the DRC. The UK hardly produced official statements or documents on the issue. According to a British official, due to its commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, the UK could neither undertake leadership nor strengthen the quota.⁵⁴⁴ By referring to its heavy military burden as an excuse, the UK expressed its general aversion to involvement in the operation.

France, which had previously played an active role in crisis management in the Great Lakes region, avoided leading the EUFOR operation. According to a UN official’s view, even

⁵⁴⁰ UN News Centre, “Stability in DR Congo will benefit whole of Africa; global commitment still needed: UN”, 9 January 2009, available at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21194&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo#.UMgjCKyE-So> (accessed on 12 Sep. 2012).

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴² See biography of Jean-Marie Guéhenno as a faculty member of SPIA in Columbia University, available at <http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/academics/directory/jg3083-fac.html> (accessed on 12 Sep. 2012).

⁵⁴³ Interview with an official, UN Headquarters, New York, 02 April 2009.

⁵⁴⁴ Interview with UK delegate to the UN, UN Headquarters, New York, 14 April 2009.

though France was willing to support the peace process of the DRC, France had to decide not to undertake leadership because there had been a critical public impression that EUFOR was led by French interest.⁵⁴⁵ As a matter of fact, following Operation *Artemis*, EUFOR was viewed as a partial force due to the huge amount of French soldiers, suspected of being supporters of Kabila's government.⁵⁴⁶ Hence, France became conscious of public opinion; if France led the European military operation in the DRC again, it could be perceived as a political backer of Kabila's regime, which may also bring up questions regarding the impartiality and neutrality of European troops. In addition, France did not have combat-ready troops available, whereas Germany did.⁵⁴⁷ Under these circumstances, France thought that it would be a wise decision to convince the other possible 'ESDP-motor', *i.e.* Germany, to be the lead-nation for the operation.⁵⁴⁸ Consequently, France insisted that Germany should take a leading role with constant French support.

The UN's request for European military support was accordingly passed on to Germany. Germany came under great pressure to make financial as well as military contributions to the operation. Initially, the German government strongly opposed participation in a military operation and resisted taking on responsibilities. Given a primary and traditional role for Germany in ESDP operations, which has been as a civilian power, Scheuermann notes that it was no surprise that Germany was reluctant to engage in EUFOR RD Congo, which was mandated to serve as a military operation.⁵⁴⁹ According to a report from the German newspaper *Die Welt*, German policy-makers warned against a hasty troop deployment and insisted that Germany should not and could not be the first troop contributors.⁵⁵⁰ The chairman of the German Federal Armed Forces Association, Bernhard Gertz, strictly rejected a deployment of German troops to the DRC by arguing that there must be other nations which have a better experience and thus are better suited for the operation than Germany.⁵⁵¹ Gertz insisted that "it would be prudent and wise if the government decide not to send

⁵⁴⁵ Interview with official, UN Headquarters, New York, 06 April 2009.

⁵⁴⁶ For example see G. Nzongola-Ntalaja, "Lessons learned from the Artemis and EUFOR operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: The EU's Africa Strategy: What are the lesions of the Congo Mission?", SDA Discussion Paper, Brussels: Security and Defence Agenda, 2007, pp.32-33.

⁵⁴⁷ Interview with German delegate to the United Nations, New York, 16 March 2009.

⁵⁴⁸ M. Scheuermann (2010), *op. cit.*, p.19.

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p.20.

⁵⁵⁰ *Die Welt* (2006), 'Jung halt Einsatz der Bundeswehr im Kongo für möglich', 23 January 2006, (author's translation), available at <http://www.welt.de> (accessed on 6 Jan. 2011).

⁵⁵¹ Gertz said, "I very much hope that Bundestag finds a way to keep the ball down." (author's translation), see *Die Welt* (2006), 'Bundeswehr soll im Kongo nur mit Logistik helfen', 28 January 2006, available at <http://www.welt.de> (accessed on 6 Jan. 2011).

combat troops to the Congo.”⁵⁵² Therefore, the question over whether Germany should and would act in line with the Secretary-General’s request attracted considerable attention.

The significant negotiating role of France, however, brought Germany to begin to abate its reluctance and change its stance.⁵⁵³ In the wake of the French call for German presence, possibly with armed forces in the DRC, German Defence Minister, Franz Josef Jung, outlined Germany’s special responsibility for Africa, which implied the possibility of German participation in EUFOR.⁵⁵⁴ Angela Merkel, the German Federal Chancellor, visited President Jacques Chirac in Paris for consultations on the Congolese issue. After her visit to Paris, Merkel clearly announced that the Bundeswehr (Federal Defence Force) was to participate in any case in a European mission in the Congo in close cooperation with France.⁵⁵⁵ Once it emerged that Germany could no longer avoid taking on an important task for the mission, Germany and France together confirmed their willingness to support the UN military operation.⁵⁵⁶

After going through months of controversial and tense negotiations, the EU officially confirmed its commitment to deploy EU military forces to the DRC in support of MONUC. In its letter to the UN Secretary-General on 28 March 2006, the EU clearly stated that the EU’s autonomous command of the operation would be a key point of the resolution. It also made it clear that the EU would set out the nature and scope of the operation on a strictly limited time and space basis. On 26 April 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1671, authorising “for a period ending four months after the date of the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections, the deployment of EUFOR RD Congo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”.⁵⁵⁷ The mandate was clear in defining time and scope, the arrangement of the operation, and its objectives. EUFOR RD Congo was authorised to take all necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to carry out the following tasks:

- to support MONUC to stabilise the situation, in case MONUC would face serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing capabilities;

⁵⁵² *Die Welt* (2006e) ‘Kongo: Jung Schickt Frankreich vor’, (author’s translation), 11 February 2006.

⁵⁵³ Interview with an official, EU Commission, Brussels, 28 April 2010.

⁵⁵⁴ *Die Welt* (2006a), *op. cit.*

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.* See also *Die Welt* (2006d), ‘Deutschland schickt Soldaten in den Kongo’ of 10 February 2006.

⁵⁵⁶ *Die Welt* (2006j) ‘Union: Massive Bedenken gegen Kongo-Einsatz’, 14 March 2006.

⁵⁵⁷ UNSC Resolution, S/RES/1671 (2006), 25 April 2006.

- to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the DRC;
- to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa;
- to ensure the security and freedom of movement of personnel as well as the protection of the installations of EUFOR RD Congo; and
- to execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger.

Once the UK declined to participate in the operation by referring to its military overstretch and the inadequate language ability of its troops, albeit it was something which also concerned German military planners, and Italy maintained a low profile for supporting the operation at the political level,⁵⁵⁸ France and Germany became central to initiating EUFOR RD Congo. Franco-German cooperation was the most important above all in formulating a possible UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation.⁵⁵⁹ For the neutrality and impartiality of EU troops, France ostensibly abandoned its commitment to act as a lead-nation for the operation. However, the analysis of this case study suggests that EUFOR was primarily encouraged by the role of France rather than Germany. An EU official acknowledged that the French role was significant and unique, which led to a major driving force for EUFOR RD Congo.⁵⁶⁰ On the other hand, the consent of Germany to undertake a leadership role on the ground was primarily a result of France's constant pressure and lobbying activities. Indeed, France played a major role as chief negotiator in the negotiations, whilst Germany was rather vital in providing operational planning and practical provision.

With respect to the High Representative, Solana had a very limited role during the negotiations in the Security Council. Compared to the case of Operation *Artemis* for which the Secretary-General had directly appealed to Solana to help muster EU forces in support of the UN operation in the DRC, the second UN call for European support with military forces was directly delivered to the British EU presidency. Hence, the EU SG/HR was neither asked for any specific tasks nor played a significant role in the decision-making process, but

⁵⁵⁸ According to an interview data, the Italian government hardly asked any questions on political and security developments in the DRC. It also did not provide a national statement on the issues related to the possible deployment of an EU-led operation. (Interview with an Italian diplomat, Embassy of Italy in Seoul, 8 June 2012).

⁵⁵⁹ Interview with an official, UN Headquarters, New York, 25 March 2009.

⁵⁶⁰ Interview with an official, EU Commission, Brussels, 28 April 2010.

only presented the result of the EUFOR mission to the UN as required by the UN-EU agreement.⁵⁶¹ In January 2007, Solana presented his report in New York, which was published by the Council in March, entitled a 'lessons learned review'. However, this document could not provide any publicly accessible analysis, as most of the content had not been declassified.⁵⁶² The role of the HR at UN-level decision-making remained minor and less influential.

Level II: Domestic EU level

The UN's official request was followed by lengthy intra-European negotiations in Brussels. Due to a general aversion among foreign ministers to consenting to force generation and planning processes, the EU decision-making process was inevitably delayed. Initial discussions on the proposal were held in Brussels on 11 January 2006, in which the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Council General Secretariat (CGS) of the EU, and military planners in the EU simultaneously discussed a potential EUFOR and the composition of the force.⁵⁶³ Nonetheless, the EU's decision did not get off the ground until the end of January, because an option paper for a possible military operation and the tasks of a potential EUFOR, under the CGS's responsibility, lacked clear political guidance and strategic planning. As a result, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) protracted this process prior to a political approval for Concept of Operation.⁵⁶⁴ From 30 January to 2 February 2006, a fact-finding mission took place in Kinshasa in order to "refine the operational and logistic parameters for the force".⁵⁶⁵ Following the fact-finding mission, in the PSC meeting on 13 February, the amended CGS option paper was initially discussed. Yet, the paper was characterized by a "lack of operational-level input that hampered the politico-strategic planning phase."⁵⁶⁶

The intra-European decision-making process faced further challenges during the operational planning phase. Although member states seemingly consented to the launch of a military

⁵⁶¹ See UN Security Council document (S005/07), 'Presentation by Javier Solana, EUHR for CFSP, on the Democratic Republic of Congo/EUFOR', New York, 9 January 2007.

⁵⁶² C. Major (2008), *op.cit.*, p.37.

⁵⁶³ EU Military Newsletter, 'EUFOR DR Congo: EU Engagement for Stability', Brussels, *Impetus*, no.1, Spring/Summer 2006, pp.17-19.

⁵⁶⁴ Interview with an official, Council General Secretariat of the EU, Brussels, 30 April 2010.

⁵⁶⁵ EU Military Newsletter *Impetus* (2006), *op. cit.*

⁵⁶⁶ L. Simón, 'Command and Control? Planning for EU military operations', *Occasional Paper*, no. 81, ISS, January 2010, p.32.

operation, the most urgent problem still remained unsolved due to the significant reluctance of member states to commit themselves to contribute to the necessary military capabilities. Franco-German cooperation was deemed indisputably essential;⁵⁶⁷ however, neither of them seemed willing to offer an Operational Commander or Operational Headquarters (OHQ). France considered itself not well-placed to lead the EUFOR in the DRC again. Germany also refused to take on the responsibility when it was asked to lead EUFOR and to offer the Headquarters stationed in Potsdam. The UK refused to get involved in the operation due to its overstretched military burden in Afghanistan and Iraq. Italy and Greece declined as well. Given this uncertainty in terms of the lead-nation, the decision was postponed until the Franco-German joint ministerial meeting in Berlin was held on 14 March, which led to an initial political compromise. According to Werner Hoyer, the foreign policy spokesman of the German FDP (Free Democratic Party), EU-level preparation was ‘catastrophic’.⁵⁶⁸

While the Operation Commander and OHQ were not yet identified, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) was forced to act as the *ad hoc* Operational Headquarters, albeit not having the expertise or precise means to do so.⁵⁶⁹ In parallel, there was a suspicion that Paris and New York would arrange a deal behind the scenes that would place Germany in a position in which Germany had no choice other than to take on the leading role.⁵⁷⁰ Accordingly, pressure started mounting on Germany to take leadership, to provide troops and to offer command structures. As it emerged that Germany could no longer avoid taking on the responsibility for the operation, the German government began setting out provisions for its involvement. Chancellor Merkel determined the nature of the operation, including a limited time scope and a strictly limited military deployment to the capital Kinshasa. The Chancellor called for fair burden sharing among the member states, by suggesting that the EU force should be composed of a broad range of troop contributors from the EU member states.⁵⁷¹ It was clearly announced that Germany would not agree to its involvement as long as all the conditions outlined were not put in place.

France and Germany agreed that each would contribute a third of the requested forces, and the rest of the EU would provide another third of the forces. Despite the Franco-German commitment to a major troop contribution, the launch of EUFOR seemed to be far from

⁵⁶⁷ M. Scheuermann (2010), *op. cit.*, p19.

⁵⁶⁸ *Die Welt* (2006), ‘Union: Massive Bedenken gegen KongoEinsatz’, 14 March 2006.

⁵⁶⁹ Interview with official, Council of the EU, Brussels, 28 April 2010.

⁵⁷⁰ Hans-Georg Ehrhart, ‘EUFOR RD Congo: A Preliminary Assessment’, *ISIS European Security Review*, No. 30, March 2007, pp. 9-12.

⁵⁷¹ *Die Welt* (2006) ‘Bundeskanzlerin Merkel kündigt Reform-Offensive an’, 13 March 2006.

approval as uncertainty still emerged concerning the leadership question. HR Solana recommended that Germany take the lead in negotiations over the makeup of the EU force.⁵⁷² German Foreign Minister Steinmeier organised a meeting on “Military aspects of UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management operations in light of EUFOR RD Congo” on 19-20 March in Berlin.⁵⁷³ This meeting provided a platform for all stakeholders - EU Member States, DPKO, the EU Council Secretariat, the EUFOR DR Congo, and MONUC Headquarters - to discuss contribution to the force as well as the possible agenda of some leading EU states towards the operation. With a view to further improving the effectiveness of EU support to the UN, Germany finally declared its intention to lead the EU mission in Congo on 21 March. It also agreed to offer its Operational Headquarters in Potsdam, while France announced its willingness to deploy the Force Headquarters (FHQ) to Kinshasa.

On 23 March, the EU Council approved the Concept of Operation for the EUFOR mission and decided to launch the military strategic planning process.⁵⁷⁴ This led to a formal agreement that the EU Presidency confirmed the principles for EU military support to MONUC in a letter to the UN Secretary-General dated 28 March 2006.⁵⁷⁵ On 25 April 2006, UNSC Resolution 1671 authorised the EU to deploy forces in the DRC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Two days later, on 27 April 2006, the Council of the EU adopted the Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP, which formed the legal basis of the operation EUFOR RD Congo. The military command of the operation was shared between Germany and France. Lieutenant-General Karlheinz Viereck (Germany) was appointed EU Operational Commander, with the EU OHQ to be located at the Armed Forces Operations Command in Potsdam, Germany. Meanwhile, Major-General Christian Damay (France) was designated EU Force Commander (FCdr), to be stationed in the FHQ based at N'Dolo airport in Kinshasa. EUFOR was strictly limited to the electoral period, *i.e.* only for four months after the first round of elections. It clearly announced that an extension would not be acceptable. In terms of the geographical scope of deployment, as Figure 6.1 illustrates, EUFOR was ‘triple-tracked’; it was composed of three pillars:⁵⁷⁶

- 1) an ‘advance element’ deployed in Kinshasa

⁵⁷² *Die Welt* (2006), ‘Union: Skepsis bei Kongo-Einsatz’, 15 March 2006.

⁵⁷³ Council of the EU (10910/07), ‘Presidency Report on ESDP’, Brussels, 18 June 2007, p.3.3


⁵⁷⁴ Council of the EU, 7762/06 (Press 88), ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: Council launches planning for an EU operation in support of MONUC during the electoral process’, Brussels, 23 March 2006.

⁵⁷⁵ See UNSC document (S/2006/219), Annex II, *op. cit.*

⁵⁷⁶ EU Document A/1954, ‘European Union operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): reply to the annual report of the Council’, 20 December 2006, p.20.

- 2) battalion-size ‘on-call’ forces on stand-by in Libreville/Gabon⁵⁷⁷
- 3) a ‘strategic reserve’ stationed in Europe (in France and Germany)

Figure 6. 1 Map of deployment of EUFOR DR Congo⁵⁷⁸




⁵⁷⁷ Keeping an over-the-horizon force in Gabon was a strategic measure as it “simultaneously ensured a deterrent capacity and avoided an unnecessary heavy military presence in Kinshasa.”, Javier Solana (2007), United Nations Security Council (S005/07), ‘Presentation by Javier Solana, EUHR for the CFSP, on Democratic Republic of Congo/EUFOR’, New York, 9 January 2007.

⁵⁷⁸ Source from the Council of the EU, ‘EUFOR RD Congo Factsheets: Map of EUFOR RD Congo’, 25 April 2006.

The operation involved 2,400 troops drawn from 19 EU Member States and two non-EU states, Switzerland and Turkey. The forces were deployed in pillars one and two. The reserve battalion for the third pillar in Europe was around 1,500 personnel, which brought EUFOR overall to 4,000 troops stationed in DRC, Gabon, France and Germany. More than two-thirds of the force came from France and Germany, and the remaining one-third from other nations. As Figure 6.2 displays, the biggest contributors were France (1,090), followed by Germany (780), Spain (130), Poland (130), Belgium (60), Italy (56), Sweden (55), Portugal (53), the Netherlands (50) and Finland (11).⁵⁷⁹

Figure 6. 2 Top-10 Troop Contributing Countries of EUFOR RD Congo



⁵⁷⁹ H. Ehrhart (2007), *op. cit.*, p.9.

Despite British commitments to strengthen European cooperation on security issues in Africa,⁵⁸⁰ the UK did not perceive this particular military operation as valuable for pushing a European agenda.⁵⁸¹ The UK had no objection to the approval of the operation and gave its political consent to EUFOR RD Congo. However, the UK abstained from EU-level negotiations and operational planning. The UK refrained from offering military troops to the DRC and provided a very small contribution – two personnel: one in the OHQ in Potsdam and the other one in the FHQ in Kinshasa. Hence, the role of the UK was not significant in EU-level decision-making.

It was not surprising that Germany initially faced domestic pressures not to intervene in Africa crisis management. Historically, the German view on ESDP operations has significantly focused on civilian crisis management rather than military operations, for every military engagement is viewed as very critical and a taboo by the German public.⁵⁸² Therefore the military operation was a political issue within Germany, which triggered criticism and strong reluctance. However, Germany changed its stance and finally accepted to take on a leadership role for the EUFOR. It was largely due to the French lobby and pressures to push Germany to do so. In this context, there was a concern in Berlin over being “instrumentalized [*sic*] by Paris, which was pushing Germany into Africa”.⁵⁸³

France played a vital role in the diplomatic activities preceding the launch of EUFOR RD Congo.⁵⁸⁴ France lobbied for the approval of member states for an opinion paper to express EU support for MONUC, which led to the formal agreement to deploy EU military forces.⁵⁸⁵ At the operational level, given the considerable reluctance of EU members to contribute the bulk of military forces, France was willing to contribute the largest amount of troops as well as the EU Force Commander to the operation. More importantly, Gross argues that France was not only crucial to launch the EUFOR, but also important to leading Germany to assume responsibilities for command over the military mission in Africa.⁵⁸⁶

⁵⁸⁰ For example, at St. Malo in 1998, Britain and France agreed on cooperation with respect to their individual policies towards Africa. At the Touquet Summit in 2003, Chirac and Blair adopted a broad view of policies toward Africa, particularly concerning the crisis issues in the Great Lakes region. The UK and France recognised both political and economic matters in the DRC and stressed their responsibility to strengthen Africa’s peacekeeping capability.

⁵⁸¹ E. Gross (2009), *op.cit.*, p.168.

⁵⁸² M. Scheuermann (2010), *op. cit.*, p.20.

⁵⁸³ See C. Gegout (2007), *op.cit.*, p.7.; and E. Gross (2009), *op. cit.*, p.58.

⁵⁸⁴ E. Gross (2009), *op. cit.*, p.118.

⁵⁸⁵ Interview with a French national official, Ministry of Defence, Paris, 5 March 2010.

⁵⁸⁶ E. Gross (2009), *op. cit.*, p.120.

In light of the role of the HR, Solana manifested a more active and important role at the EU level compared to his limited role at the UN level. The HR was mandated to act as a 'primary point of contact' with the UN,⁵⁸⁷ the authorities of DRC, neighbouring countries and other relevant actors by being assisted by the EU Special Representative in close cooperation with the EU Presidency. Solana was an important liaison who facilitated cooperation between the EU Operation Commander, the DPKO and MONUC. Also, Solana's role included providing essential information about the operational situation on the ground. These arrangements had been finalised by an exchange of letters between Javier Solana and the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the end of July 2006.⁵⁸⁸ The role of the HR was constrained to facilitating the smooth and effective operation of the EU in line with UN cooperation, so that the UN and the EU were able to handle the security situation during the Congolese general elections. Thus the HR did not exert any influence on decision-making *per se*, but acted as a facilitator in operating EUFOR RD Congo.

In sum, the revised two-level game analysis suggests that there are two important chief negotiators in the case of EUFOR RD Congo: France and Germany. Although the German role has more often been highlighted concerning its important position as a lead-nation, France indeed had a broader vision and more profound interest than any other EU member state in the operation, which led the EUFOR to be the central issue in Brussels. Given the important roles of France and Germany as chief negotiators, the next sections seek to examine French and German foreign policy toward the DRC and identify the important conditions under which France and Germany were likely to influence the likelihood of the EU deciding to launch the EUFOR RD Congo.

6.3 Realist hypothesis

Realists would lead us to believe that stated humanitarian ambitions and normative understandings of ESDP are largely superficial.⁵⁸⁹ According to a realist assumption, collaboration and cooperation in peacekeeping are possible when states identify strategic interests or power aggrandisement in a mission. Realists would posit that the EU is used by

⁵⁸⁷ C. Major (2008), *op. cit.*, p.17.

⁵⁸⁸ E. Gross (2009), *op. cit.*, p.59; and C. Major (2008), *op. cit.*

⁵⁸⁹ For example, see A. Jahier (2010), *op. cit.*; and A. Hyde-Price, 'Normative' power Europe: a realist critique', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.13, issue 2, 2006, pp.217-234.

its member states as a collective instrument for “shaping its external milieu by a combination of hard and soft power”.⁵⁹⁰ From this realist point of view, the launch of EUFOR RD Congo is deemed as nothing less than a struggle for the interests of EU actors. As the two-level game analysis identifies France and Germany as most pivotal chief negotiators in the case of EUFOR RD Congo, the realist hypothesis will be examined by investigating the French and German political and strategic motivation respectively.

1) France

It is commonly acknowledged that French foreign policy has progressively followed two main trends: a supranational approach to reinforce the EU’s capabilities as a global power, on the one hand; and a more egoistic and national approach to enhance its own strategic interest and project its power, on the other.⁵⁹¹ In fact, France tends to conceive the national and the European dimensions as nearly identical, as French foreign policy has pursued a fundamental preference for a stronger EU profile in terms of ‘Europeanisation’ as a means of bringing French national power into the region.⁵⁹² The role of France as a chief negotiator with respect to the launch of EUFOR RD Congo demonstrates considerable evidence of French foreign policy preferences towards the DRC, along with evidence of the Europeanisation of French military defence policy.

The general election was certainly a salient issue for the DRC to build upon the democratic and peace process for the first time since its independence. But it was also deemed crucial for France to maintain its own influential position in the country, as well as in the African Great Lakes region. The Congolese transitional government, which was set up in July 2003, kept Joseph Kabila as the president, and France seemed likely to continue to support Kabila’s regime by being part of a multilateral UN-EU platform.⁵⁹³ The realist interpretation is associated with the idea that a French-led unilateral intervention might be more risky than a European multilateral intervention within which risks are shared among states.⁵⁹⁴ However,

⁵⁹⁰ A. Hyde-Price (2006), *Ibid.*, p.217.

⁵⁹¹ See C. Gegout (2009), *op.cit.*, p.240; E. Gross (2009), *op.cit.*; A. Jahier (2010), *op.cit.*, p.85.

⁵⁹² J. Howorth, “France”, in J. Howorth and A. Menon (eds.), *The European Union and National Defence Policy*, London: Routledge, 1997, pp.21-47.

⁵⁹³ Interview with an official, EU Commission, Brussels, 29 April 2010. In this respect, Eva Gross also notes that it was unsurprising that France accepted the UN’s request and pressured EU member states, particularly Germany, to participate and to lead the multilateral military operation, thereby projecting its national interest in the DRC by means of the UN and through the EU. See E. Gross (2009), *op. cit.*, p.167.

⁵⁹⁴ C. Gegout (2009), *op. cit.*, p.239.

French foreign policy and its strategic interest toward the DRC seemed to be hardly feasible, when the EU was faced with significant misgivings and criticism spread throughout the DRC about European military engagement. Congolese politicians and the local population criticised that EUFOR was sent to ensure Kabila remained in power. Consequently, EUFOR has unnecessarily nurtured ‘strong xenophobic and anti-European feelings’ in the DRC, particularly in Kinshasa.⁵⁹⁵

Given the serious criticism and public aversion to EU military deployment, France had to urgently convince Congolese politicians and the local population that the operation was neutral and impartial.⁵⁹⁶ According to Mehler, EUFOR’s local reputation is likely to determine France’s future engagement in Africa; whether France will and can continue to have an interest in the “African playground”.⁵⁹⁷ Hence, France had to assure the local population of strictly impartial and neutral EUFOR tasks in supporting democratic elections.⁵⁹⁸

Meanwhile, violent confrontations, with the greatest potential for destabilisation, took place on 20-22 August 2006, following the announcement of the results of the first round of the presidential elections.⁵⁹⁹ Jean-Pierre Bemba, the vice president and presidential candidate, came under attack from the militia supporters of the leading candidate (and eventual winner) Joseph Kabila. The all-out battle between the supporters of the two parties killed at least 23 civilians and soldiers, injured 43, and destroyed Bemba’s HQ (including helicopters) before police and the MONUC took control of the city.⁶⁰⁰ EUFOR was brought in to handle the most serious outbreak of violence in concert with MONUC, and made it possible to separate the conflicting parties. Already during the operation, EUFOR was widely considered a success by the EU and some observers.⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹⁵ G. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2007), *op. cit.*, p.33.

⁵⁹⁶ C. Barrios, “France in Africa: from paternalism to pragmatism”, *FRIDE Policy Brief*, no. 58, November 2010; see also A. Jahier (2010), *op. cit.*, p.85.

⁵⁹⁷ A. Mehler (2008), *op. cit.*, p.33.

⁵⁹⁸ Lt. Gen. Karheinz Viereck, *Operation Commander EUFOR RD Congo*, Security & Defence Agenda, 2007, p.8.

⁵⁹⁹ Report 5139/07 of the Council of the EU to the PSC, Brussels, 10 January 2007.


⁶⁰⁰ For more detailed description and analysis, see ‘Securing Congo’s Election: Lesions from the Kinshasa Showdown’, Policy Briefing no. 42, *International Crisis Group*, 2 October 2006.

⁶⁰¹ For example, see EU Document (A/1954), 2006, *op. cit.*; UN Security Council (S005/07), 2007, *op. cit.*; Summary of remarks by Javier Solana (S273/06), Informal Meeting of the EU defence ministers, Levi, Finland, 3 October 2006; Security and Defence Agenda (2007), SDA Discussion Paper, *op. cit.*

Nonetheless, evidence suggests that the EUFOR operation revealed a great deal of European tokenism, which had in fact primarily focused on gaining a credible reputation and readjusting in line with a damaged image of European forces. First of all, it is interesting to note that EUFOR was determined to limit its operational dimension in the DRC only to Kinshasa, the capital city of the DR Congo. As Figure 6.3 shows, most of Bemba's support comes from the west of the country, including the area around the capital Kinshasa. According to an analysis, Kinshasa has been the bastion of anti-Kabila expression and Kabila was unpopular and even regarded as an outsider in this particular area.⁶⁰² Given the strong regional divisions and the tense political frictions, EUFOR seemed to defend against an all-out attack and to protect the residence of Bemba in Kinshasa in which the representatives of the International Committee to Accompany the Transition (known by its French acronym, CIAT) were also located. However, in reality, by stationing the major military forces only in Kinshasa, EUFOR intended to demonstrate to the Congolese that the EU military operation was not launched to promote Kabila's personal guard, but was genuinely aimed at securing a fair electoral process.

⁶⁰² L. Kinshasa, "Election in Congo won't bring freedom: Kabila and Bemba, two sides of the same treacherous social class", *The African Socialist International*, vol. 25, no. 1, 2006, p.8; M. Martin (2007), *op. cit.*, p.93.

Figure 6. 3 DRC Presidential Election and Detailed Breakdown of the Results⁶⁰³



⁶⁰³ The results of the first round elections in August 2006. The red provinces indicate a Bemba majority; the blue a Kabila majority; and the green a Gizenga stronghold. Source: the figure is made based on information (percentage data) from the United States Institute of Peace.

Yet, of course, this does not imply that France abandoned or renounced its strategic preference in favour of the odds-on presidential candidate, Joseph Kabila. On the contrary, Paris continued to be guided to promote Kabila in accordance with a commitment to the principle of respect for the country and to maintain a close relationship with Joseph Kabila. As “Kabila’s strongest advocates”, France, along with Belgium, emerged playing a key role in the West’s endorsement of Kabila as the DRC’s elected president.⁶⁰⁴ This French foreign policy strategy came to be clear when the results of the first elections were announced. Joseph Kabila took 45% of the votes, whereas his opponent, Jean-Pierre Bemba, took 20%. The EU greeted the results, which established Kabila as the new leader of the country, “with tremendous relief”.⁶⁰⁵ Furthermore, the EU and its member states officially congratulated the newly elected President Joseph Kabila.⁶⁰⁶

Second, evidence indicates that EUFOR carried out a range of campaigns and activities in order to reassure the inhabitants of Kinshasa about its stabilising role and impartiality.⁶⁰⁷ Being mocked by the local people and nicknamed “EU-*Faible*”,⁶⁰⁸ EUFOR conducted civil actions in addition to its required task of military performance to improve EUFOR’s image and win over the public’s hearts and minds. EUFOR launched various initiatives to benefit the citizens of Kinshasa, including publishing its own newspaper called *La Paillote*, which was distributed for free. The newspaper was published ostensibly for the purpose of providing general information about elections and enlightening the public about the impartial activities of EUFOR. As a matter of fact, however, it ended up revealing competition between French and German units about who had primary responsibility for the newspaper, which caused the incorrect wording of the title, although the correct French is *Paillotte*.⁶⁰⁹

Such civilian performances and activities of EU military forces illustrate that the EUFOR primarily focused on gaining recognition from the local population. EU forces appealed to the public that they were impartial and neutral. Martin argues that the military intervention

⁶⁰⁴ See Foreign Policy in Focus (FPiF), “Business as Usual in the Congo” by Tiago Faia, 10 October 2012, available at http://www.fpiif.org/articles/business_as_usual_in_the_congo (accessed on 26 Dec. 2012).

⁶⁰⁵ For example, see BBC news report, ‘Fighting mars DR Congo’s landmark poll’, by Joseph Winter, 22 August 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5270544.stm> (accessed on 16 Jan. 2011)

⁶⁰⁶ See A. Jahier (2010), *op. cit.*; and Helena Spongenberg, “Solana calls Congo leaders to urge ‘solidarity’”, EU Observer, 17 November 2006.

⁶⁰⁷ EU Document (A/1954), *op. cit.*, pp.22-23.

⁶⁰⁸ C. Major (2008), *op. cit.*, p.31. Considering a small force in numbers with a limited mandate, EUFOR was ridiculed by the public. ‘Faible’ meaning ‘weak’ in French as opposed to ‘fort’, meaning ‘strong’.

⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

led to a successfully transformed perception of EUFOR among the Congolese; from being perceived as part of a “Western attempt to support Kabila”, to the EUFOR troops gaining a reputation as both “a neutral power and a credible force”.⁶¹⁰ In parallel, France also fulfilled its political strategic interests towards the DRC by using the EUFOR as a vital means of ensuring its positive image in military intervention. France assured a safe European military presence and its influence in the DRC. Hence, the realist hypothesis that the political interests of the chief negotiator would increase the likelihood of leadership of the EU deciding to engage in an EU-led peacekeeping operation is accepted.

2) Germany

According to a national official, the German commitment, which made up a third of the overall EU forces, was by no means an insignificant contribution in military terms, given its typical tendency in foreign and defence policy, which has perceived “military assertiveness as specific historical taboos since the post-World War II (1945)”.⁶¹¹ Germany had traditionally seen military engagement as *ultima ratio*, and the concept of development of German military engagement has been profoundly restricted by the legacy of non-military action.⁶¹² Accordingly, the proactive role and use of military force has been merely available for national defence; and other than this purpose, German military deployment seemed unlikely to be legitimised by the public, which still experienced fears and suspicions.⁶¹³

Then under what conditions was Germany likely to decide to carry out such a heavy military task and responsibility, especially for African peacekeeping? Despite the significant meaning of German military engagement in the DRC, little effort has been made to identify Germany’s real motivations to launch and lead the EUFOR mission. This was primarily due to the grudging acceptance of Germany as being pushed by France on the one hand, and the indisputably visible preference of Germany towards ESDP, which has been widely acknowledged by the international community on the other hand.⁶¹⁴ However, realists would argue that the European military contribution would normally entail strategic interests for

⁶¹⁰ M. Martin (2007), *Ibid.*, p.93.

⁶¹¹ Interview with official, Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN, New York, 16 March 2009.

⁶¹² J. Bohnen, “Germany”, in J. Howorth and A. Menon (eds.), “*The European Union and National Defence Policy*”, London: Routledge, 1997, pp.49-65; E. Gross (2009), *op. cit.*

⁶¹³ J. Bohnen (1997), *Ibid.*, p.53.

⁶¹⁴ For further comprehensive accounts of the German foreign policy towards EDSP, see F. Algieri *et al.* (2006), *op. cit.*

troop contributing countries, and this is the case with Germany. In this respect, the hypothesis drawn from realist theories would argue that the foreign policy strategy and political interests of the Bundestag towards the DRC increased the likelihood of the EU deciding to engage in the military operation in the DRC.

The analysis of this case study suggests that the German national preference and its clear stance on the EUFOR were displayed during the EU-level discussion over operational planning to some extent, and during conducting the operation on the ground to a larger extent. First of all, once it emerged that German policy makers had to determine whether to take over responsibility for EUFOR, they began to prepare how to protect their own national forces while minimising military risks and burdens. When Germany expressed its willingness to contribute forces at the PSC meeting on 21 February, the nation explicitly insisted that other countries should contribute troops for fair burden-sharing. The Bundeswehr did not want to take over a great deal of military burdens alone and strongly appealed to other member states to collaborate in distributing responsibilities together.⁶¹⁵ The only concern of the Bundeswehr seemed to focus on lightening the heavy military burden and risks, rather than pursuing humanitarian responsibility.

Secondly, when Germany planned the precise modality of the EUFOR deployment, it imposed a clear limitation in time and space for its own national deployment. German troops were only allowed to operate in Kinshasa, whereas most of the other units were mandated to operate throughout the territory of the DRC. It is interesting to note that most of the German troops were nevertheless stationed outside the DRC, in neighbouring country Gabon. Out of the total 1,000-strong German force, around 300 soldiers were stationed in Kinshasa, and more than half of the forces were in Gabon as reservists for the EUFOR mission.⁶¹⁶ According to the French FCdr, Christian Damay, the majority of the EU's forces were stationed in Gabon because of the infrastructure in Libreville, the capital and largest city of Gabon, which allowed the EU to set up a force that could be deployed rapidly to the Congo by air.⁶¹⁷ However, the 'on call' forces based in Gabon were expected to temporarily back-up EUFOR in Kinshasa 'if necessary'. Put differently, it reduced the probability of German deployment. Germany did not intend to actively engage in the operation, but it rather

⁶¹⁵ *Die Welt*, 14 March 2006, *op. cit.*

⁶¹⁶ German news report, Deutsche Welle, "German Minister Not in Favour of Extending EU Congo Mandate", 26 September 2006.

⁶¹⁷ Interview with French Force Commander by FomekaNews(Archbishop Emmanuel Kataliko Foundation), 'DR Congo: EUFOR Troops Will Open Fire If Needed', 16 June 2006, <http://www.fomeka.net/giugno06/TR2145ENG.htm> (accessed on 14 November 2009).

schemed to avoid military loss or risks as much as possible. Hence, the deployment of two-thirds of the EUFOR's forces in Gabon, hundreds of miles away from the potential conflict area, led to criticism of 'a paper tiger to vaunt the Union's pretensions as a serious security actor'.⁶¹⁸

It has been often assessed that the EUFOR deployment was crucial to containing a number of incidents and preventing the spread of potential violence at sensitive moments during the election period. However, EUFOR did not face serious military challenges.⁶¹⁹ In practice, EUFOR engaged in stabilising tasks only on a few occasions.⁶²⁰ The first incidents especially, which took place between 20 and 22 August, with the greatest potential for further escalation of violence, revealed significantly passive and limited performance by German troops. Only the 130-strong Spanish force, which was the only effective combat unit in Kinshasa at the time, participated in the operation. The group of ambassadors of the five permanent members of the UNSC visiting Bemba's HQ alongside the members of CIAT were brought to safety in armoured vehicles, but after this evacuation, an additional 180 German paratroopers were flown in from the contingent in Gabon for reinforcements.⁶²¹

Thirdly, because of limited time for the operation and the withdrawal of the EUFOR forces, the evidence of this case study suggests that any norm-oriented or responsibility-driven motivation of Germany was hardly found. Germany initially announced that EUFOR would be deployed only for four months, from 30 July to 30 November 2006, and after 30 November the EU troops started to leave. Given the unexpected delay of the second round of elections, the question of extending EUFOR's mandate was raised several times. France and Belgium particularly wished to extend the operation as a precaution against the danger of disturbances which might break out during or shortly after the delayed second round of elections and particularly after the withdrawal of EUFOR.⁶²² The other European authorities in the field, including national ambassadors, the EU Special Representative, EUPOL, EUSEC and the Commission, as well as UN organisations like DPKO expressed a great

⁶¹⁸ M. Martin (2007), *op. cit.*, p.92

⁶¹⁹ C. Major (2008), *op. cit.*, p.20

⁶²⁰ For example, after the official announcement of the results of the first round elections in August, followed by the attack on Bemba's TV station in September, and when the final results were announced in November. For an overview of EUFOR's interventions during the deployment, see 'Les missions d'EUFOR RD Congo' at the French Ministry of Defence, available at: <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/layout/set/popup/layout/set/popup/content/view/full/32700> (accessed on 6 Jan 2011)

⁶²¹ European Security Review, 'EUFOR RD Congo: a preliminary assessment', ISIS, No.32, Brussels, March 2007, p.10.

⁶²² Interview with an official, Council of the EU, Brussels, 28 April 2010.

concern about the inappropriate timing of the withdrawal process. Nevertheless, the operation seemed unlikely to be extended, as Germany did not want to have to go through another vote in the Bundestag on this issue.⁶²³ Germany reaffirmed that the departure would be going ahead as originally scheduled. Germany again made a merely perfunctory effort in the EUFOR mission with no sense of humanitarian responsibility.

Overall, EUFOR was present in the DRC for about 6 months, including the pre-deployment and withdrawal phase. Although the EU forces remained until December, the only way to maintain the capacity was to limit operations to self defence and to relieve the current forces. Each unit began to withdraw under its own steam and its own space, and Germany had its troops back home by Christmas as it initially programmed. The entire withdrawal process was completed when the last French troops left the DRC (end of December 2006, beginning of January 2007).⁶²⁴ While the EU seemingly fulfilled its responsibility to assist MONUC in providing a stable environment during the electoral process, it must be underlined that Germany overlooked an essential point of the operation, which aimed to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population by supporting humanitarian security and the peace process. The decision of the Bundestag to withdraw the troops in the most critical moment caused serious insecurity in the DRC. Tensions were still high in the capital and clashes reached a much higher intensity than those of August 2006, causing around 300 deaths including many civilians and significant material damage.⁶²⁵

EUFOR actually fulfilled nothing more than the restricted objectives along the authorised measure of time and scope, which was temporarily feasible and low in risk. Although Germany was active in delineating precise and strict aims and tasks for EUFOR, Germany brought neither humanitarian responsibility nor normative issues into EU-level discussions concerning DRC crisis management. The primary motive of Germany to decide to launch EUFOR DR Congo seems unlikely to be driven by either moral or humanitarian ideas, or a particular political interest towards the DRC. The German role as a chief negotiator was merely an inevitable choice. Germany might view this particular operation as a vehicle to increase the German scope for action, to meet European pressure, and to extend its influential position as a security actor in international peace and security. In sum, the hypothesis that the political interests of chief negotiator would increase the likelihood of its

⁶²³ C. Morsut (2009), *op. cit.*, p.265.

⁶²⁴ EU Document (A/1954), *op. cit.*, p.21.

⁶²⁵ UNHCR report, "DRC: *Researched and compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland*", 14 December 2009.

leadership to lead an EU decision to engage in a peacekeeping operation is relatively weak in the German case.

In recent years, Africa has emerged as a potential supplier of energy and raw materials and has become an important trade and investment partner for Europe. Although Africa still plays a minor role for German business compared to other parts of the world,⁶²⁶ Germany has increasingly acknowledged the great potential of Africa. Hence, Germany, along with France and the UK, focused its attention on improving Africa's overall political and economic conditions so that they can promote sustainable economic and trade partnerships with Africa.⁶²⁷ From a realist point of view, Germany and France might view operation EUFOR as a strategically important opportunity to assess Africa's natural resources and improve their own economic power there. It is important to note that although the UN mandate did not impose geographical limitations, Germany and France decided to station their troops with limitation on space to Kinshasa in the DRC and Libreville in Gabon. Why did Germany and France deploy their major forces to Gabon in addition to the DRC, though the main task of EUFOR was to protect Congolese civilians?

This study acknowledges that it would be difficult to establish a clear causal relationship between economic interests and actual political decisions; which exactly caused which? Nevertheless, it argues that there are some clear correlations between political decisions and economic interests in a military peacekeeping operation. Accordingly, this study also seeks to explore evidence that may show strategically important economic relationships between sub-Saharan African countries and Germany and France. More specifically, it examines whether there existed notable changes in trade directions between Gabon and France/Germany as well as between the DRC and France/Germany, before and in the aftermath of the EUFOR operation, respectively.

3) France and Germany in DRC

As in the case of *Artemis* in 2003, France's vital role in launching EUFOR RD Congo seemed to beget another visible improvement in economic relations with the DRC. France

⁶²⁶ For example, African trade volumes stood at 40 billion euro, almost 3% of German foreign trade in 2008.

⁶²⁷ See the Federal Foreign Office announcement, "Economic relations with Africa", Berlin, 22 September 2009,

maintained and even enhanced “a relationship of trust” with the DRC through the EUFOR operation.⁶²⁸ According to a French national report, France became the DRC’s fourth leading supplier, with a market share of 7% after South Africa (18%), Belgium (11%) and Zimbabwe (8%).⁶²⁹ Although French imports from the DRC remained modest due to political unrest there, French exports to the DRC continuously increased, which led France to enhance its position in the DRC’s market. French exports are made up of capital goods (mechanical and electronic) (34%), consumer goods (21%), intermediate goods (chemicals, plastics, metals) (17%), products in the agricultural and food industries (11.5%), products in the automotive industry (7.9%) and agricultural products (5.9%). Moreover, in addition to the total French investment in the DRC, various French companies have been encouraged to be present in diverse sectors in the DRC.⁶³⁰

The weight of the DRC’s economy and potential market sector became gradually important for France.⁶³¹ The evidence of the analysis suggests that French foreign policy strategies towards the DRC became more feasible after the EUFOR operation. Figure 6.4 illustrates an interesting feature. The index of DRC imports from France shows an upward movement in 2006 following an increasing rise since 2003. At these two particular junctures in both 2003 and 2006, France undertook a key role as chief negotiator for military peacekeeping operations in the DRC. As the realist hypothesis anticipated, trade and economic relations between the DRC and France considerably improved. Hence, the empirical evidence clearly confirms that France’s military engagement under the EU cover in the DRC was followed by economic and trade benefits.

Germany established diplomatic relations with the DRC in 1960, after the DRC’s independence. However, political and economic relations between the two countries had remained inconsequential until the Congolese transitional process was initiated after the Congo Wars. Moreover, although Germany had been a development cooperation partner of

⁶²⁸ French Foreign Ministry document, “*Countries profile: France and Democratic Republic of the Congo*”, 25 March 2009.

⁶²⁹ French Foreign Ministry document, “*France Diplomatie: Economic Relations between France and the Democratic Republic of the Congo*”, 25 March 2009.

⁶³⁰ For example, major French investors include telecommunications (Alcatel), energy (Alstom, Schneider Electric and Nexans, Suez), road (Vinci) and airport (ADP and Sofreavia) infrastructures, hydrocarbons (Total), distribution (CFAO and OPTORG), pharmaceuticals (Sanofi Aventis), the brewing industry (Castel), transport (Bolloré, GTM and Air France) and data protection (Oberthur, Hologram and Sagem).


⁶³¹ EU statistics, “*Africa-EU: Economic indicators, trade and investment*”, EU Commission. Data base also available at <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/> (accessed on 26 Feb 2011).

the DRC for more than 35 years, no inter-governmental meeting had been held before the EUFOR operation. By assuming the command of the military operation and securing the Congolese presidential and parliamentary elections, Germany became engaged in the country's political and economic reconstruction process together with its European partners and the international community. At the first inter-governmental meeting which was held in Kinshasa in 2008, Germany and the DRC confirmed that they are important partner countries. Both countries agreed on three priority areas of cooperation: management of natural resources including environmental, forestry and mineral raw materials, water supply and sanitation, and microfinance.⁶³²

With regard to trade ties, Germany did not have a well-developed partnership with the DRC. Besides, when the civil war led to the political instability of the DRC in 1997, Germany discontinued its bilateral development cooperation with the DRC. There were only a few German investors active in the country. However, as Figure 6.4 illustrates, the trade index has greatly boosted since late 2006. While German imports from the Congo (mainly copper, crude oil and timber) have still remained at a low level of around 20-25 million US dollars, German exports to Congo (mainly motor vehicles, chemical products and machinery) have dramatically grown by more than 200 percent in 2007-2008 compared to the years before the EUFOR operation.

⁶³² Federal Foreign Office, 'Bilateral relations: Democratic Republic of the Congo', April 2010.

Figure 6. 4 Trade of the DRC with France and Germany (2001 - 2009) ⁶³³



Germany continues to expand its investments in various activities, including forestry, mining, and the medical, pharmaceutical, banking and logistics sectors. At governmental levels, Germany provides development support through the European Development Fund aimed at stabilising the country's economy, improving its infrastructure, and establishing a constitutional state based on the rule of law.⁶³⁴ The German government also encourages

⁶³³ Source: Built upon the International Monetary Fund (IMF) database. For further detailed figures, see Appendix 4.2.

⁶³⁴ M. Martin (2008), *op. cit.*, p.92.

several major German mechanical engineering companies to relocate in the DRC to invest and manage natural resources effectively. The evidence from the case analysis suggests that the EUFOR operation considerably developed Germany's relations with the DRC, particularly in the economic area, which led to dramatic changes in trade between the two countries. Therefore, the evidence clearly proved that military engagement of Germany in the DRC was followed by economic and trade benefits.

In sum, the analysis of this study confirms that the economic conditions of the DRC with its large market potential and an abundance of natural resources were important factors under which chief negotiators (France and Germany) seemed more likely to engage the EU in a military peacekeeping operation.

4) France and Germany in Gabon

The EUFOR operation is often criticised for its inappropriate decision to station the majority of the French/German contingent in Gabon. Given the decision to place their troops there, the case study questions whether there exists a correlation between French and German economic interests in Gabon and the likelihood of the Franco-German decision to deploy their troops there.

Gabon is a wealthy country with diverse natural resources. Given the abundance of natural resources, the country is significantly dependent on crude oil revenues to fund its economy. As of 2010, Gabon holds the third largest oil reserves among sub-Saharan African countries, and it is the fourth largest oil producer in the region. The ample natural resources represent over 40% of Gabon's GDP,⁶³⁵ which is approximately four times the average of sub-Saharan African nations. Given the fact that the exports of crude oil have accounted for approximately 60% of the government's budget, high oil prices have also helped raise GDP growth in Gabon. Hence, the oil industry of Gabon plays a critical role in the economy, representing approximately 80% of the country's export revenues. Besides its oil revenues, Gabon also produces natural gas, timber and manganese. Logging and manganese extraction were the pillar of the Gabonese economy prior to the discovery of oil. In particular, manganese mining activity remains as one of the major income generators and a potential area for growth. The country is estimated to hold around one-fourth of global reserves.

⁶³⁵ According to CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) report, as of 2008, Gabon's GDP had \$14,600 per-capita gross domestic product, which ranked 78th in the world position.

Gabon has been continuously developing other important natural resources. Recent explorations point to the potential of Gabon as the world's largest unexploited iron ore deposits.⁶³⁶

It is by no means surprising that Gabon has been considered geo-strategically important by Western powers. Oil giants, including Total, Shell, Perenco, and Addax, have long engaged in the exploitation of Gabon's natural resources.⁶³⁷ Half of Gabon's crude oil exploitations are often exported to the US, and the rest of it goes to China and Western Europe. However, the oil sector has been expected to decline in coming years as it passed its peak production in the late 1990s.⁶³⁸ Despite the rapid decrease in oil revenues, the Gabonese government lacks post-oil economic plans and is only beginning to consider an after-oil scenario.⁶³⁹ Given the challenges that lie ahead, Gabon began to open its limited market and industry, which France has exclusively dominated, and to promote foreign investments that steer diversifying the economy.⁶⁴⁰

Bilateral relations between Germany and Gabon had not intensified until recently, as Gabon had remained biased towards its former colonial power, France. The potential market of Gabon was limited to France.⁶⁴¹ Moreover, as the country was classified as a medium-income country, Gabon was not a beneficiary of German development cooperation. There has been only minor assistance that Germany indirectly provided as a part of the EU or other international development organisations and financial institutions.⁶⁴² Accordingly, there hardly existed particular occasions during which Germany and Gabon could meet and develop bilateral relations in political and economic areas. In this context, from a realist point of view, Germany might have considered the EUFOR operation an important opportunity to establish a close relationship with the Gabonese government by stationing German forces in Libreville, the capital of Gabon. Building amicable political, foreign and security relations with the Gabonese government based on mutual trust and confidence was deemed more essential for Germany than any other direct economic investment or activities,

⁶³⁶ K. Murison (2003), *op. cit.*, p.440.

⁶³⁷ Business Excellence, "Shell Gabon", 01 March 2010, online article is available at <http://www.business-ex.com/article/shell-gabon> (accessed on 12 Feb 2011)

⁶³⁸ Gabon, whose production peaked in 1996, saw its production drop by an alarming 18 percent.

⁶³⁹ U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Gabon", 7 December 2010, online archive is available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2826.htm> (accessed on 12 Feb 2011).

⁶⁴⁰ C. Furphy, "Gabon: Preparing for a post-oil economy", *Consultancy Africa Intelligence*, updated in 16 September 2010.

⁶⁴¹ Archive provided by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, "Overview: Bilateral Relations with Gabon", updated in November 2010; see also archive of the U.S. Department of State, *op.cit.*

⁶⁴² Interview with German delegate to the United Nations, New York, 16 March 2009.

because the ownership of all mineral rights, including oil and gas, was vested in the government.⁶⁴³


The foreign policy of Germany towards Gabon and vice versa has changed since the EUFOR. Various members of the Gabonese government have made official visits to Germany. Federal Defence Minister Jung visited Gabon in July 2006 as part of the EUFOR DR Congo operation, which was followed by the official visit of Federal Economics Minister Glos accompanied by a business delegation in December 2007. Economic relations as well as political and diplomatic relations between Germany and Gabon intensified, and Germany insists that the bilateral relationship could be further expanded given Gabon's potential.⁶⁴⁴ In fact, since operation EUFOR RD Congo, Germany has been more willing to engage in various projects including in the health sector, the timber industry, in cement production and in the infrastructure sector.

Interestingly, evidence from the case analysis shows that Gabon's trade with Germany has dramatically changed after EUFOR RD Congo in 2006-2007. As Figure 6.5 shows, Gabon's exports were not that considerable to Germany, remaining around 18-20 million US dollars until 2006. In 2007, however, its export index dramatically increased up to 71 million, and raised 200% reaching 137 million dollars in 2008. This increasing export flow from Gabon to Germany continued in the next year in 2009, with over 251 million dollars. Considering Gabon's economy and limited trade market which France has traditionally occupied as the country's major supplier and exporter, the increasing position of Germany in Gabon's economy and trade market implies a very significant achievement.

⁶⁴³ "Trade and Investment Guide for the Gulf of Guinea", *KPMG Professional Service*, May 2006, p.41.

⁶⁴⁴ Federal Foreign Office of Germany (2009), *op.cit.*

Figure 6. 5 Trade of Gabon with France and Germany (2001 - 2008) ⁶⁴⁵



France has maintained strong ties with Gabon in both political and economic areas, which has been an important element of Gabon's economy and commercial setting. According to the French Ministry of Economy and Commerce, France is the main supplier of goods to Gabon, furnishing half of Gabon's imports.⁶⁴⁶ French firms and subsidiaries have dominated the local formal private sector, and Gabon is the second largest recipient of French Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa. Most French investment is concentrated in the oil sector,

⁶⁴⁵ Source: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) database (see Appendix IV-2) .

⁶⁴⁶ See U.S. Department of State report, '2011 Investment Climate Statement', March 2011.

in petroleum (Total) and manganese (COMILOG/ERAMET).⁶⁴⁷ Given the incomparable prestige of France in Gabon's economic sectors, EUFOR RD Congo seemed to bring further considerable economic benefits to France in trade relations. As Figure 6.5, above, shows, the index of Gabonese exports to France went through a period of stagnation, remaining at around 330 million US dollars between 2003 and 2005. However, the trade index dramatically rebounded between 2006 and 2007, coinciding with the France's stationing of its military contingent in Libreville for the EUFOR operation.

Some, *inter alia* some International Political Economists, would argue that the increase in exports cannot be considered as French and German domestic economic interests, because those Gabonese exporting products would be competing with French and German firms. However, this study argues that the Gabonese exporters are not threatening or competing with domestic French and German industries. Rather, it should be in French and German economic interests to get more products from Gabon into their market because most of the Gabonese exports are heavily concentrated on minerals, crude oil and manganese.⁶⁴⁸ In sum, this case study confirms that EUFOR RD Congo was followed by a significant increase of economic and trade benefits for France and Germany, which presented the clear correlation between the active leadership of the chief negotiators and their economic benefits in the aftermath of the operation.

6.4 Constructivist hypothesis

Whereas realists argue that the very essence of UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping engages some powerful EU states who seek to maximise their own relative power in shaping world order better than going alone,⁶⁴⁹ constructivists underline the normative power of Europe, focusing on the power of ideas and norms rather than the empirical power as an important

⁶⁴⁷ See article of SomaliPress, '*Gabon Investment Climate*', 14 December 2009, available at: <http://www.somalipress.com/guides/investments/gabon-investment-guides-gabon-investment-climate.html> (accessed on 8 Dec 2010)

⁶⁴⁸ As of 2010, top products exported by Gabon are as follows: Crude Oil (27.15%), Manganese Ores (2.95%), Veneer Sheets (0.89%), Lumber (0.87%), Sawn Wood (0.23%), Natural Rubber (0.23%), and Plywood (0.21%). Source: *Gabon Trade Statistics*, globalEDGE, International Business Center at Michigan State University.

⁶⁴⁹ For example, see K. Waltz (1979), *op. cit.*; J. J. Mearsheimer (2001), *op. cit.*; Allen, D, "Who speaks for Europe? The search for an effective and coherent external policy", in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds.), *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?*, London: Routledge, 1998, pp.41-58.

motive for peacekeeping operations.⁶⁵⁰ Constructivist theories would lead us to believe that a process of gradual consensus on the common rules and collective norms leads EU member states to recognise that cooperation is appropriate and important, even if it is not necessarily the most rational approach in a given case or the one likely to maximise their own benefits.⁶⁵¹ Hence, the value of common norms and principles constrains the member states to be socialised or institutionalised into abandoning unilateral action and extending multilateral cooperation in international peace and security. According to Scheuermann, in this respect, the EU's multifaceted involvement in crisis managements in the DRC clearly reflects that the EU member states are already institutionalised by 'serious moral' and 'normative responsibility' within the EU framework on the issue of international peacekeeping operations.⁶⁵²

The successful and safe democratic Congolese elections were seen as a crucial step towards sustainable peace and stability in the Great Lakes region as well as an important foundation for the longer term restoration of peace and security in the DRC. According to a report from the Council of the European Union, the EU also acknowledged the significant meaning of the Congolese general elections and announced that the EU had actively sought a lasting solution for conflicts in the African Great Lakes region by "being strongly committed to supporting peace, stability and development in Africa".⁶⁵³ During the UN Security Council meeting in January 2007, Solana emphasised the important democratic transition period of the DRC which was about to enter its final and essential phase to create a secure environment. He reaffirmed the significant responsibility of the EU as a normative power in humanitarian security.⁶⁵⁴ Despite such normative commitments and statements on the responsibility of the EU, however, this study found little evidence that the EU directly expressed the colonial responsibility in formulating EUFOR RD Congo.

⁶⁵⁰ For example, see A. Ciambra, "Normative power' Europe: theory and practice of EU norms. The case of Macedonia', *Jean Monnet Working Paper (JMWP)*, no.64, July 2008, pp.1-27; I. Manners, "European Union 'Normative Power' and the Security Challenge", *European Security*, vol. 15, issue 4, 2006, pp.405-421; S. Scheipers and D. Sicurelli, "Empowering Africa: normative power in EU-Africa relations", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 15, issue 4, 2008, pp. 607-623.; and I. Manners (2008), *op. cit.*

⁶⁵¹ For example see K.E. Smith, "Speaking with one voice? European Union coordination on human rights issues at the United Nations", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 44, issues 1, 2006, pp.97-121; cited by F. Brantner and R. Gowan, "Complex engagement: The EU and the UN system", in K. E. Jørgensen (ed.), *The European Union and International Organizations*, New York: Routledge, 2009, p.40.

⁶⁵² M. Scheuermann (2010), *op. cit.*, pp.17-20.

⁶⁵³ EU document RDC/02/EN, "EU military operation in support of the MONUC during the election process in RD Congo", Council of the European Union, Luxembourg, 12 June 2006.

⁶⁵⁴ Javier Solana (2007), United Nations Security Council Presentation by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, on the Democratic Republic of Congo/EUFOR, S005/07, New York, 9 January 2007.

In the case of Operation *Artemis*, the analysis determined that French foreign policy, which tends to view the DRC as a part of *Francophone* Africa, was an important factor that triggered Europeanised collective identity and responsibility based on a colonial legacy, which in turn led to the launch of the operation. In the case of EUFOR RD Congo, however, the evidence from the case study suggests that a colonial legacy played an opposite role; it decreased the likelihood of the European major powers' leadership in bringing the EU's consent to engage in a military peacekeeping operation in the DRC. According to a *Die Welt* report, German policy-makers warned against 'a hasty troop deployment' and insisted that "Germany should not and could not be the first troop contributors".⁶⁵⁵ German politicians stressed the colonial responsibility in other European countries.⁶⁵⁶ Colonial legacy provided Germany with a good excuse to avoid undertaking a serious military burden and shift the core responsibility to Belgium, which was the former colonial power in the DRC. Nonetheless, the role of Belgium remained very informal and minor, *albeit* it had a colonial tie with the DRC. The colonial legacy thus seemed unlikely to generate a Europeanised collective identity and normative responsibility within the EU framework. Hence, the study confirms that colonial legacy was less influential to motivate chief negotiators to lead the EUFOR operation.

The normative institutionalist approach to European foreign and security policy, on the other hand, highlights that the EU's substantive and procedural norms shape member states' behaviour.⁶⁵⁷ In what follows, the constructivist hypothesis based on the normative institutional argument is examined to determine to what extent normative commitment, normative entrapment and normative suasion were important factors to increase the likelihood of chief negotiator's leadership in decision-making on the launch of EUFOR RD Congo.

Once the UK declined to participate in the operation, Franco-German cooperation became all the more important; and the Franco-German tandem played a central role in launching EUFOR RD Congo.⁶⁵⁸ Franco-German cooperation is based on the Elysée Treaty, which was signed by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer on 22 January 1963. The treaty contained a number of agreements for joint cooperation between the two countries in foreign policy, economic and military integration. The treaty has especially become the emblem of

⁶⁵⁵ *Die Welt* (23 January 2006), *op. cit.*

⁶⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵⁷ D. C Thomas (2009), *op. cit.*

⁶⁵⁸ A. Miskimmon, "Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy under the Grand coalition in Germany", *German Studies Association Annual Convention*, 2006, p.7-8.

intense cooperation between France and Germany in peace and security within the EU framework.⁶⁵⁹ These provisions were further extended by the establishment of new structures of cooperation. On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, in 1988-1989, the Franco-German Defence and Security Council (CFADS) was created. Franco-German cooperation was further reinforced in 2003, in parallel with the 40th anniversary of the Treaty, which led the two countries to strengthen their institutional and political association.⁶⁶⁰

Concerning the issue of the EU military operation in the DRC, the first Franco-German meeting was held in Paris on 23 January 2006, in which France and Germany sought to coordinate positions during initial discussions. Since then, President Chirac and Federal Chancellor Merkel discussed Congo issues and the possible deployment of EU troops on several occasions. During the Franco-German Council of Ministers meeting, on 14 March 2006, France and Germany committed themselves to pursue efforts to ‘enable the European Union to react even more efficiently and swiftly to crisis situations in the world.’⁶⁶¹ Furthermore, France and Germany together urged the EU to respond positively to the UN’s request to support MONUC during the general and presidential elections in the DRC. It is important to note that France and Germany reiterated that they were ‘willing to make a significant contribution to this military operation’ and appealed to other member states to ‘provide joint responsibility and fulfilment’ for the operation.⁶⁶² Moreover, when the CFADS met at the Elysée Palace, in October 2006, France and Germany reiterated their commitment to consolidating peace and democracy in the DRC. The two countries expressed their abiding Franco-German commitments that aimed at ending the uncontrolled movement of weapons and promoting the democratisation process in the DRC.⁶⁶³ In sum, the evidence suggests that Franco-German commitments stimulated both countries to take further robust and active action to fulfil their pledge. France and Germany were thus considerably constrained by their normative commitments.

Although France and Germany often faced tensions especially with respect to the question of who would provide the operational leadership, the Franco-German partnership and a series

⁶⁵⁹ See J. L. Clarke, “*New Directions in Franco-German Military Cooperation*”, U.S. Army War College, PA, 1988, pp.76-86.

⁶⁶⁰ See J. Schild, “The 40th Anniversary of the Elysée Treaty: The Franco-German Jubilee as Catalyst for Bilateral Relations and European Policy”, *SWP Comments*, March 2003.

⁶⁶¹ Sixth Franco-German Council of Ministers, Statement by the Franco-German Defence and Security Council, Berlin, 14 March 2006, available at: <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Sixth-Franco-German-Council-of.html> (accessed on 28 Nov. 2010).

⁶⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶⁶³ Statement by the Franco-German Defence and Security Council, Paris, 12 October 2006.

of normative commitments certainly played a crucial role to enable the EU to prepare a possible military deployment for the operation in a timely manner. In light of *normative suasion*, however, it seemed that Franco-German cooperation and normative pressures could not sufficiently convince other EU member states of the necessity of EU military engagement in the DRC. According to a normative institutionalist argument, normative suasion is primarily pursued by communication among actors involved in negotiations. In other words, EU actors would discuss normative reasons why particular European collective action is more desirable and more appropriate than what particular member states preconceive their identities and fundamental interests to be. Whatever the circumstances under which each of the member states may engage in the discussions, normative institutionalists believe that successful normative suasion would produce a convergence in the different preferences of member states.

The case study sought evidence of normative suasion to examine whether France and Germany used normative language during negotiations to get other members to change their reluctant position and to contribute to the EUFOR operation. It systematically looked through every public document provided by the Council of the EU, statements of the French and German government and foreign ministry respectively, as well as news reports released by various mass media sources between January 2006 and February 2007.⁶⁶⁴ The systematic primary and secondary data analyses displayed some remarkable outcomes. First, the use of normative language of 'European responsibility' to protect civilians from serious conflict in the DRC started to increase since 2008, after EUFOR RD Congo.⁶⁶⁵ In other words, the EUFOR operation may have resulted in a change of EU actors' ideas about the concept of the normative responsibility of the EU. However, during the time when the EU went through simultaneous discussions and negotiations on the operation, the normative argument *per se* was hardly present in most documents. Second, although there was some data in which normative terms or verbal alert were highlighted by EU actors, those documents explicitly

⁶⁶⁴ This research study looked through every kind of possible document on the relevant subject: 35 Press releases, 11 archive and Council document of the Council of the EU; 114 EU official statements at the UN; 244 statements of France at the UN (presented at both General Assembly and Security Council); Articles, Speeches and Press releases of the Federal Foreign Office; 12 German news reports (Die Welt); and 42 (2006) and 36 (2007) British news reports (Guardian)

⁶⁶⁵ For example, according to an official document released by the Permanent Mission of France to the UN, France appealed to "the responsibility to protect" and stressed that "it is the international community's subsidiary responsibility, within the framework of the UN, to protect populations". However, it was a document published in April 2011. Therefore, the evidence of France using the normative language in this article has nothing to do with EUFOR RD Congo. See 'La Responsabilité De Protéger', Permanent Mission of France to the UN, April 2011.

indicated that it was “the responsibility of the Government of the DRC” rather than the responsibility of the EU to build sustainable peace and security in the Congo.⁶⁶⁶

According to the result of the analysis, France, Germany or any other EU member state seemed unlikely to use normative terms reflecting European norms and responsibility to support EUFOR RD Congo. While France and Germany fulfilled a major responsibility for the operation, most EU member states, particularly the UK, Italy and Belgium, remained significantly reluctant to provide a military contribution to the EUFOR operation. Consequently, this study confirms that the Franco-German normative pressures were not successful in presenting normative reasons to EU member states on why the EU should embrace normative and humanitarian responsibility for the operation and participate in a cohesive and collective action for the EUFOR RD Congo. In sum, the hypothesis drawn from a constructivist theory is partially accepted; whereas the argument regarding normative commitment and normative entrapment is strong, normative suasion is relatively weak in this specific case.

Conclusion

Whereas Operation *Artemis* was mainly carried out by France as a framework nation under the EU flag, EUFOR RD Congo demonstrated a truly European character not only within the political decision-making arena but also on the ground, *albeit* with all its political and operational drawbacks. The case analysis identified that there are two most important chief negotiators: France and Germany. This chapter focused on the multi-faceted conditions under which France and Germany were likely to provide active leadership to influence the EU’s decision to launch the peacekeeping operation on the UN’s request.

The realist hypothesis claimed that the geo-strategically important conditions of the Great Lakes region would attract the considerable attention of France and Germany, which led to their active role in EU’s decision-making on a peacekeeping operation in the DRC. The evidence from the case study revealed that France and Germany concentrated on gaining a credible reputation aimed at projecting their political influence in the country through a

⁶⁶⁶ For example, see Council document (CL06-120EN), ‘*Background to EU support to the DRC during the election process*’, Brussels, 12 June 2006.

military contribution during the Congolese peace process. It illustrated that during the military operation on the ground, France and Germany manifested their divergent national preferences rather than performed a coherent action driven by a humanitarian or normative purpose. This claim was also supported by the fact that the EUFOR operation was strictly limited in time and space, regardless of the potential for dangerous disturbances after the withdrawal of EUFOR.

The abundance of natural resources and economic interests were another important proposition of the realist hypothesis. The study investigated the operational areas where EU military forces were mandated to be deployed. The analysis revealed that majority of French and German military contingents were stationed in Kinshasa and in Libreville. These two sub-Saharan African countries have emerged as potentially vital suppliers of energy resources and important trade partners for Europe. The evidence in this study showed that following the EUFOR mission in 2006, there were notable changes in the trade flows of the DRC and Gabon towards France and Germany, respectively. In sum, the case analysis confirmed that the realist hypothesis provides plausible explanations for the likelihood of chief negotiator's leadership which may have increased the EU's motivation to launch EUFOR RD Congo.

On the contrary, the hypothesis derived from constructivist theories seemed less convincing and less compelling in this specific case. In light of Europe's colonial legacy, the constructivist hypothesis stressed the important functions of pre-existing norms or the normative responsibility of Europe which are likely to constrain the behaviour of the MS, *inter alia* chief negotiator, in decision-making on a peacekeeping operation. However, the existence of a colonial legacy turned out to be less important and even had a negative impact on negotiations. The constructivist proposition that the existence of a colonial legacy would increase the likelihood of the chief negotiator's active role in the EU's decision to engage in a peacekeeping operation was rejected.

The constructivist hypothesis also argued that Franco-German bilateral commitments provided normative pressures under which EU actors seemed likely to decide to launch the operation. The analysis determined that Franco-German commitments were important factors by which France and Germany became entrapped to act cohesively in accordance with their pledge and commitment. However, apart from the Franco-German commitments and bilateral dialogue, normative discussions were not in fact used to facilitate normative

suasion to get other member states to participate in the operation. Accordingly, this case study confirmed that the constructivist hypothesis is partially accepted; historical memory or responsibility of EU was less influential; and the absence of normative suasion makes the normative constructivist argument inevitably weaker.

Chapter 7

UN-EU Cooperation in Peacekeeping III: Operation EUFOR in Chad and the CAR (2008)

Introduction

Over the course of 2007, the UN and the EU reached an agreement to create simultaneous peacekeeping operations in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). In accordance with the mandate provided by UN Security Council Resolution 1778, the EU decided to deploy a military mission in eastern Chad and the northeast of the Central African Republic, named EUFOR Tchad/RCA.⁶⁶⁷ Its mandate was to contribute to the security of the civilian population by protecting the numerous refugees and displaced persons and the local presence of UN personnel, and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. The UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), on its part, conducts a civilian operation mandated to train and monitor national security forces.⁶⁶⁸

EUFOR Tchad/RCA is the EU's fifth ESDP military deployment following Concordia (2003), Artemis (2003), Althea (2004) and EUFOR RD Congo (2006). It is the largest as well as most ambitious operation in terms of the number of troops deployed. It is also the most multinational and longest autonomous military mission that the EU has deployed in Africa so far.⁶⁶⁹ Moreover, within the context of UN-EU joint action in crisis management, Chad and the CAR is the second region where the EU conducted an EU-led military operation in support of a UN mission. However, given the dominant role of France in the region, operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA has been recognised as “the most complex and

⁶⁶⁷ In this chapter the shorthand ‘EUFOR’ will be used to refer to EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Whenever there can exist any confusion with other EU operations, the full name will be used.

⁶⁶⁸ See UNSC Resolution S/RES 1778 (2007) of 25 September 2005 and Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October 2007.

⁶⁶⁹ Para 10, Document A/2007, Fifty-fourth session for European Security and Defence Assembly, *Report on the European Union mission in Chad: EUFOR Tchad/RCA*, 4 June 2008.

ambitious European mission to date”,⁶⁷⁰ and even controversial. Thus it may not be surprising that the operation encountered a critical question of how and why the EU decided to deploy a sizeable and multidimensional force in the middle of the desert, thousands of kilometres away from Europe, for twelve months.

This chapter analyses the third empirical case of UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping through which the EU conducted an autonomous military operation in close cooperation with the UN in Chad and the CAR. This chapter consists of four main sections. The first section begins by briefly glancing at the emergence of conflict in the region (7.1). The second section explores the dynamic negotiations and decision-making process at the UN and the EU on the issue of peacekeeping operations (7.2). By doing so, this chapter seeks to identify the most important actor(s) who played a vital role in negotiating, initiating and implementing the operation. The two following sections examine the hypotheses derived from the two IR theories, realist hypothesis (7.3) vs. constructivist hypothesis (7.4) respectively. The aim of this chapter is to determine important factors which may influence the likelihood of the chief negotiator’s leadership role which led to the EU’s decision to get involved in a military operation in Chad and the CAR alongside the UN.

7.1 Background

Contrary to the two previous operations conducted in the DRC, the peacekeeping challenge facing Chad was deemed more complex and multifaceted, because the conflict of Chad has not been generated by its own single internal factor. In fact, insecurity and instability in Chad and the CAR have mingled with several different conflicts in neighbouring areas for decades, which have been exacerbated in recent years due to the spill-over from the ongoing conflict in Darfur. As a consequence of refugees from Darfur, Chadians became displaced, which caused “crime, banditry and the power vacuum inside its borders”.⁶⁷¹ The concept of insecurity in Chad thus cannot be separated from the continuous tensions between Chad and Sudan that have heightened after reciprocal attacks on the two countries’ capitals by rebel forces.

⁶⁷⁰ See B. Charbonneau (2009), *op. cit.*, p.555.

⁶⁷¹ F. Arteaga, “The Chad Conflict, United Nations (MINURCAT)”, Global Policy Forum, March 10, 2008, available at: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/180-chad-car/33312-the-chad-conflict-united-nations-minurcat.html> (accessed on 15 June 2010).

Chad is a landlocked country with an area of 1.25 million km² and 10 million inhabitants. According to UN Development reports, as of 2009, Chad ranks eighth from last in the Human Development Index (HDI), rating 175th of 182.⁶⁷² Even though its GDP has been growing by five times the rate of that of China over the last few years due to oil revenues, Chad still remains very poor and has never experienced a long period of stability.⁶⁷³ Despite oil revenues, poor conditions within the country have not been alleviated, because most of them flowed into subsidising military groups to repel the offensive Chadian rebels.⁶⁷⁴

The highly unstable situation of the Chadian government has significantly deteriorated since 2003 due to the war in Darfur.⁶⁷⁵ Darfur is an extremely poor and arid region in the west of Sudan close to the borders with Chad and the CAR (see Figure 7.1). Darfur has gone through volatile situations for many years due to a conflict between the Arab nomad population and the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa farming communities.⁶⁷⁶ The instability and insecurity in the region worsened in 2003 following a spate of attacks against Sudanese Government installations by African rebel groups who reproached the Sudanese Government for its pro-Arab stance and policy of repression against the African population.⁶⁷⁷ This led to violent reprisals against the local African population, with the Sudanese Government openly supporting a number of 'self-defence' militia groups. In particular, the pro-Arab Janjaweed militias engaged in the systematic massacre, abuse and rape of local African villagers, establishing a climate of terror and causing nearly two million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to flee.⁶⁷⁸ Accordingly, the Darfur conflict had an inevitable consequence of insecurity that has spilled over into Chad and the CAR, due in particular to the floods of refugees.

⁶⁷² Statistics of the Human Development Report (2009), UNDP, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/> (accessed on 11 June 2010).

⁶⁷³ F. Arteaga (2008), *op.cit.*, p.1.

⁶⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷⁵ "EU Relations with Chad", European Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/country-cooperation/chad/chad_en.htm (accessed on 29 May 2010).

⁶⁷⁶ See Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (2005), 'Targeting the Fur: Mass Killings in Darfur', January 24, 2005, available at <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/darfur0105/> (accessed on 29 May 2010).

⁶⁷⁷ X. Zeebroek, P. Sebahara and F. Santopinto, "*Darfour, Tchad, Centrafrique: Des processus de paix à l'épreuve du feu*", GRIP analyses, 12 February 2008.

⁶⁷⁸ See J. Flint, "*Beyond 'Janjaweed: Understanding the Militas of Darfur'*", Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2009.

Figure 7. 1 Map of Chad and planned EUFOR positions ⁶⁷⁹



⁶⁷⁹ Source: Map No. 3788 Rev. 7 - United Nations Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section.

The situation in Chad became even more volatile due to the violence and conflicts between rebels and government troops, as well as due to the presence of armed criminal militia groups, which brought about further movements of refugees. According to a report of the UN Secretary-General, fighting between the Chadian armed forces and rebel groups, some of which were armed and supported by Sudan, and the attacks by militia on the civilian population continued to destabilise eastern Chad, leading to widespread insecurity and human rights violations, including a number of internal displacements of civilian populations.⁶⁸⁰ As a result of the ongoing violence and militias attacks on the Chadian population, the refugee population in eastern Chad had reached around 232,000, whilst the number of IDPs had risen from an estimated 92,000 in December 2006 to 120,000 by February 2007.⁶⁸¹ The increase in IDPs, newly displaced persons and refugees has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad. As a consequence, Chad was extremely weakened as it faced rebel movements in Sudan and an intensification of violence between ethnic groups.

International involvement in the regional crisis started in the aftermath of the outbreak of the war in Darfur and has taken many different shapes since then. In order to protect civilians in danger, the African Union (AU) undertook the first peacekeeping efforts in Darfur with the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004. As this relatively small operation rapidly acquired a reputation for ineffectiveness, UN Security Council Resolution 1769 mandated to incorporate AMIS into the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007.⁶⁸² This civilian-military mission, with the authorised troop strength correspondingly raised from AMIS's 7,700 to 26,000 (20,000 military and 6,000 police contributions combined), has taken over the command. Despite the efforts of the UN-AU hybrid operation to contribute to protecting civilians, particularly refugees and displaced persons, UNAMID was plagued by much the same problem as AMIS. The insecurity of Darfur caused more serious problems to its neighbouring countries, Chad and the CAR.

⁶⁸⁰ UN S/2006/1019, Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of Security Council resolution 1706 (2006), United Nations Security Council, 22 December 2006.

⁶⁸¹ UN S/2007/97, 'Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic', United Nations Security Council, 23 February 2007.

⁶⁸² UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007), 31 July 2007.

7.2 Decision-making in Practice

Level I : International UNSC level

When the UN first contemplated taking over AMIS under the UNSC command, the establishment of a ‘multidimensional presence’ in Chad and the CAR had already been evoked.⁶⁸³ At the UN Security Council meeting on 31 August 2006, the Council adopted Resolution 1706 concerning the situation in Darfur, in which the UNSC reaffirmed its concern about the regional security situation, particularly in neighbouring areas along the borders between Sudan and Chad and between Sudan and the Central African Republic. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to vest international efforts to protect civilians in refugee and internally displaced persons camps in Chad and to seek answers on how to improve the security situation on the Chadian side of the border with Sudan.⁶⁸⁴

France became the political driving force behind the operation in Chad and the CAR. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, France drew the Security Council’s attention to the regional aspects of Darfur, emphasising the spillover effects of the crisis into the areas of Chad and the CAR. From September 2006, France started convening open debates within the Security Council and urged the need to ensure stable and secure conditions within Chad’s borders.⁶⁸⁵ During subsequent informal consultations and discussions, the Secretary-General was requested to deploy an advance mission to Chad and the CAR as soon as possible.⁶⁸⁶ In response to the request to take robust action to protect civilians at risk, the UN Secretariat came up with some preliminary options regarding the possible mandate, structure and concept of operations of a multidimensional United Nations presence in both eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic.

On February 2007, the Secretary-General initiated and presented a finalised plan to deploy the UN operation to Chad and the CAR, namely MINURCAT. In the first outline of the plan, this multidimensional presence would encompass three component activities: military, police,

⁶⁸³ A. Mattelaer, “The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations: The Case of EUFOR TChad/RCA”, IES Working Paper, 2008, p.8. See also UNSC Resolution 1706 (2006).

⁶⁸⁴ Also, Resolution 1706 addressed the need of a multidimensional presence consisting of political, humanitarian, military and civilian police in Chad and the CAR in order to improve the security situation. See paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 UNSC Resolution 1706 (2006).

⁶⁸⁵ Government Statement at the UN Security Council presented by Ambassador Jean-Marc De La Sablière, French Permanent Representative to the United Nations, ‘Security Council Open Debate on the situation in Sudan’, 11 September 2006.

⁶⁸⁶ UN 2007 (S/2007/97), *op. cit.*

and civilian. The military operation would assist in protecting civilians at risk and provide an “umbrella of relative security” under which the UN and the humanitarian aid community could establish a more secure environment in the area of deployment.⁶⁸⁷ The police pillar would undertake to police refugee camps and support national law enforcement activities in combination with a UN military presence that would be required to provide security in a wide area for the UN operation. Finally, the civilian pillar would be comprised of various activities, including civil affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian liaison and public information.⁶⁸⁸

However, the UN faced difficulties in deploying a multidimensional presence along the Chad-Sudan border, as the President Idriss Déby expressed strong opposition to the military presence provided by the UN. Although the Chadian authorities agreed, in principle, to the deployment of a multidimensional UN presence to eastern Chad, President Déby and his Government feared that the increased international presence would limit their margin for manoeuvre.⁶⁸⁹ Such a difficult situation caused by the Chadian and Sudanese opposition, however, became alleviated by the active negotiating role of France. France held high-level meetings in Paris and led the numerous discussions with EU members along with the UN and other stakeholders in New York.⁶⁹⁰ More importantly, in light of their historical relationship as well as a bilateral agreement between France and Chad, the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, tried to convince and persuade the Chadian government to accept a military operation.⁶⁹¹ On 10 June, President Déby met with Kouchner to discuss the situation in eastern Chad. Having subsequent discussions with the French Foreign Minister, Déby agreed to the deployment of an international military presence in eastern Chad.⁶⁹² In July 2007, President Idriss Déby finally came to an agreement on the presence of a military

⁶⁸⁷ See A. Mattelaer (2008), *op. cit.*, p.9.

⁶⁸⁸ See UN Document S/2007/97, and A. Mattelaer (2008), *Ibid.*, p.8-9.

⁶⁸⁹ For more details on the negotiations between EU-UN-Chadian on the UN follow-on force, see W. Kuehne, “*How the EU Organizes [sic] and Conducts Peace Operations in Africa: EUFOR / MINURCA*”, ZIF Report, Berlin, 13 March 2009.

⁶⁹⁰ Interview with a French delegate to the United Nations, New York, 07 April 2009.

⁶⁹¹ According to French national documents on Franco-Chadian cooperation, due to historic, linguistic and military ties, Chad has a very special relationship with France, which France considered as its closest and most significant partner (see Framework partnership document France-Chad [2006-2010], French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs).

⁶⁹² For details, see UNSC Document S/2007/488, ‘United Nations delegation to Chad and the Central African Republic: Summary of Activities’, reported by the Secretary-General on 10 August 2007.

component, but proposed a French and European military component instead of military force run by the UN.⁶⁹³

Based on the Chadian consent and proposal for the mission, the UN Security Council began redesigning an international-multidimensional operation in Chad and the CAR. In August 2007, the Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon unveiled a revised concept in his report S/700/488. One of the distinguishing features of this new concept is that it called for the deployment of an operation authorised by the UN with three distinct elements:⁶⁹⁴ the UN would handle the civilian operation, including civil affairs, human rights, rule of law and mission support; while the Chadian Government would comprise the police component with UN backing; and the EU would take charge of the military component of the mission.

The five permanent members of the Security Council favoured the new draft resolution that authorised the deployment of MINURCAT supported by a military component under EU leadership.⁶⁹⁵ Russia, in particular, committed itself to the participation in the EUFOR mission associating with the two other non-EU countries, Albania and Croatia.⁶⁹⁶ Finally, on 25 September 2007, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1778 authorising the deployment of a multidimensional presence in the eastern part of Chad and north-eastern region of the Central African Republic, consisting of three components:⁶⁹⁷

- a multidisciplinary UN mission (MINURCAT) comprising police officers, military liaison officers and civilian personnel, whose mandate includes the selection of Chadian police officers and providing training in the field of humanitarian protection and the monitoring and promotion of human rights;
- a Chadian Police for Humanitarian Protection (Police Tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire, PTPH) dedicated to maintaining law and order in refugee camps;
- an EU military presence to support the UN action.

The UN-level negotiations suggest that France certainly played a key role as a chief negotiator. France showed its important role not only by initiating the peacekeeping mandate

⁶⁹³ Interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, Paris, 05 March 2010.

⁶⁹⁴ See UN Document S/2007/488, 10 August 2007.

⁶⁹⁵ H. Gandois, "Frances Gandoisy towards Africa within the Security Council from 2007 to 2010: a real multilateral turn?", *Dynamic Internationals*, issue 4, May 2011, pp.1-24 (p.13).

⁶⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁷ See UNSC Resolution 1778 (2007) and EU Document A/2007.

at the Security Council but also by leading a substantial agreement among stakeholders on the deployment of a UN-EU multidimensional presence in Chad and the CAR. The UK and Germany, however, did not play much of a role during negotiations and decision-making at the UN level.⁶⁹⁸ The study systematically went through every UN document that Britain, Germany and Italy produced related to this subject.⁶⁹⁹ However, neither the UK nor Germany significantly demonstrated any official support or commitment or provided any official statement or paper on the given issue.

The High Representative Javier Solana, on the other hand, appeared once at the end of Level I negotiations as a facilitator. Solana addressed a letter to the Secretary-General on 17 September 2007, informing that the EU Council had approved the concept of crisis management for the operation envisaged in Chad and the CAR.⁷⁰⁰ In his letter, Solana confirmed the readiness of the EU to support the UN action, and he suggested an urgent condition to make a precise identification of detailed modalities under which the EU would carry out the mission.

Before the EUFOR mission was completed, Javier Solana had another chance to present a message on behalf of the EU at the UN Security Council. When senior officials from both organisations initiated a meeting to discuss the mid-mandate Review process, which would eventually lead to the termination of the operation and accordingly the handover to MINUCAT, Solana attended the meeting at the Security Council in June 2008. This was quite a remarkable occasion, as the Security Council normally meets at the ambassador level. Apart from a visit to Chad in May 2008, Solana had not been involved in the EUFOR operation and was largely absent from the whole process. During his visit to the Security Council, Solana urged a “quick decision from the Security Council” to lead to the

⁶⁹⁸ Interviews with UN officials (02-03 April 2009), French, British and German delegates to the United Nations (16, 25 March and 07 April 2009), and CIC (06 April 2009), New York

⁶⁹⁹ This study has gone through advanced searches for every relevant source within the time ranging from September 2006 to October 2007 by accessing not only UN archives, but also the UK mission to the UN and the Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN in New York. Only eleven Security Council Meetings Coverage and Press Releases were found related to the subject, but none of them were produced by the UK, Italy or Germany.

⁷⁰⁰ See UNSC Document S/2007/560, “Annex to the letter dated 21 September from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General”, 21 September 2007.

appropriate handover to the EUFOR by the UN. And he affirmed that the EU would do its best to support the UN in all areas and thus to make the transition a success.⁷⁰¹

In sum, the High Representative demonstrated his minor role at the international UN level. Javier Solana did not have any influence on decision-making in the Security Council but facilitated negotiations. In this respect, one EU official pointed out that the HR hardly played a significant role in negotiations as a decision-maker by stressing that “Solana only did his role as a facilitator liaising simultaneous interactions between the UN and the EU within the inter-organizational framework.”⁷⁰²

Level II : Domestic EU level

When the bilateral discussions between French Foreign Minister Kouchner and the Chadian President Déby were ongoing, the EU simultaneously began to prepare for undertaking the military component of the EUFOR mission. On 21 May 2007, the very first mentioning of the idea of a possible deployment of an ESDP operation in Chad and the CAR was discussed at the meeting of the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC).⁷⁰³ At the PSC meeting, the French Delegation proposed that “the EU should intervene in the Chad/Darfur crises” and suggested an initiative for the Chad operation.⁷⁰⁴ According to a French national official, it was followed by “further discussions on the possibility of EUFOR in Chad and CAR, which was also exclusively proposed by the French ministry of foreign affairs.”⁷⁰⁵ Moreover, the French government suggested that other EU member states provide the military element of a multidimensional UN mission in Chad and CAR.⁷⁰⁶ The French initial proposal to engage the EU in Chad gradually led to a joint Commission-Council Secretariat Options Paper to be adopted on 13 July 2007, in which the security dimension was especially emphasised.⁷⁰⁷ At

⁷⁰¹ Javier Solana, “Intervention de Javier SOLANA sur EUFOR Tchad/RCA”, UN Security Council, New York, 24 September 2008.

⁷⁰² Interview with an official from the European Commission, Brussels, 29 April, 2010.

⁷⁰³ A. Mattelaer (2008), *op. cit.*, p.14. For further details, see also EU Document A/2007, *op.cit.*, p.12.

⁷⁰⁴ See EU Document A/2009, *European Union Operation Chains of command: Informational Report*, European Security and Defence Assembly, 6 May 2008, para. 42.

⁷⁰⁵ Interview with French national official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 05 March 2010.

⁷⁰⁶ L. Simon (ed.), “European Defence Capabilities: No Adaptability without Co-operation”, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), *Occasional Paper*, March 2010, p.8.

⁷⁰⁷ See EU Document A/2049, *European Union support of UN peacekeeping operations- reply to the annual report of the Council*, European Security and Defence Assembly, 2 December 2009, para. 36.

the Council meeting of 23-24 July 2007, the Council finally approved the EU's involvement in a multidimensional UN presence in eastern Chad and the north-eastern CAR.⁷⁰⁸

France played a central role at the EU level as a chief negotiator. A French official stresses that "France made significant efforts to launch the operation in Chad and CAR by lobbying to win the EU approval for the operation and to convince our partners [EU members] to participate in EUFOR Tchad/RCA."⁷⁰⁹ During the negotiation phase in Brussels, France worked particularly hard to persuade the reluctant EU countries who suspected that the mission would serve nothing but French interests, and simultaneously lobbied to get unanimous agreement on the deployment of the ESDP mission in the area.⁷¹⁰ At the operational level, given the lack of sufficient soldiers for the mission, France announced that it would "plug the gaps" by supplying about 2,000 soldiers or half the total number for the ESDP mission.⁷¹¹ Furthermore, France pledged to fulfil logistical requirements, including helicopters and transport aircraft.

In light of the ESDP operational planning process, France viewed the options paper as the opportunity to address its willingness to be the lead nation, which meant that it would activate the Mont Valérien Operation Headquarters (OHQ) for that purpose.⁷¹² However, France expressed that it would not provide the Operation Commander for political reasons, and thereby noted that "one of the other member states would have to carry out the responsibility of the Operation Commander".⁷¹³ France certainly seemed to lose strong support from the most powerful and vocal nations in the EU, *i.e.* Germany and the UK. Whereas Germany and the UK were active in the Darfur situation; in the case of Chad, both countries were the most reticent about the action, considering the operation another "pet project in support of *Françafrique*".⁷¹⁴ In addition, Germany and the UK made explicitly clear that while they would not block the operation, they would not contribute to it either.⁷¹⁵

⁷⁰⁸ See the EU press release, 'Council conclusion on Sudan/Darfur: 2817th External Relations Council Meeting', Council of the European Union, 23 and 24 July 2007.

⁷⁰⁹ Interview with French national official, Ministry of Defence, Paris, 05 March 2010

⁷¹⁰ See F. Mérand and H. M. Rakotonirina, "La Force Européenne au Tchad et en Centrafrique: Le Baptême du feu", *Politique Africaine*, vol.113, 2009, pp.105-125 (pp.108-13).

⁷¹¹ "France pledges more troops to EU force in Chad, CAR", Deutsche Welle, 24 March 2008, available at www.dw-world.de/dw/article/o,2144,3053474,00.html (accessed on 17 May 2010)

⁷¹² H. Dijkstra, "The Military Operation of the EU in Chad and the Central African Republic: Good Policy, Bad Politics", *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 17, no.3, 2010, pp. 395-407 (p.398); and see also EU Document A/2009, *op. cit.*, para. 43.

⁷¹³ Interview with Council Secretariat official, Brussels, 28 April 2010; also see EU Document A/2009, *Ibid.*

⁷¹⁴ H. Dijkstra (2010), *op. cit.*, p.396.

⁷¹⁵ Interview with Council Secretariat official, Brussels, 28 April 2010.

In contrast with the less likely cooperative position of Germany and the UK, Italy confirmed it would take care of medical needs and provide a field hospital, not military forces.⁷¹⁶ This meant that “[...] France would probably have to carry out much larger than foreseen military and financial burden. Under these circumstances, France would have to approach other member states to make sufficient troops available and to put the position of the operation commander on the EU table.”⁷¹⁷ In spite of significant efforts by France to convince other reluctant EU member states, however, the scepticism among member states that the mission would serve French interests seemed unlikely to be eased.

Whilst the question of who would provide the Operation Commander still remained uncertain, Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, initially demonstrated a keen interest in the operation.⁷¹⁸ According to the interview evidence, Sweden had planned to provide a sizable contingent by sending a Swedish General to command the operation. Yet, this was misread by France, which viewed Bildt’s interest as a possible deployment of a Swedish-led Nordic Battle Group of 1,500 troops.⁷¹⁹ After a visit to the region in early September, the Swedish Government changed its mind. Minister Bildt announced that Sweden would not contribute such a large amount of troops nor accept the position of Operation Commander, for the mission seemed to be more challenging than expected.⁷²⁰ After all, Sweden confirmed that it would reduce its participation in the operation without providing the Operation Commander.⁷²¹

Hence, when the UN visited the Mont Valérien OHQ in early September, the EU was not able to provide any precise information, as the Operation Commander had still not been assigned.⁷²² Nevertheless, the political-strategic planning phase at the EU level got back on track as of the beginning of September 2007, when the PSC began seeking a commander for the operation. The EU organised an informal force generation conference on 24 September, but apart from France, very few states were willing to contribute.⁷²³ Given this difficult situation, President Nicolas Sarkozy made a call to his counterparts in Europe. According to an official from the French ministry of foreign affairs, Sarkozy’s calls were successful in finally bringing the position of Operation Commander to Ireland, who had expressed the

⁷¹⁶ Interview with Italian national officer, Embassy of Italy in Seoul, 31 May 2012.

⁷¹⁷ Interview with national official from the Ministry of Defence, Paris, 05 March 2010.

⁷¹⁸ H. Dijkstra (2010), *op. cit.*

⁷¹⁹ Interview with official, EU Commission, Brussels, 29 April 2010.

⁷²⁰ Hylke Dijkstra, *op.cit.*, p.398

⁷²¹ EU Document A/2007, *op.cit.*, pp.12-13.

⁷²² EU Document A/2009, *op.cit.*, para. 48.

⁷²³ A. Mattelaer (2008), *op.cit.*, p.17

intention of sending a large (400-strong) contingent; also, Poland pledged to make a similar contribution of around 350-400 troops, in addition to smaller contingents provided by other member states.⁷²⁴

In parallel with the operational concept proposed by the UN Secretary-General, the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) of the European Union outlined a multidimensional presence, which became the first formal EU planning document. The PSC issued three distinct CMC domains - political, humanitarian, and security domains - and defined their specific tasks. At the meeting of 12 September, the Council approved the concept of crisis management for the operation envisaged in Chad and the CAR, and also released the Military Strategic Option (MSO).⁷²⁵ Five days later, on 17 September, the High Representative (SG/HR) of the CFSP, Javier Solana, reported to the Secretary General of the UN that the EU was willing to take charge of the military component of the operation during the first 12 months.⁷²⁶ In his letter, HR Solana urged the Security Council to “adopt an urgent resolution providing a mandate adapted for the European force and authorising the deployment of elements of the European force in Chad and the CAR during the operation as well as during its disengagement phase”.⁷²⁷

As a consequence, UNSC Resolution 1778 of 25 September 2007 approved the establishment of a UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and authorised the EU to deploy military forces under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which allows the use of force if necessary, even taking “all necessary measures” to fulfil its functions.⁷²⁸ The EU was mandated to deploy EU-led forces in eastern Chad and the north-eastern CAR for a period of 12 months from the declaration of initial operating capability.⁷²⁹ In accordance with the mandate set out in UNSC Resolution 1706 (2006), 1769 (2007) and 1778 (2007), the EU reaffirmed its commitment to conduct a military bridging operation in Chad and CAR, named EUFOR Tchad/RCA. The Council unanimously adopted Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP, on 15 October 2007. The objectives of EUFOR Tchad/RCA were the following:

⁷²⁴ Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 06 March 2010.

⁷²⁵ For an overview of EUFOR planning milestones, see A. Mattelaer (2008), *op.cit.*, p.14.

⁷²⁶ UN Document S/2007/560, *op. cit.*

⁷²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁸ UNSC Resolution 1778 (S/RES/1778), para.6.

⁷²⁹ *Ibid.*

- to contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;
- to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations; and
- to contribute to protecting United Nations personnel and activities.

Under the mandate provided by UNSC Resolution 1778 and Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP, the EU launched its military bridging operation, EUFOR Tchad/RCA. The EUFOR mission deployed the forces in support of humanitarian and police action for MINURCAT from 28 January 2008 to 15 March 2009. Although the operation was initially planned to begin in mid-January 2008, due to the heightened level of instability and insecure conditions in Chad culminating in an anti-government rebel attack, the deployment of EU forces had to be suspended.⁷³⁰ Consequently, after the postponement of the deployment, the EU-led military operation was officially declared operational on 15 March 2008, and the operation continued for a period of 12 months until the UN took over from EUFOR on 15 March 2009.

Despite a highly suspicious political atmosphere among member states, the force generation phase was finally completed in January 2008. Fourteen members expressed commitment to providing forces on the ground and twenty-two member states contributed personnel to OHQ in Mont Valérien. The fourteen member states contributing to the forces on the ground were the following:⁷³¹ Austria (160), Belgium (70), Finland (40), France (2100), Greece (4), Ireland (400), Italy (97), the Netherlands (60), Poland (400), Portugal (30), Romania (120), Slovenia (15), Spain (80) and Sweden (200). Four other member states, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg and the UK were only represented at the Force Headquarters (see Table 7.1). Germany stationed four personnel only at the Operation Headquarters in Europe. The fact that neither Germany nor the UK engaged with troops critically exhibits a limited operational consensus among the major powers (Big-four) on the EUFOR mission, despite the unanimous adoption and implementation of the Joint Action.

⁷³⁰ Interview with official, Council of the EU, Brussels, 28 April 2010.

⁷³¹ The case analysis of this study notes that the number of force contribution of EU member states may vary in statistical analysis in different institutions, as the EU member states frequently changed the numbers of troop contributions. Moreover, individual governments seem unlikely to disclose data to the public. In this chapter, the number of troop contribution is based on the source and reports provided by an authoritative EU official body, European Security and Defence Assembly (Assembly of WEU).


As Figure 7.2 displays, the biggest troop contributor was France (2,100 out of 3,700 troops). In addition to a number of troops, France supplied high-tech facilities and equipment: two unmanned aerial vehicles, nine helicopters, etc. Poland provided 350- to 400-strong forces composed of various units, including infantry, engineering, support, an intelligence unit, as well as two multirole helicopters. Poland also provided the Deputy Operation Commander. The third major contributor was Ireland, with 400 soldiers. Ireland also provided the Operation Commander, Lieutenant-General Patrick Nash.

Table 7. 1 Contribution of the EU Member States to EUFOR Tchad/RCA

Country	Troops contributing	Represented at FHQ	Represented at OHQ
Austria	160	13	4
Belgium	70	4	6
Bulgaria	-	1	1
Cyprus	-	-	2
Czech Republic	-	1	1
Denmark	-	-	-
Estonia	-	-	-
Finland	40	2	2
France	2100	114	69
Germany	-	-	4
Greece	4	2	2
Hungary	-	-	3
Ireland	400	10	18
Italy	97	2	4
Latvia	-	-	-
Lithuania	-	-	2
Luxembourg	-	2	-
Malta	-	-	-
Netherlands	60	5	3
Poland	400	5	4
Portugal	30	-	2
Romania	120	1	1

Slovakia	-	-	1
Slovenia	15	1	1
Spain	80	3	3
Sweden	200	5	4
United Kingdom	-	2	2
EU-27 Total	14 states (approx. 3700)	17 states	22 states

Figure 7. 2 Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs)



In light of the role of chief negotiators, the positions of the Big-4 on EUFOR Tchad/RCA were remarkably split in comparison to any other issues on ESDP operations. While France displayed a dominant role in every stage of negotiations in Brussels, both the UK and Germany were strongly suspicious of the deployment of EUFOR during negotiations, which

resulted in no contribution of any forces. Italy supported the initial entry forces, consisting of Austrian, French, Belgian, Irish and Swedish troops, by providing and running an Italian field hospital, “Role 2”,⁷³² which was expected to demonstrate the “European identity of EUFOR”.⁷³³ However, the Italian role as chief negotiator was not found during political dialogues.

According to one British diplomat, Britain’s low profile on this EUFOR operation was related to “the nature of British foreign policy”.⁷³⁴ It was claimed that having carefully considered the trade-off between success and failure of the mission, the UK was aware that it might damage itself by approving a French-led EU military operation, which seemed likely to fail or be extremely difficult to achieve success.⁷³⁵ Within the EU, the UK is obviously not a small country that would provide few troops. Instead, the UK would have been more likely to make a significant contribution had it committed itself, which means that the nation could be more seriously damaged and suffer losses as well. At the time, EUFOR Tchad/RCA was the third and biggest EU military operation which demanded a tremendous financial as well as personnel contribution in addition to various resources such as vehicles, helicopters, medical facilities and many infrastructures. As Britain was neither very keen on the situation in *Françafrique* Chad and the CAR, nor found any necessary reason to get involved in this challenging mission, the UK wanted to keep a low profile on this operation.

Like the UK, Germany was also very reluctant to support the deployment of EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Germany held the EU presidency at the time when negotiations were ongoing in both Brussels and New York. Yet Germany tried to keep the issue off the agenda in favour of other priorities, such as the “final settlement of the constitutional debate”.⁷³⁶ As discussed earlier in the previous case chapter, Germany developed a bilateral relationship with France on a wide range of policy areas, namely Franco-German cooperation (known as the Elysée Treaty). Novosseloff stresses that “Franco-German issues are widely seen as the engine of European integration and a key partnership when it comes to particular foreign and security

⁷³² See News in Brief, “EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Second Quarter 2008”, European Union External Action, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/eufor-tchadrca/news-in-brief/> (accessed on 13 Nov 2012).

⁷³³ See “Summary of Remarks by Lt General Patrick Nash, Operation Commander EUFOR Tchad/RCA”, EU Press Conference, Brussels, 29 January 2008, p.3, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/98479.pdf (accessed on 14 Nov.2012).

⁷³⁴ Interview with British diplomat at the United Nations, New York, 14 April 2009.

⁷³⁵ Interview with official, Council of the EU, Brussels, 27 April 2010.

⁷³⁶ H. Dijkstra (2010), *op.cit.*, p.397.

policy within the EU framework.”⁷³⁷ Also, according to one German military advisor, “humanitarian intervention to protect civilians against violence is one of the top priorities for German security foreign policy.”⁷³⁸ Despite such commitments by Germany to share significant responsibility in promoting effective humanitarian and multilateral peace operations along with France, however, Germany remained very sceptical of the operation. A global intelligence STRATFOR report criticised that Germany believed that EUFOR Tchad/RCA would be nothing but a “product of French self-aggrandizement [*sic*]”.⁷³⁹ Germany was thus not happy to accept the ‘pet project’ in support of French interest.

In terms of the role of the High Representative, Kuehne claims that Solana made efforts to dispel the suspicion among member states.⁷⁴⁰ However, Javier Solana played a merely minor and limited role as a facilitator, rather than as an influential decision-maker, at EU-level negotiations.

In sum, the case analysis confirms that France was the chief negotiator. The identification of the most important chief negotiator would provide a key answer to the main research question about ‘under what conditions do EU Member States lead peacekeeping operations?’ Mattelaer quotes a passage from his interview that the operation was launched for many different reasons of varying importance [for France], but “there is no single dominant motivation”.⁷⁴¹ Various experts and authors suggest that the interpretation of the French incentives that pushed UN-EU multidimensional cooperation in Chad and the CAR can be diverse.⁷⁴² In the next two sections, important conditions under which France seemed likely to provide its active leadership which increased the likelihood of the EU’s decision to launch EUFOR Tchad/RCA are further examined. Hypothetical propositions drawn from realist theories *vs.* constructivist theories are tested. The goal of this chapter is to determine which of these diverse motivations were most important.

⁷³⁷ Interview with A. Novosseloff, Ministry of Defence of France, Paris, 05 March 2010.

⁷³⁸ Interview with national official, German Mission the UN, New York, 16 March 2009.

⁷³⁹ See STRATFOR, “*Chad: The EU Peacekeeper’s Tense Deployment*”, 12 February 2008.

⁷⁴⁰ W. Kuehne (2009), *op. cit.*, p.3.

⁷⁴¹ A. Mattelaer (2008), *op. cit.*, pp.15-16.

⁷⁴² For example, see A. Mattelaer, *op. cit.*; B. Charbonneau (2009), *op. cit.*; G. R. Olsen, “The EU and Military conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?”, *International Peacekeeping*, vol.16, no.2, 2009, pp.245-260; T. Koepf, “France and EU Military Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: Keeping Paris ‘on board’”, *CFSP Forum*, vol. 8, no. 3, May 2010, pp.8-14.

7.3 Realist hypothesis

The African continent has recently faced the re-emergence of great powers whose primary concerns largely focus on regional security in Africa based on various strategic interests. From a realist perspective, states want to develop military power and the capability to influence the international arena whenever they can.⁷⁴³ Realists would argue that EU member states seek to expand their military influence beyond their borders regardless of whether there is a threat to Europe. For realists, European security and defence policy is seen as a product of a series of processes through which individual member states transfer their power and authority to the European Union; by doing so, member states believe that they can maximise and achieve greater influence on the international stage than doing it alone. According to a realist argument, the development of the ESDP significantly reflects such strategic interests of member states. Accordingly, strong interests of some individual member states are often likely to be transferred to the EU's ESDP interest.⁷⁴⁴

This realist assumption is similarly found in Olsen's article which depicts that the identity of the EU is closely related to European interests driven by those of powerful member states.⁷⁴⁵ More specifically, Olsen argues that the development of the EU's military conflict management policy, particularly towards Africa, has first and foremost been motivated by two sets of interests: European common interests in general, and the French national interests in particular. Olsen's realist approach can be further strengthened by Howorth's claim, which was discussed in the previous case chapter. According to Howorth, France tends to conceive of the national and the European dimensions as nearly identical. French foreign policy has pursued a fundamental preference for a stronger EU profile in terms of 'Europeanisation' as a means of bringing French national power to the region.⁷⁴⁶

The foreign security and defence policy of France towards Africa has considerably changed since 2007, when Sarkozy's new government was formed. In comparison with the extent of foreign security and defence policy projected reforms in the previous governments of five successive presidents, from 1958 up to 2007 - de Gaulle (1958-1969), Pompidou (1969-1974), Giscard d'Estaing (1974-1981), Mitterrand (1981-1995) and Chirac (1995-2007) -

⁷⁴³ For example, see K. Waltz (1979), *op. cit.*; R. Gilpin (1981), *op. cit.*; J. Mearshimer (2001), *op. cit.*

⁷⁴⁴ For example, see Z. Selden (2010), *op. cit.*

⁷⁴⁵ G. R. Olsen (2009), *op. cit.*

⁷⁴⁶ J. Howorth (1997), *op. cit.*

there is indeed a great potential for change in Sarkozy's administration.⁷⁴⁷ Over the past half century, the world changed and accordingly the position of France in the world also changed. According to Mesfin, France found its position drastically weakened, in fact "becoming one medium-size power among many others".⁷⁴⁸ In such a dramatic depreciation of the French position in the world, French policymakers might want to come up with a new way of recovering its reputation and *place dans le monde*. Sarkozy's authorities first proclaimed that they would establish a 'strong French-led Europe' and maintain an inherently prestigious power towards Africa.⁷⁴⁹ In addition, the new government declared that they would replace *Françafrique* with *Eurafrique*, which implies Europeanisation of actions that France has undertaken in Africa.⁷⁵⁰ In parallel with this new agenda, EUFOR Tchad/RCA was put on the table for the first test of French capability.

In light of the relationship with Chad, France had developed a defence agreement with the country after its independence in 1960. In 1986, France and Chad agreed a permanent bilateral military presence, namely *Operation Epervier*, through which France reflected its "vested interest" in Chad's stability.⁷⁵¹ Since the nominal independence of Chad in 1960, France has always kept a sizeable military presence in the country and accommodated whoever was in power, such as Malloum, Goukouni, Habré and Déby, in order to maintain French influence in Chad. Yet, France's exclusive influence on the Chadian government began to falter when crude oil became the country's primary source of revenue. Chad's oil production brought an influx of non-European external powers to the country. Washington is very much present, and more recently China appeared in Chad and signed several contracts in the oil, mining and energy sectors, followed by oil companies such as Esso and Chevron, which are the main exploiters of Chadian oil on the basis of concessions granted to them by Déby.⁷⁵² As a consequence, the exclusive and absolute power of France over its old ally Chad declined in the political, cultural and economic arenas.

⁷⁴⁷ See also C. Major and C. Mölling, "Sarkozy's Brave New World: France's Foreign Security and Defence Policy", *European Security Review*, no.35, 5 October 2007, pp.1-7; B. Mesfin, "Only a Folie de Grandeur? Understanding French policy in Africa", *African Study Review*, vol.17, no.1, March 2008, pp. 114-118.

⁷⁴⁸ B. Mesfin (2008), *Ibid.*, p.115.

⁷⁴⁹ *Ibid.* See also French government document, "Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale", presented by President Nicolas Sarkozy, Paris, 17 June 2008.

⁷⁵⁰ B. Mesfin (2008), *Ibid.* p.116.

⁷⁵¹ H. Dijkstra (2010), *op. cit.*, p.397; For further details of French foreign policy in Chad, see B. Charbonneau, "France", in D. Black and P. Williams (eds.), *The International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur*, London: Routledge, 2010, pp.213-31.

⁷⁵² W. Kuehne (2009), *op. cit.*, pp.13-16.

Hence, from a realist point of view, it was deemed important for France to recover its prestige and influential position in Chad for political, strategic and economic reasons. Despite difficult circumstances posed by escalating rebel threats, demand for enormous financial as well as personnel contributions to crisis management, and the suspicious glance of other member states within the EU, France strived to deploy a French-led EUFOR to Chad and CAR. France stressed that it needed to fill a power vacuum in arid Africa.⁷⁵³ In this respect, one eminent analyst noted that “[...] among various opinions about French motivation to deploy a EU mission to Chad, it was primarily due to the French political interests in the region to re-establish its great power in Africa by helping the fragile and insecure political system of their friend, President Déby”.⁷⁵⁴

The British low profile on the military intervention in Chad and CAR serves as important evidence of French political interests in terms of power projection. Olsen argues that the UK and France have created a division of foreign policy in Africa; Britain would be passive when French interests were at stake and *vice versa* when British interests were at stake.⁷⁵⁵ In this respect, one British diplomat suggested that “[...] in this specific case [of EUFOR Tchad/RCA], we might have a different and difficult position from that of France. I think the UK understands that France may have particular interest in Francophone Africa, and the UK may have particular interest in Anglophone Africa.”⁷⁵⁶ The British official highlighted again that “[...] perhaps in rational terms, France is more likely to have interests in Francophone Africa than Anglophone Africa to sustain its great power.”⁷⁵⁷ This claim seems to coincide exactly with the realist assumptions that given the anarchic international system, powerful states are forced to safeguard their own security protection and exert all their national power and interests as much as possible.⁷⁵⁸

In light of French foreign policy and political interests in recovering its strong reputation as a great power on the international stage and sustaining its influence towards Francophone Africa, the realist approach enables this case study to account for the important motive of France to launch a French-led EU military intervention in Chad and CAR. Given a depreciation of the French position, as well as the emergence of new external powers in

⁷⁵³ B. Smith, “French lead European Union for to Chad/Sudan border”, *International Committee of the Forum International*, 5 March 2008.

⁷⁵⁴ Interview with expert on UN-EU peacekeeping operation, CIC, New York, 06 April 2009.

⁷⁵⁵ G. R. Olsen (2009), *op. cit.*

⁷⁵⁶ Interview with British diplomat at the United Nations, New York, 14 April 2009.

⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁸ For example, see A. Hyde-Price (2006), *op. cit.*; M. Sheehan, *International Security*, London: Lynne Rienner Publish Inc., 2005; R. Gilpin (1981), *op. cit.*; and K. Waltz, K (1979), *op. cit.*


Chad, France would not want to relinquish its exclusive interests and power in those *Françafrique* countries. These conditions seem to ultimately lead to a legitimate military involvement of France under the EU flag. In sum, the analysis of this case study confirms that political interests were an important condition of France to play a leading role to launch the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation.

As part of the realist propositions, the case study also examines to what extent economic interests seemed to be concerned with the likelihood of the French dynamic leadership which led to the EU's collaboration with the UN in a peacekeeping operation in Chad and the CAR. As discussed earlier in the previous chapters, concerns about Europe's energy dependence have significantly increased over the last few years, for which the EU calls for the solidarity of all member states to support the security strategy through engagement with countries, particularly where oil reserves have been discovered, such as Central Asia, the Caucasus and sub-Saharan Africa.⁷⁵⁹ Given this situation, the international community has paid more attention to Chad as a possible safeguard for the flow of energy resources since it became an oil producer. Chad has primarily had an agricultural economy with a small industrial sector, of which major products are farming and livestock dominated by cotton.⁷⁶⁰ Recently, however, the Chadian economy continues to be boosted by major oilfield and pipeline projects. Oil production was non-existent in landlocked Chad prior to 2003, but with the completion of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline in July 2003, the country began producing oil. As Figure 7.3 illustrates, as of 2008, among the sub-Saharan African proven oil reserve holders, Chad supplied over 1.6 % out of total 93 billion barrels of African oil production.

⁷⁵⁹ For more details on 'Oil as a security matter', see EU Document (S407/08), 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World', Brussels, 11 December 2008.

⁷⁶⁰ T. Collelo (ed.), "Country Study: Chad", (DT546.422 .C48 1990), Washington: Library of Congress Country Studies, 1988, available at: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/tdtoc.html> (accessed 14 June 2010).

Figure 7. 3 Oil production in assessed sub-Saharan African countries (2008)



Total = 93 billion barrels of oil equivalent

Source: IEA World Energy Outlook 2008


As of 2009, Chad ranks forty-ninth in the world in terms of total oil exports and has approximately 1.5 billion barrels in oil reserves.⁷⁶¹ Nevertheless, it must be noted that only Chad is classified as a new producer at this production cycle in Africa, while other countries like Gabon and Cameroon are classified as ‘declining producers’ by the IEA.⁷⁶² Since the exploitation of crude oil started, Chad’s production levels have climbed steadily (see Figure 7.4), and its oil revenues enabled the government to deal with economic, political and social

⁷⁶¹ For further information, see Economy Watch, http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy (accessed 25 June 2010).

⁷⁶² According to IEA World Energy Outlook report 2008, sub-Saharan African oil reserve countries are categorised by three statuses: *New producer* – Chad; *Steady and rising producer* – Sudan, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Congo; *Declining producers* – Gabon and Cameroon.

crises. In other words, Chad is becoming more important and has potential for Europe, in particular for the oil market and energy security.⁷⁶³

Figure 7.4 Chad Crude Oil Production by Year⁷⁶⁴



However, as seen in Figure 7.4, the case study found an intriguing fact that the levels of Chad's oil production started declining steadily since its peak in production in 2005. What happened, particularly between 2005 and 2006, to let oil production drop? As discussed before, Chad faced crises and suffered from an outbreak of riots and public disorder owing to

⁷⁶³ B. Percival, B. Valk and L. V. Geuns, "Gambling in Sub-Saharan Africa: Energy Security through the Prism of Sino-African Relations", *Clingendael Energy Paper*, July 2009.

⁷⁶⁴ Source: International Energy Statistics, U.S Energy Information Administration.

the war in Darfur, followed by massive flows of refugees from Sudan, and rebel movement and militias' attacks on the Chadian government. Chad became significantly weakened, despite international efforts to bring peace and security back to the regions, such as the AMIS and UNAMID missions from 2004 to 2007. Such peacekeeping involvements were ineffective and insufficient to stop the conflicts and violence in the region. This brief analysis may help explain why oil production started to deteriorate in parallel with conflicts getting serious in 2005. According to Masfin, the deployment of EU Forces in Chad was driven by a French economic interest to ensure the stability of "oil-rich Chad".⁷⁶⁵ The evidence shows an important clue for a realist argument: the decline of oil production should be a relevant motive for France to get involved in crisis management in the country, because France would want oil production to get back up to higher levels.

Realists would argue that the launch of EUFOR Tchad/RCA is associated with French strategic and economic interests, which aimed at securing the Chadian oil market and resources. The abundance in natural resources and the economic potential of Chad are certainly of interest to France. Interestingly, in spite of Sarkozy's public pledge to reduce the number of French troops and to close bases,⁷⁶⁶ France currently maintains military bases in Djibouti, Senegal, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Congo and Chad, which are all oil-rich countries in Africa (see Figure 7.5). Put differently, French military engagement in African countries suggests that French national interests lie in amplifying its influence and eventually becoming a main beneficiary of natural resources and trade in the region.

⁷⁶⁵ B. Mesfin (2008), *op. cit.*, p.117.

⁷⁶⁶ President Sarkozy announced that France would reduce its troop numbers from 271,000 to 224,000 and bring down its 'combat-ready' forces from 50,000 to 30,000. For further details, see Telegraph news article reported by Henry Samuel in Paris, 17 June 2008. available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/2146063/Terrorism-is-greatest-threat-to-France-Nicolas-Sarkozy-says.html> (accessed on 20 June 2010).

Figure 7. 5 Countries where French Troops are based in Africa (as of 2008)⁷⁶⁷



Besides French interests in Chadian natural resources, the significant question of who would be the main beneficiary of the operation *per se* was also raised. Mattelaer points out that Chadian infrastructure, such as airports, roads and camps, were essential for a robust military operation and would be renovated with EU funds.⁷⁶⁸ What became controversial on this question was that the EU would not remain engaged long-term, even though some individual member states would remain on the ground with MINURCAT after the EUFOR mandate

⁷⁶⁷ Source : A. Hanson, 'The French Military in Africa', Council on Foreign Relations, updated on 8 February 2008, available at <http://www.cfr.org/france/french-military-africa/p12578> (accessed on 19 June 2010).

⁷⁶⁸ A. Mattelaer (2008), *op. cit.*, pp.14-18.

ended.⁷⁶⁹ Then France would unquestionably be the greatest beneficiary of the operation as well as an EU investment in the end. Consequently, questions of whether EUFOR Tchad/RCA would be able to wipe out doubts about the EU “being used as pawns in political and economic interests of France” and to demonstrate its “neutrality *vis-à-vis* the French dominant troops presence on the ground” became a major focus.⁷⁷⁰

With regard to troop disposition, EUFOR Tchad/RCA consisted of three operational zones - north, centre and south - with a battalion in charge of each (see Figure 7.1).⁷⁷¹ The major aim of the northern zone (zone I) mission was to secure the region in preparation for the deployment of the UN police mission, MINURCAT, and to guarantee a EUFOR presence for security operations, under the responsibility of a 400-strong Polish battalion. French engineers and private companies established the Polish base in this area, and the bulk of the refugees were essentially concentrated in the northern zone. The central zone (zone II) laid around Abéché, home of the FHQ, and extended as far as the area around Forchana near the Sudanese border. Part of the supplies for the central zone, oil in particular, were supplied by private Cameroonian and Chadian companies. This central zone was under the responsibility of a French battalion. The southern zone (zone III), on the other hand, was located around Dar Sila in south-eastern Chad under the responsibility of an Irish battalion reinforced with troops from the French and other contingents, in particular from Sweden, Finland and a small Dutch detachment. The aim of the southern zone mission was to guarantee a robust security presence in order to create a climate of stability in which displaced people would feel safe enough to start returning to their homes.

France deployed its troops in central (zone II) and southern Chad (zone III) and the north-east of the Central African Republic (zone IV). However, French troops were absent from the northern zone (zone I). As mentioned above, the northern region was logistically important for both EU and UN operations, because the war germinated in the north, and the security conditions of the northern area had been too vulnerable and weak to forestall rebellion.⁷⁷² Despite heavy demand for security tasks in the northern zone, why did France decide not to place its troops in this particular operation zone? Would there be a clue, among

⁷⁶⁹ Some EU countries - Ireland, Austria, Finland, Poland and France - in addition to third countries such as Albania, Croatia and Russia said that they would remain on the ground and serve the operation under the UN flag.

⁷⁷⁰ Interview with official, EU Commission, Brussels, 29 April 2010.


⁷⁷¹ A fourth zone in the Central African Republic comes under the responsibility of the central zone.

⁷⁷² J. Fearon and D. Laitin, “Chad”, Stanford University, 7 July 2006, available at: <http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/ChadRN2.6.pdf> (accessed on 2 Aug. 2010)

various possibilities, that helps to unfold a plausible correlation between the French economic and strategic interests and its decision to allocate its troops in particular zones on that account?

Interestingly, a large deposit of heavy crude oil has been discovered in the vast area around the southern Doba region, the eastern Lake Chad region and part of the central regions of the country (see Figure 7.6). The central zone (zone II) is also potentially important in terms of oil supplies, because Sudan's main oil reserves are concentrated in the southern area close to the border with the east-central part of Chad. Yet, in the northern zone, neither crude oil nor other natural resources have been exploited. One could possibly argue that oil and natural resources are not the cause for French military stations being located in central and southern zones, and those two zones just happen to have crude oil. From a realist perspective, however, the answer to that question seems to be clear. France might have no appetite for deploying its troops in the northern zone because there have been no petroleum basins discovered in that area. Consequently, in the absence of French interests to put its battalion in the northern area, the UN MINURCAT civilian police and Polish troops took responsibilities to secure this area.

Figure 7. 6 Oil Development Areas and Military Bases in Chad



Sources: The map design unit of the World Bank (IBRD 31455, 2001)

According to Falkinger, member states which took an essential part in the military operation in Chad primarily sought to control the country's natural resources rather than be dedicated to humanitarian action.⁷⁷³ Falkinger posits that a large portion of oil reserves in Chad has been acting as a “magnet for the greed of the various new imperialist powers” and France was no exception to this approach.⁷⁷⁴ In this context, Mesfin criticises France's “altruistic endeavours” in the EU military operation as only destined to cover up its prolonged desire to maximise its interests – “securing oilfields in Chad”.⁷⁷⁵

The vast mineral resources and oil reserves certainly offer an excellent potential for economic development and a trade market in Africa, which makes Africa a front-ranking

⁷⁷³ J. Falkinger, “No Blood for Oil: EU Soldiers out of Chad”, *Defence of Marxism*, February 2008, available at <http://www.marxist.com/eu-soldiers-out.htm> (accessed on 14 July 2010).

⁷⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷⁵ B. Mesfin (2008), op.cit, pp. 114-118 (p.117).

trade partner of France.⁷⁷⁶ This study suggests that the analysis of the direction of Chad's trade over the last ten years is worth paying attention to.⁷⁷⁷ Appendix III-4 shows the flows of imports and exports between Chad and each of EU members from 2001 to 2009. According to the data, only a few EU countries achieved the notable benefits in trade relations with Chad particularly after EUFOR Tchad/RCA in 2007. Those members that did achieve considerable economic benefits from the operation include Ireland, Belgium, Sweden and France, who contributed a significant amount of military forces and took charge of important responsibilities for the military operation in Chad/CAR. Among the EU member states, France accounted for the largest jump. Figure 7.7 shows that France achieved a dramatic increase in its own economic gains from both imports and exports in trading with Chad.

The data also illustrates an interesting finding. Whereas Ireland, the second largest troop-contributing country following France, also achieved considerable economic benefits in both imports and exports from the trade relations with Chad, the UK and Germany, which initially held no interest in the operation, saw a negative impact on their trade relations with Chad. Italy, which had provided medical troops in the field, has received economic benefits from the trade relations with Chad, particularly in its exports to Chad, after the operation. Figure 7.8 shows that the flows of Chadian exports to Germany and the UK, which must be mostly composed of mineral resources and crude oil, started to dramatically decline since 2007. On the other hand, the figure clearly indicates that Ireland's trade relations with Chad in imports and exports grew stronger since 2007.

⁷⁷⁶ French National Statement, "France's Africa Policy", French Embassy in the UK, 11 January 2001.

⁷⁷⁷ For further detailed figures, see Appendix IV-3, 'Direction of Trade of Chad (2001-2009)'

Figure 7.7 Chadian Trade with France (2001 - 2009)





Figure 7. 8 Comparisons of Chadian Trade with Germany and UK vs. Ireland



In sum, the case analysis of this study suggests that economic interests based on securing abundant natural resources could possibly be of an important condition which may increase the likelihood of the chief negotiator's active leadership to influence the launch of EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, it must not be overlooked that the realist proposition on the relations between the economic interests and the active leadership of chief negotiator in undertaking peacekeeping missions could fall into a logical fallacy, i.e. the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* error. Put differently, it is difficult to state that since peacekeeping engagements are followed by economic benefits, peacekeeping must have been caused by economic interests. Although one cannot determine the causality of economic interests as an important variable to influence the chief negotiator's decision on its active leadership in peacekeeping, the empirical evidence proposes that there exist at least correlations between the two.

Hence, the study confirms that the realist hypothesis that political and strategic interests of the chief negotiator would increase the likelihood of the leadership to lead the EU's decision to engage in a peacekeeping operation is accepted.

7.4 Constructivist hypothesis

*“Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa.
Our strategy is intended to help Africa achieve this.”*
(Council of the European Union, 2005)

According to a constructivist assumption, the colonial legacies of European states would inform a socially Europeanised identity of the EU, which encourages EU actors to feel normative responsibility towards African peacekeeping. Constructivists would argue that France's former colonial history would eventually generate a normative responsibility of the EU to support humanitarian intervention in those African countries. For constructivists, therefore, the European military intervention in Chad and CAR is deemed a case of norms-driven humanitarian crisis management based on the special historical relationship between France and Chad, *i.e.* a colonial legacy.

One UN peacekeeping official made remarks about European peacekeeping operations in Africa, saying that “[...] we find that most African countries in conflict are ex-colonies of European nations. And European nations have maintained some kind of feeling and responsibility based on their former colonial relationship, even if it's no longer master-servant relationship. So for them [Europeans], it is their duty to protect and support their ex-colonies' peace and security.”⁷⁷⁸ In the same context, one French national official stressed that France has endeavoured to build a ‘friendship’ with countries which France had ruled over as a colonial power.⁷⁷⁹ The French official also suggested that the “French approach to African military intervention should not be linked to the post-colonial interests. Instead, as a

⁷⁷⁸ Interview with official at the United Nations, New York, 02 April 2009.

⁷⁷⁹ Interview with national official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, Paris, 05 March 2010.

‘former friend’ or ‘ancient friend’, if those countries are facing conflicts or cannot manage to be okay, France has responsibility to have them recover their sovereignty.”⁷⁸⁰

In this regard, Novosseloff stressed that one of the most important factors that enabled the EU military operation in Chad/CAR was a ‘humanitarian aspect’ rather than colonial interests on the basis of realism.⁷⁸¹ Because, “if France had any intention to take advantage of its former colonial power from the military operation, the countries would not open their door to France any more.”⁷⁸² In fact, the French official argued that, “there always have been efforts of France to bring education, development, laws and institutions to protect humanitarian safety of African countries, which must be considered as normative purpose.”⁷⁸³ France tends to perceive its former colonies as ‘her traditional friends’.⁷⁸⁴ The humanitarian approach towards Africa seems to be particularly highlighted under Sarkozy’s government. As a new generation of French decision-makers that emerged recently, France’s African foreign policy has changed. Sarkozy’s administration has emphasised the central leadership role of France in EU-African relations, referring to its responsibility and ‘humanitarian’ intention to make the African situation more stable and secure.⁷⁸⁵ President Sarkozy considered the Chad/Darfur crisis in particular as one of the top foreign policy priorities of France.⁷⁸⁶

The constructivist proposition, that the presence of a colonial legacy of chief negotiator would increase the likelihood of its leadership to lead an EU decision to engage in a peacekeeping operation, at first glance seems plausible to explain the major motive for EUFOR Tchad/RCA. However, the case analysis suggests that the normative argument cannot fully exhibit the important role or influential impact of a colonial legacy to bring the common consent of EU members to the collective European identity and/or humanitarian responsibility for the operation. Colonial legacy was certainly an important condition for France to launch the operation, but it failed to generate a collective Europeanised colonial responsibility, and remained limited to spur only French motivation. Hence, the

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸¹ Interview with Novosseloff, Ministry of Defence, Paris, 05 March 2010.

⁷⁸² Interview with national official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, Paris, 04 March 2010.

⁷⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸⁴ For example, see France’s African Policy (2001), “II. Remaining Committed, Without Improper Interference”, *op. cit.*

⁷⁸⁵ See French national document, “*President Sarkozy’s interview on foreign policy and Europe*”, Paris, May 2007, online available at: <http://www.ambafrance-au.org/spip.php?article2341> (accessed on 2 June 2010).

⁷⁸⁶ For example, see B. Charbonneau (2008), *op. cit.*, p.292; R. Marchal, “Sarkozy and Africa: Misunderstanding or Change?”, *CSIS*, 16 October 2007.

constructivist proposition about the colonial legacy is partially accepted in the case of French-led EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Yet, the study suggests that it needs to be underlined that if colonial ties had been created by 'strong European powers', the likelihood of an EU decision to engage in a peacekeeping operation will certainly increase. And, of course, the more peaceful and sound the colonial relationship established, the more an EU-led military peacekeeping engagement is likely to be.

From a normative institutionalist perspective, the study now investigates evidence of normative pressures to determine whether, and if so to what extent, normative conditions were important factors in decision-making on EUFOR Tchad/RCA. France has recently reviewed a list of its defence agreements with countries that used to be former French colonies. According to a French national diplomat, "France is willing to continue to help its former 'friends' in various forms and means" which includes, for instance, defence contracts, defence treaties and defence agreements bilaterally signed between France and its former colonies in Africa.⁷⁸⁷ For France, a defence agreement seems to be more than cooperation *per se* with its former friends, because it enables France to help them build justice, maintain a secure border, and protect civilians by intervening legitimately with military means.⁷⁸⁸

France has developed a very special relationship with Chad and the CAR in various spheres - historic, linguistic and military - since decolonisation.⁷⁸⁹ The expression of France's commitment to the maintenance of peace in Chad and the CAR originally stemmed from the defence agreement signed in 1960. Since its independence from France in the 1960s, Chad, like most other former French colonies, signed various military assistance agreements with France. Alongside recognising the independence and sovereignty of Congo, Chad and the CAR, France agreed to organise a joint system with these three countries for the purpose of ensuring their security and defence. The Defence Agreement came into force on 13 March 1961.⁷⁹⁰ According to Article 6 of Annex I,

Each of contracting parties shall take, in so far as concerns it, the measures required by the armed forces mission for joint defence and in particular those relating to the requisitioning of persons and goods and to the protecting and security of personnel, installations and equipment.

⁷⁸⁷ Interview with official, UN Headquarters, New York, 07 April 2009.

⁷⁸⁸ Interview with official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 05 March 2010.

⁷⁸⁹ Interview with official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 05 March 2010.

⁷⁹⁰ See United Nations Treaty (No 11761), 'Defence Agreement: France, Central African Republic, Congo and Chad), New York, 19 April, 1972.

The Defence agreement allowed France to keep military bases in the territory as well as to have rights to transit and over-flight. In return, France guaranteed external territorial security to its colonies and would consider all requests for assistance in the face of insurgencies and coup attempts. Additionally, France provided equipment, training and advice to the Chadian armed forces. Under the provisions of the bilateral defence agreement between France and Chad, French military involvement in Chad became binding in the mid-1970s and permanent in 1986 when *Opération Epervier* was launched in view of Libyan expansionism.⁷⁹¹ Since then, France has stationed at least 3,000 troops in Chad to contribute to stabilising the country. Realists would claim that France has stationed sizable troops in Chad in order to “buttress the pro-French government”⁷⁹² or to “keep an embattled regime in power” under President Idriss Déby.⁷⁹³ The French government insists, however, that decisions surrounding operation EUFOR in Chad and the CAR were largely determined by the normed nature of French foreign policy, which needs to be understood within a normative and humanitarian framework.⁷⁹⁴

At the Franco-African Summit in La Baule in 1990, President Mitterrand sought to publicly realign French policy towards Africa.⁷⁹⁵ President Mitterrand stressed rewarding African democratisation efforts, and France committed itself to expand its presence in Chad in order to increase stability, assist the local population, and support the Chadian national armed forces by providing training and material assistance to its various services and participating in the various peacekeeping operations.⁷⁹⁶ France reiterated its humanitarian responsibility in maintaining peace and security in Chad under the new government. In the spring of 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy won the French presidential election and he appointed Bernard Kouchner as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who in the past had frequently voiced grave concern about the regional crisis around Darfur.⁷⁹⁷ President Sarkozy and Kouchner made the Chad/Darfur crisis a top French foreign policy priority and began to convince unwilling EU member states to participate in the Chad/Darfur crisis.

In light of Sarkozy’s enhanced foreign policy towards Africa, particularly in the case of Chad/Darfur, constructivists would argue that France has undoubtedly played an important

⁷⁹¹ The English codename is *Operation Sparrowhawk*.

⁷⁹² For example, see G. R. Olsen (2009), *op. cit.*, p.255.

⁷⁹³ T. Collelo (1988), *op. cit.*

⁷⁹⁴ Interview with French delegation at United Nations, New York, 07 April 2009.

⁷⁹⁵ K. Shillington, *Encyclopedia of African History*, New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2005, p.245.

⁷⁹⁶ “Les Eléments français au Tchad”, French Embassy in Chad. <http://www.ambafrac-td.org> (accessed on 2 July 2010).

⁷⁹⁷ A. Mattelaer (2008), *op. cit.*, p.10.

role as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ who fulfils its commitment and responsibility in accordance with the European identity as a normative power.⁷⁹⁸ Besides the French commitment to maintaining humanitarian stability and security in Africa in general, one French official argues that bilateral agreements which have been developed between France and Chad became ‘*une des principales raisons*’ that pushed France to intervene in the situation, by stressing that “we [French people] respect our commitment and keep our words.”⁷⁹⁹ The French official also highlighted that EUFOR Tchad/RCA was eventually being guided by a French normative commitment, because “that’s how we [France] work in international affairs.”⁸⁰⁰ The analysis of this case study considers that this may reflect important evidence of France’s normative entrapment, which constrained it to act in compliance with what it had pledged. As a result, France was actively involved in the Chadian situation, helping the Chadian Government to repel the rebel attacks, and protect IDPs. Hence, a series of bilateral agreements between France and Chad as well as normative commitments of France bred normative entrapment, which led France to act in accordance with its commitments.

Of course France could have intervened individually in the precarious security climate of Chad and CAR, as it signed a bilateral military defence agreement which allowed it to manage conflicts in the region. However, France wanted to carry out its military intervention with consolidated support from other member states within a multilateral framework.⁸⁰¹ French Defence Minister Herve Morin suggests that “the UN declaration calling on all countries to support the [Chadian] government had not changed the terms of engagement”.⁸⁰² As discussed earlier in the previous theory chapter, normative entrapment is often facilitated by public attention to the issue (publicity), prior policy commitments (precedent), and by a site of negotiation and deliberation in which EU norms are salient (forum).⁸⁰³ Accordingly, once France had publicly announced its strong willingness to intervene in the Chadian crisis situation on the basis of multilateral consent for normative and humanitarian purposes, it would have been difficult for France to adopt a ‘no action’ position or a solely French intervention. Thus, the role of French leadership seemed to be influenced to a great extent by normative commitment and entrapment.

⁷⁹⁸ See T. Koepf (2010), *op. cit.*; E. Adler (2002), *op. cit.*

⁷⁹⁹ Interview with official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 05 April, 2010.

⁸⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰¹ Another reason why France emphasised multilateral involvement authorised by a UN resolution is because French fighter jets and reconnaissance planes had to fly over the border with Sudan. So, the operation inevitably required the multilateral support of countries mandated by a UNSC resolution.

⁸⁰² BBC News report, “France watches Chad-Sudan border”, 06 February 2008 (accessed on 25 June 2010).

⁸⁰³ For example, see F. Schimmelfennig and D. C. Thomas (2009), *op. cit.*

In light of normative suasion, if any evidence shows France's efforts to try to get other members to change their position and thereby to obtain European unanimous consent based on normative context, a constructivist argument would be stronger. One EU official suggested that the important motives of major EU troop contributors can be found in each of the national foreign policy preferences.⁸⁰⁴

Ireland pledged to contribute the second largest forces with 400-strong soldiers, following France. Initially, Ireland had taken a very reserved attitude to EU military engagement in Chad and the CAR, raising a critical question regarding the neutrality of EU forces.⁸⁰⁵ However, Ireland changed its sceptical position and decided to provide a number of military forces to the EUFOR operation. The Irish commander of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Lt. General Patrick Nash, insisted that the EU troops under his command would be "strictly neutral", and he explained the motive for Ireland's military participation as being based on the humanitarian aspect and security of the region.⁸⁰⁶ The real essence moulding the Irish motivation, however, seems to be revealed when a non-normative approach is applied to the interpretation. One EU official provided a realistic insight that the Irish troop contribution and military participation in the EUFOR operation must be seen as "an opportunity to restore its damaged reputation after [Irish] rejection of the Lisbon Treaty".⁸⁰⁷ The official dropped a hint that "of course, France should know what each of the major TCCs considered and wanted first and most."⁸⁰⁸ According to evidence from the interview, France seemed more likely to use a non-normative argument when it had to hold bilateral dialogues with Ireland regarding the EUFOR deployment. France rather focused on what the Irish government was significantly concerned about, such as "the fear that a more ambitious ESDP contradicts the Irish neutrality".⁸⁰⁹ Vis-à-vis the concerns of the Irish Prime Minister after the Irish 'no' to the Lisbon Treaty and the uncertainty about the ESDP military operation, President Sarkozy showed a 'proactive role' in his continuous consultations with Ireland to help the latter find a way to resolve such a difficult situation.⁸¹⁰ In the end, the non-normative dialogue was

⁸⁰⁴ Interview with official, Policy coordinator of the EU Commission, Brussels, 29 April 2010.

⁸⁰⁵ Interview with official, Policy coordinator of the EU Commission, Brussels, 29 April 2010.

⁸⁰⁶ Interview with Irish Lt.-Gen. Patrick Nash conducted by Pascal Fletcher (Reuters), 25 October 2007, Press articles on EUFOR Tchad/RCA and declarations by General Nash can be found at online : <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/20071031164747724.pdf> (accessed on 23 June 2010).

⁸⁰⁷ Interview with official, Policy Coordinator of the EU Commission, Brussels, 29 April 2010.

⁸⁰⁸ TCC refers to Troop Contributing Countries, such as Ireland, Poland, Austria and Sweden, in the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA.

⁸⁰⁹ For further French proactive roles, see C. Lequesne and O. Rozenberg, "The French Presidency of 2008: The Unexpected Agenda", Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2008, pp.19-20.

⁸¹⁰ *Ibid.*

successful in leading to Irish military engagement with a significant number of military contributions to the EUFOR.

For Poland, which sent the third largest contingent with 400 soldiers, African foreign policy and security matters have occupied a low profile in its national foreign affairs. Berg suggests that many of the eastern European states which had newly gained EU membership had “traditionally pursued no Africa policy of their own”.⁸¹¹ Like many of the other eastern European countries, Poland displayed little interest in the normative discussion *per se* on the issue of the EU military operation in Chad and CAR. Instead, the real motivation of Poland to pledge to take military responsibility and actively engage in EUFOR Tchad/RCA seemed to be closely linked to its national strategy and foreign policy towards the EU. Poland viewed the EUFOR operation “as a good opportunity to establish itself as a serious player willing to shoulder EU responsibilities” within the EU framework.⁸¹² Hence, there was no direct evidence of France using normative argument to get Poland to participate.

Sweden was the fourth largest troop contributor providing 200 soldiers for the EUFOR. Sweden’s interest in EUFOR Tchad/RCA seemed to grow in parallel with the emergence of the Nordic Battle Group which was to achieve operational readiness at the beginning of 2008.⁸¹³ Like many other members of the EU, Sweden also faced a great domestic controversy when it had to decide to participate in the operation. According to an analyst on UN-EU peacekeeping operations, when the EU, particularly France, was struggling to obtain the necessary troop commitments from member states, “one suggestion came from France that the bulk of the force could be possibly made from the 2400-strong Nordic battle group.”⁸¹⁴ One EU official suggested that as military engagement remained an unpopular theme in Swedish domestic politics, France seemed to find a way of justifying Swedish military engagement by referring to “the opportunity to test the Nordic Battle Group”.⁸¹⁵ Moreover, as the Swedish government had announced its intention to have “a fundamental

⁸¹¹ P. Berg, “EUFOR Tchad/RCA: The EU Serving French Interests”, in M. Asseburg and R. Kempin (eds.), *The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Mission and Operations*, SWP German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, 2009, pp.57-69 (p.63).

⁸¹² *Ibid.* p.61.

⁸¹³ Interview with official, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 28 April 2010.

⁸¹⁴ Interview with analyst, CIC, New York, 06 April 2009.

⁸¹⁵ Interview with official, Council of the EU, Brussels, 28 April 2010. For a comprehensive account of the concept of Nordic-Battle Group and Swedish approach, see L. Wedin, “The Impact of EU Capability Targets and Operational Demands on Defence Concepts and Planning: The Case of Sweden”, in *the Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy*, A. J. K. Bailes *et al.* (eds.), Stockholm, vol. 20, no. 6, 2006, pp.141-149.

debate on EU Battle Group a theme of its EU Presidency (2009)”,⁸¹⁶ President Sarkozy insisted that Sweden shall take a leading role in ESDP operations.⁸¹⁷ In sum, the case analysis confirms that there is little evidence of France using normative arguments during its consultation with the Swedish government on the EUFOR operation.

Austria announced its decision to contribute 160 military personnel which amounted to the fifth largest EUFOR contingent. As a member of the EU and of the UN Security Council for the upcoming period 2009-2010, Austria found its important position and responsibility as a global actor.⁸¹⁸ According to the foreign policy strategy of Austria, the Austrian government stressed the “increasing geostrategic importance of Africa” and was committed to “maintain and further develop the multifarious cooperation” in what concerned sub-Saharan Africa.⁸¹⁹ Furthermore, Austria confirmed its readiness to “actively promote peace, security, stability, democracy and human rights”, as a future Security Council member.⁸²⁰ On the issue of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Austria seemed to understand the operation as a humanitarian engagement, underlining “the particular importance of the protection of the civilians in armed conflicts for Austria’s foreign policy”.⁸²¹ Hence, Austria’s decision to engage in the military operation in Chad and CAR seemed to be largely driven by its own normative purpose to fulfil its responsibility and commitment in compliance with its national foreign policy, being aware of its important future position in the Security Council.

The major motive of European TCCs for military intervention in Chad and the CAR varied depending on each domestic national foreign policy. Nonetheless, Berg argues that what the EU member states had in common on the issue of EUFOR Tchad/RCA was that they considered national interests foremost and to a much lesser extent European interests.⁸²² The evidence of this case study shows that many of the motivations of troop contributors did not coincide with the normative discourse that the EU usually presents to the world, and some of them had nothing to do with the conflict in the Sudanese/Chadian border regions or humanitarian intervention. The analysis confirms that normative commitment and normative entrapment certainly played a crucial role in triggering the important role of France in

⁸¹⁶ Agence France-Press (AFP), “Sweden Wants EU to Rethink its Army”, 3 June 2009.

⁸¹⁷ C. Lequesne and O. Rozenberg (2008), *op. cit.*, p.20.

⁸¹⁸ See Government statement on Foreign Policy of Austria towards Sub-Saharan Africa, available at Austrian Foreign Ministry: <http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/foreign-policy/extra-european-area/sub-saharan-africa.html> (accessed on 6 Sep 2010).

⁸¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸²¹ *Ibid.*

⁸²² P. Berg (2009), *op. cit.*, pp.57-69

shaping the European military action in Chad and CAR. The evidence of normative suasion of France, however, was hardly found during the bargaining and negotiations process. The findings of this case study claim that France and most of EU member states seemed more likely to focus on non-normative arguments depending on their national foreign policy priorities; this claim would weaken the constructivist hypothesis. Therefore, the hypothesis that normative conditions would increase the likelihood of the chief negotiator's leadership to head an EU decision to engage in a peacekeeping operation is determined partially accepted, thereby less convincing, in the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA.

Conclusion

Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA became an important test case of the credibility of the EU as a promising peacekeeping partner of the UN for various reasons. First, it was the most ambitious operation in terms of the number of troops deployed, 3700 strong without recourse to NATO assets. Second, it provided an important opportunity for the EU to prove its capability to manage an autonomous military operation in a particularly hostile and highly unstable environment in African countries alongside the UN. Third, it was also essential for the EU to pursue the operation in light of enhancing European diplomatic capability and external power, because non-EU countries, including Russia, Albania, Norway, Ukraine, Croatia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, expressed their wishes to participate in the EUFOR mission. This was the first time Russia had taken part in an EU military operation.⁸²³ Finally, operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA was a challenge for the EU to demonstrate its neutrality *vis-à-vis* French national interests in the region.

This chapter identified France as a chief negotiator who played the most prominent role in negotiations and decision-making at both the UNSC and the EU. The UK and Germany expressed a level of suspicion and reluctance regarding European military deployment to Chad and CAR, while Italy played a very limited operational role on the ground. The High Representative Solana demonstrated his essential tasks at both levels, but the role of the HR remained minor and limited to facilitating simultaneous interactions between the UN and the EU.

⁸²³ French Foreign Affairs Ministry, "EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission: Russian helicopters arrive", available at <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr> (accessed on 9 June 2010).

The interpretations for the major driving force behind the EU decision to deploy the EUFOR Tchad/RCA were controversial. The realist approach argued that French political interests in maintaining and extending its dominant power in the countries were an important condition which increased the likelihood of the French leadership to influence an EU decision to engage in the peacekeeping operation. The evidence from the case analysis also revealed that the French-led deployment of EUFOR Tchad/RCA was followed by the noticeable economic benefits of France in the peacekeeping areas based on potential trade as well as Chadian oil reserves. Thus, the realist hypothesis that political and strategic interests would increase the likelihood of the chief negotiator's leadership to lead the EU deciding to engage with the UN in a peacekeeping operation is determined true in this specific case.

The constructivist hypothesis highlighted the importance of normative conditions. The constructivist hypothesis argued that a historical relationship between France and Chad/CAR in terms of colonial legacy was an important condition under which France felt its responsibility and played an active role as a chief negotiator to lead the launch of EUFOR Tchad/RCA. The hypothesis also argued that the bilateral defence agreement as well as normative commitments of France generated normative pressures which increased the likelihood of the EU decision to get involved in the peacekeeping operation. However, the case analysis suggested that such normative arguments provided less sufficient evidence to support its primary propositions. Despite some crucial findings of France being constrained by colonial responsibility and normative commitment, the comprehensive case analysis determined that those normative conditions were limited only to the French national motive and could not bring European discussions and consent within a normative context. Thus, the constructivist arguments were partially accepted.

In sum, lessons learned from the empirical research concerning the issue of EUFOR Tchad/RCA were quite impressive. According to interview data, France seems most likely to defend and justify its military intervention in Africa peacekeeping within a normative framework. In practice, however, little French norm-driven evidence was found during the negotiation. The case study suggested that what was expressed by other EU countries must not be underestimated. The two most powerful and reliable EU countries - the UK and Germany - which had also previously engaged in military operations along with France in Operation *Artemis* (2003) and EUFOR DR Congo (2006) expressed a strong aversion to the French-led EUFOR operation in Chad and CAR. Those two countries criticised the operation

as nothing but another “pet project” in support of French interests.⁸²⁴ The official view of Britain and Germany may imply the best evidence to reveal the real driving force behind the French decision. The fact that the two most important members of the EU felt the operation was a vehicle to serve French national interests would make the realist argument stronger than the constructivist argument.

⁸²⁴ See K. E. Smith, *EU Foreign Policy*, CIDOB International Year Book 2009, Barcelona: Spanish Foreign Policy and International Affairs, pp.25-31 (p.28); and H. Dijkstra (2010), *op. cit.*, p.396.

Chapter 8

Comparative Explanatory Analysis Across the Three Cases

Introduction

The study sought to examine the major driving force behind EU decisions to cooperate with the UN in peacekeeping operations. Given the inter-governmental nature of the EU's decision-making in the specific area of foreign and security policy, the primary research question was clearly set up: '*under what conditions do EU Member States lead UN-related peacekeeping operations?*' There have been two key steps taken for the analytical and theoretical process. First, building upon Putnam's two-level game metaphor, the study proposed a new revised two-level game approach as an analytical framework. In assessing the two-level game analysis, the study identified the most important EU actors involved in the dynamic interactions between the UNSC and the EU on the issue of peacekeeping operations. The analysis referred to the most important decision-maker or negotiator as a chief negotiator. Besides the chief negotiator, it also examined the essential role of the High Representative. Yet, due to its limited legal status in decision-making comparing to the role of chief negotiator, the HR was defined as a facilitator in this thesis. Second, with insights from IR theories, the study investigated key motivational factors under which the chief negotiator(s) seems to increase the likelihood of their leadership, which may fundamentally determine the EU's decision to engage with the UN in international peacekeeping operations. The analytical and theoretical endeavours were assessed across the three cases.

This chapter aims to offer a comparative explanatory analysis across the three cases, by using scales to examine the key research outcomes. This chapter consists of three sections. The first section reviews the analytical conceptualisation of the revised two-level game and confirms the chief negotiators in each case. The second section revisits each one of the two hypotheses across the three cases. The hypotheses derived from theoretical ideas are either

accepted or rejected. The third section rounds up the overall results of the research. It discusses the important conditions which may determine whether UN-EU cooperation occurs. It also explores the implications of the findings on the contemporary phenomenon studied, *i.e.* UN-EU cooperation in international peace and security.

8.1 Chief Negotiators and the Likelihood of Leadership

As noted earlier, the decision on UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping significantly depends on the willingness and the role of chief negotiator(s). Hence, identifying the most important chief negotiator who possesses influential power to determine the EU's decision is essential. Using a revised two-level game approach, the study evaluates the role of the European Big-four countries - the UK, France, Germany and Italy - and the High Representative. This section discusses the results of the assessment of the level of leadership role of the big-four and the HR, and confirms the most important chief negotiator.

Chief Negotiators

According to Putnam, each side of a negotiation is represented by a single national leader, namely a *chief negotiator*, whose central goal is to achieve an agreement at the international level that will be approved and ratified at domestic level. However, as Collinson noted, this study claims that there is possibly more than one chief negotiator who links Level I and Level II interactions. In this thesis, the chief negotiator is formally involved in the UNSC negotiations, leading to a tentative agreement or UN Security Council resolution. The chief negotiator also plays a central role at domestic EU level, seeking to bring the negotiations to a successful agreement and to the approval of a Council Joint Action.

In assessing the role of the Big-four countries in decision-making, three possible degrees of the role of chief negotiator were considered:

1. A *low* degree of the role of chief negotiator connoted that the negotiator made little contribution to the negotiations at both the UN and the EU levels. In addition, the

negotiator expressed a certain level of scepticism on a peacekeeping initiative, although it had no objection on the approval of the operation.

2. A *medium* degree of the role of chief negotiator meant that the negotiator provided official documents or commitments to support an operation and endorsed a deployment of an EU operation in close cooperation with the UN. However, the negotiator did not undertake an active role during the negotiations to bring other member states to participate in a peacekeeping operation.
3. A *high* degree of the role of chief negotiator involved significant contributions to negotiations and decision-making at both levels. The negotiator produced essential documents and official commitments to support a peacekeeping operation without reservation or objection. More importantly, the negotiator demonstrated an important leadership role during the negotiations to persuade other states to endorse and participate in the operation.

In the case of Operation *Artemis* (2003), France displayed a *high* degree of the role of chief negotiator at both Level I (UNSC) and Level II (EU) negotiations. In response to the UNSC's request for EU military support in the DRC, France indicated its readiness to act as the lead nation for the military operation. Level I negotiations were heavily spurred and determined by France's major role, which shaped the nature and scope of the operation. France also showed a *high* degree of the role at Level II negotiations, bringing a tentative idea of a possible military deployment into an EU-level agenda. France induced other member states which had been sceptical about the operation to endorse the EU-led military operation in the DRC. The French chief negotiating role led to ratification at the EU level. On the other hand, the role of the UK remained at a *medium* level at both Levels I and II. Despite its official statements and commitments to support and strengthen the EU's capabilities for humanitarian crisis management, in practice, the UK provided little effort during the negotiation as well as the implementation processes. The degree of Germany's as well as Italy's role as a chief negotiator appeared at a *low* level at both the Security Council and the EU levels. Whilst Italy showed neither particular interest in nor objection to the approval of the operation, Germany initially questioned the EU's endorsement of Operation *Artemis*. Germany was extremely reluctant to give the EU responsibility for a military intervention in the DRC.

The case of EUFOR DR Congo (2006) presented interesting findings. The analysis of this case study suggests that the degree of the role of chief negotiators can lead to different interpretations. This study claims that the identification of the most important chief negotiator would vary depending on whether the assessment focused on the political negotiation phase or the operational planning phase. In the case of EUFOR DR Congo, France is often deemed less important than Germany, as France refused to take on the leadership role on the ground. Nevertheless, during the negotiations and the decision-making process, no one manifested a more vital role as chief negotiator than France. Given a strong aversion and significant lack of political will of many of the other EU member states to engage in the military operation, the role of France as a chief negotiator crucially led to the EU's endorsement and approval of EUFOR DR Congo. The *high* degree of the French role in negotiations also influenced the German decision to become the lead-nation for the operation.

The UK's contribution was limited to a *low* degree at both Levels I and II. The UK was holding the EU Presidency when it received a letter from the UN SG requesting a European military presence in the DRC. Despite its important position, however, the UK abstained from any kind of negotiation and bargaining processes. Referring to its heavy military overstretch in Afghanistan and in Iraq, the UK avoided providing either commitments or military support for the operation. The Italian role was presented as a *low* degree during the negotiations at both levels. Although Italy had no objection to the operation, it hardly provided any official document or commitment to support the operation. Germany displayed a *low* degree of the role of chief negotiator during Level I negotiations. When the UN's call for EU military support was presented to Germany, Germany strongly opposed its military engagement in the DRC. Thus it seemed almost impossible that Germany would participate and act in line with the UN SG's request. However, once Germany was placed in a position in which it had to take on the leadership for the operation, it demonstrated a *high* degree of the role of chief negotiator at EU level. Germany, along with France, made substantial efforts and provided constant pressure to other member states to induce them to contribute to the EUFOR RD Congo.

In the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, France demonstrated a *high* degree of the role of chief negotiator at Level I negotiations. France drew the Security Council's attention and provided a platform where substantial formal and informal consultations among stakeholders took place, which led to an initiative for a UNSC mandate. During negotiations at the EU level,

France also displayed a *high* degree of the role of chief negotiator. France made a significant effort to convince other reluctant EU members that EUFOR would be a neutral and impartial European military operation. The Italian role was perceived as important when Italy expressed its willingness to provide troops and support the initial entry force in the field. However, Italy did not undertake further active role as a chief negotiator to bring other members to participate in the operation. Instead, it merely acted in a *medium* degree of the role of chief negotiator at the EU level, and in a *low* degree at the UN level. The UK and Germany, on the other hand, exhibited a *low* degree of the role of chief negotiator in the UNSC. On the issue of European military support in Chad and the CAR, neither the UK nor Germany provided substantial commitments nor played an important role during Level I negotiations. Likewise, the role of the UK and Germany as chief negotiators was observed to be at a *low* degree at the EU level. Despite the development of British-Franco cooperation in European foreign and security policy, the UK kept a low profile in EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Germany remained very sceptical about the nature of the EUFOR, referring to the operation as a pet project in support of French self-aggrandisement.

Table 8. 1 Identification of the degree of chief negotiators

Cases Actors	I. Operation Artemis		II. EUFOR RD Congo		III. EUFOR Tchad/RCA	
	<i>Level I</i>	<i>Level II</i>	<i>Level I</i>	<i>Level II</i>	<i>Level I</i>	<i>Level II</i>
UK	medium	medium	low	low	low	low
France	high	high	high	high	high	high
Germany	low	low	low	high	low	low
Italy	low	low	low	low	low	medium

As summarised in Table 8.1, the degree of the important role of the European Big-4 in each level of negotiations varied across the three cases. The two-level game analysis has identified that France is the most important chief negotiator in every EU military peacekeeping operation in line with cooperation with the UN. It revealed that the UK, despite its unquestionably prestigious permanent position in the Security Council, is less likely to become an important chief negotiator insofar as the issues of UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation are concerned. Although the UK is unlikely to be an encumbrance to France when France carries forward a UN-EU peacekeeping initiative, the UK always tends to be cautious and sceptical about committing itself to EU-led autonomous military peacekeeping operations. Germany had been expected to become one of the most important advocates of 'the EU as a global security actor' alongside France. However, the findings of the case studies suggest that the role of Germany, particularly for the launch of EU military operations, seems less important to increasing the likelihood of EU decisions. Germany exceptionally undertook a leadership role for the EUFOR mission in the DRC. But it must not be underestimated that such an outstanding role of Germany in formulating European consensus on military deployment was to a considerable extent a result of French pressure, lobby and suasion to get Germany to change its position and to participate in the operation. The evidence of the case studies also confirms that Italy seems less likely to become an important chief negotiator on the issue of UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation. Although Italy did not express any objection or scepticism on the peacekeeping initiatives, its contribution to the political dialogues to bring the European approval remained relatively insignificant.

Likelihood of Leadership

The revised two-level game analysis revealed that the EU's decision to engage with the UN in a peacekeeping operation depends considerably on the effective role of the chief negotiator(s). The first case analysis confirmed that France is the chief negotiator in Operation *Artemis*. In the second case, EUFOR RD Congo, France played an influential role with substantial support from Germany. France and Germany were thus identified as chief negotiators in the EUFOR RD Congo case. The third case study confirmed that France is the most important chief negotiator in the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Any other EU actors seemed unlikely to be equalled with France in the context of the role of chief negotiator in bargaining and decision-making at both UNSC and EU levels.

Under what conditions are the chief negotiators likely to play their decisive role to increase the effectiveness and the likelihood of the EU cooperating with the UN in international peacekeeping operations? In order to evaluate the motivations, this thesis examined the hypothetical relationships between important conditions (independent variables) and the likelihood of the Big-4's leadership which may significantly determine the EU's engagement with the UN in a peacekeeping operation (dependent variable). The next section reviews the results of hypotheses testing for each case study. It aims to determine which theory provides the best answer to the main research question of this thesis.

8.2 Independent Variables and the Likelihood of Leadership

This thesis proposes two hypothetical propositions drawn from theories. According to the hypotheses, the likelihood of the EU Member States' leadership to lead a EU's engagement with the UN in a peacekeeping operation would increase *if*:⁸²⁵

From a realist perspective, *there is*:

- Hypothesis 1: political and strategic interests of the EU Member States in the peacekeeping areas.

From a constructivist perspective, *there is*:

- Hypothesis 2: normative pressures of the EU Member States in a peacekeeping operation.

Important conditions that may significantly determine the likelihood of chief negotiator's leadership are independent variables. Based on the leading theoretical insights of IR - realism *vs.* constructivism - the thesis depicted two broad contours of hypothetical assumptions: political and strategic interests (PSI) and normative pressures. The variables of PSI were drawn from the main ideas of realist theories, which primarily focused on the political interests (exertion of powers) and the strategic interests (economic benefits and acquisition of natural resources) of the chief negotiator in the peacekeeping areas. The realist hypothesis proposed that *if* political and strategic interests of the chief negotiator increase,

⁸²⁵ And *vice versa*, the likelihood of leadership would decrease if the opposite variable is true.

the likelihood of chief negotiator's leadership to promote the EU deciding to engage in a peacekeeping operation will also increase. Normative pressures, on the other hand, contained two core theoretical assumptions, *i.e.* historical memories and normative conditions, of which the ideas were generated from constructivist theories. The constructivist hypothesis proposed that *if* there are normative pressures of the chief negotiator in a peacekeeping operation, the likelihood of chief negotiator's leadership to lead the EU's decision to engage in a peacekeeping operation will also increase.

This thesis accordingly created two plausible hypothetical relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable. Each of the hypotheses was examined across the three cases to determine whether they are accepted or rejected.

Hypothesis 1: Political and strategic interests increase the likelihood of chief negotiator's leadership to lead the EU's engagement in a peacekeeping operation.

The hypothesis drawn from realist theories defined the concept of political interests of the chief negotiator as a desire for extending power. The hypothesis argued that as the political interests of the chief negotiator increase, the likelihood of leadership of the chief negotiator will also increase. The political interests of the chief negotiator were evaluated using the following ordinal scale:

1. *Low* level of Political Interests: The chief negotiator had no particular political interests in the peacekeeping areas in light of the extension of both national and European power.
2. *Medium* level of Political Interests: The chief negotiator sought to defend its national power foremost, but manifested a lesser intention to strengthen European power.
3. *High* level of Political Interests: The chief negotiator intended to view a peacekeeping operation as an opportunity to extend its own national power and European power.

A *high* level of political interests means that a chief negotiator embodied a clear motivation driven by both national interests and European common interests. Especially, given the emergence of new external powers and thereby a potential threat of losing its own relative position within particular areas which are geo-strategically important, the realist hypothesis argued that the political interests of a state would normally entail a strong desire to create and defend the zones of its own influence, promote its national prestige, and enhance its reputation as a major power. Moreover, a chief negotiator who has a high level of political interests would be likely to fulfil European common interests and reinforce European power. If any evidence of a chief negotiator seeking the European balance of power and the projection of national power exists, this study confirms that the chief negotiator had a high level of political interests. A *medium* level of political interests posits that whereas the chief negotiator clearly demonstrated its political interests at national level, the desire to pursue the European interests was absent. The chief negotiator rather focused on maintaining the status quo in political leverage and national power in particular peacekeeping areas; yet it has to a lesser extent an intention of strengthening European power. A *low* level of political interests denotes that the chief negotiator seemed unlikely to have particular interests in a peacekeeping operation. The chief negotiator presented a very defensive attitude and only tried to protect itself in operating a peacekeeping mission. It puts its own efforts only to minimise military risks and losses of national power.

In the case of Operation *Artemis*, France demonstrated a *high* level of political interests in both national and European power projection. First, the case analysis clearly showed evidence of France seeking to regain its influential national power in the region. France had supported the Mobutu regime as underpinning its national interests and power in the Great Lakes region. However, following the collapse of the Mobutu regime, which was displaced by Kabila, the French position in the DRC began to decline. Furthermore, the stronger Kabila's opposition to the western intervention into DRC became, the more difficulties France faced to re-establish its important status in the DRC. Consequently, such critical loss of prestige and power for France became an important driving force to lead to the EU-led military intervention in the DRC. Second, in light of the enhancement of European power as a global security actor, the findings of the case study also illustrated that France was largely aware of the importance of recovering European capability and the European image that had been critically damaged by the dispute over the Iraq invasion. The analysis of this case study suggested that France, as a leader of the European Union, wanted to enable the EU's

multilateralism to balance power against U.S. unilateralism, by conducting the EU-led autonomous military operation outside Europe independent from NATO.

In the second case of EUFOR RD Congo, France presented a *medium* level of political interests and national strategic preferences towards the African Great Lakes region. Since the first military engagement in the DRC (Operation *Artemis*), France continued to support Kabila's regime, and thereby could establish further closer and enhanced bilateral relations with the Congolese government. The evidence of this study suggested that France viewed the operation EUFOR RD Congo as an important opportunity to maintain its support for Kabila and to enable it to project national influence as a great power in the region. Facing the criticism and misgivings about neutrality and impartiality of the EUFOR among the local population, however, France seemed most likely to need the EUFOR to gain a credible reputation. In this regard, the study confirmed that EUFOR RD Congo was merely considered as a vehicle for a French national interest to protect, maintain and ensure its strong relationship with the Kabila regime and Kabila remaining in power. In light of European interests, France hardly displayed a desire to promote European power and interest in this specific case.

On the other hand, Germany displayed a relatively *low* level of political interests in the case of EUFOR DRC. The findings from this case study stressed that the German decision to launch the military operation was not made by its own voluntary will, but was simply a result of external pressure from France to take over the leadership for the EUFOR operation. Initially, Germany was by no means interested in the military intervention in the DRC. Germany had to grudgingly accept to play chief negotiator alongside France, despite its strong aversion to holding military responsibility. Once it could no longer turn down the French proposal to undertake a major leadership task for the EUFOR, Germany sought to defend its national reputation as an important security actor of the EU while minimising military risks and losses of forces as much as possible. The primary motive of the German decision and behaviour was viewed as being driven by a rational calculation, which led to a criticism that German activities were nothing but a 'paper tiger' to vaunt the Union's presentation as a serious security actor.

In the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, France showed a *high* level of political interests. France had maintained historically, politically and militarily an exclusive position in the Chadian regimes. As new external powers emerged as strategically important partners of the Chadian

government, however, the change of power distribution within the country resulted in a relative weakening of the French position in the region. Consequently, France lost its great power in the international system and got a reputation as a medium-size power among many super powers. Given these circumstances, the French-led EU military operation in Chad and the CAR was deemed an important opportunity for two political purposes. First, it was a vital chance for France to prove European capabilities as a reliable partner of the UN in civil-military peacekeeping operations; and secondly, it was an attempt of redemption for French foreign policy to ensure its prestigious power not only in the region, but also in the world. In sum, the case study presented the evidence that the French-led military intervention in Chad and CAR under the EU flag was primarily driven by a high level of political interests for France to achieve the reinforcement of French national and European power in both regional and international arenas.

The second hypothetical variable drawn from a realist assumption implies that global distribution of power is rapidly shifting to energy exporters and oil producers, which will have been central in the minds of national foreign policy-making of European states. The hypothesis claims that if there is an economic interest of the chief negotiator in particular peacekeeping areas, the likelihood of chief negotiator's leadership to lead to the EU deciding on an EU-led peacekeeping operation will increase. Yet, as it would be difficult to clearly reveal causality, this study seeks to elucidate to what extent correlations exist between the variables. A nominal classification was thus used to examine this variable:

1. *Presence of correlations:* evidence shows that there exist clear correlations between the economic interest of the chief negotiator in particular peacekeeping areas and a significant increase of economic benefits for the chief negotiator following the operation.
2. *Absence of correlations:* there is no or limited evidence to show some links between economic interests of the chief negotiator and economic benefits for the chief negotiator following the operation in particular peacekeeping areas.

In the case of *Artemis*, France manifested its strong economic interests in the abundance of natural resources of the DRC. When France agreed to provide the bulk of military forces to the DRC, France attached two important conditions: a strictly temporary basis and an operational area limited only to Bunia. Interestingly, Bunia is the core rich repository of vast

natural resources of the DRC. The case analysis showed that the DRC's major export production began to shift dramatically to France after the French-led EU military peacekeeping operation in the DRC. France undoubtedly became an important trade partner of the DRC and one of the main beneficiaries of Congolese vast natural resources. Hence, the evidence of this case study confirmed that there is a clear *presence* of correlation between economic interests of the chief negotiator in the peacekeeping area and an increase of economic benefits of the chief negotiator following the EU-led military peacekeeping operation in the DRC.

In the case of EUFOR RD Congo, the evidence suggested that France's vital leadership role as a chief negotiator was largely encouraged by its strong national economic interests, which focused on the securing of plentiful natural resources of the Great Lakes region. The analysis of the case study elucidated that whereas the French position had remained relatively modest in the Congolese market as well as in economic relations in the past, the EUFOR considerably strengthened the French economic position in the country. Furthermore, France also achieved considerable economic benefits from trade relations with Gabon after the EUFOR mission. The case study showed evidence that the French decision to station its major military forces in Libreville, Gabon, led to increasing economic advantages for France as well. In sum, the case study confirmed that EUFOR RD Congo was followed by a significant increase of economic benefits for France, which presented the clear *correlation* between the economic interests of the chief negotiator and the economic benefits for the chief negotiator on the EUFOR operation.

Germany, as it turned out in the case analysis, was the main economic beneficiary of the military operation in the DRC. When Germany confirmed its decision to lead the EUFOR mission, it strongly insisted that the majority of German forces would be stationed in Kinshasa and Libreville, the capital cities of the Congo and Gabon, respectively. The evidence of this case study showed that the EUFOR operation led to Germany's considerable economic growth in trade relations with the DRC since 2006. The evidence also clearly proved that German military presence in Libreville for a rapid back-up of EUFOR in Kinshasa brought Germany a dramatic increase in economic benefits in relations with Gabon as well. Hence, the case analysis confirmed that there existed a clear *correlation* between the economic interests and benefits acquired by the operation for the chief negotiators.

In the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the study suggested that the economic interests of the chief negotiator was of an important condition which may have triggered the active leadership of the chief negotiator and led to the launch of a French-led EU military operation in Chad and the CAR. France displayed its strong economic interests in the peacekeeping areas, particularly in ensuring the stability of the oil-rich fields of Chad and CAR. The case study examined the operational zones where the main battalion of French troops was mandated to be stationed. The findings from the case study presented that every location of French forces was in the core areas where there was a large concentrated deposit of heavy crude oil. The evidence of the study also showed that France achieved dramatic economic benefits in its trade relations with Chad after the EUFOR mission. Hence, the study confirmed that there existed a clear *correlation* between France's economic interests in the areas and economic benefits following the launch of the EUFOR operation in Chad and CAR.

Hypothesis 2: Presence of normative pressures increases the likelihood of chief negotiator's leadership to lead to the EU's engagement in a peacekeeping operation.

The second hypothesis is drawn from a constructivist theory. According to a constructivist assumption, the foreign security policy and behaviour of individual EU member states is largely influenced by a common identity and collective responsibility within the EU framework. The constructivist hypothesis argued that the presence of a colonial legacy as part of historical memory will increase the likelihood of chief negotiator's leadership to determine the EU deciding to engage in an EU-led peacekeeping operation. This variable was assessed using a nominal classification:

1. *Presence of normative responsibility for colonial legacy*
2. *Absence of normative responsibility for colonial legacy*

In the first case of Operation *Artemis*, evidence from the case analysis showed that the decisive French leadership to launch the EU-led military operation in the DRC was to some extent influenced by normative responsibility for European colonial legacies. Given the lack

of Belgium's capability to maintain the stability and security of its former colony, the DRC, France expressed its desire to collaborate closely with Belgium in the peacekeeping operation in the DRC. Although France had no direct feeling of colonial responsibility for Congolese crisis management, French foreign policy towards Francophone Africa viewed the operation as part of Europe's collective and normative responsibility. Hence, the first case study confirmed that the *presence* of a normative responsibility of the chief negotiator for the colonial legacy of Europe increased the likelihood of leadership of the chief negotiator to determine an EU-led military operation in the DRC.

In the second case of EUFOR RD Congo, on the other hand, neither France nor Germany presented normative responsibility for the colonial legacy of Europe. France seemed unlikely to be constrained by colonial responsibility or its historical relationship with the DRC. Germany rather used the colonial legacy as an excuse to shift the responsibility to other European countries, particularly Belgium. Germany insisted that the first troop contributors should not and could not be Germany, referring to the colonial responsibility of the former colonial empire of the DRC. Hence, the analysis of the case study confirmed that normative responsibility for colonial legacy was *absent* in the case of the EUFOR DRC.

In the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, colonial legacy was identified as an important motivation for France, which led to the French active leadership role in the launch of a French-led EUFOR operation. When France expressed its intention to conduct a European military operation in Chad and the CAR, French authorities officially mentioned that France had endeavoured to build a friendship with its former colonies. France committed itself to maintain and support the peace and security of French 'former friends'.⁸²⁶ Moreover, France emphasised a norm-driven responsibility and humanitarian intention to make its ancient African friends' situation more stable. Therefore, the case study confirms that the EUFOR operation was conditioned by the *presence* of a normative responsibility of the chief negotiator for its colonial legacy.

The second hypothetical proposition on the normative pressures is drawn from a constructivist theory inspired by the work on normative institutionalism. The hypothesis argued that as the normative conditions increase, the likelihood of leadership of the chief negotiator to lead an EU decision to engage in an EU-led peacekeeping operation will also increase. The normative conditions were measured using the following ordinal scale:

⁸²⁶ See footnote no.781, 782, and 790

1. *Low level of normative pressures*: evidence presented that the chief negotiator's leadership was unlikely to be conditioned by normative pressures.
2. *Medium level of normative pressures*: evidence showed that normative commitment of the chief negotiator was followed by normative entrapment. However, evidence of the chief negotiator using normative language in suasion was hardly illuminated.
3. *High level of normative pressures*: evidence clearly displayed that the normative commitment of the chief negotiator resulted in normative entrapment, which led to the chief negotiator's efforts to bring normative suasion within the EU.

In the case of Operation *Artemis*, the analysis of the study confirmed that the chief negotiator was conditioned by a *high* level of normative pressures - normative commitments, normative entrapment and normative suasion. France reaffirmed its normative commitments through a series of Franco-British summits since the 1990s, in which France pledged to intensify its efforts to enable the EU to equip autonomous military capabilities in the case of threats confronting African crises. Operation *Artemis* was the very first result of a high level of expectation of France to fulfil its international peacekeeping commitments in close cooperation with the UN. By its commitments to promote European solidarity in pursuing international peace and security, France was normatively constrained and entrapped. Furthermore, the evidence showed France trying to vest its efforts during negotiations to persuade other members, particularly the UK, to participate in the peacekeeping operation. France used normative discussion referring to Franco-British normative commitments.

In the case of EUFOR RD Congo, France and Germany had committed themselves to a multilateral involvement in DRC crisis management. Franco-German normative commitments seemed to have constrained both France and Germany to become more important than anyone during negotiations, which led to a Franco-German central tandem role in operating EUFOR DR Congo. However, the evidence of the case study suggested that Franco-German commitments were only limited to normative entrapment, which resulted in a convergence of different preferences between the two European powers on the issue of military engagement in the DRC. Germany was significantly reluctant and suspicious of the military operation, and thereby its commitments slightly constrained its decision. Yet, France seemed more likely to dedicate its efforts to get other member states to change their critical position and to participate in the EUFOR operation. In sum, whereas Germany remained a

medium level of normative pressures, France showed relatively *high* level of normative pressures during the negotiations on the launch of EUFOR RD Congo.

In the last case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the analysis showed a *medium* level of normative pressures. Having gone through the establishment of various bilateral relationships with Chad and CAR, France had committed itself to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. In compliance with bilateral defence agreements with those countries, France reiterated a number of normative commitments during the negotiations. However, despite such clear evidence of normative commitments and to a lesser extent normative entrapment, the evidence hardly demonstrated France using a normative argument to persuade other EU member states to get involved in the operation. The findings of this case study suggested that the launch of the EUFOR operation coincided less with the normative discourse. France and many other EU member states seemed rather likely to focus on non-normative arguments according to the national foreign policy priorities of each.

8.3 Conditions and the likelihood of chief negotiator's leadership

Drawing from the comparative explanatory analysis across the three cases, this thesis comes to two main conclusions. The first conclusion is about the chief negotiator in contributing to UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping. The second conclusion is about the important factors that are theoretically assumed to increase the likelihood of chief negotiator's leadership. This thesis argues that the insights from the two conclusions ultimately provide the best answers to the research question: '*Under what conditions do EU Member States lead UN-related peacekeeping operations?*'

The comparative analysis revealed that, in every case, France steered the debate and shaped the EU decision on a possible EU-led peacekeeping operation on the UN's request. The German leadership was once identified as a chief negotiator in the case of EUFOR RD Congo. However, it must not be overlooked that although the overall German role was important on the ground at operational level, it hardly contributed to negotiations at a political level. The UK remained at a lower level of commitments in every case. The role of Italy was presented as limited and less likely decisive during the negotiations across the three cases. The comparative analysis verified that robust and effective UN-EU cooperation in

peacekeeping is eventually determined by France and whether it plays a proactive leadership role in negotiations at both the UN and the EU levels. Hence, the study indicates that the general expectations for the role of the European Big-4 are to some extent overestimated. The case analysis also reveals that the HR does not have any direct or decisive influence on decision-making, and thereby the role of the HR remains as a facilitator. In sum, this thesis confirms that UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping seems likely to be fundamentally determined by the choice of France rather than any other EU actors.

Table 8.2 summarises the most crucial findings from theory testing across all three cases. According to the results of the comparative analysis, economic interests of the chief negotiator are present across all the three cases, while normative conditions are either high or medium. On the other hand, the political interests of the chief negotiator vary across the cases – high, medium and low. The colonial legacy as part of normative pressures is either present or absent.

Table 8. 2 Hypotheses and Results of Testing

UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping	Chief Negotiator	Neoclassical Realism (Hypothesis 1)		Social Constructivism (Hypothesis 2)	
		Political interests	Economic benefits	Colonial legacy	Normative pressures
Case I Operation <i>Artemis</i>	France	high	present	present	high
Case II EUFOR DR Congo	France	medium	present	absent	high
	Germany	low	present	absent	medium
Case III EUFOR Tchad/RCA	France	high	present	present	medium

The first case analysis showed evidence of all two hypotheses. France displayed a *high* level of political interests in pursuing both the projection of national power and the European balance of power; economic benefits for France were *present* from the peacekeeping operation; normative responsibility of France for European colonial legacies were *present*;

and a *high* level of normative conditions constrained France to provide an active leadership role to lead the EU to cooperate with the UN. Every hypothesis was accepted in the first case of Operation *Artemis*. The results of the case analysis suggest that the likelihood of UN-EU cooperation in a peacekeeping operation will increase when France meets all these four variables and so provides its robust leadership.

The second case study displayed a *medium* level of political interests in the projection of national power; economic benefits were *present* from the peacekeeping operation; and a *high* level of normative pressures, all of which were important driving forces behind the French decision to play a decisive role to determine the EU military peacekeeping operation. On the other hand, the analysis showed that economic interests and a *medium* level of normative pressures were important conditions under which Germany was likely to lead the operation. The realist hypothesis on the political interests was rejected in the case of Germany. The constructivist hypothetical variable on the colonial legacy within the context of normative responsibility was rejected in both French and German conditions.

The last case study accepted all four theoretical propositions as important conditions of the chief negotiator that may increase the likelihood of leadership to promote UN-EU cooperation. More specifically, hypotheses on the political interests, economic interests, and colonial legacy were fully accepted, while the hypothetical variable on the normative pressures was partially accepted. According to the outcomes from this case analysis, UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation in Chad/CAR occurred as France held a high profile in political and economic interests, as well as normative responsibility for its colonial legacies and normative commitments.

In sum, the primary conclusion drawn from this comparative explanatory analysis is that economic interests and normative pressures are most consistently supported across all cases, which tells us that these two conditions are the best answers for the research question. Political interests are either accepted or partially accepted, while colonial legacy is either accepted or rejected across the three cases. When comparing the two realist variables, the evidence suggests that economic interests are more important than political interests. For the realists, therefore, EU cooperation with the UN is most likely to occur because of the active leadership of the chief negotiators being decisively motivated by economic interests rather than political interests. Of the constructivist propositions, the evidence illustrates that the normative institutionalist pressures are more important than a colonial legacy which links to

the historical memory and the normative responsibility. From a constructivist perspective, accordingly, the EU cooperates with the UN because of normative pressures of the chief negotiators rather than European historical responsibility.

When bringing all these outcomes back to the research question by combining the two separate conclusions - one about the leadership of the chief negotiator and the other about the important factors - the insights drawn from the comparative explanatory analysis find the best answer to the research question; ‘*under what conditions do EU Member States lead UN-related peacekeeping operations?*’ The best answer to the research question is that the EU cooperates with the UN in international peacekeeping because France, as a major driving force behind the negotiations, has strong economic interests and normative pressures in specific peacekeeping operations.

The comparative explanatory analysis across the three cases implies an important lesson for this research. Given all the specific three cases in which cooperation occurred, operation *Artemis* seems particularly important, in which the evidence showed *high* (Hypothesis 1-1) – *present* (Hypothesis 1-2) – *present* (Hypothesis 2-1) – *high* (Hypothesis 2-2) results. Operation *Artemis* is deemed unique and more significant than the other two cases with regards to the question of the effective role of the EU as a promising peacekeeping actor alongside the UN. Despite being the very first, new and large EU operation in terms of autonomous military engagement beyond Europe in close cooperation with the UN, the agreement took less than a month from the UN’s request until the official decisions of UNSC Resolution followed by Council Joint Action. This case raises an important question about how cooperation occurred and was agreed upon so quickly. The comparative explanatory analysis highlights that France, who undertook the leadership as well as chief negotiating role for the operation, embodied both realist interests and normative responsibilities. France fulfilled all four conditions at all high levels, which led to the most rapid, robust and effective negotiation outcomes on the peacekeeping cooperation. In this respect, the study suggests that those four hypothetical propositions are certainly important for UN-EU cooperation to achieve an utmost effective and rapid action in maintaining international peace and security.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

Internal and External Challenges Facing the EU

Introduction

The findings of this thesis have several implications for the study of the EU as a global security actor alongside the UN. Contrary to most EU policy areas, the decision-making process on the issue of UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping has revealed the serious internal and external problems of the EU. This thesis argued that the two-level game metaphor, which Putnam used to depict international negotiations and show the entanglements between international and domestic politics, was a useful analytical framework to investigate the cooperation between the UN and the EU. This thesis suggests that the analysis of a revised two-level game approach not only explains the complexity of the EU as an international actor at the UN, but it also diagnoses the critical internal incoherence within the EU. By using a revised two-level game approach, this chapter seeks to discuss the domestic discordance and international challenges facing the EU in the realm of international peace and security. The aim of this chapter is to put forward some thoughts on how the diversity of views between the UN and the EU can overcome discord and scepticism in peacekeeping operations.

9.1 Internal Resonance

The comparative analysis across the three cases has demonstrated that the effective role of the EU as a global security actor alongside the UN crucially depends on the political will of the member states. Decision-making involves all EU member states “at all times with a right

to veto at any time”,⁸²⁷ insofar as the issues of CFSP and ESDP are concerned. Therefore, every EU-engaged peacekeeping operation, whether it is military or civilian, has to be approved by all member states through the ESDP decision-making process in order to provide the Union with a real capacity to carry out EU-led peacekeeping operations. The formal negotiations on ESDP operations are taken in bodies where all members are represented, such as the PSC, and decisions are to be taken unanimously. Accordingly, the supranational institutions are far less involved in negotiations and the decision-making process. Due to this complex decision-making process and these unusual working methods of the ESDP, serious cleavages and discordance among the member states often occur.

The nature of decision-making on a military operation makes it more difficult for the EU to reach a consensus on the possible troop contribution and deployment of civil and military personnel. Whereas civilian operations are normally funded by the CFSP budget, military operations are funded outside the CFSP budget as well as the regular EU budget.⁸²⁸ The EU’s contribution to UN military peacekeeping operations entirely depends on the voluntary will of and the financial as well as military capability of the member states to fund and support resources for such operations. As the analysis of the three case studies has addressed, participation in ESDP military operations is always on a voluntary-basis and subject to the member states’ own deliberations. Consequently, during the negotiations and decision-making process, the lack of political will to commit to troop contributions and the shortage of resources in many member states are significantly displayed.

Given these fundamental difficulties in the area of EU foreign and security policy, this thesis suggests three sets of interlocking driving forces to grasp internal coherence. First, this study argues that the European major powers, *inter alia* the Big-3 (Britain, France and Germany), should recognise their important leadership position in security and defence issues. The comparative explanatory analysis of this thesis has revealed that those Big-3 countries are the most important actors to drive the ESDP forward, shape the capacity of the EU, and influence the political will of other member states. Considering the fact that the idea for new peacekeeping operations or initiatives normally originates outside the EU, particularly from discussions and negotiations in the UNSC, Franco-British bilateral cooperation and their tandem leadership needs to be further enhanced. According to the evidence from the case

⁸²⁷ A. Björkdahl and M. Strömvik (2008), *op. cit.*

⁸²⁸ According to Article 28.2 TEU, the CFSP budget is not for financing of military operations. Instead, Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP (of 23 February 2004) established the *Athena Mechanism* to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications, i.e. outside EU budget (OJL 63, 28. 02.2004).

studies, France and the UK demonstrated their important bilateral collaboration to convince Germany of the necessity of a EUFOR operation, which eventually led to German approval. The recognition of the important French and British leadership position on issues of European security and defence would constantly stimulate the German position, and subsequently other member states, which will increase internal coherence. In regard to the role of Italy in peacekeeping, the three selected cases found little evidence of Italy's notable leadership both at the political and operational levels. However, this does not mean that Italy is a less important actor in peacekeeping operations. Instead, Italy has been expected to play a bigger role in international peace and security, particularly for multi-faceted and multi-dimensional operations equipped with military-civilian personnel and humanitarian assistance.⁸²⁹ If the Big-3 strives harder for the maintenance of international peace and security by collaborating with Italy, forming a Big-4, the EU would achieve further enhanced capacities, capabilities, legitimacy, and credibility in the field of international peacekeeping.

Second, the findings from the three case studies suggest that the degree to which national and European interests overlap is crucial for successful and effective decision-making within the EU on issues of foreign security and defence. As the comparative analysis across all the three cases has demonstrated, the more member states view European security and defence policy and European common interests as a part of their own national foreign policy and national interests, the better and easier the EU can achieve a common position and consensus on the given issues at domestic level. It is important for the EU, again, to focus its internal efforts on the Big-3 countries to enable them to converge on their different national policy and preferences first, so that they can inject the EU agenda into their national preferences, which will then be followed by other member states.

Third, in order to constrain various and different foreign policy and interests of individual Big-3 nations, this study suggests that normative commitments need to be further developed. The findings of the case studies show that normative commitments that are particularly driven by the genuine wish to strengthen European normative power, and the wish to see the EU developing its independent capabilities as a promising global security actor, will have a stronger impact on the identity, position and behaviour of the Big-3 within the EU structure. Normative commitments of the EU would at least entrap the member states to fulfil their

⁸²⁹ For further information and data supplied on the Italian missions for peace in the world, visit the Ministry of Defence of Italy (www.difesa.it)

commitment and to contribute to European multilateralism, which will also provide an important interlocking driving force for the internal discordance of the EU.

9.2 External challenges

There is a very well-known question, “who do I call, if I want to talk to Europe?” The inability to speak with a unified voice has hobbled the EU, most notably during the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The question of a stronger representative of the EU on the international stage has thus occupied a central position on the issue of the EU as a global actor at the UN. The Lisbon Treaty most recently proposed overall changes to the relationship between the Council and the Commission in the whole CFSP area by creating a new post of High Representative, Catherine Ashton, who is mainly responsible for so-called implementation missions (peacekeeping) and also simultaneously serves as the president of the External Relations Council and Vice President of the EU Commission. Nevertheless, the fundamental question of ‘who speaks for the EU’ remains unclear.⁸³⁰ Especially in the area of foreign, security and defence policy, decisions are made on the basis of inter-governmentalism in which individual member states remain central players at both the UNSC and the EU. Consequently, such a distinctive nature of inter-governmental decision-making has also impeded the diplomatic clout of the EU at the UN, which constrains the EU from being an effective global security actor alongside the UN in international peace and security.

The analysis of a revised two-level game reveals some external challenges facing the EU at the UN. First, despite a legal status and vital role of the HR who has been mandated to work closely with the UNSC on behalf of Europe,⁸³¹ evidence from the case studies shows that there is a great deal of ambiguity about the EU as an actor at the Security Council. The EU itself has no legal standing at the Security Council. Moreover, the European Community represented by the HR only has observer status.⁸³² It is not exceptional for the EU Presidency.

⁸³⁰ M. Farrell (2006), *op. cit.*, p.30

⁸³¹ For example, the United Nations has expressed its appreciation to the *High Representative*, who actively supported in enhancing UN peace operation and implementing command. See UN Security Council (S/1996/460), “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 1035 (1995)”, (June 18, 1996), available at <http://www.nato.int/IFOR/un/u960621a.htm> (accessed on 16 Jan 2009)

⁸³² K. V. Laatikainen and K. E. Smith (2004), *op. cit.*, p.4.

Although the Presidency is allowed to express the EU's common position concerning CFSP matters and to speak on behalf of all the member states in the UN, if the country holding the Presidency is not a member of the Security Council, it has no opportunity to act as a front-runner in UNSC negotiations. In terms of the representative figure of the EU at the UNSC, delegates from the HR and the Presidency would remain in a listening mode. This may constrain them from having discussions and coordinating outside the Council in New York, and eventually in Brussels with other member states for making a better view of issues.⁸³³ The EU is often invited to public meetings of the UNSC when the decisions have already been taken and the states are just formalising their positions. However, the Presidency and the HR are generally not allowed in during the most important moments of negotiations and deliberation, which takes place behind the closed doors of the small room of informal consultations, the "*sancta sanctorum*" of Security Council's exclusiveness.⁸³⁴ Consequently, again, the institutionalised political will of the EU member states sitting in the UNSC and effective leadership of the European permanent members at the Security Council, *i.e.* France and the UK, are essential to present the EU as an actor at the UNSC.

Secondly, however, the analysis of this study indicates that it would be much more difficult to expect that those two permanent members of the Union will employ their exclusive positions at the Security Council to pursue the EU's common interest rather than their own states' preference. From a realist perspective, the case analysis has manifested that states would not easily abandon their interests and position. Rather, they become more resistant if their interests are affected. In this context, Hill notes that a permanent position on the UNSC forces the UK and France to work collectively together, but 'not necessarily to pursue a substantive EU agenda in the UNSC'.⁸³⁵ French and British approaches to the UNSC, according to Hill's argument, are merely to preserve their privileged national positions and the source of their power and influence on it.⁸³⁶

In sum, recognising the identity, leadership and vital role of France and the UK as a diplomat and representative of the EU in the UNSC is essential to boost the role of the EU as an effective actor in the Security Council. This thesis argues that in order to cope with external

⁸³³ At EU weekly meetings chaired by the Presidency, EU member states sitting on the UNSC take it in turns to brief the other EU member states on the previous week's Security Council activities. The HR of the EU may be invited to speak to the UNSC on behalf of the EU. See M. Farrell (2006), *op. cit.*, p.34.

⁸³⁴ F. P. Fulci, "L'Unione Europea alle Nazioni Unite", *Rivista di studi politici internazionali*, no. 269, Gennaio-Marzo, 2006, p.38.

⁸³⁵ C. Hill (2006), *op. cit.*, p.14.

⁸³⁶ *Ibid.*

challenges facing the EU, France and the UK together have to provide greater efforts to achieve coherence and show their solidarity in the Security Council. Solana emphasised that “if France and the UK do not reach a common position, there will be no common EU position.”⁸³⁷ The HR also stressed that “Europe is losing influence when it does not speak with one voice”.⁸³⁸ The UK and France are thus deemed the foremost leading actors of the Union that can represent the ‘spirit of the EU’ at the international level.⁸³⁹

Cooperation between the UN and the EU in the field of international peace and security is an interesting but elusive and difficult subject to investigate. In recent years, the role of the EU as a global actor has attracted considerable attention from EU scholars. There is currently much discussion about the EU as a promising partner of the UN in international peace and security. Furthermore, the question of effective multilateralism of the EU, in contrast with US unilateralism, has engaged current interdisciplinary scholarship across a range of fields. However, most of the literature and studies on the EU’s external security policy have rather come to focus on the evaluation or examination of the practical phenomenon of the EU and its performance in international relations. To a lesser extent studies have contributed to illuminating the fundamental reasons why and the major driving forces behind the EU cooperating with other international or regional actors in maintaining international peace and security. Comprehending a natural phenomenon and predicting future aspects and events must be preceded by an investigation of fundamental motivations and factors which may influence actors’ behaviours and overall outcomes.

In this regard, this thesis would probably be useful in accounting for the motivational factors which may increase the likelihood of UN-EU cooperation in international peace and security. The analytical strength of this thesis is that the revised two-level game analysis has successfully identified the most important actors involved in the complex web of decision-making and entanglement of international and domestic negotiations. This thesis also has theoretical merits, as it has aimed to examine leading IR theories by testing each of the theoretical hypotheses. In addition, ideas on how the EU will skilfully cope with its internal and external challenges contributed general understanding and expectation of the role of the EU for upcoming international peacekeeping operations.

⁸³⁷ S. Biscop and E. Drieskens (2006), *op. cit.*, p.119.

⁸³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸³⁹ *Ibid.*

Nevertheless, it is essential to address some limitations of this research and comment about the future work based on what has been discussed. The comparative analysis confirmed that a high level of political and strategic interests is a vital condition under which the EU member states are most likely to drive the EU to actively engage in peacekeeping operations with the UN. Normative conditions are partially accepted, which means that the EU member states are not always constrained by normative and ideational reasons. However, much work remains to ensure and strengthen the validity of the arguments. This study limits the scope of possible variables which may influence the likelihood UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping. By positing that active leadership of the European major powers holds the decisions of effective and robust peacekeeping cooperation of the EU with the UN, the study examined two hypothetically distinct variables drawn from the two IR theories. The research work suggests that other independent variables could influence the EU's active role as a security actor along with the UN in maintaining international peace and security.

Besides, although this study was carefully prepared, there still remain significant concerns regarding the utility of the data with limited supporting evidence. Due to the limited access to each nation's substantial document, the study presented the fundamental problem of large percentage increases in very low absolute trade numbers. In order to scrutinise the realist claims about the correlations between the economic interests and motivations of the chief negotiator, overall further and different data is required to consider the hypothesis. Hence, further research work needs to identify possible alternatives and provide supplementary source in order to ensure the credibility of the research argument and outcome. As briefly mentioned earlier, for example, a detailed breakdown of the mineral resources may provide a vital clue to the realist argument when it comes to dealing with trade levels. Existing corporate investment or foreign direct investment in particular peacekeeping areas may be another possible source, as the data seems to be helpful in elaborating on the chief negotiator's trade or investment access which would necessarily have been intervened or impeded after the fact of an intervention.

In addition, further cases as well as a broad range of actors involved in decision-making, including individual actors, countries and organisations, should be investigated to confirm or reject these hypotheses. To conclude, it is hoped that the contribution of this thesis will include an implication of the work for future research and an impetus for strengthening multilateral cooperation between the UN and the EU in international peace and security.

Appendix I

Research Note

When the research first got under way, it rapidly recognised potential shortcomings in data collection. As the aim of this research project was to investigate the important conditions under which the decision on UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping is most likely, it was essential to examine the simultaneous negotiation process in which important actors collaborated to achieve a decision-making outcome. However, academic literature on this specific issue was limited. Furthermore, substantial documents and archives are not fully disclosed to the public due to the sensitivity of security and defence policy. Official documents released to the public often entail the final results without the full details of negotiations; documentation was therefore difficult or only partially accessible. It became clear that interviews would be the most effective way to access primary sources and data that could not be found through public documents.

The research carried out 35 interviews between February 2009 and June 2012 in New York (February-April 2009), Paris (March 2010), Brussels (April 2010), Edinburgh (November 2010), and Seoul (May-June 2012). Interviews were conducted with officials, academics and experts from various institutions; the interviewees included officials from EU Member States' Missions to the UN in New York, officials from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, officials from non-EU States' Missions to the UN specialised in peacekeeping operations, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence of France, officials from the European Commission, officials from the Council of the EU and officials from NATO, national officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy. In addition, academics and experts working in the area of UN-EU relations were also included. Almost all interviews were conducted in person, while one interview was conducted via email. All interviews were conducted on a non-attributable basis and interviewees were guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality in order to encourage free expression and honesty on the part of interviewees. The interviews were normally recorded and transcribed; except one interview that was conducted off the record and notes were taken instead. The research adopted in-depth semi structured interviews which lasted generally between 40 minutes and an hour.

In addition to interviews, empirical and primary data was also gathered using non-participant observation. The first observation took place during the substantive session of the 'UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping and its Working Group (C-34)' in New York from 23 February to 20 March 2009. The author was given a formal authorisation by the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN as a delegate and special advisor on UN peacekeeping operations. The author was allowed to attend and monitor almost all High-level plenary meetings, daily working group meetings, and exclusive meetings at the Security Council concerning peacekeeping. The second non-participant observation was carried out during the 'NATO Parliamentary Assembly Annual Meeting' which was held in Edinburgh from 13 to 17 November 2010. The committee offered the author an accreditation to the meetings as an interpreter, and thereby the author witnessed first-hand the procedures of coordination and decision-making concerning a closer partnership among nations for maintaining regional/international peace and security. The observation allowed the author to acquire valuable knowledge of the role of international organisations in promoting cooperation in peace and security and to conduct simultaneous interviews with prominent officials.

This empirical research was well aware that interviewees would undoubtedly be tempted to highlight their own institutional role or to not give the exact account of specific events. In order to avoid the potential biases generated by the interview data, interviewees were asked almost the same questions in general; and on the specific issues and events which demanded special knowledge and experience, secondary questions were given. In this way, the research was able to corroborate statements provided by different interviewees, and thereby the risks were mitigated.

Appendix II

List of Interviews

New York (February-April 2009)

- Interview with an official from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (24/02/2009)
- Interview with an official from German Mission to the UN (24/02/2009)
- Interview with an official from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN (25/02/2009)
- Interview with an official from German Mission to the UN (16/03/2009)
- Interview with an official from the Mission of the Czech Republic to the UN (16/03/2009)
- Interview with an official from UK Mission to the UN (18/03/2009)
- Interview with an official from the UN Political Affairs (26/03/2009)
- Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the UN (26/03/2009)
- Interview with an official from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (02/04/2009)
- Interview with an official from UK Mission to the UN (07/04/2009)
- Interview with an official from French Mission to the UN (07/04/2009)
- Interview with an official from UK Mission to the UN (14/04/2009)
- Interview with an official from the UN Office of Police Capacity (15/04/2009)
- Interview with an official from the UN Office of Military Affairs (16/04/2009)
- Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the UN (28/04/2009)
- Interview with an expert from the CIC (24/02/2009)
- Interview with an expert from the CIC (06/04/2009)

Paris (March 2010)

- Interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (04/03/2010)
- Interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (05/03/2010)
- Interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (05/03/2010)
- Interview with an official from the Ministry of Defence (08/03/2010)
- Interview with an official from the Ministry of Defence

- (08/03/2010)
- Interview with an expert from the EUISS
(03/03/2010)
- Interview with an expert from the EUISS
(04/03/2010)

Brussels (April 2010)

- Interview with an official from the NATO
(26/04/2010)
- Interview with an official from the Council of the European Union
(27/04/2010)
- Interview with an official from the European Commission
(28/04/2010)
- Interview with an official from the European Commission
(29/04/2010)
- Interview with an official from the Council of the European Union
(29/04/2010)
- Interview with an official from the Council of the European Union
(30/04/2010)
- Interview with an expert from the EGMONT
(30/04/2010)


Edinburgh (November 2010)

- Interview with a (former) Minister of National Defence of the ROK to the NATO Assembly Annual Meeting (17/11/2010)

Seoul (May-June 2012)

- Interview with an official from the OSCE
(31/05/2012)
- Interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy
(31/05/2012)
- Interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy
(08/06/2012)

Appendix III United Nations Principal Organs



Source: United Nations, available at <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/> (accessed on 05 June 2008). This figure does not include all agencies, programmes, organs or bodies associated with these organs of the UN, nor Trusteeship Council or the International Court of Justice represented in this chart.

Appendix IV - 1. Direction of Trade of Democratic Republic of Congo, 1998-2005 ⁸⁴⁰

Reporter country	Partner Country	Flow	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
DR Congo	Austria	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 1,754,350 (V) 389,561	(V) 631,000 (V) 140,800	(V) 1,177,000 (V) 106,370	(V) 39,909 (V) 749,430	(V) 1,636 (V) 1,327,590	(V) 40,455 (V) 1,146,640	(V) 241,545 (V) 896,390	(V) 263,091 (V) 1,268,630
	Belgium	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 622,764,000 (V) 142,906,000	(V) 724,290,000 (V) 104,103,000	(V) 689,869,000 (V) 145,068,000	(V) 705,945,000 (V) 121,891,000	(V) 911,209,000 (V) 132,380,000	(V) 595,587,000 (V) 156,722,000	(V) 525,451,000 (V) 190,883,000	(V) 522,894,000 (V) 252,650,000
	Denmark	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 70,005 (V) 1,798,360	(V) 26,364 (V) 821,700	(V) 12,355 (V) 351,166	(V) 10,923 (V) 1,374,530	(V) 161,213 (V) 1,699,870	(V) 1,021,190 (V) 6,094,720	(V) 136,567 (V) 6,334,440	(V) 152,545 (V) 5,277,250
	Finland	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 44,991,000 (V) 44,991,000	(V) 45,567,100 (V) 31,350	(V) 75,749,600 (V) 409,090	(V) 82,318,500 (V) 518,760	(V) 68,738,300 (V) 518,760	(V) 52,605,400 (V) 909,590	(V) 230,154,000 (V) 1,406,240	(V) 106,206,000 (V) 1,529,000
	France	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 12,971,600 (V) 40,627,300	(V) 6,469,000 (V) 29,712,000	(V) 17,877,500 (V) 43,907,400	(V) 6,037,270 (V) 44,043,700	(V) 33,793,700 (V) 85,671,400	(V) 26,968,500 (V) 133,138,000	(V) 13,150,600 (V) 133,206,000	(V) 109,528,000 (V) 142,520,000
	Germany	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 21,053,800 (V) 37,183,900	(V) 5,126,360 (V) 18,100,500	(V) 3,431,820 (V) 24,194,500	(V) 10,549,100 (V) 33,173,800	(V) 7,448,180 (V) 68,808,300	(V) 11,300,000 (V) 71,773,900	(V) 7,545,450 (V) 71,894,900	(V) 17,710,000 (V) 72,637,400
	Greece	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 1,662,400 (V) 758,321	(V) 95,727 (V) 768,350	(V) 565,391 (V) 113,234	(V) 92,364 (V) 38,830	(V) 82,455 (V) 443,960	(V) 124,182 (V) 305,800	(V) 96,909 (V) 563,420	(V) 83,727 (V) 640,860
	Ireland	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 340,666 (V) 5,473,820	(V) 93,546 (V) 5,541,030	(V) 18,091 (V) 3,250,610	(V) 0 (V) 3,434,860	(V) 727 (V) 5,327,080	(V) 0 (V) 10,403,900	(V) 98,546 (V) 18,056,500	(V) 34,636 (V) 18,280,700
	Italy	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 42,252,400 (V) 14,959,900	(V) 34,206,400 (V) 9,812,440	(V) 25,750,400 (V) 9,721,910	(V) 20,729,300 (V) 12,121,600	(V) 11,137,400 (V) 21,627,500	(V) 10,873,000 (V) 28,750,300	(V) 13,854,300 (V) 26,685,900	(V) 17,851,100 (V) 36,088,800
	Luxembourg	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 0 (V) 1,177,780	(V) 0 (V) 901,120	(V) 0 (V) 444,620	(V) 37,455 (V) 526,460	(V) 5,909 (V) 838,970	(V) 36,455 (V) 916,410	(V) 44,636 (V) 1,206,260	(V) 0 (V) 1,582,350
	Netherlands	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 5,206,050 (V) 39,126,300	(V) 5,904,910 (V) 23,653,800	(V) 32,691,600 (V) 30,112,400	(V) 6,383,910 (V) 33,273,500	(V) 2,229,730 (V) 48,123,400	(V) 3,881,360 (V) 42,393,200	(V) 1,966,640 (V) 38,492,300	(V) 7,686,450 (V) 64,992,000

⁸⁴⁰ Source: Based on information from The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database (1980-2009), Currency: US dollar (\$)
(V) Identifies data consolidated from estimated monthly/quarterly partner country records (US\$)
(Y) Estimated by other methods, sometimes including the use of partner country records (US\$)
c.i.f. Cost, Insurance, and freight

	Portugal	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 21,813,600 (V) 471,089	(V) 9,118,090 (V) 332,860	(V) 9,628,270 (V) 825,110	(V) 14,992,500 (V) 887,150	(V) 9,606,450 (V) 4,109,820	(V) 11,132,200 (V) 1,725,460	(V) 20,672,600 (V) 4,530,350	(V) 23,792,700 (V) 5,216,530
	Spain	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 4,378,380 (V) 6,152,460	(V) 3,179,640 (V) 4,965,950	(V) 2,315,090 (V) 10,106,300	(V) 514,364 (V) 3,550,140	(V) 21,422,100 (V) 5,286,380	(V) 2,996,910 (V) 8,198,300	(V) 2,686,550 (V) 11,666,700	(V) 3,947,090 (V) 11,216,600
	Sweden	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 2,156,810 (V) 1,993,180	(V) 191,423 (V) 184,994	(V) 107,938 (V) 777,367	(V) 43,879 (V) 2,939,720	(V) 60,807 (V) 1,626,030	(V) 74,029 (V) 1,944,390	(V) 3,328 (V) 14,161,800	(V) 321,273 (V) 17,338,500
	United Kingdom	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 6,234,020 (V) 10,713,900	(V) 4,972,340 (V) 4,734,810	(V) 1,267,720 (V) 6,836,600	(V) 736,126 (V) 15,274,400	(V) 1,326,140 (V) 9,148,520	(V) 2,154,340 (V) 14,514,900	(V) 7,832,460 (V) 13,224,400	(V) 10,123,500 (V) 22,934,900
	EU	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(Y) 790,484,000 (Y) 304,535,000	(Y) 841,273,000 (Y) 204,274,000	(Y) 861,257,000 (Y) 277,708,000	(Y) 848,976,000 (Y) 274,897,000	(Y) 1,068,210,000 (Y) 387,329,000	(Y) 719,406,000 (Y) 481,751,000	(Y) 826,421,000 (Y) 537,313,000	(Y) 822,454,000 (Y) 658,169,000

Appendix IV - 2. Direction of Trade of Gabon, 2001-2009 ⁸⁴¹

Reporter country	Partner Country	Flow	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Gabon	Austria	Exports	(v) 1,363	(v) 3,545	(v) 7,272	(v) 66,545.5	27,090	12,000	203,727	346,636	6,090
		Imports (c.i.f.)	(v) 7,378,800	15,138,300	18,064,500	19,680,800	22,774,100	17,352,400	43,775,300	23,496,800	23,559,400
	Belgium	Exports	(v) 12,936,400	11,436,400	12,193,400	13,151,400	14,460,400	18,443,500	21,639,000	21,648,700	15,184,100
		Imports (c.i.f.)	37,862,000	34,572,300	45343300	51034000	67206800	85,060,200	149,070,000	132,654,000	118,385,000
	Cyprus	Exports	379,669	358,559	90,946	468,621	584,216	202,091	897,545	1,653,640	444,273
		Imports (c.i.f.)	45976.3	0	0	13592	0	4400	0	0	47190
	Czech Republic	Exports	26,291.30	61,090.10	327,871.00	144,598.00	722,102.00	-	37,727	727	-
		Imports (c.i.f.)	751,933	403,195	465,640	2,221,570	1,423,770	174,350	1,081,850	1,716,550	126,830
	Denmark	Exports	316,763	218,789	386,397	910,448	730,455	562,273	1,114,180	510,818	482,000
		Imports (c.i.f.)	4,150,040	1,407,270	2,988,920	2,203,280	1,886,500	10,733,400	2,736,140	7,225,570	3,021,040
	Estonia	Exports	0	9,090.91	9,090.91	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Imports (c.i.f.)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14300
	Finland	Exports	114091	27909.1	1000	0	0	0	320455	1272.73	38636.4
		Imports (c.i.f.)	489,830.00	664,950.00	719,290.00	1032680	227260	7180250	2164910	7412570	1924340
	France	Exports	770,783,000	378,007,000	319,465,000	330,445,000	321,735,000	365,529,000	587,848,000	471,510,000	301,946,000
		Imports (c.i.f.)	907,469,000	583,370,000	691,371,000	706,833,000	686,298,000	688,617,000	765,463,000	904,554,000	764,311,000
	Germany	Exports	9,143,640	7,546,360	20,031,800	15,211,800	18,589,100	20,321,100	71,127,300	137,450,000	251,287,000
		Imports (c.i.f.)	28,923,400	28,960,800	35,875,400	44,468,600	43,049,600	73,031,400	68,209,000	86,150,100	70,654,600
	Greece	Exports	12478400	9696450	11532100	15542400	17657500	17018700	11285300	39792500	16542900
		Imports (c.i.f.)	547800	3264800	1563980	5388240	11526000	241120	17852200	260810	146960
	Hungary	Exports	107,273.00	1,818.18	50,909.10	72,727.30	60,090.90	30,272.70	146,636.00	23,454.50	2,545.45
		Imports (c.i.f.)	83600	0	110,000	562,100.00	611,050.00	813,010.00	617,870.00	510,290.00	356,620.00
	Ireland	Exports	2,950,450.00	90.91	41,181.80	13,818.20	30,000.00	15,000.00	36,727.30	354,909.00	4,818.18
		Imports (c.i.f.)	2,311,100	2,849,220	2,534,180	2,195,930	4,473,150	3,269,750	5,661,260	5,804,810	3,321,230
	Italy	Exports	33,605,800	36,471,600	51,423,700	80,576,800	82,361,000	80,241,900	88,315,000	304,811,000	50,268,800
		Imports (c.i.f.)	30,488,900	38,749,200	36,256,400	46,499,000	48,497,800	60,596,000	65,672,200	87,375,100	76,375,100

⁸⁴¹ Source: Based on information from The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database (1980-2009), Currency: US dollar (\$)

(V) Identifies data consolidated from estimated monthly/quarterly partner country records (US\$)

(Y) Estimated by other methods, sometimes including the use of partner country records (US\$)

c.i.f. Cost, Insurance, and freight

n.a. Data not available

	Latvia	Exports	0	0	0	0	0	189,727	89,636	0	0
		Imports (c.i.f.)	0	0	0	0	0	19,030	522,500	80,850	129,470
	Lithuania	Exports	1,363.64	19,818.20	182	20,363.60	0	0	29,273	0	0
		Imports (c.i.f.)	16,403.60	16,966.00	18,857.90	24,525.40	42,680.00	112,530	119,240	21,560	135,080
	Luxembourg	Exports	181.82	90.91	181.82	0	0	35,636	0	1,182	273
		Imports (c.i.f.)	489,280	637,340	596,860	1,089,110	586,960	1,023,990	1,536,260	1,907,290	1,941,170
	Malta	Exports	0	0	0	1,569.95	0	0	0	0	0
		Imports (c.i.f.)	22,052.50	0	0	168,952	334,290	325,600	236,940	223,850	103,620
	Netherlands	Exports	13,548,800	12,829,800	10,904,300	9,559,180	42,043,500	17,501,500	29,620,700	283,307,000	40,545,000
		Imports (c.i.f.)	35,624,900	41,669,300	49,295,500	64,267,200	64,576,300	107,804,000	129,277,000	119,005,000	103,081,000
	Poland	Exports	1,298,990	1,037,090	1,865,550	1,738,270	294,364	1,669,910	518,091	758,091	860,909
		Imports (c.i.f.)	257773	557370	2039950	848823	1711600	2691480	3288890	3414400	2844380
	Portugal	Exports	52,330,500	20,602,500	61,892,800	83,689,000	17,703,100	10,758,200	14,264,500	9,703,730	6,105,640
		Imports (c.i.f.)	2,734,600	4,748,150	22,256,700	50,894,000	2,299,550	2,899,820	2,562,230	6,945,950	3,334,540
	Slovakia	Exports	53611	34,119.70	38,191.80	49,983.90	17,000	181.818	1,454.55	272.727	0
		Imports (c.i.f.)	28,631.70	97,279.80	106,216.00	119,975.00	574,200.00	1,448,260.00	639,430.00	1,160,500.00	725,340.00
	Slovenia	Exports	0	1,925.45	6,443.27	8,432.72	92,727.30	0	5,090.91	27,545.50	0
		Imports (c.i.f.)	0	16016	0	0	541,530	874,610	5,170	142,780	24,860
	Spain	Exports	47,251,500	26,804,600	26,630,800	67,594,400	116,399,000	150,447,000	107,243,000	342,209,000	276,305,000
		Imports (c.i.f.)	21,756,400	31,785,700	22,046,000	27,978,600	63,451,700	44,443,100	63,440,300	60,612,100	40,460,200
	Sweden	Exports	57,330	33,734	0	120,040	226,091	29,546	19,273	24,182	5,364
		Imports (c.i.f.)	3,814,170	3,229,990	4,993,270	11,829,900	9,220,530	19,793,300	27,236,600	16,395,600	13,526,500
	United Kingdom	Exports	5,662,940	7,900,830	35,043,000	11,174,000	16,711,800	10,720,700	10,834,400	6,024,180	23,144,600
		Imports (c.i.f.)	55,317,400	40,898,500	60,054,100	95,340,500	58,620,300	57,641,400	69,061,500	94,752,700	74,963,700
	Switzerland	Exports	488,878	139,779	230,879	7,185,440	625,636	293,630	1,029,650	751,427	234,905
		Imports (c.i.f.)	5,473,810	5,057,300	6,424,730	10,787,900	9,937,790	6,440,540	3,836,470	6,679,350	23,384,700
	Turkey	Exports	6,564,080	6,785,220	7,542,920	16,780,900	20,671,300	13,576,900	21,647,400	24,582,600	10,531,300
		Imports (c.i.f.)	2,038,740	4,834,140	2,823,660	3,618,380	5,180,400	6,719,870	25,053,000	14,551,200	15,341,000

Appendix IV - 3. Direction of Trade of Chad, 2001-2009⁸⁴²

Reporter country	Partner Country	Flow	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Chad	Austria	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(v) 356,545 (V) 330,770	(V) 0 (V) 163,130	(V) 0 (V) 3,060,860	(V) 9,091 (V) 1,627,560	(V) 3,364 (V) 7,490,780	(V) 10,000 (V) 6,427,190	(V) 57,091 (V) 2,674,100	(V) 0 (V) 6,287,160	(V) 2,000 (V) 23,896,500
	Belgium	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 1,700,000 (V) 10,384,000	(V) 836,364 (V) 12,943,000	(V) 1,291,320 (V) 10,678,600	(V) 19,652 (V) 18,868,300	(V) 28,636 (V) 32,916,600	(V) 48,364 (V) 25,964,800	(V) 238,273 (V) 20,589,200	(V) 203,545 (V) 26,693,300	(V) 16,091 (V) 35,745,800
	Bulgaria	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 1,818 (V) 9,900	(V) 0 (V) 11,000	(V) 15 (V) 0	(V) 2,347 (V) 0	(V) 20,952 (V) 1,030,560	(V) 0 (V) 953,590	(V) 364 (V) 100,980	(V) 364 (V) 71,390	(V) 0 (V) 36,080
	Cyprus	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 9,542 (V) 0	(V) 0 (V) 0	(V) 0 (V) 0	(V) 24,533 (V) 0	(Y) 28,668 (V) 0	(V) 182 (V) 40,810	(V) 182 (V) 8,800	(V) 0 (V) 0	(V) 91 (V) 0
	Czech Republic	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 4,206,620 (V) 57,841	(V) 2,443,600 (V) 167,998	(V) 2,943,990 (V) 415,293	(V) 2,097,640 (V) 42,230	(V) 1,847,540 (V) 96,320	(V) 0 (V) 610,280	(V) 0 (V) 142,450	(V) 0 (V) 108,130	(V) 0 (V) 1,180,630
	Denmark	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 21,846 (V) 3,198,440	(V) 0 (V) 3,539,080	(V) 0 (V) 1,953,650	(V) 0 (V) 1,432,130	(V) 0 (V) 1,229,910	(V) 455 (V) 1,856,360	(V) 91 (V) 2,789,050	(V) 364 (V) 6,019,420	(V) 4,273 (V) 4,869,370
	Estonia	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 0 (V) 55,000	(V) 0 (V) 0	(V) 0 (V) 0	(V) 0 (V) 0	(V) 0 (V) 0	(V) 0 (V) 0	(V) 0 (V) 0	(V) 455 (V) 0	(V) 0 (V) 0
	Finland	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 0 (V) 97,350	(V) 0 (V) 107,470	(V) 0 (V) 675,290	(V) 0 (V) 187,660	(V) 0 (V) 10,241,100	(V) 0 (V) 501,600	(V) 1,091 (V) 899,690	(V) 3,727 (V) 1,322,310	(V) 0 (V) 2,169,310
	France	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 5,253,640 (V) 104,124,000	(V) 4,077,360 (V) 140,568,000	(V) 5,739,090 (V) 98,640,000	(V) 7,898,270 (V) 89,499,800	(V) 14,246,200 (V) 103,361,000	(V) 12,964,300 (V) 98,580,200	(V) 7,495,550 (V) 146,142,000	(V) 50,317,200 (V) 156,527,000	(V) 99,959,600 (V) 161,164,000
	Germany	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 12,074,500 (V) 9,881,300	(V) 10,031,800 (V) 24,534,400	(V) 14,658,200 (V) 13,390,300	(V) 11,341,800 (V) 26,206,400	(V) 11,150,900 (V) 15,254,800	(V) 9,874,820 (V) 38,791,100	(V) 11,151,400 (V) 54,122,600	(V) 9,125,180 (V) 49,603,600	(V) 4,692,000 (V) 30,250,000
	Greece	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 0 (V) 117,480	(V) 0 (V) 144,980	(V) 0 (V) 100,980	(V) 0 (V) 48,730	(V) 23,091 (V) 7,590	(V) 0 (V) 90,970	(V) 0 (V) 440	(V) 6,454,180 (V) 38,060	(V) 2,601,730 (V) 0
	Hungary	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 310,000 (V) 31,900	(V) 9,091 (V) 1,907,400	(V) 26,364 (V) 278,300	(V) 0 (V) 0	(V) 0 (V) 205,260	(V) 0 (V) 7,040	(V) 0 (V) 8,030	(V) 108,545 (V) 2,860	(V) 0 (V) 29,040
	Ireland	Exports Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 0 (V) 188,100	(V) 0 (V) 154,440	(V) 91 (V) 946,660	(V) 14,818 (V) 219,230	(V) 0 (V) 215,820	(V) 1,455 (V) 77,330	(V) 1,364 (V) 554,290	(V) 1,107,730 (V) 796,400	(V) 2,656,090 (V) 9,813,870

⁸⁴² Source: Based on information from The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database (1980-2009), Currency: US dollar (\$)

(V) Identifies data consolidated from estimated monthly/quarterly partner country records (US\$)

(Y) Estimated by other methods, sometimes including the use of partner country records (US\$)

c.i.f. Cost, Insurance, and freight

n.a. Data not available

Italy	Exports	(V) 864,455	(V) 424,000	(V) 902,909	(V) 476,364	(V) 360,091	(V) 177,909	(V) 84,636	(V) 25,364	(V) 18,455
	Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 7,650,720	(V) 8,873,260	(V) 8,517,520	(V) 7,187,620	(V) 7,202,250	(V) 6,718,800	(V) 12,323,400	(V) 26,616,500	(V) 59,374,700
Latvia	Exports	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Imports (c.i.f.)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Lithuania	Exports	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Imports (c.i.f.)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Luxembourg	Exports	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 3,182	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 15,909	(V) 0
	Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 55,550	(V) 220,770	(V) 149,380	(V) 0	(V) 12,100	(V) 11,770	(V) 252,670	(V) 72,930	(V) 38,280
Malta	Exports	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 182	(V) 0
	Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 273,240	(V) 660,880	(V) 1,106,710	(V) 2,033,240
Netherlands	Exports	(V) 3,636	(V) 1,727	(V) 82,364	(V) 50,364	(V) 31,455	(V) 160,273	(V) 42,636	(V) 16,107,000	(V) 31,591,400
	Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 15,910,700	(V) 9,467,810	(V) 15,560,700	(V) 14,273,400	(V) 19,821,300	(V) 14,730,100	(V) 21,647,100	(V) 35,896,600	(V) 39,703,600
Poland	Exports	(V) 3,619,620	(V) 2,719,270	(V) 2,727,820	(V) 2,289,400	(V) 111,545	(V) 111,545	(V) 111,545	(V) 111,545	(V) 3,000
	Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 805,383	(V) 273,350	(V) 665,280	(V) 605,550	(V) 406,120	(V) 636,130	(V) 688,380	(V) 287,980	(V) 918,830
Portugal	Exports	(V) 22,346,000	(V) 19,980,700	(V) 13,768,500	(V) 48,084,600	(V) 48,991,000	(V) 13,519,600	(V) 14,913,500	(V) 6,531,640	(V) 3,810,450
	Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 1,201,200	(V) 12,054,800	(V) 4,790,170	(V) 42,717,800	(V) 22,258,800	(V) 466,950	(V) 1,212,640	(V) 118,580	(V) 279,510
Romania	Exports	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 36,364	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0
	Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 0	(V) 11,000	(V) 0	(V) 638,000	(V) 125,620	(V) 6,380	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 117,700
Slovakia	Exports	(V) 124	(V) 221,325	(Y) 280,126	(Y) 367,899	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 91	(V) 0
	Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 324,695	(V) 533	(Y) 675	(Y) 886	(V) 0	(V) 25,300	(V) 58,080	(V) 117,920	(V) 108,460
Slovenia	Exports	(V) 1,819,220	(V) 470,985	(V) 945,937	(Y) 1,242,330	(V) 301,364	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 182
	Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 242,639	(V) 199,517	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 0	(V) 117,480	(V) 0
Spain	Exports	(V) 4,093,450	(V) 3,732,180	(V) 3,345,090	(V) 1,470,450	(V) 317,636	(V) 0	(V) 686,000	(V) 33,818	(V) 737,182
	Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 858,880	(V) 1,301,520	(V) 1,286,780	(V) 1,772,430	(V) 1,404,260	(V) 5,112,580	(V) 5,601,420	(V) 5,198,050	(V) 5,564,020
Sweden	Exports	(V) 0	(V) 250	(V) 539	(V) 2,651,950	(V) 4,751,450	(V) 2,855,450	(V) 1,248,090	(V) 182	(V) 6,182
	Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 935,110	(V) 378,441	(V) 1,508,160	(V) 4,481,180	(V) 12,091,100	(V) 8,729,820	(V) 12,010,400	(V) 5,381,860	(V) 11,126,600
United Kingdom	Exports	(V) 51,728	(V) 163,767	(V) 1,690,330	(V) 266,987	(V) 587,554	(V) 408,870	(V) 1,402,000	(V) 1,174,450	(V) 830,000
	Imports (c.i.f.)	(V) 5,815,890	(V) 7,411,080	(V) 6,112,810	(V) 9,465,000	(V) 9,792,170	(V) 6,253,840	(V) 13,092,600	(V) 24,052,100	(V) 24,920,200
EU	Exports	(Y) 56,732,800	(Y) 45,112,500	(Y) 48,442,300	(Y) 78,308,600	(Y) 82,801,400	(Y) 40,021,700	(Y) 37,368,000	(Y) 91,212,200	(Y) 146,929,000
	Imports (c.i.f.)	(Y) 162,277,000	(Y) 224,433,000	(Y) 168,731,000	(Y) 219,274,000	(Y) 245,164,000	(Y) 216,866,000	(Y) 295,579,000	(Y) 346,436,000	(Y) 413,339,000

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